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This dissertation explores the emergent movimiento de hip hop cubano (the Cuban hip 
hop movement) as a critical site to examine the interplay of race and social 
transformation in contemporary Cuba.  Following Cuba’s post-1990 economic crisis 
know as the “special period,” the ethnographic investigation centers on the ways young 
Afro-Cubans are utilizing the expressive cultural space of rap music and broader hip hop 
“culture” to performatively fashion new kinds of transnationally engaged black identity 
and related race-based social critique.  The author suggest that through such 
transnationally informed identity processes a new generation of Afro-Cuban youth are 
positioning themselves in strategic response to the shifting dynamics of race and class in 
a socialist Cuba increasingly shaped by the interpenetration of global capital and related 
free-market transformations.  In a post-“utopian” Cuba characterized by economic 
dollarization, expanding tourism, rising social stratification, and – significantly – 
resurgent levels of racial inequality, the author’s analysis seeks to understand how these 
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emergent subjectivities and the social critiques they invoke pose challenges to, as well as 
contribute to a current reconfiguring of nationally-bounded constructions of race and 
corresponding ideologies of national non-racialism.  He additionally draws attention to 
the evolving negotiated relationship between Cuban hip hop as a new, potentially 
oppositional identity-based social phenomenon, and the Cuban state as it attempts to 
institutionalize hip hop within a prescriptive, socially homogenizing frame of 
revolutionary national culture.  In turn, Cuban rap has come to occupy a unique site of 
racially-positioned critique within revolutionary Cuba, serving as a key actor in an 
evolving black public sphere predicated on the assertion of black political difference 
within a previously configured non-racial Cuban national imaginary.  The author 
proposes that Cuban hip hop in this capacity represents a critical manifestation of, as well 
as an active social agent within the shifting transnational complexities of national racial 
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On a hot August night in an open-air theater in Alamar – a municipality just east 
of Havana comprised of a vast array of high-rise apartment complexes – an 18 year-old 
rap MC by the name of Papa Humbertico walked on stage followed by two others 
holding a rolled bed sheet.  Before a packed audience of some three thousand 
overwhelming darker-skinned youth who came out for the first night of the 8th annual 
Cuban hip hop festival, the bed sheet was unfettered to expose in large bock letters 
“Denuncia Social” – or “Social Denunciation.”  The MC asked the crowd if they knew 
the meaning of the expression before lapsing into a series of songs rapped in a fluid 
Cuban cadence over hard-edged hip hop beats.  His lyrics vividly recounted the daily 
lives and struggles of people in his working-class, predominately black barrio of 
Guanabacoa, touching on themes of poverty, crime, imprisonment and prostitution.  A 
sea of hands could be seen waving in the air as the crowd sounded off in energetic 
agreement whenever the MCs’ narrative hit a particularly salient cord.  Collective 
energies peeked as Papa Humbertico riffed critically about Cuban police and their 
frequent harassment of black youth. “Police, police, you are not my friend; For Cuban 
youth, you are the worst nightmare... You are the delinquent...,” the MC exclaimed amidst 
a ring of cat calls.   
The directness of Papa Humbertico’s challenge caught many present by surprise, 
particularly members of La Asociación Hermano Siaz, the state-run cultural institution 
for youth and the central organizer of that year’s festival.  Some of the U.S.-based press 
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at the festival ran with the story, filing articles claiming Cuban rap as a new vanguard of 
anti-government protest in socialist Cuba.  Such claims, in turn, were quickly seized upon 
by Miami’s right-wing Cuban American community as new fodder in their obsessive 
battle with Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution.  Many Cuban rap artists, including 
Papa Humbertico, however, felt that the U.S. press had distorted and manipulated his 
words in painting him and other artists whom performed at the festival as contra-
revolucionarios, or anti-revolutionaries; that Cuban rap in this way had been swept up in 
the 40 year-old transnational power-play between Cuba and the United States.   
While Cuba’s evolving hip hop movement is certainly rooted in a nexus of 
national and transnational interarticulations of history, power, and culture, the 
complexities of its relationship to the Cuban state, the Cuban Revolution, and the Cuban 
“nation” itself is radically more dynamic and nuanced than such representations could 
possible suggest.  In my understanding, Cuban hip hop has emerged as an organic social 
phenomenon of a particular historical moment; one characterized, above all, by rapid 
social transformation as Cuba negotiates between a socialist past and an ever-advancing 
capitalist informed present.  My suggestion is that Cuban hip hop represents both a 
critical manifestation of a transformative Cuba, while simultaneously operating as a key 
social actor within such transformation processes themselves.   
This dissertation examines the social contours of the self-defined el movimiento 
de hip hop cubano – the Cuban hip hop movement – as they relate to the critical interplay 
of race and social transformation following Cuba’s post-Soviet economic crisis of the 
1990s known as the “Special Period.”  I am particularly interested in the ways in which 
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young self-identified black Cubans, who comprise the vast majority of raperos/as (rap 
artists) and their followers, are utilizing the expressive cultural space of rap music and 
associated hip hop culture to fashion new kinds of transnationally-engaged black 
identities and related social critiques.  Through such identity processes, I contend, a new 
generation of black and darker-skinned Cubans are positioning themselves in strategic 
response to the shifting dynamics of race and class within a socialist Cuba that is 
increasingly shaped by the island’s recent insertion into contemporary transnational 
networks of neoliberal capital. In a post-“utopian” Cuba characterized by economic 
dollarization, expanding tourism, rising social stratification, and – significantly – 
resurgent levels of racial inequality, I seek to understand how these emergent 
subjectivities and the social critiques they invoke pose challenges to, as well as contribute 
to a current reconfiguring of nationally-bounded constructions of race and corresponding 
ideologies of national non-racialism.   
My analysis additionally draws attention to the evolving negotiated relationship 
between Cuban hip hop as a new, potentially oppositional identity-based social 
phenomenon, and the Cuban state as it attempts to institutionalize hip hop within a 
prescriptive, socially homogenizing frame of revolutionary national culture.  In turn, 
Cuban hip hop has come to occupy an important site of racially-positioned critique within 
revolutionary Cuba today.  In doing so, I hold, the Cuban hip hop movement has assumed 
a key role within an evolving black public sphere predicated on the assertion of black 
political difference within a previously configured non-racial Cuban national imaginary. 
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In framing my above analysis I ultimately seek to illuminate the dialectical play 
between new structures and processes of racialization, and emergent kinds of race-based 
social agency as they contemporarily take form within the changing frameworks of global 
late capitalism.  Drawing on Michael Omi and Howard Winant’s “racial formation” 
model, I suggest that the interface of new frames of racialization and evolving race-based 
social strategies of blackness – of which Cuban hip hop represents one manifestation – 
are part and parcel of a shifting national paradigm of racial formation in the making in 
present-day Cuba (Omi and Winant 1986).   
At the core of my inquiry is an investigation into the political character and 
potential of black identity production as a basis for a politics of social action.  Here I 
recognize the extent to which processes of racial subject making often involve strategic 
acts of self-position, or what Stuart Hall has referred to as “practices of self-constitution.” 
(Stuart Hall 1996).  Such efforts are by no means openly contingent but are rather always 
and already informed and constrained by historically prescriptive fields of racialized 
power as they are lived in the material everyday.  What I am most concerned with, 
however, is the ways in which critically positioned identities of blackness are forged and 
how they can be mobilized towards liberatory-directed kinds of politics.   
Within the context of Cuban hip hop, my attention is focused on the processes by 
which such identities are constituted at the intersection of national and transnational or 
“diasporic” constructions of blackness.  Here, I am interested in moving beyond a notion 
of the African Diaspora as a conceptual tool to categorize historically displaced peoples 
of African descent.  I venture rather, along with others, to examine the politically laden 
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processes by which the African, or possibly more appropriate, Black Diaspora, is 
constituted as a lived social reality through the making of transnational forms of black 
identification, cultural production, and related social mobilizations. (Gilroy 1993a; 
Lemelle and Kelley 1994; Gordon and Anderson 1999; Costa Vargas 2003).  I am 
interested therefore in diaspora as a political space; one that enables certain kinds of 
identity-based social praxis.  Among black-identified youth involved in the Cuba’s hip 
hop movement,  I contend that diaspora operates instrumentally in this way as a key 
paradigm of both identity and politics.   
 In mapping the black identity politics at play within Cuban hip hop, I examine the 
multiple ways in which such practices contest dominant racial constructions within a 
framework of antiracist advocacy and struggle.  My treatment, moreover, underscores the 
role of performance in the forging and mobilization of rapero/a identities, and the 
differing ways such performative makings are gendered in their articulation of new, 
critically positioned black Cuban subjectivities.  I suggest that Cuban hip hop in this 
capacity operates as a site of critical black self-making through the ways in which such 
black subjectivities are strategically fashioned and politically deployed.  Beyond the 
immediate context of their making, however, raperos/as are actively engaged in efforts to 
transform contemporary and historical frames of racialized power.  As such, these young 
people need to be seen as active social agents, rather than passive consumable objects of 
historical processes.  
 Briefly, who are these raperos/as?  As I will describe in much greater detail in 
Chapters 4 through 6, the raperos/as of whom I speak are among a new generation of 
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black and darker-skinned youth who are coming to age at a moment of significant 
socioeconomic transformation and flux.  The majority of these youth are drawn from 
working-class or poorer families from urban centers across Cuba, comprising an often 
cited estimated 500 rap groups island-wide.  My research, however, focuses on raperos/as 
in Havana whom represent by far the largest and most cohesively self-identified and 
organized hip hop community on the island.  Many of these individuals I will be 
introducing represent the avant-garde of the Cuban hip hop movement whose work and 
personal histories greatly reflect the complexities and the ideals advanced and fought for 
by the movement as a whole.  Though raperos/as themselves may range in age from early 
teens to one particular case well into his forties, the actors with whom I will be dealing 
fall generally between the ages of early twenties to mid-thirties.   
 Regarding methodology, I spent a rough total of twenty months conducting field 
research in Cuba between 1999 and 2003.  This period was comprised of multiple trips to 
the island due in large part to an inability to secure sufficient sources of research funding 
that would have enabled me to spend longer periods in Cuba.  As a resultant side-effect 
of the forty year-old U.S. economic blockade that has been inflicted on Cuba and its 
people, there is a very limited rage of U.S.-based funding sources for academic research 
on the island.  This reality necessitated my frequent back-and-forth movement between 
Cuba and the U.S. in order periodically rebuild my finances through various piecemeal 
means.  While on the whole this extended considerably the total time necessary to 
conduct thorough ethnographic research, the four-years of contact with the Cuban hip 
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hop movement provided me something of a longitudinal perspective on the evolving 
charter of the phenomenon, its actors, and its changing relationship with the Cuban state.    
 While in Cuba, I lived in and based my research out of the largely black, working-
class barrio of Cayo Hueso, home to a few key individuals in the hip hop movement. 
This densely populated neighborhood in central Havana is often associated with its 
numerous solares – the large formally private homes converted into multi-family units 
occupied communally by predominantly black working-class and poor families.  As a 
something of a Cuban social institution, solares have become a poignant symbol of black 
urban life and culture in Havana.  The development of rumba as the archetypal musical 
expression of a “traditional” Afro-Cuban urbanity,1 for one, finds contemporary roots in 
the solares.  As poor black urban spaces, however, solares are commonly associated – 
often through racially-coded discourses of marginalidad – with prostitution, drugs, and 
criminal activity.  By centering my research out of Cayo Hueso, I ethnographically 
grounded my investigation of Cuban hip hop within the material realities of today’s black 
“inner-city” experience in Havana.  Though participant observation in this community, I 
engaged local raperos/as and their families amidst their daily negotiations of an 
increasingly dollarized Cuban society in order to illuminate the everyday lived social 
consequences of race in Cuba today. 
 Such an ethnographic undertaking, moreover, was significantly informed by and 
predicated upon my own racialized subject position.  That is to say, that on one level my 
                                                 
1 Famed congero Chano Pozo was born and raised in one of Cayo Hueso’s renowned solares 
reportedly named África.  In historical relation to rumba, the work of contemporary raperos/as in 




personal experience as an African American navigating the streets of Havana where I am 
commonly read as a black or mulato Cuban greatly informed the ethnographic depth of 
my exploration into the contemporary ways in which race is lived in Cuba today.  During 
periods my at time daily experience of being stopped by Cuban police and asked for my 
carnet identidad, or national identification card, exposed me to a key quotidian social 
consequence of being black, male, and young within the context of Cuba’s new racially-
charged and policed social landscape.  My inability to enter a tourist hotel without being 
challenged by a male security staff is yet another example of my own racialization within 
the logics of Cuba’s new dollarized economy.  Yet at the same time I recognized that if I 
presented to the questioning police officer the tattered photocopy of my U.S. passport 
that I had become conditioned to always carry, or spoke English to the security guard at 
the hotel I would be allowed to pass on without further consequence.  In the latter case I 
would then be free to indulge in a the hotel’s privileged dollar-zone otherwise restricted 
to Cubans.  Thus, though I was black I clearly remained one of privilege relative to my 
black Cuban friends and associates.  
 At the same time, however, my black racial positionality nonetheless served an 
instrumental site of engagement with my black Cuban peers where blackness, through 
both its sameness and difference, became an initiating space of dialogue.  I speak here of 
“black” peers in reference to those individuals within the Cuban hip hop movement who 
politically self-identity as black regardless of how they might be externally labeled within 
Cuba’s graduated racial classification system.  Such political identifications of blackness, 
particularly as they find articulation though the transnational lens of hip hop, becomes a 
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vital point of departure through which my ethnographic engagement with Cuban 
raperos/as moves.  As such my project is unapologetically political; one directed towards 
advancing transnational kinds of critical black dialogue and antiracist politics.   
 In following, my primary subject group is comprised of young, self-identified 
black raperos, their followers, disk jockeys, music producers and other key individuals 
involved in the development and promotion of Cuban hip hop.  Within the primary group 
I have participated in and/or attended on a daily basis uncountable numbers of hip hop 
performances and local peñas (parties or small club gatherings), numerous recording 
secessions, meetings, classes and colloquia.  I have gathered field data though the use of 
video and audio-recorded interviews, video and audio-recorded rap performances, 
extensive rap lyric texts, and copious field notes.  I have also access a secondary subject 
group which is composed of black self-identified academics, cultural workers and 
intellectuals, artists, and key individuals affiliated with state-run cultural and research 
institutions.  This second group provided important alternative perspectives on the 
phenomenon of Cuban hip hop and its emergent racial politics.  This group was further 
broken down into two primary subgroups: the first representing an older generation of 
black intellectuals; the second comprised of a younger set of hip hop-affiliated black 
intellectuals, academics, and cultural producers who were generational peers of my 
primary rapero/a subject group.  Largely predicated on their generational positionality, 
these two subgroups presented differing ranges of analysis and relationality vis-à-vis  
Cuban hip hop in the shaping of critical dialogues on race.  
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 Another crucial, methodologically-related issue that necessitates brief discussion 
pertains to the politics of fieldwork in Cuba as a U.S. national.  Given the highly charged 
nature of Cuban-U.S. relations resulting from a history of cold-war policies and 
imperialist aggression on the part of successive U.S. administrations since the early 
1960s, negotiating this divide as a U.S. researcher is a particularly complex undertaking.  
An immediate challenge for one politically sympathetic to many of the ideals of the 
Cuban Revolution as a bastion of utopic promise and anti-colonial/imperialist struggle, 
has been how to develop critical analyses that may confront the limitations – if not the 
contradictions and autocratic tendencies – of the Revolutionary project without risking 
the possibility that such conclusions could be exploited by those intent on destroying that 
very same project for malevolent gain.  It would appear that I find myself in a somewhat 
similar dilemma that Papo Humbertico and others in the Cuban hip hop movement face 
regarding how to engage in productive and necessary critique without playing into, or at 
least compounding the designs of U.S. imperialism and its right-wing Miami-based 
cohort.  Given the particularly malicious posture the Bush administration has assumed 
through its destructive tightening of the already server U.S. trade embargo against Cuba, 
the stakes of such efforts take on an added and potentially urgent level of political 
liability.   
 An obvious yet crucial distinction between myself and raperos however is that my 
analysis is articulated from a position of an ‘outsider’ rather than from within – a 
distinction perhaps further complicated by my U.S. vantage point.  Here, my positionality 
as a U.S. national necessitates a particular sensitivity to both the potential political 
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consequences of my research with regard to the current condition of Cuban-U.S. 
relations, as well as to the ways in which my work as might be received in Cuba itself. 
Such complexities, as I will explore in detail in Chapter 5, can carry real political charge 
in the field.   
 How did I come to this juncture and how is it that have I attempted to navigate its 
challenges.  Raised by leftist parents active in the U.S. civil rights movement – my father 
African American, my mother Jewish – Cuba and its Revolution were celebrated in my 
household as an alternative to the history of imperialist capitalism and racism in the U.S.  
The Revolution’s declared commitments to racial justice and its support for anti-colonial 
struggles in Africa carried particular resonance in my household were Fidel Castro was 
held as something of a folk hero.  It was out of this grounding context that in the summer 
of 1998, privileged with some leftover research money from my Master’s project, I first 
visited Havana to experience “for myself” a Cuba which had long held a mythic allure.   
 Cuba of 1998, however, was not the Cuba of the 1960s and 70s of my parent’s 
generation.  It had been decade since the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the end of 
Cuba’s preferential trade relationship with the Soviet Union and its allies.  Since the early 
1990s the island’s cautious, though ever-advancing re-engagement with global capitalism 
had introduced new levels of contradiction and social tension in a once confidently 
socialist Cuba.  By 1998 such strains were clearly evident to even a foreign visitor such 
as myself.  Of particular concern to me were the ways in which these developments were 
impacting the inter-dynamics of race and class on the island long central foci of the 
revolutionary project.  Leaving Cuba later that summer with undoubtedly more questions 
 
 12
than I arrived with, I was moved to return the following year to begin my dissertation 
research centered on investigating in more methodological depth what it was that was 
occurring in this “utopia,” and how it reflected critically upon the shifting, transnational 
dynamics of race and racialization processes under global late capitalism.   
 Though I did not have the opportunity to engage directly with raperos/as during 
my initial trip to Havana, I became aware of the existence of a Cuban hip hop movement 
and its pronounced racial significance.  Having come into early self-awareness in New 
York City during the rise of hip hop culture in the late 1970s and 80s, I later became 
interested through my travels in how this cultural space – organic to the particular socio-
racial context of post-industrial inner-city New York – was being reworked by other 
generations of black youth in the diaspora.  In particular, it was my exposure to hip hop 
in Brazil and South Africa in the early 1990s which open me to the differing ways rap 
music was being used to mobilize new kinds of transnationally-engaged black identity 
and related forms of antiracist advocacy.2  Within these contexts I thus recognized the 
potentiality of hip hop as an active site of black agency making.  Regarding my research 
interest in Cuba, the key question became how hip hop’s black-signified racial politics 
were being articulated vis-à-vis the island’s shifting socio-economic landscape, and to 
what extent might such practices be enabling new forms of race-based social agency at 
this critical historical juncture.  Cuban hip hop therefore appeared to present an ideal 
entry into the island’s contemporary dynamics of race, as well as a possibly vibrant site 
of black self-making and action.   
                                                 
2 See Chapter 1  
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 Beyond intellectual engagement, my desire to pursue this project stemmed largely 
from my own political orientation and humanist commitments towards furthering 
struggles for social justice and global egalitarianism.  As mentioned, Cuba’s position as a 
one of the last remaining bastions of popular revolutionary promise coupled with its long-
standing resistance to western capitalist hegemony continues to evoke a considerable 
level of political resonance for me.  As a racialized subaltern subject, however, the 
frames through which oppression and corresponding efforts to contest such oppression 
are shaped by racialized forms of power engender yet another level of political urgency.  
As one committed, moreover, to promoting black transnationalism as a vital strategic 
paradigm in combating globalized modes of racial subjugation, Cuban hip hop offers a 
consequential site for both mapping and advancing such transnationally-engaged 
processes.  It has thus been these junctures of interests, concerns, and political solidarities 
that have brought me to and maintained my extended involvement with Cuban hip hop as 
a research site.  Channeled primarily through the informal relationships I have developed 
with members, my engagements with the movement have been feed largely by dialogue, 
modest material and resource support, and the critical documentation of the movement 
and its evolution during the four or so years in which I have been conducting research. 
Positionality and commitments notwithstanding, the complexities intrinsic to the highly-
charged divide between Cuba and the U.S. remain in a necessary sense a sensitive space 
of negotiation as an outside researcher.  
 In terms of the dissertation’s layout, Chapter 1 “Global Hip Hop and the 
Transcendent Racial Politics of Black Difference” is primarily a survey of literature on 
 
 14
the global dissemination of hip hop culture.  My intervention is that I analytically focus 
on the ways that racialized subaltern youth in various national contexts utilize the 
racially-oppositional meanings and performative frameworks of hip hop to construct new 
kinds of racially-oppositional identities vis-à-vis exclusionary national formations.  I 
suggest that in many of these cases these youth advance antiracist forms of politics 
through their musical voicings and extra-musical activism.  Mediated, U.S.-derived 
representations of blackness, I contend become transnational templates for other forms of 
racial difference, thus racially transcending the immediate “black” context of their 
making.  This chapter lays the important contextual and theoretic groundwork for my 
ethnographic exploration of the transnationally-informed black identity politics at play 
within Cuban hip hop.   
 Chapter 2  “Cuban Nation Building, Non-Racialism, and Black Historical 
Agency” presents an historical overview of the centrality of race in the making of the 
Cuban nation.  My emphasis in the chapter is on the ideological construction of national 
raceless-ness or what I call “non-racialism” throughout the history of Cuba from its 
inception as a slave-based plantation economy to the building of revolutionary socialism.  
This chapter is also critically concerned with illuminating the role of black Cubans as 
historical social actors in both the making and contesting of the Cuban nation and its 
claims to national non-racialism.  This chapter provides the central historical 
problematics of race and nation which will continue to shape the political terrain of 
contention within the contemporary social context of Cuban hip hop.  
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 Chapter 3 “Consuming Blackness:  New Racial Economies, Tourism, and 
Evolving Black Social Strategies” examines Cuba’s post-Soviet era period following the 
economic crisis known and the “Special Period.”  This section focuses on the emergence 
of a new dollarized economy in Cuba and the complex socio-racial affects that it has 
engendered 1990s Cuban society.  Particular attention is played the emergence of the 
dollar-based tourism economy as a critical manifestation of the island’s new neoliberal 
reality, and the various ways it has contributed to the cultural commodification of 
blackness in Cuba today.  While providing a framework to talk about both the resurgence 
of preexisting forms of racism as well as the emergence of new kinds of racializing logics 
and practices within Cuba’s new racialized economy, this section also plays particular 
attention to new forms of social strategy that black and darker-skinned Cuban have 
adopted in response to the island’s shifting dynamics of race and class.  This chapter is 
crucial in laying the immediate socioeconomic context for Cuban hip hip’s emergence 
which I argue arises in part in response by some black youth to Cuba’s new economy of 
race.  
 Chapter 4 “Hip Hop Cubano: The Narrative of an Emergent Blackness” 
introduces an account of hip hop’s evolution as an organic sociocultural phenomenon in 
1990s Cuba.  I refer to Cuban hip hop’s initial coming to being as a narrative to 
underscore that its beginnings have assumed something of the status of canonic urban 
lore among the initiated and the numerous foreign journalist as well as a growing number 
of foreign academics whom have further codified the narrative.  My intervention is that I 
critically foreground the centrality of race and racial politics in the early making of 
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Cuban hip hop, while grounding this approach within an ethnographically-informed 
analysis.  While introducing a number of key individuals and players in the early 
formation of Cuban hip hop, a central metaphor that I employ in this section relates to 
Cuban hip hop’s production of new black space.  Here, I speak of “black space” in a 
geospatial sense that hip hop in Havana arose though the making of local spaces of black 
congregation were blackness was in effect performatively enacted and celebrated in new 
kinds of ways by its participants.  I also speak of black space in the sense that Cuban hip 
hop in-and-of-itself is an assertion of new space of blackness within Cuban revolutionary 
and national frameworks; historical formations that have otherwise tended to restrict 
critical articulations and ways of being “black.”  
 Chapter 5 “New Black Revolutionary Horizons” delves more deeply into the 
ethnographic present with regard to Cuban hip hop’s contemporary racial identity 
politics.  This section opens by introducing in more detail my own initial engagements 
with Cuban hip hop as well as some of the key players in within the Cuban hip hop 
movement.  I then move to a description and analysis of the 2000 Cuban hip hop festival 
and the ways that event illuminated in stark ways the evolving, transnationally-engaged 
black identity politics that underskirt the Cuban hip hop movement.  Particularly attention 
is paid to the development of new kinds of black radical identities and politics within the 
movement through its engagements with black radical currents and individuals from the 
U.S.  I conclude this section with an account of my own complexities at trying to 
navigate this emergent black Cuban radicalism as an “outsider.”  
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 The closing Chapter 6 “Critical Black Self-makings and The State” takes a more 
detailed look at the ways in which critical kinds of black self-making are occurring 
through the space of Cuban hip hop.  This section opens with an exploration of a personal 
narrative of one raperos’ negotiations of new black radical identity and subjectivity 
through two distinct spaces of black radicalism; one rooted in a recuperative assertion of 
a black critical subject of Cuban history, the other through appeals to transnational 
frameworks and histories of black radical struggle.  In following, the second major focus 
of this section deals with emergence of a new black feminism with the rise of critical 
black female voices within the Cuban hip hop movement.  These women present critiques 
of both the heavily masculinist character of  Cuban hip hop as well as the pervasiveness 
of racialized machismo in revolutionary Cuban society.  These women, moreover, bring 
critical attention to the gendered dimensions of racialized power in Cuba as well as the 
particular ways such racially gendered power articulates within the logics of Cuba’s new 
economy.  The section closes with a discussion of the shifting position of the Cuban state 
vis-à-vis the development of Cuban hip hop.  I suggest that the state had become actively 
involved in efforts to incorporatively institutionalize hip hop within the frame of 
revolutionary national culture.  While such efforts might seek to limit Cuban hip hop’s 
racial character and political capacities, I contend that hip hop in Cuba is in fact 
contributing to an opening up of both national-dominant as well as racially-alternative 
public spheres around critical discussions of race.  
 A few brief notes on racial terminology and its usage in this dissertation.  In this 
text I tend to use the expression black Cuban rather than Afro-Cuban for a number of 
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reasons.  The first being that in Cuba the term negro or black is commonly used to 
describe darker-skinned, strong phenotypically-marked people of African descent. 
Afrocubano or Afro-Cuban, when used, is most often applied to realms of black cultural 
production and expressive culture.  Even in this context, as I discuss in Chapter 3, it 
remains a multiply contested term.  I will, however, primarily limit my use of the term to 
refer to cultural realms.  In emphasizing the term “black” I further underscore the 
political significance of black identity and blackness as they are articulated within the 
space of Cuban hip hop.  
 I have also tended to use the expression “darker-skinned Cubans” when referring 
to African-descendant populations and individuals who might not be categorize within 
Cuba’s racial system as negro or black.  In doing so I intentionally avoid the various 
gradated vernacularism for non-whiteness such as mulato, moreno, jabao, trigueño, 
susuio or a plethora of other terms used habitually Cuba.  I thus employ the more 
expansive and inclusive expression “darker-skinned” to elude, when necessary, the 
politically divisive tendencies of such terms.  With many scholarly estimates suggesting 
that Cubans of African-descendent comprise upwards of 60% of the island’s population, 






Global Hip Hop and the Transcendent Racial Politics of Black Difference   
 
 
Prior to delving into the ethnographic specificity of the politics of race, identity, 
and culture within Cuba’s emergent hip hop movement, I will first provide a broader 
sociohistorical analysis of the increasingly global phenomenon of rap music and hip hop 
culture.  In this opening chapter I seek to examine the ways in which the global 
proliferation of rap and hip hop are engendering the mobilization of new kinds of 
racialized identity and related forms of social expression.  I draw attention to the 
practices by which new generations of racially-marked youth in various national 
geographies utilize the racial contours of blackness conveyed through rap and hip hop to 
give critical form and voice to their own racially-informed subjectivities.  Here, blackness 
– as a mediated effect of black cultural production and corporate-driven commercial 
commodification – serves as a transnational trope of racially oppositional difference 
appropriated by other racialized youth in the performative articulation of their own 
identities of oppositional difference.  Beyond the politically laden processes by which 
these identities are creatively fashioned, I am equally concerned with the ways such 
critically-situated racial identities are in turn mobilized towards liberatory kinds of 
politics.  Among the global sites of hip hop production that I examine here both within 
the context of the Black diaspora and beyond, these politics articulate along various lines 
of antiracist activism.   Such an undertaking provides a vital analytical frame for my 
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exploration of the multivalent social significance of rap and hip hop within a socially 
transformative Cuba of today.  
 
 Since its inception in New York City in the mid 1970s, rap music and the broader 
cultural phenomenon of hip hop have received bountiful scholarly attention.3  This has 
increasingly been the case as a once marginal youth culture encompassing expressive 
elements of music, verbal lyricism, dance, graffiti art and fashion has evolved into a 
multi-billion dollar global industry.  Although rap and hip hop have undergone 
considerable transformation during this movement from street to international 
marketplace, they have undeniably retained at their core – though clearly not without 
their complexities – a signifying masculine blackness of representational meaning.  I thus 
wish to draw attention here to the complex ways representational meanings of black 
racial difference are actively constituted and signified through the mediated spaces of rap 
music and hip hop “culture.”4  Today hip hop has emerged as one of the most visible and 
widely disseminated forms of black popular imagery globally; commercially mediated 
not only through music, but increasingly through film, television, and the marketing of 
corporate merchandise.  Though the majority of scholarship on hip hop has tended to 
focus almost exclusively on the cultural politics of its domestic production and 
consumption within the U.S., there have been recent moves to examine the social and 
                                                 
3 The breath of academic writing on hip hop culture expansive, however a couple key pioneering 
texts are important to mention here: Tricia Rose (1994); William Eric Perkins et al. (1996). 
4 In this dissertation I generally use the expression “hip hop” or “hip hop culture” to refer to the 
broad set of cultural practices, stylized aesthetics, and the larger cultural industry associated with 
and inclusive of rap music.  I will tend to reserve the use of term “rap” when referring to the 
music genre itself or when it is necessary to mark a distinction between the two terms.  
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cultural dynamics involved in the global trafficking and spread of rap music and hip hop 
culture (Mitchell et al. 2001).  
 Following this second line of inquiry, this chapter is concerned with how the 
culturally-signified, black racial significance of U.S. hip hop is being received, translated, 
and culturally recontextualized in different international settings.  My particular interest 
is in the ways racially and/or “ethnically” marginalized youth in various national contexts 
utilize rap and hip hop as performative spaces in articulating new, potentially 
oppositional kinds of racially-informed identity and related antiracist politics.  Here, I 
stress the term racial over ethnic to underscore the ways that so-called “ethnic” group 
difference, as culturally-defined as they might appear to be, are often configured in 
racialized (i.e. phenotypically-associated, biologically-ascribed) kinds of ways within 
various national contexts.  This is especially the case of ethnically-categorized minority 
populations who, often situated in subordinate positions vis-à-vis dominant national 
cultures and structures of power, frequently experience racialized forms of oppression 
and discrimination.  In these circumstances, as I will discuss in more detail latter in this 
chapter, the use of the term “ethnic” elides discussions of the racializing processes 
through which these marginalized identities and experiences are largely informed. 
 In many of these cases rap and hip hop serve as creative mediums through which 
transnational or diasporic modes of black identification are discursively forged.  In 
others, hip hop’s black signifying difference offers a cultural framework through which 
alternative forms of racially-oppositional identities can be creatively fashioned and 
positioned in new socially relevant ways.  Such efforts often provide racially marked 
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minority youth ways of mobilizing under new modes of collective identification, while 
strategically tying their local concerns within the broader framework of antiracist struggle 
globally.  Rap and hip hop in this way, to borrow from George Lipsitz’s writings on 
global music, serve very much as discursive spaces which “allow for the recognition of 
new networks and affiliations [as] they become crucibles for complex identities in 
formation that respond to the imperatives of place at the same time they transcend them” 
(Lipsitz 1994:6).  Though these practices arise out of a negotiated interplay of black 
cultural production, processes of commercial commodification and cultural appropriation, 
I am particularly interested in questions of representation, performance, and style in their 
capacity to culturally convey and reconfigure black racial significance through the 
increasingly transnational cultural lens of hip hop.  In approaching the global trafficking 
of rap and hip hop in this manner I attempt, through critical literature review and 
ethnographic material, to elucidate the social significance of these contemporary cultural 
forms not simply in terms of their international circulation and consumption, but rather 
through the ways they are actively lived and strategically employed abroad.  Such a 
framing provides an analytical framework within which my work on Cuban hip hop is 
critically couched.  
 
The Cultural Dialectics of Black Performance as Commercially Mediated Blackness 
 
 In setting up my discussion of the locally-transcendent racial politics of hip hop, it 
is necessary to first outline the ways hip hop’s representational politics of blackness are 
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mediated through a dialectical play of black expressive cultural practice and processes of 
commercially-driven cultural commodification.  An extensive treatment of the subject 
would be far beyond the scope and design of this chapter.  Rather, I attempt to illuminate 
how the imagery, discourses, and notions of blackness produced within the popular 
cultural lens of hip hop emerges through a negotiated makings of self- and externally-
generated frames of black representational practice.  
As is commonly recognized, rap music and broader hip hop culture arose within 
specific sociocultural settings of postindustrial New York City in the mid 1970s.  These 
mediums evolved as creative means of self-expression among poor and working-class 
urban youth of color whose structural marginalization left them few spaces to give 
critical voice to their subjectivity and daily experience.  Though associated primarily with 
African American youth, the emergence of hip hop owes much of its creative impetus to 
New York City’s particular Afrodiasporic mélange of African American, West Indian, 
and Latino culture in and around its public housing projects, particularly those in the 
South Bronx.  A number of early innovators of rap music, for example, were significantly 
influenced by 1960s Jamaican “sound system” culture employing cut-and-mix sonic 
manipulation techniques.  Foremost among these pioneers was Jamaican-born Bronx DJ 
Kool Herc who is popularly attributed as the first to introduce the break-beat5 generated 
through the back-and-forth use of two turntables with corresponding copies of the same 
LP.  No doubt further informed by the verbal techniques of Jamaican toasting and dub 
                                                 




voice-over, Kool Herc’s pioneering microphone shout-outs during his famed jams (street 
parties) laid the groundwork for the emergence of rapping or MC-ing.  
 Others have highlighted the particularly critical role Puerto Rican youth played in 
the early development of hip hop as a cultural space (del Barco 1996; Juan Flores 1996, 
Rivera 2003).  Young Nuyoricans in particular comprised a significant membership of 
the early breakdance troupes such as the Rock Steady Crew and the New York City 
Breakers.  These Puerto Rican b-boys proved key innovators of breaking and were crucial 
to the international proliferation of the art form.  Nuyoricans were also strongly 
represented within New York’s vibrant graffiti culture which, along with DJ-ing, MC-
ing, and breaking, was one of the original defining “four elements” of the early hip hop 
landscape of the late 1970s and 1980s.  As a number of scholars and old school “heads” 
(hip hop devotees) have lamented, however, Latino participation in the early formation of 
hip hop culture has been significantly expunged from what has become the dominant 
narrative of hip hop’s evolution (Flores 1994; Rivera 2003) – a narrative, that is, that 
foregrounds the form’s contours of blackness.  One key contributing factor to this 
blackening of hip hop, if you will, involved the commercially-promoted elevation of rap 
music as the primary expressive component of hip hop’s original cultural expanse.  In 
turn, I shift attention to what is undeniably hip hop’s centrally signifying trope of 
blackness – a blackness mediated through the intersections of black expressive cultural 
and processes of commercial commodification.  
 While fully cognizant of rap’s indebtedness to a history of black diasporic and 
Latino cultural interchange within the broader frame of hip hop, one cannot loose sight of 
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the fact that the music genre remains critically rooted – in both form and function – 
within an historical continuum of black expressive culture and music making.  Regarding 
aesthetic form, the infusion of key Afrodiasporic musical practices such as polyrhythmic 
percussion and rhythmic-centered organization as well as the black orality of first-person 
narrative, call-and-response, and “the dozens” stylistically marks rap’s historicity as a 
black cultural form.  As exemplified by Eric B and Rakim’s celebrated remixings of 
James Brown to Snoop Dogg’s homages to P-Funk, rap’s black historicity finds further 
expression though the innovative use of sampling in which previously recorded black 
artists are resignified in the making of black musical expression.   
 Sampling in this manner is evocative of what cultural critic Paul Gilroy has 
termed “process of recovery” within the black diasporic music genres where “quotes 
from and parody of earlier styles and performers make the past actually audible in the 
present” (Gilroy 1993b:37).  Building on the work of Amiri Baraka (LeRoi Jones 1963), 
Gilroy has referred to such sociocultural processes though the metaphor of a “changing 
same” in suggesting that the old is continually drawn upon and referenced in the making 
of new, signifyingly “black” cultural forms and identities – hence a changing same 
(Gilroy 1993a).6  Indeed, through the rearticulation of historical black musical elements 
and the more demonstrative use of sampling techniques, rap has and continues to 
sonically “represent,” as it were, its black cultural significance as a cultural form.  Here 
there is no claim to an essentialized blackness as such, but rather the creative fashioning 
                                                 
6 Such black reworking the old in the making of the new further resonates diasporically with the 
practice of versioning in Jamaican reggae where artists pay homage to those before through 
various refashionings of original works in the making of new “versions” (Hebdige 1987) 
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of signifyingly “black” cultural differences constituted both within and in response to a 
history of racial exclusion and “otherness” vis-à-vis dominant (read euro-“white”) 
cultural paradigms.   
 This is to suggest that a history of U.S. racial oppression and marginalization has 
on one hand configured black folk as the ultimate racialized “other,” while it has 
simultaneously constituting the very America-ness of the African American condition. 
This ambiguity, or what W.E.B. Du Bois seminally referred to as a black “double 
consciousness” of being neither fully American nor “other” (Du Bois 1989 [1903]), is 
tied to the ways that African Americans have historically constructed cultural difference 
both within and against dominant white cultural norms.  The evolution of black 
vernacular English or “ebonics” continues, per illustration, to function as a key cultural 
marker of black difference and historical site of African American cultural resistance – 
once again constituted both within and counter to dominant “white” English – is a 
principle example of this cultural dynamic (Morgan 1994).  Here, Henry Louis Gates’ 
discussion of signifyin(g) and signification practices within black vernacular traditions is 
particularly fruitful when thinking about how black “difference” is constituted through 
oppositional plays on normative euro-white cultural forms (Gates 1988).  The act of 
asserting or signifying black cultural differences in this fashion additionally speaks to 
what Dick Hebdige refers to as a “refusal” of dominant cultural norms among 
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“subculture” groups in the production of counter-hegemonic cultural practice and 
collective identity (Hebdige 1988 [1979]).7 
 Rap’s historically-grounded evocations of black cultural difference are not tied 
solely to questions of aesthetics.  Rather, what most saliently signifies rap’s blackness of 
tongue, if you will, is that those who produce it on the ground understand it as a 
conscious and active expression of their subjectivity as black Americans.  This is to 
suggest that rap, as with other historical black music forms from slave spirituals, to the 
blues, to soul and R&B, arose in large part out of the need to testify and affirm the 
particularity of the African American experience. Amiri Baraka has referred to such 
cultural priorities as the “blues impulse” within African American musical traditions 
(Baraka 1963).  These priorities find textual form in rap’s lyrical evocations of self-
identifiably black themes and concerns through which artists give verbal expression to 
their subjectivity as young, principally male African Americans.  The black inner-city 
poverty, urban decay and desperation vividly portrayed in Grandmaster Flash’s 1982 
composition “The Message” stands as a potent early framing of rap’s critical voicing of 
contemporary inner-city black realities as well as the genre’s tendencies towards black-
centered social commentary and critique.  More politically progressive artists from KRS-
One to Talib Kweli have furthered in this vein.  While not as overtly political, the party-
focused lines so prevalent in rap from the Sugar Hill Gang’s “bang bang the boogie” to P-
Diddy and company’s “Pass the Courvoisier” do nonetheless project – though clearly not 
                                                 
7 In a similar vein, others have evoked Mikhail Bahktin’s work in referring to black vernacular 




without their problematics – a celebratory self-referential black male subject attesting to 
the resiliency of contemporary black life and pleasure.  
Such efforts at black self-representational expression, however, clearly cannot be 
unhinged from the commercial frames within which they have been forged.  While self-
conscious projections of contemporary black cultural “difference” continue to be at the 
core of hip hop’s representational force and significance – white rapper phenomenon 
Eminem notwithstanding, the kinds of black images and accompanying discourses 
constructed through its cultural lens remain without question intimately tied to the 
commercial commodification that feed its reproduction.  Predicated on a multi-billion 
dollar cultural industry that has emerged today as the quintessential commercial framing 
of black youth culture, rap and hip hop are arguably as dependent on corporate 
management and marketing for their production as they are on black artistic expression.  
This is as true for more “conscious” artists such as Mos Def as it is for the more blatantly 
commercial 50 Cent.  Hip hop today has, in turn, become a primary commercial vehicle 
for the corporate packaging and commerce of black expressive culture and body imagery.  
Hence, any discussion of the representational significance hip hop’s projected images and 
conveyed meanings of blackness per se must account for the complex ways such 
representations are produced through a dialectic interplay of black artistic and cultural 
production on one end, and corporate-driven commercial commodification and marketing 
on the other.   
 As a number of observers have noted, despite these inherent tensions – or 
precisely because of them – hip hop has operated simultaneously as both a medium of 
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black self-expression and sociopolitical commentary, and as hyper-commodified cultural 
product (Ross 1994; Kelly 1996; De Genova 1995; Neal 1999).  It is through these two 
seemingly divergent capacities that hip hop has become a key mediator of not only how 
blackness is popularly represented in the U.S., but how it is actively performed in the 
daily public sphere as well.  My suggestion here is that as a key site of popular black 
representation, hip hop’s cultural impact is most powerfully felt through the differing 
ways that its black cultural difference is performatively enacted – both as mediated 
commercial spectacle and collective social practice – within its multivalent cultural 
terrain.  Underscoring the black representational significance of hip hop in terms of how 
its black images and meanings are performatively constituted, I suggest, opens up a space 
to explore the important interconnections between black expressive culture, frames of 
representational practice, and the politics of contemporary black identity production.  
Again, representations, meanings and identities of blackness are by no means of a given, 
essentialized nature; they rather continually evolve through interarticulated processes of 
negotiation between individuals and institutions within overlapping fields of cultural and 
social power.  Particularly illuminating here is Stuart Hall’s suggestion that identities, in 
particular those subalternly positioned, are constituted through interplay of interpellating 
forces on one hand and “practices of self constitution” on the other (Hall 1996).  This 
model of subject making is valuable in that it allows for more nuanced understandings of 
how racialized/subaltern subjectivity and identity are forged in that space between 
“structure” and “agency” through a Gramscian dialectics of accommodation and 
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resistance.  Hip hop in this way has become a significant contemporary site for just such 
kinds of negotiated frames of black representation.  
Regarding the ground level of music production, when stressing in current 
African American  vernacular the importance of “represent’in’” in order to “keep it real” 
as it were, African American rap artists and their producers clearly understand the self-
representational significance of their work.  Beyond simply “rockin’ phat beats,” what is 
additionally at stake when recording an album, shooting a music video, or performing 
live in concert is how these artists perform themselves as contemporary African 
Americans performers.  Here questions of black authenticity become paramount.  As 
Mark Anthony Neal observes, “even though some forms of hip-hop craved the prestige 
and visibility that mainstream culture afforded … hip-hop [is] dually concerned with 
remaining authentic to its core constituency of black youth located across various and 
often transitory urban spaces” (Neal 1999:192).  Such authentications of black-self, as 
mentioned earlier, are at one time voiced through rap artists’ referencing of contemporary 
themes, concerns and desires that shape the daily lives of many African American youth 
today.  
 Apart from the overt verbal expression, rap’s black (self-)representational 
significance is immediately signified through the sheer visual force of young black, 
overwhelmingly male bodies publicly performing their blackness through the 
commercially-mediated space of hip hop.  Here, African American rap artists give 
aesthetic expression to their black male subjectivity through the signifying use of black 
vernacular English, lyrical word-play, bodily gesture, and material fashion which 
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collectively project an unmistakable blackness of style.  Such stylistic practices are drawn 
from the larger cultural repertoire of hip hop-informed black youth culture were African 
American youth often employ the conduits of designer fashion and forms of black 
vernacular speech to publicly mark, or more accurately “perform” their black identity in 
collective everyday kinds of ways.  As Robin Kelley has noted with regard to the use of 
style among African American youth in Los Angeles: “Young men wear starter jackets, 
hoodies, L.A. Raiders caps, baggy khaki pants, and occasionally gold chains not only 
because they are in style, but because it enables them to create a collective identity that is 
distinct from, and even in opposition to, the dominant culture” (Kelley 1996:133, italics 
added).  
 Black popular style in this way can be understood as performative in that it 
operates as an expressive practice through which group identity and meanings are not 
simply reflected, but rather actively constituted though their collective social enactment. 
Here the term performative is two fold: style is performative in that it is literally 
constituted through the act of doing or “performing” it, while it simultaneously has a 
“performative” affect in that it acts upon and produces something new, i.e. identity 
(Butler 1990).   The oppositional character of such practice again lies first and foremost 
in the ways these expressions are constructed as self-affirming signifiers of a black racial 
difference vis-à-vis the un-marked, un-problematized sociocultural norms of white 
sameness.  The cultural politics of black style in this way recalls Dick Hebdige’s seminal 
work on the use of style among white and Afro-Caribbean working-class youth in Britain.  
For Hebdige, the social significance of the stylistic use of material culture, bodily gesture, 
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and language lay precisely in the ways these groups employed them in the construction of 
oppositional kinds of meaning and identity vis-à-vis dominant cultural norms (Hebdige 
1988 [1979]).  Regarding hip hop, while such style-driven markers of black difference 
may be appropriated by other youth including whites, and might as in the case of popular 
fashion be tied to broader patterns of consumerism and cultural commodification, they 
nonetheless communicate a level of signifying black meaning through the ways they are 
fashioned and employed by African American youth as stylized representations of self.  If 
we consider Stuart Hall’s suggestion that “it is only through the ways in which we 
represent and imagine ourselves that we come to know how were are” (Hall 1992:30), 
emphasizing the performative nature of black popular style in this way again encourages 
considerations of the active self-representational force of style practice in its capacity to 
culturally articulate, more than simply reflect, identities of blackness and ways of being.  
Though both verbal expression and stylistic signification, I suggest, hip hop operates as 
an important cultural framework through which contemporary black identity in the U.S. 
is self-representationally or performatively manifested.  
 One cannot understate, however, the significance of the fact that those 
subjectivities most often given performative expression through the black signifying 
cultural aesthetics of hip hop are resoundingly male.8  Such masculinity is tied in the first 
instance to the dominance of male MCs who commonly project a hyper-masculinized 
                                                 
8 In underscoring the heavily masculine character of rap and hip hop I do not wish to elide the 
important contributions and struggles of female rappers in the development of the genre.  From 
the Real Roxanne and Salt’n Pepa to Little Kim and Ra Digga, black women have and continue to 
assert their presence and voices within the primarily male space of hip hop.  For a discussion of 
female rap artists and the gender politicof hip hop in rap see Tricia Rose (1994), Nancy Guevara 
(1996), and Gwendolyn D Pough (2004).  
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heterosexual self-imagery.  Frequently framed in sexist and if not misogynistic kinds of 
ways, these black self-masculinist representations operate in part, along with boastful 
materialism, as misdirected symbolic correctives to a history of black sociopolitical and 
economic disempowerment.9  Like the earlier pimp or “mac” imagery of the 1970s 
blaxploitation films – themselves filmic renditions of the super-Blackman figure 
fashioned during the Black Power era10 – an “emasculated” black man is re-endowed, as 
it were, with his full, unbridled masculinity through hip hop’s self-representations of a 
super-charged black maleness.  To “represent!” is in essence the performance of this self-
authenticized heterosexual black male prowess.  In claiming at some level an 
oppositional stance through the evocation of such black male self-authorship, these 
representations may nonetheless reify many dominant racial stereotypes and discourses of 
black hyper-sexuality and social dysfunctionality, while at the same time reproduce at 
least at the level of practice larger patriarchal structures of male privilege. 
 While at one level black rap artists and music producers may be responsible for 
the artistic composition of rap music, its imagery and performative style, what “sells”– or 
what at least is promoted and packaged to sell in often formulaic fashion by the corporate 
recording industry – is precisely these kinds of hyper-masculinized representations of 
                                                 
9 For a critical account of gender politics and sexism in rap lyricism and hip hop music industry 
see Trisha Rose (1994).  Robin Kelly (1996) also provides an historically contextualize 
discussion of the masculinist and patriarchal tendencies within hip hop particularly as they pertain 
to genre of gansta rap. Also see Ernest Allen Jr. (1996) for a discussion of gender imagery in 
message rap.  
10  Such discourses and representations where tied to the notion during this period that the Civil 
Rights Movement’s passive non-violence methodology and philosophy contributed to an 
symbolic emasculation of the black male, or what the Black Power Movement was obligated to 
redeem. The gun and the cock became the icons of the a new black (male) power.  For a critical 
treatment of sexism and masculinity within the Black Power Movement in general, and the Black 
Panther Party in particular see for example Elaine Brown (1992).  
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blackness.  Similar can be said of the gun-toting gangsta’/thug image so pervasive in 
much of hip hop which, while embodying some oppositional attributes and critiques 
(McLaren 1995; Kelley 1996), nonetheless reproduces many dominant racialized 
discourses of black criminality and social pathology.  In their carnivalesque celebrations 
of U.S. consumerist culture, the excessive materialism of the contemporary “bling bling” 
tendencies in hip hop additionally operate in this manner.  Though market factors may 
not directly produce such imagery in the first instant, they certainly have and continue to 
exert a driving influence in their thematic reproduction.  At the same time African 
American producers and performers of rap music are clearly cognizant of the 
commercially informed logics that underlie the cultural capital of their products.  As 
Kelley has pointed out, the development of hip hop from the on-start was tied to black 
entrepreneurial endeavors to “get paid” through the melding of work and pleasure.  Such 
efforts ultimately involve an active participation in, to use Kelley’s expression, the “self-
commodification” of blackness by these young men in ways that bolster rather than 
undermine these capital-driven processes (Kelley 1997).   
At a broader societal level, the performance of hip hop’s spectacle of blackness 
through the commercial conduits of popular music, video, fashion, and advertisement has 
enabled it to become a powerful cultural force in informing how people – black, white, 
and other – think about, and to a certain extent enact blackness in the everyday.  Hip 
hop’s black representational significance emerges once again through this complex 





The Contemporary Racial Identity Politics of Global Hip Hop  
 
 How does hip hop’s black representational politics travel as its engages other 
communities beyond the particular socio-cultural context of their making?  The simple 
answer to this question all depends upon the specific local conditions under which these 
mediated cultural forms are received and interpreted.  Although U.S. rap and hip hop may 
move along similar transnational routes as geographically and culturally far a field as 
Cuba and Japan, their reception and recontextualization in the formation of local hip hop 
followings often involve very different types of social and cultural meaning making.  As 
one of the most widely circulated commercial spectacles of blackness globally, the 
central question I wish to ask is to what extent and in what ways might rap music and the 
broader cultural sphere of hip hop be informing contemporary discourses of blackness 
and identities of difference transnationally.  In particular, how are other racialized and/or 
“ethnically” defined youth groups receiving, translating, and performatively redeploying 
hip hop’s black oppositional difference in new socially relevant ways?  
 In addition to the commercial processes of their domestic production, any 
discussion of hip hop’s global significance must be equally attuned to the transnational 
capital networks through which these commodified cultural products circulate 
internationally.  At the forefront of hip hop’s international ascendance has been recording 
conglomerates like Sony, EMI, Time/Warner Music, and the Universal Music Group – 
themselves owned by even larger international conglomerates – whose combined 
 
 36
holdings by the early-1990s included some two-thirds of the global recording market 
(Garofalo 1993).  Under these corporation’s leadership the record industry was able to 
boast $32 billion in revenues for 2002, with the category of “urban music” which 
includes American R&B and rap capturing a substantial share of the market.11  In step 
with these developments, Def Jam Records – the godfather of the once independent hip 
hop music labels now part of Universal Music which, in turn, is owned by the Paris-based 
Vivendi corporation – has expressed interest in opening offices in at least eight foreign 
counties including the UK, Germany, France, Spain, Poland, Japan, and Brazil.  Such 
efforts are joined by the likes of FUBU (For Us, By US), the majority African American-
owned retail line of hip hop-associated apparel, which has plans to open some twenty-two 
international outlets from South Korea to Nigeria (Leeds 2000).  Moreover, as the 
institution possibly most responsible for the projection of hip hop’s black spectacle into 
the international marketplace, MTV – a subsidiary of cooperate media giant Viacom – is 
currently broadcast in eighteen languages reached some 375 million households in 164 
countries12  These high-end industry-based expansions have been accompanied among 
others by the proliferation of hip hop-content magazines that are now produced in a wide 
array of national markets from Italy to Cuba.   
 Another flourishing and increasingly instrumental source in the global dispersion 
of hip hop is the internet.  There is an unimaginable number of hip hop-related web-sites 
of an extraordinary range of content and orientation whose numbers are growing daily.  
                                                 
11 International Federation of Phonographic Industry (IFPI) statistics <www.ifpi.org>.  




There are for example extensive networks of hip hop-related web-based promotional 
material generated by corporate record labels and distributors.  In addition to more 
overtly commercial sites, there is an extraordinary collection of websites ranging in 
specialization from German to African to Hong Kong rap.  The emergence of internet-
based file-sharing groups and related software following the demise of Napster has 
further enabled the global circulation of hip hop music.  One particularly noteworthy on-
line manifestation of hip hop-gone-global is the Universal Zulu Nation.  As the 
quintessential institutional icon of hip hop’s Bronx roots founded in the early 1970s by 
Afrika Bambaataa, the now “Universal” Zulu Nation has its own website 
(www.zulunation.com) containing information ranging from the history of hip hop, to 
afrocentric teachings and readings of world events, to black-produced consumer products.  
The site even provides an on-line application service for membership, enabling the 
expansion of what is now the organization’s global network of local branches.  As these 
examples illustrate, the internationalization of hip hop has been significantly facilitated 
through the rise of the internet.  
 While hip hop’s global diffusion may in many ways be intimately tied to the 
international expansion of capital markets, it would be short-sighted to reduce the cultural 
form’s transnational significance simply to that of a U.S. cultural export, one inactively 
and uncritically consumed by others.  Such a reading would evoke cultural imperialism 
theses which generally regard the international spread of media and cultural commodities 
from economically more powerful nations (most notably the U.S.) as overpowering 
and/or displacent of local cultural practices in non-western locales.  Dominant cultural 
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flows in this view are seen as contributive to a homogenization of global cultural 
diversity.  Arguments of these kinds however have their critiques, with some of the more 
rigorous coming from those writing on the transnational politics of popular music.  As 
musicologists Reebee Garofalo has suggested of such positions: “In addition to 
underestimating the power of local and national cultures in developing countries, this 
tendency assumes audience passivity in the face of dominant cultural power and negates 
the active, creative dimensions of popular music consumption” (Garofalo 1993:18).13   
 In the case of U.S. rap and hip hop, it is important to recognize not only the active 
ways these commodified cultural forms are consumed within other national contexts, but 
also how such forms may be critically rearticulated and redeployed in the formation of 
local rap artists and followings.  Such a proposition does not seek to mitigate the cultural 
force with which hip hop’s commercially-driven elements penetrate and impact other 
cultural experiences beyond the U.S.  Nor is it an attempt to evade the very real, often 
detrimental global effects of late capital expansion and neoliberal policies sanctioned by 
institutions like International Monetary Fund (IMF), The Word Bank, and the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) on the everyday lives of people, especially those of the non-
western developing world.  The challenge rather is to illuminate how individuals and 
communities make local meaning in often strategic kinds of ways both within and 
through dominant, if not hegemonic, cultural fields and material conditions of power.  
Given the growing significance of transnational forces in today’s late-capitalist world, 
such negotiations increasingly take place the interstices of the local and the global. 
                                                 




 The writing of Arjun Appadurai among others is often invoked when thinking 
about how local communities utilize transnational flows of people, goods and information 
as resources the production of locally-situated, yet globally-conscious modes of culture 
and identity.  Appadurai’s notion of “mediascapes,” for one, refers to international 
networks and processes of information distribution which “tend to be imaged-centered, 
narrative-based accounts of strips of reality [that] offer to those who experience and 
transform them a series of elements out of which scripts of reality can be formed of 
imagined lives, their own as well as those of others living in other places” (Appadurai 
1996:35).  Although Appadurai’s often celebratory rendering of such processes tends to 
elide critical discussions of the power-laden conditions under which these transnational 
“social imaginaries” are shaped (Ong 1999), his framework is nonetheless helpful when 
considering the ways rap and hip hop serve as cultural resources in the mobilization of 
new kinds of racially-informed identities transnationally.  As commercially-mediated and 
corporately-propelled as these cultural forms might be, they are still capable of conveying 
a signifying black racial difference and oppositionality across time and space.  It is 
precisely through the ways racially marked youth receive and strategically reproduce rap 
and hip hop in the performative self-representation of their own subjective realities, that 
hip hop’s oppositional potential finds articulation globally.  
 




 When discussing hip hop’s black transnational significance one cannot overlook 
the particular salience of its self-representational politics within the black Atlantic world.  
Whether Haitian immigrants in Montreal, Afro-Cuban raperos in Havana, or Afro-
Amerindian Garifuna in Honduras, young people of African descent internationally are 
utilizing the performative space of hip hop in the local shaping of new, diasporically 
aware forms of signifyingly “black” identity and self-expression.  Drawing on the work 
of Paul Gilroy, I suggest that rap music and hip hop culture in this manner operate as 
transnational routes of contemporary black identification through which the African or, 
possibly more appropriately, black diaspora is actively constituted as a lived social reality 
rather than an historically-given classification of collective social dispersion (Gilroy 
1993a).14  This is to imply that however historically rooted the black diasporic experience 
might be, it is precisely through the ways local communities identify with and move from 
diasporically-aware positions of blackness, that the sociocultural significance of a black 
diaspora is actively realized.  To the extent such identities are often articulated in 
oppositional kinds of ways vis-à-vis dominant racial constructions and histories of social 
marginalization, these mobilizations, as Stuart Hall has argued, frequently involve 
strategic negotiations of power through processes of a creative self-making (Hall 1996).  
As an increasingly transnational medium of black self-expression and self-representation, 
hip hop has become an important modality through which such diasporically attuned 
black self-making occurs among contemporary generations of youth throughout the Black 
                                                 
14 Taking a lead from Gilroy, I emphasis “Black” over “African” Diaspora in this context to 
underscore the contemporary sociopolitical significance of blackness as a socially-produced 
marker of racialized experience and subjectivity as the key signifier of modern, if not 
postmodern, Afrodiasporic forms of identification.   
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Atlantic world.  To recognize hip hop’s diasporic significance in this way is not, 
however, to privilege the U.S. as a center of black diasporic cultural production and 
identity.  Rather it is an attempt in part to map, through the specifics of hip hop, the ways 
the expanding global influence of the U.S.-based cultural industries are negotiated and 
strategically utilized by others in socially and politically significant ways. The following 




 The rise of Brazilian rap offers a vivid illustration of how black diasporic 
identities are being mobilized through the performative space of hip hop.  Although hip 
hop’s immediate cultural foundation in Brazil were laid in the 1980s through the 
circulation of U.S. music videos, record album photos, and stylized images of African 
American life popularized by Spike Lee’s films (Magaldi 1999), Brazilian rap’s black 
diasporic affiliations should be understood within a broader recent history of Afro-
Brazilian engagement with U.S. black popular culture.  Brazil’s Black Soul movement of 
the 1970s represents a particularly notable example of such diasporically-attune 
engagement.  Through the performative mediums of music, dance and fashion, Black 
Soul’s ranks of young Afro-Brazilians drew upon the black cultural aesthetics and 
embodied self-awareness of 1970s U.S. soul music in the voicing of new, transnationally 
inspired expressions of Afro-Brazilian blackness.  Parties were organized where young 
Afro-Brazilians donned bell bottoms, dashikis, and wore their hair in afros while they 
listened and danced to the likes of James Brown and Marvin Gay.  Similarly to the latter 
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development of Brazilian rap, such practices were informed by mediated flows of black 
images, ideas, and commercial culture emanating from the U.S. 
 Transcending questions of simple cultural importation, Michael Hanchard has 
argued that Black Soul represented an effort to construct alternative forms of self-
affirming black identity as oppositional responses to Brazil’s historical privileging of 
whiteness and persistent forms of racism (Hanchard 1994).  Emerging during the 
repressive era of Brazil’s military government, Black Soul events became important 
venues of the dissemination of information pertaining to the nascent movimento  
negro – the loosely coordinated affiliation of Afro-Brazilian sociocultural and political 
organizations mobilizing strategically around black racial identity. Hanchard suggests 
efforts of this kind provided catalysts for the development of later identity-based politics 
that continue today to be actively articulated within various forms of Afro-Brazilian 
social and political organizing.  Importantly, such identity-based mobilization posed 
direct political challenges both in form and function to Brazil’s historical claims of racial 
exceptionalism holding  that race and racism are purportedly non-factors in society that 
has one of the greatest levels of social disparity in the world. 15   
 The emergence of Brazilian rap, moreover, needs to be viewed within this 
continuum of diasporically engaged Afro-Brazilian identity-based politics.  Young Afro-
Brazilian favelados – residents of Brazil’s urban shanty towns known as favelas – in and 
around São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro were the first to take up rap music in the voicing of 
their own racially-informed experiences and concerns.  The highly popular São Paulo-
                                                 
15  For critical treatments of Brazil’s “myth of racial democracy” and its impact on black political 
mobilization in addition to Hanchard (1994) see Howard Winant (1994) and John Burdick (1998). 
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based Os Racionais (the Rationals) lead by Pedro Paul a.k.a. Mono Brown are a prime 
example of this early movement in Brazilian rap.  Establishing their reputation in the late 
1980s and early 1990s while performing primarily in favelas and the “darker” suburbs on 
the peripheries of São Paulo, the group’s aggressive lyrics focused on social themes most 
pressing in these impoverished marginalized communities such as racism, racially-
targeted police violence, drug trafficking, and government corruption.  The duo’s 1994 
hit “Fim de semana no parque” (“Weekend in the Park”) addressed the harsh living 
conditions, daily survival, and struggles with police in the perifieria or periphery 
(Magaldi 1999).  Os Racionais’ 1989 debut album sold over one million copies marking a 
significant early milestone in the development of Brazilian rap. 
 Within a couple of days following the infamous Candelaria murders of 1993 in 
which a group of black street children were systematically gunned down by off-duty 
police in the center of Rio Janeiro, a protest rally was coordinated in the city by a 
coalition of organizations within the movimento negro to condemn the murders and the 
broader culture of racism and racial violence from which these acts manifest.  Among the 
rally speakers and performers was the early Rio-based rap duo Consciencia Urbana 
(Urban Consciousness).  Member Big Richard described the political significance of his 
music this way:  
 
In the US blacks have a notion that racism exists. Not in Brazil. In Brazil racism is 
disguised.  In Brazil we live in a racial democracy, believe it if you will.  Here we have 
a small number of black youth who fight against racism, while the majority, even as 
they suffer racism everyday like being harassed on the bus by the police, prefer to 
believe what is shown to them on television and in the media.  So what happens is that 
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we present the counter-culture to this, and to fight as a counter-culture is not easy, 
especially in Brazil.16 
 
 
In addition to employing rap as a pedagogic tool in the shaping of Afro-Brazilian 
counter-hegemonic sensibilities, Consciencia Urbana’s songs lyrically evoke black 
diasporic imagery and identifications.  In referencing the significance of Malcolm X for 
example, Big Richard explained:  
 
We decided to make a rap song about Malcolm X because he was not solely a black 
American.  He lost his American-ness when he fought against racism, for any person 
who fights against racism anywhere in the world is fighting for blacks, for the survival 
of black people.17  
 
 
 Similar diasporic identifications are echoed in a song by Os Racionais where 
baggy jeans, baseball cap-adorned Mono Brown riffs “We need a leader with popular 
credit like Malcolm X as in other times in America, who is black down to the bones – one 
of us – and reconstructs our pride from ruins” (McDaniles 1999 :7).  These artists 
adoption and rearticulation of Malcolm X’s black nationalist imagery within the context 
of Afro-Brazilian struggle is a poignant example of the ways in which African-
descendant communities draw inspiration transnationally from experiences and cultures 
of black populations elsewhere.  By mobilizing such diasporic resources in this manner, 
to use Jacqueline Nassy Brown’s term, Afro-Brazilian rap artists not only tie their 
struggles historically to others in the diaspora, but in effect actively constitute the Black 
                                                 
16 personal interview 1993 
17 personal interview 1993 
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Diaspora itself as a lived social reality (Nassy Brown 1998).  In the case of Malcolm X’s 
imagery, such cultural appropriations were no doubt informed by the revitalization of 
Malcolm X in the U.S. by rap artists such as Public Enemy whom, along with Spike Lee, 
helped feed the “X” fashion trend of the early 1990s.  Although these commodified 
representations of Malcolm’s complex legacy were not devoid of their commercial 
contradictions, they nonetheless retained a capacity to transnationally convey and 
generate meanings of a radical blackness for others.   
 These examples prove illustrative of how U.S. rap music and hip hop-attune black 
popular culture operate as contemporary routes through which diasporically informed 
ideas, messages, and identifications can and are actively forged.  Such black diasporic 
processes and understandings are clearly articulated by Big Richard who explains: 
 
By principle, we think that rap is not a [North] American music.  Rap is a music of 
black people, and black people originated in Africa.  In the case of those who are born 
outside of Africa, we are speaking of the Diaspora.  Here in Brazil, it is a regional 
music, adapted to the Portuguese, to the Brazilian swing where we mix timbalala and 
samba-reggae with rap.  We make a connection by joining American music with 
Brazilian music in creating our own style, but without ever loosing the music’s roots, 
because in fact these two roots are sisters – they originated in only one place, Africa.18 
 
 
While emphasizing the African historical “roots” of rap music, Big Richard 
simultaneously evokes the contemporary routes of rap’s black diasporic significance in 
referencing its aesthetically conveyed blackness as the basis for constructing 
transnational black “connections” between Brazil and the U.S.  He suggests that such 
                                                 
18 personal interview 1993.  
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identifications are made most real not simply through the consumption of rap, but rather 
through the ways rap is pro-actively transformed in the making of a new culturally-
relevant, yet signifyingly black Brazilian music form.  Big Richard’s reference to 
“creating our own style” through the fusion of Afro-Brazilian musical elements and the 
use of Portuguese to indigenize rap, further underscores the important inter-relationality 
between style making and identity.  On both aesthetic and linguistic levels, then, the 
creative re-working of rap music’s signified blackness may give rise to not only a new 
Brazilian music genre, but might in fact serve as an alternative modality for articulating 
blackness in Brazil all together.  As such, Brazilian rap may provide space for the 
performative self-expression of new forms of Afro-Brazilian identity that are responsive 
to the particular socio-historical context of their contemporary making.   
 Within the broader space of Brazilian hip hop, style is also key to the ways 
blackness is performatively marked and bodily exhibited through popular fashion.  
Glossy hip hop magazines such as Rap Brasil, Hip Hop en Movimento, and Rap Rima 
that have emerged over the past decade are filled with images of young black and brown, 
primarily male, Brazilians donned in U.S.-inspired hip hop attire.  The performative 
“rocking” of such hip hop fashion is often accompanied by overt body posturing 
stylistically evocative of that employed by young African American men and male rap 
artists.  Many of Brazil’s most established rap groups signify themselves in one form or 
another through such U.S.-inspired black “urban style.”  Afro-Brazilian rap duo Afro-X 
and Dexter for one exemplify the fusion of signified black style and politics.  The duo 
recorded their first album in 2000 while imprisoned in the infamous São Paulo Carandiru 
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prison complex that first gained international attention in 1992 when 111 inmates where 
systematically massacred by military police following a prison uprising.19  Referring to 
themselves as 509-E after their prison cell number, Afro-X and Dexter’s music assails a 
corrupt justice system while testifying to the violent realities of being black, male, and 
poor in contemporary Brazil.  In addition to limited performances in prison, the duo 
recorded a video for MTV Brazil in which they can be seen sporting gold chains and 
designer sneakers (Darlington 2000).  The state-regulation beige pants they don are worn 
baggy and off the hip – stylistically referencing U.S. hip hop-associated fashion practices 
first coined by young African American males that, interestingly, arose out U.S. prison 
culture.  
 As these Brazilian examples suggest, rap music and associated hip hop culture 
can provide alternative cultural frameworks through which new meanings and identities 
of blackness can be strategically articulated and performatively mobilized.  In line with 
their U.S. counterparts, however, the predominance of male artists testifies to the 
overwhelmingly masculine character of such black sensibilities. To the extent to which 
such identifications are forged through transnationally-projected black masculine 
imagery, they clearly are not predicated on linguistic intelligibility. Rap’s black racial 
alterity, rather, is conveyed most tangibly through its signifying blackness of style.  Such 
blackness, in turn, is transformed through both linguistic and stylistic innovations in the 
voicing and bodily performance of new kinds of critical black subjectivity that are both 
                                                 
19 The prison complex was finally shut down in 2002.  Brazilian filmmaker Hector Babenco 
presented an account of the massacre in his 2004 film “Carandiru.”  
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products of, and responsive to the particular sociocultural imperatives of contemporary 
Brazil.  Writing on Afro-Brazilian youth culture in Bahia, Brazil, Livio Sansone observes 
that the fashioning of new black-signified youth styles as exemplified in hip hop “offers 
black people new opportunities for redefining black difference in Western societies by 
aestheticizing blackness, in the first place, through highly visible styles and pop music” 
(Sansone 1997:461).  Indeed, the adoption of these transnationally-informed youth 
practices provides young Afro-Brazilians with means of not only marking their blackness 
more visibly, but actively linking their struggles to a broader black diasporic experience 
and related political frames of black antiracism.  Sansone has additionally proposed, in 
line with others, that the performance of the black aesthetics embodied in hip hop further 
enables these Afro-Brazilian youth to participate in a globalized space of black modernity 
in juxtaposition to the dominant framing of black culture and blackness in Brazil as 
folkloric or traditional.20  While arguments of these kind clearly have their critical merits, 
I will suggest in my concluding remarks to this chapter that it might be equally fruitful to 
think of contemporary hip hop in terms of its relationship to a black postmodernity.  
 
South Africa  
 
 While the African/Black Diaspora is commonly thought of as being defined by 
various populations of African descent who share a common historical experience of 
dispersion from an African “homeland,” hip hop’s significance as a contemporary route 
                                                 
20 For other discussions of the relationships between transnational black cultural practices and 




of black identification clearly resonates beyond these immediate boundaries.  The wide-
spread proliferation of rap artists and hip hop culture throughout Africa itself represents 
an important manifestation of just this sort of black transcendent significance.  The rise of 
vibrant local hip hop movements in Senegal, Tanzania, Ghana, Benin, Mali, and Cote 
d’Ivoire to name a few suggest that African youth today are increasingly engaging in the 
black-signified cultural space of rap and hip hop.   
 South African rap stands out as a particularly interesting African context in which 
hip hop’s black cultural politics are being mobilized in response to its own specific, 
historically defined social imperatives of race.  South Africa’s alternately self-titled Black 
or African Hip Hop Movement finds its roots within the particularities of Cape Town’s 
social, cultural, and racial make-up.  The reason I speak here alternatively of an “Black” 
or “African” Hip Hop Movement in South Africa is that during my time in Cape Town in 
1991 when the movement was first taking shape, youth involved used the term Black Hip 
Hop Movement to refer to the nascent hip hop scene.  More recent web-based research 
suggest, however, that Cape Town-based hip hop is now couched as the African Hip Hop 
Movement.  Though I lack information to definitively explain this shift, if indeed one has 
occurred, one might wonder if this change in language might relate to post-Apartheid 
efforts to move away from racial classifications towards national discourses of non-
racialism. Here, the nomenclature “Africa” within the context of multi-racial South 
Africa could correspond with such a move. 
 Cape Town has traditionally been the home to large numbers of so-called 
“colored” South Africans as people of ‘mixed-race’ were long legally classified under 
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apartheid’s racialized caste system.  Occupying literally the racial “middle ground,” this 
group was historically positioned by the white Apartheid government as a buffer between 
the worlds of white and black South Africa.  Residentially, educationally, and frequently 
professionally segregated from blacks and whites, colored communities often developed 
their own cultural identity drawing variously upon their African, Indo-Malaysian, and 
European cultural histories.21  In line with Apartheid’s logic of divide-and-rule, this 
isolated community was allotted limited class privilege over those of blacks (i.e. the 
majority of “full blooded” indigenous South Africans).  Such efforts historically 
contributed to a racialized class of South Africans who generally aspired to, and 
identified more with white South African status to the determent of a non-white or 
“black” social identity – a development exactly in tune with the grand designs of 
Apartheid. 
 The 1980s however was a highly charged time in the Cape Town region for anti-
Apartheid mobilization as it was for the rest of South Africa. During this period 
significant numbers of colored youth were politicized through their activism.  The critical 
turning point in the anti-Apartheid struggle of course occurred in 1990 with the release of 
Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC) and South 
African Communist Party (SACP).  Emerging within this climate of growing 
                                                 
21 Significant numbers of enslaved and indentured laborers from what is today Malaysia and 
Indonesia were brought to the Cape Town region starting in the late 1600s by Dutch traders. 
These “Malays” later inter-mixed with European settlers and indigenous Africans resulting in the 
racial codification of “coloreds” as a population group under Apartheid.  Large segments of Cape 
Town’s coloured community still practice the Islam first introduced by the Malay/Indonesian 
influence, and the religion continues to be an important part of their distinct cultural identity.  
Within the broader coloured population, both Afrikaans of English are spoken a distinctive 
vernacular accent, cadence, and intonation. Depending on the region, however, one or the other is 
often used as the primary vernacular.  
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politicization and rapid social change, the Cape Town-based rap crew Prophets of Da 
City formed that same year.  The group, locally known by their acronym POC, was 
organized by young men from the the sprawling sandy flatlands known as the Cape Flats 
just outside of Cape Town which host a number of poor residential areas or “townships” 
designated as colored-only under Apartheid.  At POC’s helm was longtime bee-boy 
Ready D who, following exposure to Liverpool, England’s vibrant DJ culture during a 
family visit, turned to DJ-ing and MC-ing upon his return.  Drawing upon Cape Town’s 
strong pre-existing breakdance scene, POC’s incorporated breakdancers and poppers – 
another “old school” form of hip hop-associated dance – as part of their performance 
troupe and group identity.  Releasing a total of seven albums on an independent South 
African label Ghetto Ruff (distributed by Polygram), POC music took on a strong 
sociopolitical focus in addressing the everyday struggles of township life of poverty, 
unemployment, gang violence, and drug abuse.22  At center of these concerns, most 
importantly, was an explicit critique of Apartheid and its various manifestations of racial 
oppression. Such political positioning contributed to the 1993 banning of one of POC’s 
albums by the still then Apartheid government.23 
 A related and additionally defining component of POC’s music has been its black 
identity-based orientation and message.  Through their music and other public 
engagement these youth have consistently referred to themselves, and by extension 
coloreds in general, as black and African in direct opposition to their historical 
                                                 
22 Jörg Faber “Cape Town's Hip Hop Scene” Ntama - Journal of African Music and Popular 
Culture, Mainz University, website <http://ntama.uni-mainz.de/hiphop/faber/> 
23 Profits of Da City official web page. <http:/ rucus.ru.ac.za/~eitan/poc/pocintro.html> 
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classification as coloreds under Apartheid.  This move is particularly significant when 
considering that during the same period the colored population voted resoundingly for the 
Nationalist Party – the white Afrikaner-lead political party which erected Apartheid – 
over Nelson Mandela’s ANC in South Africa’s first multi-racial national elections in 
1994.  As representatives of a new generation of South Africans coming to age at a time 
of considerable socio-political transition, POC’s assertion of a black Africanness in the 
face of a history of racialization as “colored” represented a political affront to a 
previously divisive racial paradigm – one that radically hindered political alliance 
between people of ‘mix-race’ and the larger “black” South African majority.  The point I 
wish to stress here is that such counter-hegemonic assertions of black identity were 
significantly informed by hip hop’s articulation of a transnational discourse of blackness 
which, in turn, was drawn upon and ultimately re-employed for strategic ends.  
 Another influential and long standing Cape Town-based rap group that is 
illustrative of this dynamic is Black Noise.  Possibly more centrally than POC, Black 
Noise performatively projected self-signifying “black” African identity and social 
message as a principal defining component of their music and public image.  As a 
particularly notable example of the group’s transnational engagement with hip hop’s 
cultural politics of blackness, Black Noise’s MCs – all historically classified as colored – 
are active members of the local South African branch of the Universal Zulu Nation.24  
The irony here of course is that discourse of Zulu Nation carries a whole other set of 
immediate social meanings within South Africa given both the historical importance of 
                                                 
24 Jörg Faber. 
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the Zulu Nation under the famed Shaka Zulu, as well as the contemporary social, cultural, 
and political significance of Zulus in South Africa today.  The question to be asked then 
is how these overlapping discourses of black Zuluness articulate with one and other 
within the context of Cape Town’s hip hop movement.  It is clearly significant on both 
interarticulated levels, however, that a group of racially-classified colored youth rooted in 
a community who have historically rejected a black African identity, would chose to 
identify with – or at least under – the black cultural signifier of Zulu.   
 Beyond the immediate context of music, such black-signified identity finds active 
social expression through the numerous workshops and speaking engagements in schools, 
libraries, and prison that both POC and Black Noise and have undertaken throughout the 
years.  These efforts illustrate a creative fusion of the pedagogic tendencies of rap music 
with social activism as these youth take their message and concerns to a generation of 
young people throughout the Cape Town region.  Through performative fashioning to 
political dissemination though music and community engagement, these young South 
Africans can be understood as not only constructing new oppositionally-positioned 
identities of blackness, but in fact actively mobilizing them in very real, politically 
directed ways. 
 
Hip hop’s Representational Politics of (Black) Racial Difference 
 
Within the North American context, hip hop’s representational politics of black racial 
difference have registered a significant level of cross-cultural resonance with other 
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racialized minority youth.  Following the early involvement of Puerto Rican DJs and rap 
artists like Puerto Rock and MC KT of the Bronx’s Latin Empire, Latino posses such as 
New York’s Terror Squad have emerged as important players in the East Coast hip hop 
scene.  Their music and creative impetuses are intimately tied to the urban socio-cultural 
dynamics that first gave rise to hip hop in New York City.  The west coast-based, 
Chicano-identified Cypress Hill is another high-profile example of transcendent black 
racially significance of hip hop within the broader Latino experience in the U.S.  Cypress 
Hill however is itself indebted to the earlier movement of East L.A.-centered Latino rap 
artists spearheaded in the early 1990s by the likes of Chicano rapper Kid Frost and 
Cuban-born rapper Mellow Man.25  As further illustrated by the diverse collection of west 
coast Asian American MCs comprised primarily of youth of Filipino and Samoan-
descent, hip hop has been taken up by other racialized minority youth in the performative 
fashioning of their own oppositional expressions of racial difference.  
 In examining how rap music has been utilized by Chicano youth in L.A. to voice 
contemporary sociopolitical concerns within the ideological frame of Chicanismo, 
Fernando Pedro Delgado has observed that “[a]lthough rap remains predominantly rooted 
in urban black experiences, it has become a cultural form through which other ethnic and 
racial groups have articulated their experiences as aggravated and under-resources 
communities.26  Delgado’s assessment is echoed in the examples of Native American 
youth who have appropriated black-identified rap and hip hop as cultural frameworks for 
                                                 
25 del Barco 1996.  
26 Fernando Pedro Delgado 1998:96  “Chicano Ideology Revisited: Rap Music and the 
(Re)Articulation of Chicanismo. Source: Western Journal of Communication. 62(2):95-114 
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the production of their own oppositional forms of self-expression and self-representation 
(Ullestad 1999).  Referencing the social invisibility of Native Americans within the 
national imagination in Canada, Adam Krims’s work suggests that Cree youth in Alberta 
have employed the racially marked status of African American-associated hip hop to 
signify their racial difference in symbolically empowering ways (Krims 2000).  While 
Krims underscores how these youth strategically identify with African American racial 
marginalization through hip hop, he does not go as far as to consider the ways rap and hip 
hop may in fact provide these youth creative mediums for the performative articulation of 
their own Native America oppositionality within new, contemporarily-relevant frames of 
antiracist struggle. 
 
France   
 
 Globally further a field, one site that clearly cannot be overlooked when 
discussing hip hop’s transcendent politics of black racial oppositionality is France.  As 
both largest domestic consumer and producer of rap music after the U.S., France has 
emerged as one the most sophisticated and influential of hip hop industries – boasting a 
level of artistic production, creativity, and MC virtuosity that arguably rivals that of 
anywhere including the U.S.  What is of interest to me is the ways French hip hop has 
both evolved within, and is responsive to the racial postcolonial particularities of a 
contemporary France.   
 The French have long appreciated popular forms of American music dating back 
to the strong reception of jazz beginning as early as the 1920s (Prévos 1996).  What 
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makes hip hop’s presence in France noticeably different, however, is that the vast 
majority of French rap artists and their followers are first and second generation 
immigrant youth from North and West Africa and the French Caribbean.  Many of these 
youth are drawn from France’s geographically and socioeconomically marginal banlieus 
(literally suburbs in French); the sprawling high-rise public housing complexes that skirt 
large urban centers, most notably Paris.  Home to large numbers of poor and working-
class immigrant families, banlieus are often inflicted by many of the social problems that 
affect impoverished U.S. urban areas such as high unemployment, drug-related violence 
and addition, crime, and youth gangs.  The mounting frustration and desperation within 
these areas is reflected in the eruption of riots in the 1980s in a number of banlieus 
outside of Paris, Lion, and Marseilles (Prévos 1998).  These poor multiethnic/racial 
banlieus were fertile and receptive ground for the growth of an indigenous hip hop 
movement.  This growth received important inspiration from a 1982 tour of France by 
Afrika Bambaataa and an entourage of breakdancers including the Rock Steady Crew 
(Aidi 2001).  Within two years of this tour the first branch of the Zulu Nation was 
established in France which, as André Prévos has noted, was instrumental to introducing 
hip hop culture to youth in Paris’ banlieus (Prévos 1996).  
 The social marginalization experienced by immigrant descendant youth of these 
geographically peripheral banlieus is further compounded by their racialized position in 
French society.  These young people represent a new generation of French citizens whose 
non-white postcolonial condition stands in contrast to a French nation historically 
predicated on a white-European cultural paradigm and history.  Drawing upon the work 
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of Ben Jelloun, Lawrence Kritzman writes that the marker of “immigrant” in France 
today serves as “an essentialized troupe of difference, representing everything resisting 
assimilation to the national consciousness that it perceives as lacking in subjectivity” 
(Kritzman 2000:17).  Such sentiments find contemporary political expression the rise in 
the 1990s of the rightist National Front (NF) party led then by Jean Le Pen whose fascist, 
xenophobic positions included advocating for the expulsion of non-white immigrants 
from France. It is precisely within this heightened environment of racist anti-immigrant 
sentiment that today’s immigrant-descendent youth are struggling to find their place.  
Caught in this racialized postcolonial dilemma, these youth can neither claim easily an 
Arab or African identity as their parents might, nor unproblematically a French one.  
 Hip hop, I suggest, offers an empowering alternative – a cultural paradigm 
through which a multi-racial/ethnic collective identity of oppositional non-whiteness can 
be creatively forged.  Hip hop provides a means by which these young people 
symbolically transform their position as racialized national minorities to that of global 
majority by affirming their solidarity with urban youth of color and antiracist struggles 
world wide.  In this way these youth become part of a transnational cultural movement, 
one that self-affirmingly asserts a racially oppositional identity of difference in the face 
of an often racially exclusionary – if not overtly racist– Euro-western cultural hegemony.  
Here the black representational significance conveyed through the mediated cultural 
space of hip hop becomes the basis through which new kinds of oppositional identities of 
racial difference can be mobilized.  This is to suggest that regardless of how “truly” 
oppositional U.S. rap music and hip hop culture might be, their transnational significance 
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as resistant cultural practices lies in the particular ways they are received and redeployed 
by others.  In the case of the inter-lingual dissonance between American English and 
French, such oppositionality is conveyed not so much through the intelligibility of the 
spoken word, but rather through its aesthetics and language of style. 
 What particular forms then does this oppositional difference take within the 
context of French hip hop?  With regards to the politics of aesthetics, like their U.S. 
contemporaries French rap artists and their followers don much of the latest in black-
signified U.S. hip hop-related fashion as a key performative marker of their identity as 
hip hop “heads.” Breakdancing and graffiti art have also evolved as critically vibrant 
elements within French hip hop culture.  These expressive, style-driven practices operate 
as additional sites through which alternative, if not oppositional, identities are 
performatively constituted through the transnational cultural paradigm of hip hop.   
 On a more culturally specific level, French rap has a history particularly in Paris 
of drawing linguistically on verlan, a form of vernacular street slang especially common 
in Paris’ banlieus.  As a type of word play characterized by syllabic and spelling 
inversions of French words, verlan’s roots can reportable be traced to French criminals in 
the 19th century who used the coded vernacular to communicate discreetly with one and 
other.  Today’s verlan, however, is practiced by and associated primarily with French 
urban youth of immigrant backgrounds.  Although the vernacular has been increasingly 
appropriated by white French youth and broader commercial media as a cultural symbol 
of generational chic, verlan as with all slang is constantly being remade and re-inscribed 
with meanings by minority youth as performative markers of their French difference.  In 
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this way verlan operates similarly to black vernacular English in that it draws upon 
standard European linguistic forms and structures while creatively reworking them in the 
stylistic construction of a signifying vernacular, racially-coded difference.   
 It is important to emphasize that in the case of verlan such oppositional difference 
is actively constituted through the ways in which it is collectively enacted or performed, 
and thus serves as an means by which these youth negotiate their individual and group 
identity as a racialized, socially marginal population in France.  French rap artists’ 
incorporation of verlan and Arabic expressions commonly used by the large numbers of 
French youth of North African descent, represents both a signifier of their cultural 
authenticity as members of the ‘hood, while it simultaneously positions the genre itself in 
cultural opposition to an otherwise exclusionary French society and culture.  It is worth 
noting that MC Solaar, probably one of the most internationally recognized French rap 
artist, rarely if ever uses verlan in his lyric compositions.  Solar to the contrary is known 
for his highly poetic use of formal French grammar which has contributed over the years, 
along with other factors, to his image as a commercially oriented cross-over artist.  While 
this may be true, an alternative reading might suggest that Senegalese-born Solaar’s adept 
use of formal French produces a sonic racial dissonance within the otherwise racially-
exclusionary constructions and discourses of French culture.  MC Solar notwithstanding, 
the political resonance of the wide-spread used of verlan is reflected in the establishment 
of the Toubon Law of 1994 which, in part a response to the growing influence of French 
rap, attempts to guard the French language against incursions of Americanism, Arabism, 
and verlan (Aidi 2001).  
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 Highly successful long-standing Marseilles-based group IAM (Imperial Asiatic 
Men) for one provides an other key illustration of the ways alternative, racially 
oppositionally French identities are being articulated through the space of hip hop.  
Reflecting the strong multiethnic character of the southern port city of Marseilles which 
boast a considerably large and diverse immigrant population, IAM’s members of 
Madagascar, Algerian, Senegalese, Spanish and Italian origin champion a self-image that 
draws more from Africa and the Mediterranean for its imagery than from France.  These 
MCs have all adopted pharaonic names and have suggested in their lyrics that Marseilles 
was originally part of Africa prior to the continental drift, and therefore rooted in an 
African historical experience as opposed to European (Prevos 1996).  Here, Africa 
becomes a metaphor of racial/cultural difference vis-à-vis a white Euro-French centered 
national imaginary and cultural hegemony.  IAM also embraces an identification with 
Islam, particularly as it is voiced by one of the group’s members Akhenaton who, of 
working-class Italian descent, is a convert to Islam.  Ted Swedenburg has suggested that 
IAM projects what he calls a black Islamic Mediterraneanism though their music that 
serves as a pan-ethnic/racial framework reflecting Marseilles’ multicultural makeup.  
This Islamic informed discourse stands in juxtaposition to France’s white Euro-Christian 
national identity and pervasive anti-immigrant sentiment often expressed in anti-Islamic 
terms.  Swedenburg additionally notes that the transnationality of hip hop further enables 
a level of identification among IAM’s members with African American rap artists 
associated with Islam including those identified with the black nationalist-oriented Five 
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Percenters (Swedenburg 2001).  In both cases hip hop’s embodied meanings of racial 
alterity serve as frames for the production of other forms of oppositional racial difference.  
 IAM’s celebration of a self-affirming non-European identity takes on an added 
level of significance when considering that the group’s own artistic maturation occurred 
at a time when Le Pen’s previous mentioned anti-immigrant National Front rose to 
prominence with a string of local election victories in the south of France in the mid-
1990s.  In response, IAM became increasingly active in antiracist activism during this 
period.  Following their participating in a massive counterdemonstration against a Le Pen 
campaign stop in Marseilles in 1997, the group released a single entitled “11’30” contre 
les lois racists (Eleven Minutes Thirty Seconds Against Racist Laws).  Produced in 
collaboration with a French antiracist organization, the song was aimed at increasing 
critical awareness about racists immigration legislation while encouraging Marseilles 
youth to vote against the National Front (Swedenburg 2001).  This antiracist activism 
emerged through a creative framing and mobilization of racially oppositional identities in 
response to the politics of racial exclusion in contemporary France.  Hip hop in this 
instance provided just such a frame.   
  IAM is but one of a number of influential old school rap groups that have helped 
establish French hip hop’s strong tradition of social protest and critique in the 1990s.  
Positioned at the margins, these critiques were frequently targeted at the French 
government as corrupt and unresponsive to the plight of France’s poor and socially 
disenfranchised minority populations.  Some of the most formidable criticism has been 
reserved for the French police who are viewed particularly among youth as repressive 
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agents of a hostile state.  Such voicings have often brought the contempt of the French 
government which over the years has exhibited a significant level of combativeness with 
French rap.  One of the most infamous examples of government sanctions against French 
rap involved the influential Paris-based Suprême NTM.27  During a 1995 concert 
organized by the antiracist organization SOS Racime to protest the election of a Nation 
Front mayoral candidate in the south of France, members Kool Shen and Joey Starr (of 
Portuguese and Caribbean descent respectively) provocatively challenged police and/or 
security guards after performing their accusatorial song “Police” whose 1993 release first 
brought the duo into conflict with the French government.  A French judge eventually 
found the members guilty of public slander, giving them a three month jail sentence, a six 
month ban on public performances, heavy fines, and demanded a commitment that they 
would limit their provocative use of language in the future (Rosello 2000; Prévos 1998).  
The high-profile affair dramatically boosted the group’s record sales, reportedly helping 
them acquire a multi-record deal with Sony Music and an apparel contact with Adidas 
(Aidi 2001). 
 Another related and highly celebrated controversy, as recounted by André Prévos, 
occurred that same year (Prévos 1998).  In 1995 the French record company Delable 
produced a French hip hop compilation inspired by the recently released film “La Haine” 
(“Hate”) by young French director Mathieu Kassovitz.  Set in a banlieu outside Paris 
amidst heightened tensions following the hospitalization of a young Arab at the hands of 
French police, the film centers on three unemployed youth – a West African, an Algerian, 
                                                 
27 NTM is short for Nique ta mère which translates literally from French as “fuck your mother.” 
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and a Jew – whose anger and frustration over the incident ultimately leads to their own 
fatal confrontation with police.   Drawing on French hip hop’s associations with les 
banlieus, the film’s bleak black and white portrayal of banlieu life is accented with a fast-
paced filmscore inflected with French hip hop.  One of the groups participating in a 
follow-up hip hop compilation inspired by the film was Paris-based Ministère AMER 
whose founding members Stomy Bugsy and Passi are of Cape Verdean and Congolese 
(the Republic of Congo) respectively.  The group’s contributing track entitled “Sacrifice 
de poulets” (“Sacrifice the Chickens”) caused an immediate firestorm.  Headlining with 
the derogatory French slang expression les polutes for police, the song drew parallels to 
Ice T’s earlier “Cop Killer” in triggering the anger of the national police union over the 
song’s provocative title and content.  The police union initiated a lengthy court battle 
against Ministère in which its members were ultimately charged with publicly calling for 
the killing of police, as well as insulting the French police force and the French 
government. As punishment, Ministère’s two MCs were fined a total of roughly $70,000.  
The notoriety of the case however helped secure Ministère’s place within the annals of 
“hard-core” French hip hop history as they went on to contribute to compilations in 1997, 
1998, and 2000.   
  Through the stylistics of language, fashion, graffiti, and dance, to the discursive 
imaginings of alternative histories, to more overt challenges to racialized forms of state 
power, French hip hop has emerged as an important site for the articulation and 
mobilization of contemporary identities of difference among France’s immigrant and 
immigrant-descendant youth.  As a highly commercialized cultural industry, however, 
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French hip hop shares many of the contradictions and ambivalences embodied within 
U.S. hip hop.  Hence, any discussion of the oppositional nature of such practices must 
therefore always consider the mediated cultural terrain through which such difference is 




 A related and final illustration of the ways racialized identities and related 
antiracist politics are being mobilized through the increasingly globalized cultural field of 
hip hop is Germany.  Germany represents the second largest consumer of rap music in 
Europe after France, and as in the case of France immigrant youth are key players within 
Germany’s vibrant hip hop scene.  The cultural politics of difference at play within 
German hip hop, however, may at some levels be articulated in more staunchly 
oppositional terms vis-à-vis national conscriptions of race and culture and related 
discourses of citizenship.  This is particularly the case when considering the cultural 
dynamics of Germany’s prominent Turkish rap movement.  As with all emergent social 
phenomena, it is necessary to situate Turkish rap within the particular social context of its 
making. 
 The rise of new right-wing nationalists currents following the reunification of 
Germany 1990 significantly complicated the already ambiguous position of large 
numbers of immigrants currently living in former West Germany territory.  Often 
categorized as gastarbeiter or temporary “guest workers,” the liminal status of these 
immigrant communities of predominantly Turkish and North African origin is 
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exemplified by the fact that children born of immigrants are not automatically granted 
German citizenship as they are in most other Western countries.  Moreover, these 
communities have in the past been the brunt of racists anti-immigrant violence carried out 
by neo-Nazi skinheads who – comprised primarily of youth from the former East 
Germany – have turned to xenophobic scapegoating in reactionary response to their 
social displacement amidst the economic instability of the post re-unification period.  It is 
against this national backdrop that hip hop in Germany has emerged during the 1990s as 
a popular cultural force among second generation immigrant youth who have played a 
particularly visible role in its development. 
 In addition to the early influence of MTV Europe, rap music first found its West 
German groundings in cities and towns near U.S. military bases where locally-broadcast 
American radio programming and large numbers of African American GI’s provided 
local youth access to the music and the broader black cultural context of its making 
(Bennett 1999).   As Dietmar Elfein has noted, early films on New York hip hop culture 
such as Wild Style (1982) and Beat Street (1984) were additionally instrumental in 
introducing hip hop to German audiences (Elfein 1998).  Although German youth soon 
followed in organizing local rap groups, rap has had a notably strong resonance among 
racially marked youth of immigrant parentage.  This has been most evidently the case 
with those of Turkish descent who, representative of some two million Turkish 
immigrants in Germany, exhibit a particularly powerful presence among the ranks of 
contemporary German rap groups and their followers.  Focusing on rap music among 
“ethnic minority” youth of primarily Turkish and Moroccan background in Frankfurt, 
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Andy Bennett observes that these young people “have appropriated aspects of African-
American hip hop culture and, moving beyond a point of straight-forward imitation, are 
beginning to rework it to act as a mode of expression for a range of local issues”  
(Bennett 1999: 77).  Bennett notes that issues relating to racism and the problematics of 
an exclusionary German national identity are often of central thematic concern among 
these groups.  
 Bennett’s analysis is important in that it not only underscores how these youth are 
mobilizing rap and hip hop as modes of political self-expression, but it also draws 
attention to questions of identity as they relate the local (re)production of these popular 
cultural forms.  His work suggests that while some racially marginalized youth employ 
the protest-oriented space of rap to textually assert their national legitimacy as German 
citizens, others utilize the oppositional character of hip hop in the projection their own 
self-affirming identities of difference as affronts to exclusionary constructions of German 
national identity.  This second trend is pointedly illustrated in the movement of Turkish-
descendant youth in Frankfurt who have opted to rap in their native Turkish rather than 
German.  In addition to overtly marking their linguistic difference, rapping in Turkish 
also provides these young people with a collective means of performatively enacting their 
identity as minority youth in new, oppositionally-positioned kinds of ways.   
 Although Bennett notes that such practices evoke their own nationalist claims – in 
this case Turkish – as strategic counter-balances to dominant national constructions of 
Germanness, his use of the term “ethnic” to describe these immigrant populations seems 
inadequate to account for the very real, everyday kinds of racializing forces and 
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discourses that shape the collective experiences these communities.   My suggestion 
rather is that what might hold the most significance for these racially marked youth is 
their identification with hip hop’s embodied black racial oppositionality which, in turn, is 
rearticulated in the performative fashioning of new racially-informed expression and 
identities of Turkish-German difference.  Common refrains among Turkish MCs like “we 
are the blacks of Germany” or alternately “we are the niggers of Germany” are 
illustrative – though not unproblematically – of such identification and its redeployment 
(Ayse Cagler 1998). 
 Ayse Caglar has argued, however, that scholarly and popular representations of 
German Turkish hip hop have tended to uncritically celebrate its marginal and 
oppositional character without taking into consideration the role of state institutions in the 
promotion of rap and hip hop among Turkish youth.  Focusing on Turkish hip hop in 
Berlin, Caglar suggests that government-sponsored youth centers in the 1990s were 
instrumental in introducing rap music, breakdance, and graffiti to youth of immigrant 
parentage – in particular those of Turkish descent.  Viewed as non-threatening cultural 
activities, she follows, hip hop was encouraged as an alternative cultural framework for 
immigrant descendent youth whose high levels of unemployment and social 
marginalization marked them as an ‘at risk’ population.  In Calgar’s understanding such 
moves represented systematic attempts on the part of the German state to incorporate 
Turkish youth within institutional structures, in effect reifying the production of cultural 
difference while simultaneously modifying and regulating it.  Drawing attention to such 
practices, Caglar contends, complicates the notion of Turkish hip hop as an “authentic” 
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and “spontaneous” mode of oppositional cultural expression.  Caglar’s work is 
illuminating in underscoring the role of state institutions in contributing to the 
development of Turkish rap in the first instance, and how such efforts sought to 
reconfigure potentially oppositional expressions of cultural difference within a de-
politicized discourse of German multiculturalism.  Her analysis, however, does not 
undermine the fact that rap and hip hop have become key spaces through which Turkish 
and other racially marked immigrant descendant youth are articulating and, importantly, 
employing their difference in strategic and politically meaningful ways.   
 The influential German rap collective Cartel serves as a poignant example of the 
cultural meaning-making and activist-focused concerns that have become defining 
elements within Germany’s Turkish-identified hip hop movement.  Formed in 1995 with 
the release of the album Cartel, a collaborative project between the groups Karakan, Da 
Crime Posse, and rapper Eric C, Cartel was successful in fusing signifyingly-Turkish 
instrumentation, melodies, and elements of Turkish language with a strong antiracist 
message.  The group’s highly charged lyrics have focused on themes such as anti-
immigrant racism and violence, social exclusion, and drug abuse among immigrant youth 
(Swedenburg 2001).  Through the melding of style and politics, Cartel’s music has been 
influential in providing cultural form and critical voice to a new generation of 
Turkish/immigrant youth in Germany.  As a press release of the collective’s reads: “As in 
France and England, here also ethnic minorities have stated to rebel against 
discrimination their own music.  Hip hop as a language is here a logical choice. Cartel 
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understands itself as a music lobby for thousands of kids of the second generation, 
speaking up for what they feel” (Elflein 1998:260).  
 Resonating beyond its national boundaries, however, Cartel’s music has also 
struck a cord among youth in Turkey were its popularity has helped spark the growth of 
the country’s own ingenious hip hop movement.  Evocative of the black diasporic 
context, Turkish hip hop in this manner serves as a popular modality through which 
diasporic forms of Turkish identification can be transnationally forged between 
immigrant descendant youth in Germany and their generational peers in Turkey.  
Although the politics of their production in these national settings may differ, the 
diasporic significance of Turkish hip hop remains significant in both.  Within Germany, 
hip hop has enabled marginalized immigrant youth a symbolically empowering means to 
tie themselves to an alternative national framework of Turkishness.  Illustrative of this 
move, Cartel’s album cover graphics utilized red background and an ornamented “C” for 
Cartel evoking the Turkish national flag’s white crescent framed in red.  These discursive 
associations, however, have raised problems in post-WWII Germany where nationalist 
appeals raise immediate alarms and are often readily condemned.  Such was the case with 
Cartel who were accused of advocating an anti-German Turkish nationalism which they, 
in turn, felt compelled to disavow (Caglar 1998).  The rise of hip hop in Turkey in turn 
must be understood within that country’s broader and continued struggle to define itself 
as a “modern” western-styled secular state following its historical ambiguity as a 
crossroads of East and West – between Islamic civilization and empire on one hand, and 
hegemonic constructions of a Euro-western modernity on the other.  Hip hop provides 
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youth of Turkey today a means to construct their own (post)modern identities as 
contemporary Turks; identities that link them to their diasporic cousins in Germany while 
tying them to a more expansive imagined community of a hip hop (trans)nation.   
 
The Transcendent Politics of Black Racial Oppositionality 
 
 In my attempt to explore the politics of race and identity as they play out within 
the increasingly globalized phenomenon of rap music and hip hop culture, my query has 
centered on one simple question: how does the “black” in black expressive and black-
identified popular cultural travel?  Though it clearly depends on the specific local context 
of its reception, my attention has focused on the tendency – and it is a significant one – 
among other racially marked youth to translate, reconfigure, and redeploy the black racial 
oppositionality conveyed through rap and hip hop in articulating their own 
oppositionally-positioned identities, related social critiques, and antiracist activism.  I 
have suggested that representational meanings of blackness embodied within the frame of 
rap and hip hop have emerged in the first instance through highly mediated negotiations 
of African American expressive and artistic production on one side, and racially 
prescriptive commercial processes on another.  The resulting “performance” of blackness 
that arises from this dialectic has become an influential modality through which 
blackness and racial difference is popularly represented and enacted in the U.S. and 
increasingly beyond.  Underscoring the ways black images and representational meanings 
are performatively shaped through the cultural lens of hip hop, I have argued, reveals the 
important inter-relationality of black expressive culture, representational practice, and the 
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politics and processes of black identity formation.  This is to say that the broad cultural 
sphere of hip hop in the U.S. functions interdependently as a realm of black cultural 
production, a commercially commodified black spectacle, and as an important everyday 
space for the production and signification of contemporary black identities of difference.  
  The politics of style, I have emphasized, serve as central conduits through which 
hip hop’s blacknesses of meaning are performatively constituted and conveyed.  Be it the 
signature bass-heavy beats or cadent lyric flow of rap music, or the cultural materiality of 
hip hop-informed “black urban fashion,” hip hop’s black textuality is signified above all 
through its style. It is precisely through such black-signified stylistics, as complexly 
interarticulated as they may be, that rap music and hip hop culture communicate a 
racialized difference transnationally.  Here there is no claim to an essentialized African 
American or black culture “authenticity” and/or ownership of hip hop.  Rather, the 
question becomes one of cultural roots verses cultural routes: hip hop’s historical 
rootedness within an African American continuum of expressive culture and music 
making – one additionally forged at the intersection of Afrodiasporic/Latino culture 
interchange; and the contemporary transnational routes through which hip hop is 
refashioned in the sociocultural making of new meanings and ways of being.     
 Hip hop’s politics of black style provide a frame for other racialized minority 
youth for the performative refashioning and mobilization of their own alternative 
identities and politics of racial difference.  Again, the cultural politics aesthetically 
conveyed through the stylistics of hip hop operate at a meta-linguistic level; enabling 
non-English speaking youth globally to identify intelligibly with and redeploy hip hop’s 
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racially oppositional underpinnings despite barriers of language.  Blackness functions 
transformatively in these contexts as a transnational signifier of racial difference; one 
which can be utilized as far away as New Zealand where the Upper Hutt Posse, a Maori 
rap group, has sonically fuse elements of Maori language with samples of Nation of 
Islam’s Minster Louis Farrakhan (Mitchell 1996:2).  The global space of rap and hip hop 
in these ways possess, to borrow again from George Lipsitz, the capacity to “created new 
networks of identification and affiliation that render obsolete some traditional political 
practices and identities while creating complicated and complex new cultural fusions 
with profound political implications.”28 
  The cultural processes and the racially reconfigured identities that emerge from 
within hip hop’s increasingly transnational contours are, moreover, by their very nature 
intimately tied to broader economic, social, and cultural dynamics associated with global 
postmodernity.  Along the lines of Fredrick Jameson, David Harvey and others, I speak 
here of the postmodern as an historicized global condition materially linked to and 
characterized by the rapid expansion of transnational capital.  For Jameson, a defining 
characteristic of this new global reality involved practices of cultural commodification: 
that is, the advancing global pace at which “culture,” in all its potential forms, is being 
transformed into objects of market value by and for the seemingly transnational 
boundlessness of a postmodern cultural logic.  The cultural complexities of hip hop’s 
production and global diffusion, as I have argued, are inextricably linked to such 
commercially-mediated modes of cultural commodification as they are to the 
                                                 
28 Lipsitz 1994:13. 
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proliferation of transnational capital networks and markets.  The trans-local flows of 
music, images, fashion and meanings that feed rap and hip hop’s internationalization are 
themselves material and discursive manifestations of these same postmodern processes.  
Cultural flows of these kinds, in turn, operate as key resources in the (self)fashioning of 
emergent, critically-positioned identities of difference within hip hop’s global cultural 
frame.   
 Beyond their cultural sources, such hip hop-informed identities are further marked 
by postmodernity in a number of interrelated ways.  Within the sociocultural context of 
the Black Atlantic, as previously mentioned, there are prominent scholarly arguments that 
root the black diasporic experience, its politics, and identities squarely – if not 
uncontestably – within historicized space and project of Western modernity.29  My 
suggestion, however, is that while black diasporic frameworks may engage, evoke, and/or 
reproduce their own discourses modernists structures and discourses, they nonetheless 
propose some fundamental post-modern challenges in both form and function to 
modernist interarticulations of race and nation.  Predicated on the projection of 
nationally-transcendent forms of black identification, black diasporic modes of identity 
are often strategically mobilized in contestation of dominant national constructions of 
race and corresponding modes of racialized subjugation.  As the cases of Brazilian and 
South African rap vividly illustrate, hip hop’s black transnational significance has 
enabled the mobilization of new forms of black identity and politics which challenge the 
racial underpinnings of national formations and their socially disabilitating affects.  In 
                                                 
29 See again Gilroy (1993), Nassy Brown (1998) and Michael Hanchard (1999). 
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contexts such as France and Germany, racially marked minority youth employ hip hop’s 
racially oppositional meanings in articulating new identities of racial difference and 
antiracist politics which contest exclusionary and repressive tendencies of Euro-national 
identity and citizenship.  In all these cases, the outer-national production of critically-
mobilized forms of racial identity undermine nationally-bounded constructions of race 
which have historically underskirted the construction of “the nation” as the quintessential 
organizational structure of modern power.30  In these ways these emergent hip hop-
inflected identities of difference and their political framings can be understood as 
postmodern ruptures within the modernist façade of their respective national contexts – 
effectively fracturing the homogenizing meta-narratives of national monolithies.   
 The social mobilization of racialized identities through the transnational frame of 
hip hop in these ways can be further understood within the context of new identity-based 
social movements.  The term new social movements generally speaks to the emergence of 
new kinds of action-oriented social organization predicated most often on subaltern forms 
of identity politics. A sizable body of recent literature theorizing the rise of new social 
movements has occurred within the context of Latin America where indigenous and 
African-descendent communities have mobilized around “ethnic” and/or racial identities 
(as opposed to “class”) in struggles for greater cultural and political rights.31  Such 
struggles and the politicized identities around which they are organized are frequently 
                                                 
30 For discussions of the historically interarticulations of race and nation see Paul Gilroy (1987) 
and Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (1991).  For key treatments of the nation and 
modern power see Benedict Anderson (1991), Anthony Smith (1991), and Partha Chatterjee 
(1993). 
31  For a comprehensive review of Latin American-based new social movement literature see 
Charles Hale (1997).  
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articulated in oppositional terms vis-à-vis exclusionary constructions and practices of 
specific national formations.  Identities of oppositional difference therefore become the 
social lens through which these groups mobilize in response to forms of social power and 
inequality that are expressed along these very same lines of difference.    
A significant segment of the literature on new social movements has underscored 
the links between the rise of identity-based social mobilization and the advancing pace at 
which transnational capital and related neoliberal policies are reshaping the social 
landscape of previously more-bounded national contexts.  The emergence of new 
national-transcendent, locally-manifested social imperatives, in turn, demand new forms 
of equally responsive collective social strategies.  As I have attempted to illustrate, the 
transnational cultural framework of hip hop has enabled the mobilization of just such 
kinds of critical identities.  In many of these cases new racialized paradigms have both 
shaped and necessitated the emergence of new kinds of racial-based social strategies on 
the part of new generations of racially marked citizenry.  In Europe we have seen the rise 
of new forms of racism tied to right-wing neo-nationalist movements and settlement that 
primarily target non-western immigrants whose “cultural difference” is viewed as 
incompatible with Euro-national cultural norms.  This rise of what Etienne Balibar has 
termed neo-racisms (Balibar 1991) calls for new kinds of racially responsive agencies of 
which hip hop, as illustrated in the case of France and Germany, has become an 
important site for immigrant-descendant youth to critically shape and act from newly 
articulated identities of racial difference.  In these cases the current economic and social 
restructuring towards an integrated Europe in conjunction the postcolonial movement of 
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peoples from the “peripheries” to the “centers” that characterize this moment are largely 
informed by the global workings of late capital. 
In the case of South Africa, a new generation of racially classified colored youth 
are attempting to position themselves amidst shifting racial paradigms of “old” and 
“new” where current claims to non-racialism run counter to the continuing 
socioeconomic structures of hierarchical racial privilege.  In Brazil, hegemonic 
discourses tied to notions of “racial democracy” are increasingly becoming unhinged as 
Afro-Brazilian youth utilize the diasporically-configured black racial contours of hip hop 
to construct new identities as the basis to critically interrogate the social realities of their 
everyday.  In all these instances, rap music and the broader cultural frame of hip hop 
enabled a level of strategic self-making within and through prescriptive structures of 
racialized power as they intersect at the nexus of the local and global.  
As U.S. and other globally-situated examples of hip hop attest, the creative 
fashioning of such “postmodern” informed racial identities are resoundingly masculine in 
character.  To the extent to which patriarchal forms of power may be reproduced in 
efforts to advance oppositional kinds of racial politics and antiracist activism, the 
question that must be asked is whether such attempts at political praxis can be truly 
liberatory.  While the late Audre Lorde reminds us that the masters tools may never 
dismantle the master’s house (Lord 1984), the growing assertion of women’s voices 
within local rap communities holds possibilities for a more inclusive envisioning of a 
socially-just hip hop future.  As I move to my examination of el movimiento hip hop 
cubano questions of gender and liberation remain a highly contested domains as they 
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plays out at the intersections of revolution, machismo, U.S. black radicalism, and 









 Before I offer a more detailed description of el movimiento de rap cubano and its 
relationship to the interplay of race and social transition in contemporary Cuba, it is 
necessary to first contextualize the historical significance of race in the making of a 
modern Cuban nation.  In order to do so, it is imperative that one be attentive to the 
constitutive roles different forms of black political mobilization have played within 
Cuba’s dialectic of race and nation.  Such an effort is an attempt to locate black Cubans 
as active agents in the historical process of Cuban nation building rather than as passive 
objects or “cultural elements” of the nation as they are all too often portrayed.  
 As throughout the Caribbean, Cuba’s development as a modern nation is 
inextricably tied to race through the foundational role of African slave labor.  Within 
eight years of initial Spanish settlement, the first enslaved Africans were brought to Cuba 
in 1522.  Early interest in gold extraction using coerced indigenous labor quickly gave 
way to cattle ranching and small-holding tobacco cultivation which became the mainstays 
of the Cuban colonial economy throughout the seventeenth and most part of the 
eighteenth century (Segal 1995:82).  Though the importation of enslaved Africans 
continued during this period, neither cattle ranching nor tobacco production required 
enormous numbers of slave labor.  Cuba did, however, serve as a key trafficking point for 
slave ships en route from Africa to their various destinations in the new world.  It was not 
until large-scale plantation-based sugar production took hold in Cuba that the demand for 
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African slave labor dramatically escalated, radically altering the historical direction and 
character of the island as a whole. 
 This transformation of the Cuban economy was directly tied to the collapse of the 
colonial sugar industry of St. Domingue, brought on by the initiation of the Haitian 
Revolution in 1791.  Capitalizing on St. Domingue’s abrupt departure from the world 
market as the Caribbean’s preeminent sugar economy (Pérez 1983), Cuba – with the help 
of thousands of French settlers who had fled St. Domingue with some of their enslaved 
workers – embarked on a rapid, large-scale expansion of sugar production.  In total, some 
750,000 enslaved Africans were introduced to Cuba between 1763 and 1862 (Pérez 
1983:85), feeding Cuba’s ever-expanding sugar industry which would soon became the 
world’s largest.32  As a grim illustration of the pace at which African lives were 
consumed by Cuban sugar, the average life expectancy of enslaved Africans on many 
nineteenth-century plantations was less than seven years (Pérez 1983:92).  In general 
terms then, Cuba’s enslaved population was sustained less through “natural growth” than 
through the ongoing acquisition of Africans – a practice which continued as late as the 
early 1860s (Thomas 1996).  
 Such brutality, however, did not go unanswered.  Though there were numerous 
slave revolts during the eighteenth-century, it was not until Cuban slaves began hearing 
word of the freeing of slaves in the British West Indies in the 1840s that resistance to 
Cuban slavery increased dramatically (Segal 1995:93).  These rebellions represented 
some of the first collective expressions of organized black opposition.  Under Spain’s 
                                                 
32 For an unparalleled examination of the rise of Cuba’s plantation-based sugar economy see 
Manuel Fraginals’ EL ingenio  (1978).   
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colonial authority, Cuba’s repression of these early forms of black resistance came to a 
head in the infamous La Escalera massacre of 1844,33 in which thousands of slaves and 
free people of color were accused of plotting to end slavery and Spanish control of the 
island.  By the end of 1844 – which became known as año de cuero (“year of the lash”) – 
thousands of people of color, both free and enslaved, were executed, imprisoned, or 
simply disappeared (Paquette 1988).   
 The physical repression of Cuba’s enslaved population, and the racist legislation 
targeted primarily at free people of color which ensued, appear to have been intended 
more as systematic attempts to curtail the potential of black resistance and political 
mobilization than a response to any real threat.  In fact, there has been significant 
historical debate as to whether the alleged plot behind La Escalera may have been a 
state-fabricated “conspiracy theory” to justify its bloody reprisal against blacks (Paquette 
1988).  White Cuban creole elite’s fears of a “black Cuba” were most certainly 
exacerbated by the recent memory of the Haitian experience.  While the specter of the 
Haitian experience would continue to haunt “white” Cuba (Duharte Jiménez 1993), La 
Escalera would in many ways set an historical precedent regarding how Cuba would 
chose to deal with oppositional expressions of black political organization and 
mobilization. 
 
The Independence Wars, Antonio Maceo, and the Assertion of Black National Legitimacy  
                                                 
33  La Escalera, or “the ladder”, refers to the inhuman practice of binding individuals suspected 
of insurrection to ladders, upon which they where interrogated and often severely whipped as 
punishment. This was the a central method by which Africans allegedly involved in this 




 Another significant, if not historically constitutive, moment of early Afro-Cuban 
mobilization occurred during Cuba’s wars of independence.  During the first set of 
independence wars between 1868 and 1878, and the second between 1895 and 1898, 
upwards of seventy percent of the rank and file of the liberation army were estimated to 
be men of color – e.g. black or mulatto (McGarrity and Cárdenas 1995:82).  Such rates of 
black voluntary military participation were remarkably high when compared to other 
black populations in the hemisphere.  The key inspiration for such involvement was the 
promise of manumission to those who volunteered, as well as the association of the 
independence struggle with the abolition of slavery and eventual social reforms (Helg 
1995).  When the larger rebellion refused to emancipate blacks en masse, General 
Antonio Maceo, a “mulatto” and a key military figure in the independence wars, led raids 
on plantations to free enslaved blacks and encouraging them to join the independence 
struggle.  These freed blacks, who were among the officially recorded thirty-two percent 
of Cuba’s population of African descent in 1887 (Helg 1995:24), made up the vast 
majority of los mambises – the famed, horse-backed fighting force of the liberation army. 
 Concerning the historical position of Afro-Cubans vis-à-vis questions of national 
citizenship, the significance of Maceo’s role and symbolism as heroic liberator of both 
black Cubans and the Cuban nation is a complex one.  Under the leadership of Maceo 
and other black cabecillas (rebel leaders), including his brother José, the involvement of 
thousands of recently freed blacks in the nationalist struggle represented the ultimate 
challenge to those who would choose to exclude blacks from equal participation in a 
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newly liberated Cuba nation.  Within this clearly male-centered nationalist paradigm, 
claims of black national legitimacy were predicated on the fact that black soldiers were 
willing to sacrifice their lives in the struggle for an independent Cuba.  In so doing blacks 
were therefore entitled to demand their rightful share as full citizens within a newly 
independent Cuba (Helg 1995).  Realizing such claims, however, proved quite illusive.  
Following the official abolition of slavery in 1886 – the second to last country in the 
hemisphere to do so, Cuba finally gained independence from Spain in 1898.  Cuba was 
then immediately occupied between 1899 and 1902 by the U.S. military after Spain’s 
defeat in the Spanish-American War.  Within a newly formed Cuban Republic, blacks 
continued to experienced systematic exclusion from full participation within the political, 
social, and economic spheres of a ‘liberated’ Cuban nation. 
 Though Antonio Maceo died in battle two years before Cuba officially gained 
independence, his historical importance as a leader and embodied icon of Cuban 
nationalism can not be overstated.  Among creole elite at the time, however, such 
reverence was accompanied by fear – a racist fear resonant of the Haitian Revolution of a 
black caudillo (leader) ushering in a black Cuba (Duharte Jiménez 1993; Ferrer 1999).  
This fear was clearly prevalent among white civilian independence leaders during the 
period just prior to Maceo’s death, when his position as the second most influential of 
Cuba’s rebel generals was increasingly under attack.34  It has been suggested that such 
white fear may have been a contributing factor to Maceo’s (un)timely defeat and death at 
the hands of the Spanish (Duharte Jiménez 1993; Helg 1995).    
                                                 
34  Maceo officially served as second in command of the liberation army after Dominican-born 
General Máximo Gómez was named commander and chief in 1878.  
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 Among black Cubans, Maceo represented the martyred personification of black 
national legitimacy.  For many creole elite of an emerging Cuban Republic, however, the 
image of a black or mulatto occupying such a key position in Cuba’s national beginnings 
was in conflict with those attempts to write a “white” Cuba into history.  To these ends an 
“anthropological” study of Maceo’s exhumed skeleton was commissioned in 1900 that 
employed 18th century eugenics theories to “scientifically” prove that Maceo’s “white” 
heritage predominated over that of his “black” (Helg 1985:104-5, Ferrer 1999:168).  Such 
attempts to erase Maceo’s blackness – and by extension the significance of black 
participation in the independence wars – symbolized larger efforts to erase blackness 
itself from the face of the nation and corresponding conceptions of cubanidad.   
 Maceo’s African ancestry would eventually be resurrected by celebrated Afro-
Cuban/nationalist poet Nicolás Guillién, whose work was instrumental in promoting a 
racially creolized discourse of Cuban national identity during the Afro-Cubanismo 
movement of the mid-1920s (Moore 1997, Ellis 1998, Marínez-Eschzábal 1998).  
Maceo’s blackness, or more accurately “mulattoness,” would be further revived in a post-
1959 revolutionary Cuba that posited Maceo as one of three heroic father-figures of 
Cuban nationalism.35  Maceo’s non-white mulattoness – symbolic of black participation 
in the independence wars – is celebrated in such a way that it testifies not only to the 
multi-racial character of Cuba, but ultimately to the non-racial foundations of the Cuban 
nation itself.  Moreover, Maceo’s racially-mixed background provides an embodied icon 
                                                 
35 The other two are General Máximo Gómez  and the nationalist intellectual José Martí, to whom 
I will return shortly.  These three stand as canonic expressions of the highly male-defined 
character of Cuban nationalism.  
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of a creolized36 Cuban national identity which the Revolution, developing on a history of 
twentieth-century nationalist discourse, has come to claim as the sprit of cubanidad.  
Fidel Castro’s recent proclamation of Cuba as a “Latin-African” nation is illustrative of 
this position (see Moore 1988).  As I will soon argue, such creolized conceptions of 
cubanidad, as with similar nationalist discourses of mestizaje, have proven problematic 
vis-à-vis black Cuban efforts towards the development of black-identified forms of 
political action.  
 
José Martí, National Non-racialism, and U.S. Interventionism   
 
 Another key figure of Cuban nationalism whose intellectual legacy has been 
central to questions of race and nation in Cuba is the Cuban intellectual and activist José 
Martí.  While in exile in New York City in 1892, Martí founded the Cuban Revolutionary 
Party whose platform embodied his appeal for a united Cuba in which all Cubans 
regardless of race or class would join collectively in struggle for an independent republic.  
Martí was later killed in 1895 in a skirmish with Spanish troops within a month of 
returning to Cuba to join in the offensive.  Though his death deprived the independence 
movement of one of its most respected and promising civilian leaders, Martí’s writings 
on nationalism and anti-colonialism/U.S. imperialism have been powerfully resonant 
                                                 
36 I use the term creolized here as opposed to mestizo to signify the black racial significance 
implicit in the notion of racial mixing in Cuban. The term “mestizo” as it is commonly used 
within the Latin American context refers in historical to the cultural or “biological” mixing of 
indigenous and European peoples. Within the sociohistorical context of the Caribbean, the term 
creolization is more often used signify syncretization of African and European cultural elements.   
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within twentieth-century nationalist thinking in Cuba (if not throughout Latin America).  
Martí’s conception of a non-racial Cuba has been particularly enduring.  
 In his celebrated essay “Our America” published in New York in 1891, Martí 
outlines his ethical and political visions for a future Cuba.  Appealing to the Cuban 
independence movement, he rejects the idea of biologically-determined notion of race by 
asserting: “There can be no racial animosity, because there are no races” (cited in 
Shnookal 1999:119).  Martí’s appeal was no doubt informed by his recognition of the 
necessity of a racially unified independence struggle, which in turn would become the 
foundation of a newly established Cuban Republic predicated on non-racialism.  In his 
1893 essay “My Race,” Martí more explicitly elaborates: 
 
In Cuba, there is no fear of racial war. Men are more than whites, mulattos, or 
Negros. Cubans are more than whites, mulattos or Negros. On the field of battle, 
dying for Cuba, the souls of whites and Negros have risen together into the air. In the 
daily life of defense, loyalty, brotherhood and shrewdness, Negros have always been 




 Like Maceo, Martí was later canonized by the 1959 Cuban Revolution as a 
nationalist symbol, employing his vision of non-racial Cuba as a central tenet of a 
revolutionary Cuban society.  During one of two notable speeches in March 1959 on the 
question of race and the Revolution, a recently triumphant Fidel Castro evoked Martí’s 
non-racialist ideals when he declared:  
 
We have asked people to collaborate in the way which is most worthy, that they help 
us find greater friendship and understanding among all Cubans, and that they help us 
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fight against every injustice, that they help us fight against prejudice... We have to 
uproot the last colonial vestiges, conscious of making that phase of Martí’s reality.  
He said it before, we have to repeat it now: that the Cuban is more than white, more 




 Among black soldiers of the independence army, Martí’s racially-inclusive 
nationalist discourse was used to further justify their claims to national legitimacy.  
Historian Adda Ferrer contends that black soldiers often employed this language of non-
racialism to expose and condemn what they saw as racism within the nationalist ranks.  
Here, discourses of a raceless nation – those positing racial harmony and integration –  
were employed by black Cubans to win concessions within the independence movement 
(Ferrer 1999:9-10).  A similar argument has been posed by de la Fuente, who maintains 
that popular discourses of national racelessness have provided blacks with spaces to make 
political claims demanding the realization of such principles (de la Fuente 1999).  
 While such discourses of non-racialism may embody strong antiracist claims, they 
nonetheless present serious obstacles to the development of extra-national forms of 
political identification and action.  More specifically, beyond simply dismissing 
biological arguments of race, Martí’s non-racial proscriptions leave little legitimate space 
for the production of racially-informed kinds of identification that could serve as the 
basis for black political mobilization.  By radically juxtaposing the concepts of race and 
nation in this manner, forms of racial identification were configured as “racist” in their 
antithetical opposition to strictly “nationalist” modes of identifying.  Within this non-
                                                 




racial paradigm, claiming one’s blackness (or whiteness) is akin to an act of anti-
patriotism, if not by implication one of national treason.  As Ferrer suggests, the 
historical silencing of race in this way denies space not only for black Cuban political 
organizing, but possibly the very validity of black Cuban subjectivity as well (Ferrer 
1999).  These concerns continue to be a central dilemma of the black Cuban experience.  
 The reality, however, is that before history allowed space for the Cuban 
independence movement to address in one fashion or another its promise for a non-racial 
Cuban Republic, U.S. imperialism usurped the moment though its intervention and defeat 
of colonial Spain in the Spanish-American War of 1898.  The intervention in effect 
commandeered the battle over Cuba, transforming it from popular nationalist insurrection 
to imperialist conquest.  The ensuing U.S. military occupation in 1898-1902 and 
subsequent second intervention and occupation in 1906-9 had critical and lasting effects 
upon the Republic’s historical trajectory and, arguably, the islands racial dynamics well 
into the 20th century and beyond.  These interventions provided secure footholds for U.S. 
capital expansion within Cuba’s sugar economy over the next fifty years.   
 U.S. commercial interests in Cuban sugar, though, date back to the intensification 
of the mono-crop’s production though enslaved labor during the 19th century to feed 
growing U.S. and European consumption.38  By the mid-1890s the U.S. had in fact 
replaced Spain as Cuba’s primary importer of sugar (Martínez-Alier 1989).  The ultimate 
issue, however, was one of control as successive U.S. administrations made unsuccessful 
                                                 
38 For a seminal study of the political economy of sugar consumption in the West as an engine for 
the rise and expansion of slave-based plantation economies in the Caribbean see Stanley Mintz’s 
Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History (1985).  
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bids during the mid-19th century to annex the island within its territorial fold (Pérez 
1988).  Given that by the middle of the 19th century Cuba under slavery was producing 
25% of the worlds total sugar production (Leogrande and Tomas 2002:325), the potential 
economic stakes of such control were great. There was, moreover, concern by 1997 
within the McKinley administration regarding the advancing successes of the largely 
black independence army that could, in its assessment, potentially lead to the installation 
of a “Haitian-style black dictatorship” – a development that could, in turn, threaten U.S. 
interest in the island (Helg 1995:89).  Two military interventions resolved these 
dilemmas, and by the mid-1930s U.S. firms controlled upwards of seventy-five percent of 
Cuba’s sugarcane production (Jatar-Hausmann 1999:11).  By 1959 U.S. commercial 
investments in Cuba exceeded those of any foreign country with the exception of 
Venezuela, while it managed to consume roughly two-thirds of the islands exports and 
supply about three-quarters of its imports (Aguilar 1996:96).  Such imperialist designs 
were secured and codified in the Platt Amendment of 1901 which gave the U.S., among 
other things, the right to intervene for “the maintenance of a government adequate for the 
protection of life, property and individual liberties…”39  In this Cuba became a forth 
jewel among Spain’s former colonial holdings – along with Puerto Rico, the Philippines, 
and Guam – within the U.S.’s expanding imperialist war chest.  
 Subsequent with U.S. control, a number of scholars have argued that the U.S. 
occupation of 1898-1902 and ensuing influence up through and beyond the second 
occupation of 1906-9 contributed to further socio-political marginalization of black 
                                                 
39 To this end the Platt Agreement established the permanence of the U.S. naval base in 
Guantánamo Bay.   
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Cubans during the first half of the 20th century.  Helg for instance has suggested that the 
occupying U.S. military administration drew upon Cuba’s long standing patterns of racial 
differentiation in instituting policies that reified and further entrenched structural 
discrimination against blacks. She draws attention to systematic discrimination in 
employment and the implementation of new restrictive election laws that had a limiting 
effect on black Cuban participation within the island’s system of universal male suffrage 
– a key sanctioned triumph of the independence struggle (Helg 1995).  Alejandro de la 
Fuente has contended, moreover, that the U.S. military administrators actually introduced 
a “scientific racism” into Cuba’s social framework which institutionally codified an 
ideology of black racial inferiority enabling an importation of southern, U.S.-styled Jim 
Crow segregation within U.S.-owned sugar facilities with regard to housing and social 
amenities such as barber shops (de la Fuente 2001:109).  Many of these developments 
were perpetuated under the administration of Tomás Estrada Palma who, with the explicit 
consent of U.S. military governor, became the Republic’s first elected president in 1902.  
Estrada Palma’s government as later brought down in 1906 by a political uprising 
through the organizational framework of the oppositional Partido Liberal (Liberal Party)  
in which black Cubans participated in large numbers (de la Fuente 2001). It was this shift 
in power, again were black folks played a critical role, that provoked the second U.S. 
military intervention in Cuba that same year.  
 




 The emergence of the Afro-Cuban-based Partido Independiente de Color 
(Independent Party of Color) in 1908 represented a radical challenge to the young 
republic’s early claims of a national racelessness.  The Partido grew out of a growing 
black disillusionment over the continued exclusion of black Cubans from full and equal 
participation in the newly formed nation.  As former combatants and supporters in the 
independence wars, blacks found themselves systematically relegated to the working and 
peasant classes.  This situation was further exacerbated by massive state-promoted 
immigration of Spanish workers encouraged through the systematic use of European 
labor preferences.  In total, some 128,000 Spaniards entered the Cuban labor force 
between 1902 and 1907 (Helg 1995:99).  In addition to advancing black socio-economic 
marginalization, the creole elite’s encouragement of larger-scale Spanish immigration 
was also designed to promote a racial “whitening” of the Cuban population.  Historian 
Aline Helg has argued that Cuba’s official efforts at national whitening – unlike other 
Latin American variants of blanqueamiento (most notably Brazil) – was predicated less 
on the idea of “racial mixing” than on the notion that massive importation of European 
workers would further numerically marginalize blacks as a racial minority (Helg 1995). 
Official discourses aside, the historical consequences of so-called whitening and racial 
“miscegenation,” as I will discuss shortly, have been and continue to be very complex 
ones with regards to questions of Cuban nationhood.  
 It is within this context of continued black exclusion and marginalization that the 
Partido Independiente de Color formed in 1908.  As the first autonomous black political 
party in the Americas, the Partido built upon already existing organizational networks 
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developed during the independence wars.  Politically, the Partido brought a range of 
black individuals and interests together in presenting a program that pressed for demands 
to end racial discrimination, increasing access for blacks to state-sponsored employment, 
and social reform (Helg 1995).  Given the early passage of universal male suffrage, the 
Partido’s ranks grew rapidly, posing an electoral threat to the established white-
dominated parties.  The growing presence of black racial consciousness surrounding the 
Partido’s ascendance posed an additional challenge to the Republic’s attempts to silence 
race through its mantra of non-racialism.  The particular character of black Cuban racial 
identification given form by the Partido, however, did not embrace a black separatist or 
nationalist character.  Rather, the Partido’s ideological orientation and political project 
were directed toward the inclusion of blacks as full members within the Cuban nation – 
again, an assertion of an Afro-Cuban national legitimacy (Helg 1995).  As such, these 
political aims can be seen as framed within what Paul Gilroy has called a “politics of 
fulfillment” in their call for the realization of contractual promises by “the nation” and/or 
state power regarding the rights of full citizenship (Gilroy 1993a).  Such an approach is to 
be distinguished from a “politics of transfiguration” that would, in Gilroy’s formulation, 
seek to transform, rather than fulfill, existing structural conditions and contractual forms 
of state power.  I will later argue that an analogous politics of black national fulfillment 
finds contemporary (re)articulation through the space of Cuban hip hop.   
 Demands on the part of the Partido’s leadership for full and equal citizenship 
were nonetheless perceived as a threat to the national (read racial) status quo.  In 
response, the established Partido Liberal, which had traditionally garnered the majority of 
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black votes, passed legislation to prohibit political parties from organizing along class or 
racial lines.  The Moúra amendment of 1910 effectively banned the Partido from 
participating in national elections.  For two years party members unsuccessfully waged 
legal challenges against the law.  As a final strategy, the Partido organized a massive 
protest in Havana in 1912 against the amendment.40  The protest was brutally crushed by 
the Cuban army, effectively annihilating the party’s organization and its agenda.  More 
than three-thousand blacks were massacred while black folks were systematically 
terrorized across the island.  Often referred to as the “race war of 1912” by reactionary 
press and official accounts for decades, the massacre was fed once again by lingering 
white fears of a black Cuba rising to swallow up the nation in the making of another 
Haiti.  The experiences of 1912 were a radical reminder of the political stakes at play 
concerning Cuba’s proclaimed non-racialism.  In this case, the perceived threat of an 
asserted black voice through autonomous political action was met with unrestrained state 
violence.  As Helen Safa observes, the events of 1912 are a clear illustration of how a 
system of racial hegemony – in Cuba’s case, one predicated on notions of national 
racelessness – can shift to one of overt physical coercion when threatened by the 
formation of a racial (or “ethnic”) blocs (Safa 1998:9).  
 The 1912 massacre effectively put an end to independent black political parties in 
Cuba as blacks subsequently worked within existing political parties and trade unions as 
opposed to their own autonomous organizations.  There exists some debate as to whether 
                                                 
40 There is some debate over whether protesters were armed or not.  The official State account at 
the time held that they were bearing arms.  Given the experience of La Escalera, these claims 
might have been fabricated as a pretense for the Cuba government’s bloody reprisal against the 
Partido Independiente’s supporters.  
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this move signified a radical neutralization of black political expression within Cuba.  
Some have suggested that the brutal razing of the Partido Independiente amounted to the 
end of organized black radicalism in Cuba (e.g. Helg 1993:21).  Others have argued that 
blacks continued to press political demands through their work within national 
organizations and structures (la Fuente 2001).  The Cuban Communist Party (PCC), for 
instance, took up some of the demands of the Partido Independiente de Color, assuming 
the role as vanguard of working-class which was overwhelmingly made up of black 
Cubans and a new and growing body of black migrant workers from the Caribbean 
(McGarrity and Cárdenas 1995).   
 Between 1912 and 1931, more than 300,000 black Caribbean immigrants, 
primarily from Haiti, Jamaica and Barbados, entered Cuba to work the cane fields 
following a post WWI sugar boom (Carr 1998; de la Fuente 2001).  The introduction of 
these workers – the largest numbers from Haiti and Jamaica – significantly complicated 
the national dynamics of race on the island, as well as contributed a new and lasting black 
presence primarily in the eastern provinces of Camagüey and Oriente.  By the 1920s 
these immigrants became targets of racist anti-immigrant hostilities fed by elite fears of a 
black “invasion” which would thwart those efforts at “whitening” the Cuban Republic (de 
la Fuente 1999).  Racially-coded discourses of disease and national contamination were 
systematically tied to these immigrants (Carr 1998:86; de la Fuente 1999:52).  
Additionally, growing anti-imperialist sentiment linked black Caribbean workers to the 
increasing influence of U.S. capital, which had come to dominate Cuba’s sugar sector by 
this time (Carr 1998:84).   
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 An important development tied to the growth of the black Caribbean immigrant 
population at this time was the establishment of Cuban branches of the UNIA.  The 
UNIA’s publication the Negro World began circulating in both Spanish and English 
editions in 1920 (Fernández Robaina 1998).  The organization’s black nationalist 
organization presented an ideological, if not oppositional, alternative to the racial 
exclusivity of an ostensibly non-racial cubanidad.  The UNIA’s message was particularly 
appealing to Cuba’s radically marginalized Caribbean-born black population.  In fact, the 
UNIA’s race-based appeals were staunchly rejected by black Cuban intellectuals and the 
established black press.  When Garvey himself visited Cuba in 1921 his reception among 
black Cuban leaders was rather mixed (Fernández Robaina 1998).  President of a 
prominent Havana-based black society, Miguel Angel Cépedes was at the time quoted as 
saying:  
 
The black Cuban strove to create a republic where he could live in dignity and enjoy 
all the rights of a civilized and free man: he cannot imagine another homeland other 
than the Cuban homeland. He does not share in the Pan-African ideal because he has 




 As this quotation illustrates, hegemonic discourses of national inclusively found a 
level of resonance among the black middle-class establishment.  Another possible factor 
contributing to an on the ground distancing of black Cubans from the UNIA is that racist 
anti-immigrant attacks often targeted “indigenous” blacks as well as immigrants (Carr 
1998). It has been suggested that this situation may have helped discourage black Cubans 
                                                 
41 Cited in Fernández Robaina 1998:121.   
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from participating in racially-identified forms of political organization (Aviva Chomsky 
1994 cited in Carr 1998:86).  Yet, among Caribbean-born blacks Garvey and the UNIA 
remained popular, especially with English-speaking Jamaican workers.  By the late 
1920s, however, both Garvey and the UNIA were banned by the Cuban government.  
 The combination of anti-immigrant sentiment and the growing economic crisis 
culminated in a massive general strike in Havana and other cites which eventually 
brought down the U.S.-backed Machado dictatorship in 1933.  The brief five-month reign 
of the left-leaning Grau San Martin government was unsuccessful at consolidating its 
position amidst continued labor unrest, and was quickly overturned  by a U.S. supported 
coup lead by army strongman Fulgencio Batista.  Through the organizational leadership 
of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) and its allies, black sugar workers – who were 
comprised of large numbers of Caribbean immigrants – were at the center of the labor 
mobilizations which helped shape the political outcomes of 1933 (Carr 1998).  During the 
same period, the PCC had begun a short-lived campaigning for the establishment of an 
autonomous black region, or “franja negra” (“black belt”), in the eastern part of the island 
– an idea which was eventually abandoned.  Although the PCC positioned itself as a 
champion against racial discrimination and the deportation of foreign-born black 
workers, the depth of its organized support among Cuban blacks was limited.  
 Alternatively, blacks continued to organize within the space of religious and 
cultural organizations which had developed as traditional black social institutions.  
Cabildos were established during slavery as spaces in which groups of blacks organized 
themselves into collective societies to promote social welfare and cohesion among the 
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enslaved.  The formation of cabildos were initially encouraged by the Cuban state and 
Roman Catholic Church in Cuba as a means, at least in part, to create individually 
identified slave communities as a bulwark against a unified African slave population 
(Segal 1995).  Many of these societies practiced forms of ‘traditional’ African-based 
religion and ritual involving the initiated.  Cabildos, however, are to be distinguished 
from earlier religious communities such as lucumi, abakuá, arara, and mayombé orders 
formed by enslaved Africans along ethnic or “national” lines, many of which still exist 
today.  The more prolific santería – a collection of more self-consciously syncretic forms 
of Yoruba/Congo-based religious practices – has and continues to serve as another 
important space for Afro-Cuban cultural production and social organization.   
 As these examples illustrate, cultural institutions evolving around realms of 
expressive culture have historically been key sites of Afro-Cuban social organization 
given, in part, the limited access to other kinds of collective mobilization.  Through the 
production and codification of self-identifiably “black” cultural practices, black Cubans 
constituted group identities of difference through the space of expressive culture, 
providing a basis not only for collective identification, but collective action as well.  
Throughout the early twentieth century, however, many of these groups experienced 
harsh periods of repression from succeeding Cuban administrations (Moore 1997).  This 
repression was accompanied by continued racial discrimination and exclusion of blacks 
from national structures of power.  Though a new constitution was established in 1940 
that nominally made racial discrimination illegal, black Cubans continued to experience 




Fernando Ortiz, Race and the Cultural Politics of Cubanidad 
 
 One cannot adequately discuss the historical interplay of race and nation in Cuba 
without addressing the ways in which the two have been configured vis-à-vis questions of 
culture within popular, if not hegemonically constituted, conceptions of Cuban national 
identity.  The work of Cuban sociologist Fernando Ortiz has been particularly 
instrumental in influencing twentieth-century ideas on race and culture in relationship to 
notions of cubanidad.  Ortiz was part of a movement arising during the early 1920s 
comprised of primarily middle-class white elites and vandgardist intellectuals who 
represented the first wave of Republic-born intelligentsia.  These individuals led efforts 
to hegemonically construct a national Cuban identity independent of, if not oppositional 
to, a history of Spanish colonial influence and growing U.S. imperialist domination 
(Moore 1997).42  Ortiz and his colleagues recognized that contemporary ideas of national 
Cubanness, though they may have made claims to a non-racialism, tended to exclude 
non-whites from national representations.  In search of an “authentic” Cubanness, these 
individuals looked toward black Cubans as the cultural saviors of a Cuban national soul.  
One manifestation of this ideological development was the previously mentioned Afro-
Cubanismo movement of the mid-1920s, comprised chiefly of writers, poets, and 
musicians (Moore 1997).  
                                                 




 Commonly venerated as the ‘father’ of Afro-Cuban studies, Ortiz’s early work 
argued that Afro-Cuban religious practices, in particular so-called brujeria,43 were 
examples of an Afro-Cuban cultural and social pathology.  Much of his initial writings 
attempted to argue a black racialized propensity towards criminality – efforts which took 
on added force given Ortiz’s early work as a professional witness for the prosecution of 
black religious leaders (Moore 1997:34).  In a related vein, Ortiz made early 
recommendations that immigration to the island be limited to northern Europeans as a 
way of stemming the incorporation of other “races” that would contribute to a greater 
level of Cuban criminality (Helg 1995:104).  Presumably abandoning much of his earlier 
racist orientations, Ortiz’s latter work shifted considerably as he became an active 
champion of Afro-Cuban culture.  These efforts were institutionalized in his founding of 
the Sociedad de Estudios Afro-Cubanos (the Society for Afro-Cuban Studies) in 1937.  In 
addition to presenting a new-founded academic legitimacy to Afro-Cuban culture and 
religious practice, the establishment of the Sociedad de Estudios Afro-Cubanos also laid 
an institutional groundwork for an appropriation and folklorization of black expressive 
culture as the basis for a Cuban nationalist culture (Moore 1994).  The configuring of 
Afro-Cuban expressive culture and by extension black Cubans themselves within 
nationally-bounded discourses of “folklore,” as I will discuses in the subsequent chapter, 
                                                 
43 The term brujeria or “witchcraft” is a derogatory, creole-derived catch-all expression which 
refers to various Afro-Cuban espiritism practices which employ a complex use of plants and 
animals, incantations, and the exercise of supernatural powers to heal, protect, or harm people.  
See Ortiz’s Los negros brujos (1906) for an example of Ortiz’s early representations of Afro-
Cuban cultural criminality.  
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additionally poses a number of problematics with regard to black cultural and political 
viability outside nationally prescribed dictates of non-racialism.  
 Perhaps Ortiz’s single most influential idea within Cuban nationalist thinking in 
the later twentieth century has been his notion of transculturation.  Drawing heavily upon, 
among others, Mellville Herskovits’ work on acculturation (Moore 1997),44 Ortiz first 
elaborated his idea of transculturation in his 1940 work Contrapunteo cubano del tabaco 
y el azúcar (Cuban Counterpoint of Tobacco and Sugar) in which Bronislaw 
Malinowski’s introduction contributed a level of canonic authority.  For Ortiz, Cuban 
culture evolved through a historical process of continual cultural – if not biological – 
mixing or “transculturation” between peoples of African, Spanish, and to a lesser degree 
Chinese descent.45  As an ideological variant of mestizaje, Ortiz held that such processes 
had given rise to what he understood as a uniquely hybridized character of Cuban culture 
and national identity.   Here Ortiz made a distinction, drawing on Herskovits, between the 
idea of “acculturation” – which he understood as processes by which subaltern cultures 
are assimilated into larger or more dominant ones – and a process of transculturation in 
which two or more cultures engage each other through continual interaction resulting in 
mutual “transmutation” (Morejón 1993).  Out of this dialectic, Ortiz argued, arose a new 
creolized Cuban culture and national identity that stood distinctly apart from both its 
cultural antecedents.   
                                                 
44 See Herskovits (1938) 
45 Some 130,000 mostly male Chinese “contract workers” (i.e. indentured laborers) were 
introduced to Cuba between 1853 and 1872 to replace an increasingly shrinking numbers of 
enslaved black labor due to gradual manumission (Thomas 1996:18) 
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 Ortiz’s claim of a synthesized Cuban exceptionalism was reminiscent of Mexican 
ideologue José Vasconcelos’ earlier conception of la raza cosmica (Vasconcelos [1925]).  
An apparent distinction between these two models, however, is that while Vasconcelos’ 
la raza cosmica paradigm was grounded in biologized notions of race – the mixing of 
indigenous and Spanish “blood” in the making of a new mestizo people – Ortiz’s 
Herskovitian orientation focused more on processes of cultural syncretism and 
hybridization as the foundations for the production of cubanidad.  I speak of this as an 
apparent distinction to underscore the ambiguity of Ortiz’s culturalist approach.  
Although Ortiz’s model of transculturation employed the language of culture, it often 
conceived of it subtly racist, biologically-essentialized, and racially hierarchical kinds of 
ways (Moore 1994).  
 Another key problematic of Ortiz’s notion of transculturation is that his model of 
cultural interchange is devoid of any critical discussion of power.  This is to say that 
Ortiz’s paradigm of transculturation does not account for the gross power discrepancies 
that have historically defined inter-relationships between Cubans of African and 
European descent.  Any cultural and/or racial intermixing which has occurred between 
these two groups of actors by their very historical positions involved negotiations of 
power along axes of race, class, and gendered positions.  Ortiz’s “poetic” account of 
Cuba’s transculturated beginnings clearly elides such examinations.  To the extent to 
what Ortiz’s notion of transculturation like all ideologies of mestizaje ultimately invokes 
“whitening” (Wade 1993), Ortiz’s discussion of cultural mixing tended to obfuscate the 
reality of Cuba’s historical experience of racial mixing.   
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 As Verena Martinez-Alier’s study Marriage, Class and Color in Nineteenth-
Century Cuba makes clearly apparent, racial mixing within Cuban slave society was a 
highly gendered, power-laden affair.  Almost without exception, interracial ‘relations’ 
between black and white Cubans during the period involved white men and women of 
color, both free or enslaved (Martinez-Alier 1989).  The writings of prominent 
nineteenth-century Cuban intellectual and political leader José Antonio Saco lent 
intellectual legitimacy to such practices.  In advocating limited interracial mixing as a 
means to “neutralize...the terrible influence of the three million negros” poised on 
overrunning a “white” Cuba, Saco argued that interracial liaisons should be limited to 
those between white men and black or mulatto women (Martínez-Echazábal 1998:28).  
The early production of what Ortiz and others would later celebrate as the uniquely 
hybridized essence of Cuban national identity or cubanidad is therefore historically 
rooted in practices of socioeconomic domination along lines of gender and class, as well 
as those of race.  
 Ortiz’s idea of transculturation and related notions of cultural syncretism continue 
to have strong resonance within official, academic, and popular conceptions of the Cuban 
national imaginary.  As prominent black Cuban poet Nancy Morejón recently argued:  
“We have not been assimilated, that is to say acculturated to Spanish or African culture.  
With a highly creative sprit, in the constant quest for nationhood, we have produced a 
mixed people, who inherit and embody both components, no longer either Spanish or 
African, but Cuban.” (Morejón 1993:232)  Although such discourses of Cuban cultural 
creolization – and by extension national racelessness – may be racially incorporative, like 
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similar national ideologies of mestizaje they simultaneously undercut efforts among 
blacks (and other “others” ) to mobilize around real-lived experiences of racial exclusion 
and racialized forms of oppression (Stutzman 1981; Wade 1993, Hanchard 1994, Safa 
1998, Windance Twine 1998). 
 
Race and the Cuban Revolution  
 
 
 With the triumph of the Cuban Revolution in 1959, the soon-to-be acknowledged 
socialist government placed the elimination of racial discrimination as a center-piece of 
its revolutionary program.  In two famous speeches within three months of triumph, Fidel 
Castro directly addressed the issue of racial inequality in Cuban society by laying out the 
fundamental position of the Revolution with regard to the question of race.  The focus 
was on institutional practices of racial discrimination with regard to two areas: access to 
employment; and access to recreational and educational facilities and institutions (Casal 
1979).  In line with a Marxist-Leninist materialist analysis, racial discrimination – and by 
extension race itself – was seen as a product of underlying class exploitation rooted in the 
historical system of racialized slave labor, a system which had been perpetuated under 
capitalist (read U.S. imperialist) modes of production.  By dismantling the foundational 
material and class basis for racial discrimination this position held, structures and 
practices of racial inequality would follow (de la Fuente 2001). 
 Scholarly debate concerning the nature of race relations and racial discrimination 
in post-1959 Cuba have been highly politicized, often resulting in fierce debate over the 
effectiveness if not legitimacy of the socialist government.  Nadine Fernández has 
 
 103
suggested that ridged ideological positions often hamper critical analysis of the social 
consequences of race in Cuba (Fernández 1996).  A summary of those positions are as 
follows: There are those who contend that the revolution inherited and resolved the racial 
problem (e.g. Ring 1961, Serviat 1993).  A second position argues that the revolution 
inherit a racist society, but has either reinforced or at least failed to eliminate racial 
inequalities (e.g. Moore 1988).  Another position argues that the revolution has had a 
mitigative impact on racism, but argues that pre-revolutionary Cuban society had already 
open doors for black advancement and that there had been a long-term trend towards 
racial integration in Cuba (e.g. Masferrer and Mesa-Lago 1974; Domínguez 1978).  A 
final argument contends that, while socialist Cuba has made substantial reforms that have 
significantly reduced structural forms of racial discrimination and inequality, more 
“cultural” manifestations of racism have not been eradicated from Cuban society  (Casal 
1979; de la Fuente 1995; Fernández 1996, 2001).  
 This final position represents a significant break from the previous arguments in 
that it draws an analytical distinction between structural forms of racial discrimination 
and racial ideologies that affect everyday individual thought and practice.  As Casal 
contends: “It can be unhesitatingly affirmed that racial discrimination has been solidly 
eradicated from Cuban society [...] This does not imply that all forms of prejudice have 
been banned or that the consciousness of all the people has been thoroughly transformed” 
(Casal 1979:479).  A critical question that such a conclusion begs, however, is whether 
“institutional” and “individual” manifestations of racism exist as exclusively distinct 
phenomena.  Nadine Fernández for one has argued that a critical understanding of race in 
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revolutionary Cuba has been elusive given Cuban academics’ long reluctance to analyze 
the mutually-constitutive relationships between racial ideologies and structural 
inequalities of race. (Fernández  1996).  I will return momentarily to this key 
problematic.  
 It is unquestionable, however, that in a general sense black Cubans benefited 
significantly from the social gains of the Revolution.  As historically among the most 
socially marginal and poor, black and darker-skinned Cubans gained much from the 
Revolution’s efforts at to build a more socially egalitarian society based on the principles 
of a “class-less” nation.  With regards to education, for example, the 1961 nationalization 
of private schools – most of which were racially segregated – and the mass mobilizations 
of the national literacy campaign initiated that same year, set in motion an educational 
system that was significantly more inclusive of black Cubans (de la Fuente 2001).  This 
was accompanied by an educational shift in an emphasis on liberal arts to one promoting 
professional vocations (Dominguez 1992).  Largely as a result of these changes the ranks 
of black professionals, not to mention literacy rates, increased significantly during the 
revolutionary period in comparison to pre-1959 levels.  And while in a structural sense 
racial discrimination was declared illegal, overt programmatic efforts such as affirmative 
action-type policies were never embraced by the revolutionary leadership (Fernández 
2001).  In terms of housing, the urban revitalization projects undertaken during the period 
with a focus on the building lower-income units also benefited the black urban poor, 
significant numbers of whom lived in shanty-like conditions prior to 1959 (de la Fuente 
2001).  Similarly, the massive socialization of national healthcare under the Revolution 
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greatly impacted the quality of healthcare for poorer black and darker-skinned Cubans.  
With the flight of large numbers of doctors following the exodus of wealthy and middle-
class white Cubans with the Revolution’s triumph, there was a desperate need to train 
more doctors of which black and darker-skinned Cubans made a sizable contribution 
(Dominguez 1992).  
 Such gains taken aggregately lent credence to the idea that racial inequalities were 
ultimately historical products of class-based stratification.  Again, beyond officially 
banning racial discrimination in employment and recreational and educational facilities, 
little more race-specific remedies were introduced.  By 1962, the second Declaration of 
Havana proclaimed that revolutionary Cuba had successfully eliminated racial 
discrimination (de la Fuente 2001).  From this point on, any discussion of racism or 
“racial politics” in a purported non-racial Cuba was viewed by the Cuban government as 
taboo and tantamount to political subversion.  Black Cubans concerned with what they 
perceived as the continued presence of racial inequalities found themselves in a dilemma.  
If they were to organize around racially-associated grievances they risked being labeled 
counter-revolutionaries.  If they did not, they would in effect be complacent in their 
oppression.  
 Carlos Moore has been one of the most outspoken of Cuban-exile critics of Castro 
and the revolutionary Cuban government with regard to the question of race in post-1959 
Cuba.  Though Moore may have his own ax to grind, his thoroughly researched Castro, 
the Blacks and Africa (1988) provides, among other things, important information 
concerning revolutionary Cuba’s repression of independent forms of black political and 
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cultural organization.  His work draws attention to the increasing restrictions the Cuban 
government put on Afro-Cuban cabildos and religious groups during the 1960’s. 
Cabildos and black religious leaders experienced systematic harassment by the Cuban 
state during this period, and their festivals were heavily curtailed and policed (Moore 
1988:100).  Moore also documents the ways in which black religious fraternities – 
recalling earlier efforts– were often associated with criminality through discourses 
evoking notions of social pathology (Moore 1988: 102).   
 As part of a larger “folklorization” of Afro-Cuban culture (Daniel 1995), the 
Cuban state has also initiated a program targeted at promoting Afro-Cuban religious 
practice and ritual as national folkloric symbols for consumption by foreign tourists.  The 
political consequences of such moves are multi-fold.  Such institutionalization of Afro-
Cuban culture and practice tends to freeze blacks within static representations of the 
“traditional” rather than recognizing the dynamic and changing character of Afro-Cuban 
culture and identity.  Configuring black cultural practice as a commodity for foreign 
consumption further confines Afro-Cuban blackness as an affixed, exploitable resource 
for tourist dollars.  Moreover, efforts to incorporate these images of Afro-Cuban culture 
within official representations of Cuban national culture and history may also serve as 
means of neutralizing these realms as spaces for the production of potentially 
oppositional forms of black subjectivity.   This last concern is a particularly significant 
one when considering the evolving relationship between the Cuban state and Cuban hip 
hop. Again, I will be returning to the sociohistorical significance folkloric discourses in 
Chapters 3 and 6.  
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 Such questions come to bear when reviewing Moore’s accounts of how the 
revolutionary government systematically dismantled the Sociedades de Color, which, 
having been established in the late nineteenth-century to promote education among 
former slaves, had increasingly become forums for the articulation of black social and 
political demands (Moore 1988: 48; see also de la Fuente 2001).  Moore further furnishes 
accounts of a government crackdown starting in the late 1960’s on a series of alleged 
underground black political organizations (Moore 1988:306-13).  Whether these 
organizations ever existed in an real operational capacity is not completely clear.  If 
Moore’s assessment is even partially accurate, it suggests that in the late 1960s and early 
1970s the Cuban state actively policed organizations perceived as having the potential for 
fostering autonomous black political consciousness or activity. 
 It is interesting to note is that, while Cuba may have been repressing domestic 
forms of black political aspirations, the revolutionary leadership was fervently drawing 
parallels between Cuba’s battle against U.S. imperialism and civil rights and black 
nationalist struggles in the U.S.  In drawing a direct contrast to the racist violence and 
turmoil of the 1960s U.S., Cuba held itself up as a paradigm of racial utopia under 
socialism.  Any attempt to suggest otherwise was considered counter-revolutionary, an 
affront to the very sovereignty – if not solvency – of the Cuban nation.  The irony then is 
that for black Cubans to be “included” into the Cuban nation they must not speak of, nor 
organize against the many ways in which they have been historically excluded from full 
participation in the Cuban nation itself. 
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 Regarding the Revolution’s initial approach to and the subsequent silencing of 
race, let me return to the distinction the revolutionary leadership made early on between 
“public” and “private” spheres of racism (Fernández 1996; de la Fuente 2001).  The 
argument here being that while the state could make efforts to eradicate overt, public 
expressions of racism (i.e. legal and “structural” forms of racial exclusion), with respect 
to the “private” spheres of the home, family, and interpersonal relationship racism it was 
held could not as easily be challenged.  In a particularly poignant illustration of this 
position, Fidel Castro in one of his early speeches on the topic of race stated in effect that 
the Revolution would never force a young white girl to dance with a black boy (Moore 
1988).  The point to underscore again here is that while revolutionary social reformed 
may have effect certain “structural” changes though which racialized power and 
exclusion were historically articulated vis-à-vis black and darker-skinned Cubans, the 
ideological manifestations of racism remained very much alive in revolutionary Cuba.  
Though officially banned and silenced, historically-configured, racially-inscribed notions 
of black intellectual inferiority, criminality, and laziness, for instance, persisted as 
“culturally” engrained components of Cuban society.46  
 Yet on another critical level, as mentioned earlier, this discursive differentiation 
between “public” and “private” forms of racism obfuscates the constitutive linkages 
between individual practices and institutionalized structures and process of racial forms 
of oppression.  The logic in declaring that only residual forms of individual racism exist 
now that structural forms have been officially eradicated inhibits any analysis, let along 
                                                 




public discussion, of the systemic processes that shape both individual as well as broader 
institutionalized kinds of racist practice.  In discursive terms, such framings find 
expression in the common privileging of the term “prejuicio” (prejudice) over “racismo” 
(racism).  Here there is a common tendency to use the individualizing expression 
“prejuicio” when referring to racist behavior on the part of individuals rather than using 
the “r” word which would imply a systematic level of racialized power inequality.  By 
limiting the terms of discourse to individual practice – which was officially claimed 
beyond the immediate scope of the Revolution – there is little recourse to challenge 
broader processes; hence, a further silencing.  Nadine Fernández has pointed out, 
moreover, that by relegating the persistence of racism to only those private spheres of 
practice the revolutionary leadership could make claims that racism, if it did exist at all, 
was an historical remnant from Cuba’s past that would dissipate in time (Fernández 
2001).  Hence, rather than recognizing racism as a complexly dynamic, continually 
reproducing social process, the state in effect ultimately washed its hands of the issue.  
 It is, however, important to acknowledged that by significantly reducing the gross 
levels of social stratification which once marked pre-1959 Cuba, the Revolution was able 
at certain levels to undermining the expressive power though which such “interpersonal” 
forms of racism could be exercised at the mirco-level of the everyday.  This is to suggest 
that by reducing, though clearly not eliminating, the socioeconomic disparity between 
most Cubans – be they black or white – white Cubans’ ability to exercise racist practices 
no longer carry the same level of force they once did given the past pervasiveness of 
white class privilege.  Here I do not wish to reproduce reductive analyses that would 
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collapse racial forms of oppression and difference into those of class (Hall 1986; Omi and 
Winant 1986) – a key limitation of the Cuban Revolution’s own approach to race.  Nor 
clearly do I seek to define racialized power solely to those “individual” practices and 
forms of expression.  What I am suggesting, however, is that in the context of 
revolutionary Cuban society, where most Cuban’s under socialism have had narrow 
economic privilege, there has been a limiting affect on the relative leverage in which such 
interpersonal expressions of racism and racial exclusion can be practiced. It could be 
argued that such conditions have opened up space during the revolutionary period for the 
emergence of a certain level of nationally-configured class solidarity among Cubans 
predicated on the structural limiting of overt forms of historical white privilege.  
 Having said this, it is necessary to once again underscore that such achievements 
did not eliminate the very real and persistent presence of racism in Cuban society.  To the 
extent to which revolutionary socialism was able to mitigate the expressive capacity of 
racialized power though “structural” class-based efforts, fundamental contradictions 
between discursive claims of a raceless Cuba and the enduring lived realities of race, 
while silenced, remained ever present.  As I will argue in the following chapter, these 
historical contradictions as well as their expressive capacities found emboldened and new 
form within the context of Cuba’s socioeconomic transformations of 1990s.  To the 
extent to which revolutionary efforts might have had a “limiting” effect on various 
manifestations of racialized power, with the expansion of Cuba’s dollar-based economy 
all bets were now off.  These same transformative processes, moreover, proved fertile 





Consuming Blackness:  
New Racial Economies, Tourism, and Evolving Black Social Strategies 
 
 Before probing further into the specifics of el movimiento rap cubano, it is 
necessary to first provide a broader contextualization of the shifting socioeconomic and 
cultural dynamics of race in Cuba today.  Of particular concern to me are the ways new 
forms of racialized power are increasingly shaping the everyday lives, experiences, and 
social strategies of black and darker-skinned Cubans.  This evolving socio-racial 
complex, or what Omi and Winant have referred to as a “racial formation” (Omi and 
Winant 1986), manifests itself through the interwoven articulation of resurgent structures 
of racial exclusion, new modalities of racialization, and related processes of racial 
commodification – all inextricably tied to deepening incursions of transnational capital 
within Cuban society.  Here I wish to expand on this proposition with the intention of 
probing the critical connections between Cuba’s reintegration into global capitalism, and 
the evolving dialectical interplay of racialized “structures” and corresponsive racial 
“agencies” as lived by black and darker-skinned Cubans today.  
 
Economic Crisis and el Periodo Especial 
  
 It is unquestionable that the 1990s marked a distinctive new juncture in Cuba’s 
national narrative.  From its 16th century inception as a slave-based plantation society, 
through its late 19th century wars of independence seeking to redefine the island’s 
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historical trajectory, to the 1959 triumph of the Cuban revolutionary army and the 
subsequent pursuit of socialism, Cuba at the millennium’s end found itself undergoing 
yet another decisive moment of rupture and transformation.   
 The economic relationships initiated in the early 1960s with the Soviet Union and 
the Eastern Bloc effectively underwrote the Cuban economy and, by extension, the 
Cuban Revolution during the consolidation and development of Cuba’s efforts to build a 
socialist society.  While a shift may have occurred at the Revolutions triumph from free-
market capitalist to state-centralized forms of economic organization, as it had in the past 
sugar continued to be the principle driving force of the island’s economic base.  Brief 
post-1959 attempts at diversification not withstanding, Cuba’s perpetuation of its mono-
crop dependence began with the initiation of Soviet subsidies in 1960 in which Cuba was 
guaranteed preferential market prices for sugar.  This scenario was augmented by 
payments in Soviet oil where surplus supplies were sold on the international market as a 
key source for hard currency (Jatar-Hausmann 1999).  Entrenched in its position as sugar 
producer, Cuba was admitted in 1972 to CMEA (Council of Mutual Economic 
Assistance) becoming the primary supplier of sugar to the Soviet bloc by 1981.47  In the 
short run this agreement appeared to pay off.  Between 1972 and 1985 the Cuban 
economy grew an average of 6% annually, where 1970 to 1974 saw double digit levels of 
annual growth (Brundenius 2002:366).  Such economic subsidization largely shielded 
Cuba from full impacts of the U.S. trade embargo officially initiated in 1960 following 
                                                 
47 Also known as Comecon, the CMEA was established in 1949 to foster economic coordination 
between communist bloc counties as an alternative to global free-market capitalism.  Within this 
arrangement Cuba also received capital goods from automobiles to television sets to food stuff at 
preferential prices from various Eastern bloc countries in return for its sugar exports.  
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the revolutionary government’s nationalization of U.S.-controlled interests on the island.  
For many Cubans much of the 1980s represented a golden moment of the Revolution in 
which the period’s economic growth translated into a time of relative prosperity were 
access to food, healthcare, higher wages, and services such as transportation were 
significantly increased over previous levels.  
 All this, however, radically changed with the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the 
subsequent suspension of Soviet subsides in 1990.  As consequence, trade between Cuba 
and the Soviet Union/Eastern bloc fell by 89% between 1989 and 1994 resulting in an 
annual loss of three to four billion dollars (Leogrande and Tomas 2002:342).  The island 
plugged into a sever economic crisis which saw the GDP decrease more than 40% 
between 1989 and 1993 (Jatar-Hausmann 1999:46). In 1990 during a major speech before 
the Congress of the Federation of Cuban Women (FMC) Fidel Castro declared that the 
county had entered a “Periodo Especial en Tiempo de Paz” (a “Special Period in Time of 
Peace”) which called for new austerity measures and social sacrifice aimed at reducing 
national consumption and expenditure.  This “Special Period” was characterized by 
severe shortages in food, electricity, and transportation due in significant part to drastic 
oil shortages as a result of the suspension of Soviet oil imports upon which the island’s 
economy had become completely dependent (Jatar-Hausmann 1999; Brundenius 2002).  
Some Cubans I know infamously recall the early 1990s as “el tiempo de los flacos” – 
“the time of the shinny ones” – in which acute scarcities of produce, shelved goods, and 
meat of any kind lead to endemic levels of undernourished. Family food consumption in 
fact fell 33% between 1990 and 1993 which was accompanied by the rise of some 
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neurological diseases tied to poor nutrition (Leogrande and Tomas 2002:343; Hidalgo 
and Martinez 2000).  Moreover, as a result of server oil shortages extended planned 
power outages know as “apagones” were the ubiquitous during the Special Period as was 
the drastic reduction of transportation service – both public and commerce-related – 
across the island. It was during this period that Cuba arranged the importation of over a 
million Chinese-made bicycles which took over the island’s now largely auto-less streets 
and roads.  
 Significantly exacerbating, if not intentionally exploiting the crisis situation, the 
U.S. began tightened its trade embargo against Cuba in the early 1990s.  The 1992 
passage of the Torricelli Act was aimed at restricting third-country commerce with the 
island effectively halting an estimated $768 million in annual trade, 90% of which 
involved imports of food and medicine (Leogrande and Tomas 2002:355).  The Helms-
Burton Act of 1996 further sought to discourage foreign investment by, among other 
measures, penalizing foreign corporations and company officers who conduct business 
with Cuba.  The economic costs of such U.S. interventionism to Cuba’s economy has 
been estimated at $67 billion, equaling roughly four times Cuba’s GDP and 
approximately sixteen years’ worth of export revenue  (Hidalgo and Martinez 2000:104). 
Such developments no doubt contributed to a deepening of crisis’ social toll on the 
everyday lives of Cubans, markedly squeezing and stretching already scarce recourses 
such as food and medicine.48    
                                                 
48 See Hidalgo and Martinez (2000) for a critical discussion of the social cost of the U.S. trade 
embargo against Cuba.  
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 By 1993 the Cuban leadership realized that a fairly radical intervention needed to 
be undertaken in order to stem the deepening economic and social crisis.  It was at this 
point that socialist Cuba was forced to seek a new kind of economic relationship within 
the shifting paradigms of a post-Cold War world: one that meant reinserting itself 
cautiously, though ultimately unequivocally, within the global networks of late 
capitalism.  It was that year 1993 that the Cuban government decriminalized the 
possession of U.S. dollar as a means of capturing the flood of dollars already circulating 
within the island’s expanding the black market – most of which stemmed from 
clandestine remittances to Cubans from family aboard.  Such hard currency was 
desperately need by the Cuban state now that that had engaged itself within the global 
free-market.  The codification of the dollar as legal tender was followed in the early 
1990s by a set of economic reforms which included the limited sanctioning of private-
owned small businesses and cooperatives, and the opening up of the economy to foreign 
investment and joint ventures with foreign-owned companies.  In aggregate these reforms 
in effect initiated what was tantamount to a move towards a neoliberalization of the 
heretofore closed socialist economy of the previous revolutionary moment.  A critical and 
instrumental facet of this movement was the re-introduction of tourism as a strategic 
generator of fast hard currency.  While the confluence of neoliberal dollarization and 
tourism would usher in a new phases of Cuban history, as it had in the past race would 
continue to operate as a key if not shifting social dynamic within this transformative 




The Racial Logics of the New Economy  
 
In his influential 1991 article “The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism,” Frederic 
Jameson set out to ground the notion of the postmodern within a materialist framework, 
providing a model for understanding postmodernity as an historicized global condition 
tied to the rapid, post-fordist expansion of transnational capital.  As a defining 
characteristic of this new global reality, Jameson suggested that what he termed late 
capitalism was radically altering the nature of cultural production the world over.  A 
central facet of Jameson’s critique revolved around questions of cultural commodification 
– that is, the advancing global pace at which “culture” in all its potential forms is being 
transformed into objects of market value by and for the seemingly transnational 
boundlessness of a postmodern cultural logic.  In Jameson’s understanding, ultimately 
nothing is sacred, nothing is beyond the grasp of such processes inherent within this late 
capitalist moment.   
 The central framing question that I explore in this dissertation concerns how 
contemporary Cuba and its people are responding to these new global imperatives as they 
are reinserted – and reinsert themselves – within an international marketplace 
increasingly dominated by transnational capital and the socioeconomic affects of 
neoliberalism.  Here, I wish to draw particular attention to the new inter-articulated ways 
that race and “culture” are being (re)configured within Cuba as it efforts to negotiate its 
place within this shifting global landscape.  Moving beyond Jameson’s focus on the 
cultural affects of globalized capital, however, I endeavor along the lines of Aihwa Ong 
who has underscored the political and analytical necessity of locating subjects within, and 
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– importantly – the particular strategies that they employ in response to these new 
transnational processes of power and corresponding modes of subjugation (Ong 1999). 
 Ong refers to such situated practices on the part of positioned subjects as “maneuvers” in 
emphasizing the active and strategic nature of these efforts.  The question I ask is whether 
one can map such maneuvers and their socio-political consequences within the rapidly 
shifting social frameworks of contemporary Cuba.  
In a post-1990 Cuba where tourism has become the main source of foreign 
currency as well as increasingly its principal site of global interface, one could argue 
culture has replaced social revolution as Cuba’s defining export.  What is of particular 
concern to me is the differing ways Afro-Cuban culture, or possibly more accurately 
Cuban blackness itself, is being commodified and marketed in Cuba for international 
consumption, and the various transnationally-informed practices or maneuvers black 
Cubans employ in response.  Such an analysis attempts to illuminate the critical interplay 
of race, nation, and culture as they intersect and are lived in Cuba today as it mediates the 
cultural logics of this post-modern “new world order.”  
As discussed, sugar has been a definitive factor in shaping the economic and 
social history of Cuba as a nation since its inception in the early 19th century as the 
largest plantation-based society in the Caribbean.  While it is unquestionable that sugar 
has framed Cuba’s modern history, then it might be said that foreign tourism today is a 
key actor in its transformative, postmodern present.  This is to suggest that Cuba’s 
economic liberalization and re-entry into an international marketplace is signified above 
all by the rapid resurgence of tourism.  While the dismantling of Cuba’s Batista-era 
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tourism industry infamously characterized by casinos and prostitution was one of the first 
celebrated achievements of the Cuban Revolution, tourism was (re)identified as strategic 
sector by the Cuban state shortly after 1989.  Tourism now accounts for more than 40% 
of Cuba’s foreign currency income;49 making it, as mentioned, the single largest source 
of hard currency on the island.  According to official Cuban figures, gross revenues for 
tourism increased 800% between 1990 and 2000, generating an excess of $12 billion 
dollars over the last decade.50  Foreign visitors have increased during this period by an 
average of 18% annually with the number of hotel rooms jumping from roughly 13,000 
to 35,000 between 1990 and 2000.51  In 2003 alone a reported 1.9 million tourist visited 
Cuba (Comellas 2004).52   These figures illustrate the rate at which tourism has exploded 
in Cuba over the last decade – at one level freeing it from a history of single-source 
sugar-based trade dependency, while at the same time impacting Cuban society, its 
people and culture in many complex ways.  
Most notably, tourism along with U.S. dollar remittances from Cuban’s living 
abroad has fed the dollarization of the island’s economy, giving rise to a paralleled 
dollar/Cuban peso economy.  At the everyday level of the streets, the growing dominance 
of the dollar is contributing to greater class-based social stratification in a nominally 
socialist Cuba where virtually all are now dependent on U.S. dollars for daily existence.  
Within this dual economy, it is virtually impossible for most Cubans to survive on the 
                                                 
49 Associated Press, July 4 2001 
50 Prensa Latina, August 4, 2001 
51 ibid.  
52 Foreign tourism revenues did, however, take a significant hit after the 911 attacks as the level 
of westerners opting to travel internationally dropped significantly.   
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state-regulated peso salaries when basics like soap, clothing, cooking oil and other 
essential food-stuffs can be purchased only with U.S. dollars in state-run “dollar stores” 
or on the black market.  Virtually everyone has to have some sort of hustle, or in Cuban 
terms mecánica (mechanism), to acquire dollars in some fashion.  Moreover, there is 
mounting recognition that race is increasingly a factor impacting who and how one gets 
access to these circulating dollars.   
With regard to remittances, black Cubans comprise a minority of Cubans living 
abroad,53 putting them at a significant disadvantage in terms of access to the estimated 
$600 to $800 million dollars remitted annually to the island (de la Fuente 1998).  In 
addition to immediately enabling a relatively higher standards of living, remitted monies 
are often reinvested by Cubans in developing small entrepreneurial projects that may 
additionally provided economic benefits further along.  With relatively limited access to 
remittances, many black Cubans are left with tourism-related activity as a potential 
source of dollars.  
Within Cuba’s European-oriented hotels and related tour services, however, there 
is a growing acknowledgment that “white” Cubans are most often favored for 
employment (de la Fuente 1998:33).  Though these workers receive salaries in Cuban 
pesos, their incomes are often augmented exponentially by tips and other transactions in 
                                                 
53 Surveying the largest and most economically positioned group of Cuban’s abroad for 
illustration, the 1990 U.S. census recorded 83.5% of Cuban immigrants living in the U.S. identify 
themselves as “white” (cited in de la Fuente (1998:6). Black Cubans who are living in the U.S. 
tend to be poorer, more recent immigrants in comparison to the long established networks of 
“white” Cuban Americans in particular Miami. Though these Cuban’s might have more 
immediate links to family “black home,” they do not possess the levels of surplus income their 
relatively advantaged white counterparts.  
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dollars which flow freely within these contained tourist spaces.  One often finds that the 
only visible black or brown faces working within hotels are young male security 
personnel who stand at the doors vigilantly guarding the boarder between these privileged 
dollar zones and the public space of la calle, the street.  One commonly found 
explanation for these ‘whitened’ Cuban spaces is that a significant number of high-end 
tourist hotels are managed by foreign staff whom, it is argued, exercise racial prejudices 
when making hiring decisions.  An alternative explanation offered is that the tourist 
market is simply responding to the tastes of Cuba’s predominantly white European and 
North American clientele who prefer to be served by people who “look like them.” While 
these dynamics may be contributing factors to racial exclusion within these areas of 
tourist activity, they simultaneously present some rather disturbing problematics for 
contemporary Cuba where, as discussed,  the eradication of racial discrimination is 
popularly cited as a triumph of the Cuban Revolution in its realization of a professed non-
racial socialist society.   
Leaving this problematic aside for the moment, it does appear as if these new 
practices of black socioeconomic marginalization are certainly tied in important ways to 
structural shifts in the Cuban economy through capital liberalizations.  Given these the 
limitations on black Cuban participation in the legal dollar-based tourism industry, what 
are the alternatives available to black and darker-skinned people and, importantly, what 
kinds of strategic spaces are they creating for themselves within this new Cuban reality?   
Before attempting to answer this question, I must first return to a more general 
discussion of contemporary tourism in Cuba.  Clearly part of what draws tourists to Cuba 
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is the island’s “tropical” beaches and other “scenic” attractions.  Such, however, can be 
found anywhere in the Caribbean.  Rather what it is that Cuba uniquely has to offer 
foreign tourists – the vast majority of whom again are from Europe and North America – 
is its revolutionary history and allure, its culture, and its people.  There certainly was a 
time when most foreign visitors to Cuba came out of solidarity with, and support of the 
Cuban Revolution.  This era, however, has clearly passed in that it would not be a stretch 
to claim that for many tourists the extent of their engagement with the Revolution is their 
purchase of a Che Guevara tee-shirt or figurine.  As Che’s image has become 
commodified as the quintessential icon of the Cuban Revolution, so too is Cuban culture 
currently experiencing its own form of commodification.   
Ruth Bahar once spoke of the “buena-vistaization” of Cuba in reference to the 
1997 album of classic Cuban son music produced by Ry Cooder and the subsequent 
documentary directed by Wim Wenders that launched an international commercial frenzy 
for Cuban music, and by extension, Cuban “culture.”54  This craze was and continues to 
be embedded with discourses of nostalgic desire for the “old Cuba”: the pre-
Revolutionary Cuba of old American cars, historic urban architecture, and “traditional” 
signifyingly Cuban forms of expressive culture and tropical exoticism – all to be relived 
after a forty-year hiatus.  Reminiscent of Renaldo Rosaldo’s notion of imperialist 
nostalgia (Rosaldo 1989), buena-vistaization might then speak to the contemporary ways 
cultural markers of Cubanness are historically reconfigured, commodified, and marketed 
                                                 
54 Reference made during a panel presentation “Complex Relations: Contemporary Art in Cuba,” 
Austin Museum of Art, Austin, TX. September 25, 1999.   
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for Western consumption both on and off the island.  Such reconstructions, I suggest, are 
often inscribed with racialized and gendered meanings and power.  
When speaking specifically about realms of expressive culture in Cuba one 
cannot avoid the question of race.  Anyone who has recently visited Cuba knows that 
there is a strong tourists market for Afro-Cuban culture a wide range of forms.  “Afro-
Cuban” or Afro-Cubano, however, remains a highly contested term within certain sectors 
of Cuban society given the history of “racial” mixture on the island, as well as the 
previously mentioned national institutionalization of non-racial discourse.  The term 
Afro-Cubano in this context is seen as marking off a black ‘difference’ from an otherwise 
normalized “white” Cuban national identity, hence unmooring a hegemonically 
constructed frame of national non-racialism.  
Further ideological discussions aside for the moment, there are cultural practices 
in Cuba that are African-derived or informed, and are associated with, and most 
importantly practiced primarily by people who identify themselves and their practices as 
negro (black) within the Cuban historical context.  Many of these cultural practices such 
as rumba music and dance, santería and other Afro-Cuban identified religious systems 
have, however, been historically configured within the officially sanctioned trope of 
national folklore or folklorico  (Daniel 1995; Moore 1997;. Hagedorn 2001).  
Institutionalized by the likes of seminal Cuban ethnologist Fernando Ortiz as previously 
discussed, the classification of elements of Afro-Cuban expressive culture as folklore 
effectively roots these forms, and by extension those who practice them, squarely within 
the discursive constructions of a non-racial Cuban national patrimony.  Efforts to 
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incorporate Afro-Cuban culture within official representations of Cuban national culture 
and history, moreover, may also serve as attempts to neutralize these realms as spaces for 
the production of autonomous and potentially oppositional kinds of black subjectivity.  
Configurations of folklore in this manner tend to relegate Afro-Cuban culture to an 
ahistorical, unchanging past, effectively freezing blacks within static representations of 
the “traditional” rather than recognizing the dynamic and ever-changing nature of black 
Cuban culture and identity.  Within the hyper-commodified cultural marketplace of 
today’s Cuba, such moves simultaneously facilitate the packaging and marketing of black 
cultural forms as affixed, exploitable resources for tourist dollars.  
Although the Revolution created and has continued to support a number of 
cultural institutions to document and institutionalize (Afro-)Cuban “folklore,” there has 
been a strong resurgence of public exhibitionism of black culture that to a large extent 
has coincided with the rise of tourism.  Today there are numerous spaces in Havana, both 
institutional and informal, where one can regularly see and experience “authentic” Afro-
Cuban rumba.  Such performances are also making limited inroads into hotel settings that 
are usually reserved for son groups who often play the entire Buena Vista Social Club 
repertoire while tourists sip their mojitos, tap their feet, and hum along.   
 The Yoruba-based santería religion has also experienced a public outing of sorts.  
There was a period in recent revolutionary history when it was a social liability to openly 
mark oneself as a santero or practitioner of santería.  This reality grew out of a history of 
police repression and harassment of black Cuban religious organization and practice 
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which were often associated with social deviance and delinquency.55  Today however it is 
not uncommon to see black and as well as a growing number “white” Cuban followers of 
santería wearing their religious color-beaded necklaces in public.  This is also the case 
with the white-clad initiates of the religion know as iyawos who have become a 
commonplace image in the streets of Havana.  The growing visibility if not popularity of 
santería may not necessarily be tied to the rise of tourism.  It may, however, signify a 
new openness in Cuban society to black-identified forms of cultural expression that does 
articulate with tourist-related marketing of black culture.   
Possibly more overtly related is the rise of what some in Cuba have dubbed 
babalaoismo.  Borrowed from the Yoruba-derived term babalao for priest of the santería 
religion, the term babalaoismo draws its reference from the increasing numbers of 
foreigners who are coming to Cuba, often repeatedly, for spiritual work related to 
santería.  Such services are most often provided by babalaos who live and work in areas 
in close proximity to zones of high tourist activity.  Though the relationship between 
babalaos and their Cuban clientele has traditionally been one of paid patronage, 
exchanges between these Afro-Cuban babalaos and their foreign patrons are almost 
exclusively in dollars and often at levels far exceeding what Cubans would pay for 
similar services.  Given this reality, the term babalaoismo for some has come to suggest 
the commercialization or even a “pimping” of santería by practitioners for tourist dollars.  
                                                 
55 For discussions of Cuban revolutionary repression of Afro-Cuban religion see Moore (1988) 
and Hagedorn (2001). For treatments of pre-revolutionary state repression of Afro-Cuban 
religious practice and practitioners see Moore (1997) and Palmie (2002).   
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Though I certainly do not wish to reduce santería’s complexities and 
meaningfulness simply to its black racial significance, it is unquestionable that santería’s 
associations with “traditional” African-derived spirituality – along with related discourses 
of a “primitive” black authenticity – are certainly important to its cultural draw and 
capital within a western-oriented consumer market.  To the extent that such an economy 
of exchange is informed by its racial markers, blackness operates as a space within which 
some Afro-Cuban babalaos can and do exercise a level of agency in accessing tourism-
related dollars outside other legally sanctioned means.  Although the gendered-specific 
proscriptions of santería allow for men only to be babaloas, female madrinas or religious 
“godmothers” within santería can also establish relationships with visiting practitioners 
of the religion where dollars are also the currency of exchange.   
In addition to these informal, individually-initiated examples, there has also been 
an emergence of institutionally state-sanctioned, religio-cultural commerce where 
foreigners pay to tour santería houses or organized events to experience “genuine” Afro-
Cuban religious ritual and ceremony.  There has in fact been an emergence of 
government-sponsored tours for foreigners who wish to undergo initiation into santería 
for sizable sums of money (Furé 2000).  Examples of these kinds clearly illustrate the 
elevated institutional and state ante regarding the commodification and 
commercialization of Afro-Cuban culture and signs of blackness in Cuba today.  Such 
occasions, moreover, complicate in some interesting ways the distinctions traditionally 
drawn between the cultural “authentic” and commercially “performed.”  They 
simultaneously bring to clear relief the larger context of a performed blackness – that is 
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the ways in which individuals and communities involved in these commercial contexts 
are at some level performing their blackness as a means of accessing tourist-related 
commerce.  These examples moreover again illustrate the ways some black Cubans can 
and are utilizing the commodified space of blackness as a form of maneuver or mecánica 
within the postmodern logics of contemporary Cuban society.    
 
 In 1999, a French hip hop producer pulled together four young Cubans in France 
and produced the first internationally successful Cuban rap album.  Since then, the 
Spanish language album has gone gold in France and Spain and has been widely popular 
through out Western Europe.  The key to the project’s success was the astute fusion of 
signifyingly “Cuban” musical elements such as son, rumba and traditional Cuban vocal 
styles, with contemporary rap lyricism and hip hop-informed beats.  One of the most 
popular songs in the album is a bouncing, rap-laced remake of the classic son song “Chan 
Chan” made international famous by the Buena Vista Social Club release two years 
earlier.   
The name chosen for the group was Orishas, taken from the Yoruba name for 
deities of the santería pantheon.  In the album liner notes individual members – whose 
gradated skin complexions range in Cuban terms from white to black – can be seen 
posing adorned with beaded colored necklaces symbolizing various individual orisahs, 
marking them (truthfully or not) as initiates in the religion.  At least one urban legend in 
Cuba, where the group has also been phenomenally popular, purports that the group’s 
producer consulted a babalao about a name and was divinely given “orishas.”  
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Alternatively, one of the group’s members explained in an interview that first and 
foremost the name was chosen “like and ID for Cuban music worldwide.  People would 
see the name and think of Cuba, because of the connection, spiritually” (Rose 2001).  
Here santería operates as a national marker of Cubanness effectively decontextualized 
from its Afro-Cuban historical context and meanings.  The signified economy of race and 
blackness remains nonetheless ever-present in the packaging of the project from its 
opening with Yoruba chants to actual orisahs and the heavy use of “traditional” Afro-
Cuban percussion throughout the album, to the stylized darkening of the members’ 
photos on the album cover and liner notes.  
In the album’s title track “A Lo Cubano” (“the Cuban way”) the members sing of 
a hetero-masculinist Cuban-style partying awash with tobacco and rum.  Shot in Cuba, 
the song’s video depicts group members on a beach frolicking with young Cuban women 
in bikinis and beach balls – reproducing tendencies within both U.S. rap videos and 
Cuban popular culture regarding the sexual objectification of women and their bodies.  
The male-centered representations of Cuba painted in the album embody an apparent 
level of ambivalence.  While one song celebrates the “mystical” quality of Cuban 
women, another critically addresses the recent rise of female-focused sex tourism.  
Another laments the struggles of single mothers in Cuba’s urban centers.  As such, these 
songs reflect competing gendered discourses circulating in Cuba today – this being on 
one level the notion of gender equality promoted by the Revolution in its efforts to 
elevate women’s status through their incorporation within a democratically-structured 
workforce and higher educational system.  At the same time, however, the historically 
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embedded culture of machismo and patriarchy remain signifying, ever-present elements 
of present day Cuban society.  
Within Cuba’s ingenious hip hop community, however, Orishas are viewed by 
many as nothing significantly more than a commercial product, one packaged and 
marketed for overseas consumption.  It is apparent, moreover, that race plays an 
important if not calculated role in such packaging where Afro-Cuban symbolism is 
configured and mediated through the ways it is performed within the commercial frame 
of popular music.  I will return in Chapter 6 to a more explicit discussion of Orishas as it 
relates to commercialization pressures within the Cuban hip hop movement vis-à-vis 
questions of race, commodification, and performance in contemporary Cuban society.  
 
 Focusing on the realms of material culture, there is also a foreign market for 
blackness in Cuba in the form tourist-related arts and craftwork.  In the large crafts 
markets of Havana and other concentrated tourist areas, such as the Cancun-like beach 
resort of Vadadero, one finds a bountiful collection of racialized, if not racist, imagery of 
black Cubans.  Many figurines and tee-shirt prints employ racially-inscribed physical 
attributes such as grossly accentuated large mouths and lips – often construed into the 
proverbial ‘big smile.’ Others frequently play upon gendered-specific discourses of a 
primal black hyper-sexuality.  In male form this may translate into a smiling black figure 
with a protruding, absurdly large erect penis complete with pink end.  One of the most 
prevalent images, however, is the black female figure with exaggeratedly large breast – 
which may or may not be exposed – and correspondingly ample backside.  Discursively 
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resonant with eroticized historical representations of la mulata as the oversexed temptress 
(Kutzinski 1993; Williams 2000; Arrizón 2002), this figure-type more often than not is 
commonly accompanied by a large phallic cigar projecting from a, once again, smiling 
mouth.  While such representations draw upon a long history of racist stereotypes 
associated with blackness in Cuba, they simultaneously articulate transnationally with 
other Latin and North American historical constructions as well.    
Interestingly, many Cubans themselves including some blacks do not necessarily 
regard these images particularly offensive let alone racist.  Upon speaking to market 
venders – many of whom are not black – about the significance of physical stereotypes 
and sexual explicitness of the black images, some vendors responded that these were 
simply representations of Cuban “folklore.”  Some claimed that these figures with their 
hyper-exaggerated body parts actually resemble black Cubans.  Suggestions that these 
images might be infused with racist meanings where often meet with adamant denials of 
any racist content or intent.  I would contend, however, that such positions are in part 
couched within and informed by historically-constituted hegemonic notions of Cuban 
non-racialism, which may elide more critical readings of such representations.  This has 
certainly been my personal experience, though my reading of these images and 
experiences of race on the island are clearly informed by my own particular positionality 
as an African American from the U.S.  What is less debatable, however, is that these 
racially-inscribed images historically resonate with both overtly racist caricatures of 
blackness employed in pre-Revolutionary Cuba, as well as globally manifested 
representations and discourses of black racism.  Most significantly, this imagery is 
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intentionally reproduced for an international market.  This dynamic comes into focus 
when one considers that a number of vendors, when pushed, claimed that black images 
and figures of the like are produced first and foremost to meet foreign tourists’ own 
notions and consuming tastes for iconic representations of Cuba and its “culture.” 
Clearly, blackness sells.    
 
The commodification and market for the exotics/erotics of blackness in Cuba is 
not limited strictly to realms of cultural production.  Increasingly black bodies are being 
consumed by the thousands of overwhelmingly-white European and North American 
tourists who flock to Cuba yearly to participate in its flourishing sex trade.  As previously 
mentioned, the dismantling of tourist-based female prostitution of the Batista-era was a 
key reform undertaken shortly after the triumph of the Cuban Revolution in 1959.  
Emphasis was put on reintegrating former sex workers into a revolutionary envisioned 
society-in-the-making through education and vocational retraining programs.  Beyond the 
immediacy of their social worth, such efforts took on an added level of symbolic 
meaning.  In the eyes of the Revolution, the prostitution of Cuban women to foreign – in 
particular U.S. – men within the pre-revolutionary period was tied to the symbolic 
national rape of Cuba by a history of U.S. imperialism and preceding Spanish 
colonialism.  The revolutionary reclaiming of Cuban women’s bodies, it was held, 
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signified a re-masculinizing empowerment of an otherwise historically emasculated 
Cuban nation.56   
 As a number of researchers have noted and as is clearly apparent to the casual 
observer, the majority of female sex workers in Cuba today are black and darker-skinned 
(O’Connell Davidson 1996; Fusco 1998; Cabeza 1998).  An important contributing factor 
feeding this economy is tied to contemporary reconfigurings of hyper-sexualized imagery 
of the black Cuban women as la mulata.  A growing body of scholarly work examining 
the expanding international sex trade industry, some key research of which has been 
conducted in the Caribbean, has drawn attention to the role of racialized sexual fantasy 
among western tourist in third-world sex markets (Kempadoo et al. 1998; de 
Albuquergue 1998).  Playing on such objectifying desires, European tour operators in 
places like Spain and Italy regularly employ coded language to advertise Cuba as a travel 
destination for sex tourism.  Moreover, the profusion of international internet sites 
designed for the heterosexual male sex-traveler commonly reference Cuba as a top 
destination for sex tourism.  One English-language site “cuba-sex.com” posts the 
following anonymous commentary:  
  
Cuba prostitutes are called jineteras, or “jockeys.”  Wild, untamed, uninhibited 
women, they love to get on top and ride a man hard.  Often displaying Afro-
                                                 
56 For a more thorough treatment of the Cuban Revolution’s discursive positioning of pre-
revolutionary female sex work vis-à-vis U.S. imperialism see Rosalie Schwartz (1997). 
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Cuban features, these dusky, scantily-clad native girls with fine asses are very 
passionate and may cling tightly and fondle you after sex.57 (italics original) 
 
 
This short caption unabashedly illustrates, in the most blatant of racists terms, the racially 
inscribed sexual objectification of Cuban female sex workers that circulate the internet’s 
global network of sex-tourism sites.  Not only does this example reproduce the hyper-
sexualized imagery of the black women in Cuba, it further situates this eroticized 
representation squarely within a racialized discourse of an innate black primitivism.  It is 
precisely these kinds of overly racist representations that feed and are inextricably 
interwoven within the economy for female sex-work in Cuba.  
The Cuban state’s position vis-à-vis the resurgence of female sex work in Cuba, 
in practice, has been ambivalent.  At one level the official position is one of 
condemnation, recognizing that the rise of prostitution correlates with the growth of 
tourism.  A distinction, however, is made between pre-revolutionary and contemporary 
forms of sex work.  The dominant discourse argues that female sex workers today, unlike 
their predecessors, are highly-educated, healthy and engaged in sex work not out of 
desperation, but more out of materialist desires to acquire luxury goods like clothing and 
to access privileges afforded to foreign tourists (Fusco 1998; Cabeza 1998).  The 
dilemma of prostitution then is couched within the rubric of moral crisis rather than an 
assessment of the complex structural (and cultural) factors contributing to the rapid 
                                                 
57 Cited from <http:/cuba-sex.com/cuba_prositutes.htm>.   
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resurgence of female sex work in a transitional Cuba.  Since 1996 there have been 
periodic crackdowns on the streets of Havana and the beach resort of Vadadero.  
However, many critics – including those emanating from the reactionary Cuban exile 
community in Miami – have argued that the Cuban state has long encouraged prostitution 
as a means of generating tourist-based revenue, and that the crackdowns have occurred 
only after increased negative international publicity over the bludgeoning sex trade.  
Although prescribing to the official view of prostitution as one of moral degradation, the 
Federation of Cuban Women (FMC)58 has in the past been critical of what they have 
identified as the Cuban state’s own use of images of bikini-clad mulata women to 
promote tourism on the island.  The FMC took a particular strong stand against the Cuban 
government’s consent to a 1990 Playboy pictorial of beach-set topless young women in 
Vadadero. 
Based on my own experience it seems apparent that there is indeed a level of 
tolerance on the part of the Cuban state to what has become a pervading presence of 
foreign  client-based prostitution in heavily touristed areas such as Havana and Santiago 
de Cuba.  In these areas one literally cannot avoid the sight of older white European or 
North American men particularly at night in the company of young, often seductively-
dressed Cuban women.  What is most visually striking about these public spectacles are 
the blaring contrasts of age and skin color.  While male tourists may range between their 
mid-twenties to well into their fifties and sixties, it is not uncommon to see a white man 
in his fifties with a black or blown-skinned Cuban woman who looks no older that her 
                                                 
58 The official Cuban state organ of women.  
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late teens.  As illegal as it might be, the sheer numbers of these interactions and the dollar 
income they generate within the vast network of night clubs, restaurants, car rental and 
taxi services, hotel, and casas particulares (legally sanctioned private homes that rent 
rooms to tourists) that cater to dollar-paying tourists make it an essential component of 
Cuba’s expanding, increasingly crucial tourist sector.   
As for its promotion, there are indeed frequent images of young bikinied women – 
with or without the company of men, and more often than not white rather than of color – 
used in tourist-targeted magazines and material to promote products from cigarettes to 
resort hotels.  The same use of women’s bodies is prevalent throughout advertising the 
western world over.  However, while captive waiting in line to pass through immigration 
in Havana’s new international airport one can find oneself greeted by a Cuban-produced 
music video playing loudly over one of the newly-installed television monitors.  The song 
entitled La mulata is sung by a popular black Cuban salsero (salsa  vocalist) who 
serenades his pledges of desire for a young, attractive brown-skinned women with long 
wavy brown hair.  In the video we see the salsero moving through a colorful Havana 
setting while in crooning pursuit of this woman or, more appropriately, an image of a 
women for in keep with the objectified historical image of the Cuban mulata “she” never 
speaks nor do we get any sense of her own subject position.59  By song’s end the salsero 
rides off in an old pre-1959 American convertible along Havana’s famed Malecon with 
“la mulata” in tow.  Welcome to Cuba…  
                                                 
59 For critical discussions of the historical configuring of the mulata figure within Cuban national 
discourse see Vera Kutzinski (1993) and Alicia Arrizón (2002).  
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 Unlike the depthlessness of the song’s figure, black and mulatto women’s 
subjectivity is very much present and active within the economy of the Cuba sex trade.  
Here I return to the previously cited internet reference to female sex workers as jineteras.  
As the excerpt suggests, jinetera is derived from jinete which means horse jockey.  The 
feminizing word-play on the term thus refers literally and figuratively to these women’s 
“riding” of tourists for their dollars.  Within this metaphoric understanding one can 
subvert, if not invert, the paradigm prescribed by this white male-centered reading of the 
power dynamics between foreign clients and female sex workers.  The question then 
becomes whom is being “pimped” by whom?  The related and commonly used male 
linguistic equivalent jinetero does not in fact have direct sexual connotations.  Jineteros 
rather refer generally to the large numbers of young Cuban men who work the streets of 
Havana and other urban centers hustling for dollars by providing various kinds of non-
state sanctioned (i.e. illicit) services to tourist such as selling cheap cigars or acting a 
guilds.  Like their female etymological counterparts these men are most often black and 
darker-skinned due in large part to their limited access to legal forms of tourist-based 
dollar commence.  In a broader sense, the expression jineterismo has become a metaphor 
for any kind of tourist-based hustling in Cuba’s dollar-dependant economy.   
The central point I wish to make here regarding the dynamics of female sex work 
in Cuba today, is that black and mulato young women and men are able to access the 
space of blackness to position themselves within a dollar market of which they are often 
otherwise excluded.  This is to suggest that within Cuba’s new sexualized economy of 
race, an erotized blackness has assumed a new level of cultural capital – one which can 
 
 136
and is employed by individuals to access economic privileges of which they are 
otherwise marginalized.  
Within the context of the previously mentioned spaces in Havana where tourists 
flock to bodily experience the black authenticity of Afro-Cuban rumba, there is one 
weekly event held along a narrow a small street, know as callejon de hamel, which has 
become notorious for the hustling of white tourist women by young black men.  Many of 
these men speak of, at times in the plural, of “girl friends” from Europe or North America 
they have met while these women were on holiday in Havana.  When talking with some 
of these young men it becomes apparent that they are clearly cognizant of the dynamics 
of black sexual desire at play and their ability to work it for gain.  These relationships 
most often differ from the more overtly economic nature of exchange that characterizes 
much, but not all of female jinetera-related activity.  The ultimate goal for many of these 
Cuban men is to arrange a fiancé visa in order to travel abroad and make a new life with 
(or without) their foreign girlfriend.  Given the extraordinary prohibitive costs of the visa 
application and related legal fees for most Cubans – all of which must be paid in U.S. 
dollars – foreign women are most likely those who finance such procedures that often 
require extended months of waiting time.  During these periods it is not uncommon for 
these women to provide additional financial support to their Cuban boyfriends and their 
families.  These scenarios resonate strongly with those cited in research on white female 
tourism conducted in other Caribbean locales (de Albuquergue 1998; Phillips 1998).  
This is not to suggest that healthy and lasting relationships may not give rise to or grow 
out of these kinds of arrangements.  Rather, what cannot be denied is that such situations 
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are most often informed by a larger racialized economy of sex and desire that permeates 
the cultural logics of Cuba’s contemporary tourism market.  In a related vein there are 
what is commonly referred to as pingueros (taken from pinga, the Cuban vernacular 
vulgarism for penis) who participate in Cuba’s paralleled gay foreign-based sex trade (see 
Hodges 2001).  Though many of these young men in places like Havana may not be 
black in the strictest of senses, there remains an undeniable, ever-present racialized power 
dynamic between the predominantly white, gay male johns from European and North 
American and their racially sexualized Caribbean-Latin partners.60  
In setting up this discussion, I do not wish to elide the very real class and 
gendered power dynamics at play between darker-skinned sex workers and foreign 
clients.  Nor do I wish to project ethnographically romanticized degrees of social agency.  
Rather, what I am attempting to do is underscore that while the commodification of 
blackness operates as a locale for its commercial consumption, it simultaneously provides 
black Cubans space for maneuver – again to use Ong’s term – within a shifting 
socioeconomic structure offering few other options.  The agency of black and mulato sex 
workers predicated on the cultural capital of blackness, is once again ultimately realized 
through the ways in which such blackness is performed – performances which at one time 
conform to transnationally-prescribed desires, fantasies, and their racially-inscribed 
                                                 
60 Hodge’s treatment of male sex workers, among other things, is completely devoid of any 
analysis let alone mention of racial dynamics.  
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disciplining effects, while simultaneously enabling a level of strategic positioning and 
play among some black Cubans. 61  
 
 Within this emergent dollar-based Cuban economy where racial status is 
increasingly tied to who and how one obtains U.S. dollars, illicit strategies and practices 
developed by black Cubans to access dollars have become heavily policed by the Cuban 
state.  The escalation of police activity in the streets of Havana since 1999 serves as a 
critical material expression of the new dynamics of racialized power in Cuba today.  
During a speech in January 1999 commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the founding 
of the National Revolutionary Police, Fidel Castro address what he understood as the 
increase in illicit activities such as prostitution, street crime, and drugs since the 
introduction of the dollar (Hammond 1999).  In response, Castro argued, the streets in 
effect much be taken back.  Shortly following this announcement police could be seen on 
virtually every other street corner in many areas of central Havana, particularly those 
with high concentrations of tourist activity.  A central focus of this crackdown has been 
street crime and the illicit dollar-based black market economy upon which large numbers 
of blacks – if not most Cubans in general – are dependent given their relatively limited 
access to legal forms of acquisition.  As a result, this crackdown has disproportionately 
affected black, particularly young men who are often racially profiled by Cuban police as 
delincuencia.   Discursive association of blacks with criminality and social pathology 
                                                 
61 Such practices are resonant with Robin Kelley’s discussion of how young African American 
males have learned to performatively exploit racial stereotypes in the production of commercial 
rap and hip hop “culture” in the U.S. (Kelley 1997).  
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have a long history in Cuba dating back to the early work of Fernando Ortiz who, as 
mentioned, has been profoundly instrumental in shaping twentieth-century ideas in Cuba 
on race and culture in relationship to national constructions of cubanidad (Moore 1994, 
1997).  The difference here, however, is that a confluence of “old” pre-existing racial 
discourses and “new” economic processes ushered in by the new dollar-based economy 
gave new form and force to racialized structures and practices in Cuba today.   
In their quotidian scenarios, black youth are routinely asked for their carnets 
identidades, or national identification cards, whose information may be radioed in to 
check for previous involvement with police.  Such scenes have become a common fixture 
in Havana’s streets.  If the questioned are unable to produce this document or if there are 
any discrepancies, these youth are often taken in and held by the police.  In response to 
the seemingly systematic proliferation of these practices, young men in a few more 
marginal, predominantly-black barrios  in Havana began wearing their carnets – the very 
markers of their national legitimacy and citizenship – around their necks in symbolic 
protest.  While such developments clearly resonant with a history racist discourse and 
representation, these current practices and enabling discourses of black criminalization I 
suggest are being reconfigured and emboldened within newly articulated frames of 
racialized power.  Shifting racialized “structures” of these kinds, in turn, both shape and 
necessitate the emergence of new forms of race-based social strategy on the part of black 
and darker-skinned Cubans.  In the following chapters I will argue that Cuban hip hop 




Chapter Four  
 





  In the preceding chapter I outlined some of the evolving contours of what I have 
called Cuba’s new economy of race which, as suggested, is tied in important ways to the 
impacts of transnational capital on the Cuban social landscape following the economic 
crisis of the early 1990s.  Within the interwoven contexts of economic dollarization and 
an expanding tourism industry – two critical expressions of Cuba’s increasingly 
neoliberal reality – I sought to illustrate how this new racial economy is predicated on the 
convergence of preexisting racial structures and discourses, and a new racialized 
socioeconomics grounded in growing class stratification and a post-modern logic of 
cultural commodification.  While this confluence of “old” and “new” is giving resurgent 
force and form to lived experiences of blackness in Cuba today, I have been particularly 
concerned with exploring the range of social practices that black and darker-skinned 
Cubans have developed in response to these rearticulations of racialized power.  The 
focus hence had been on the interplay of contemporary frames of racialization and 
emergent race-based social strategies as they are increasingly shaped at the nexus of the 
local and global.   
 As I now move to my examination of el movimiento hip hop Cubano my analysis 
of this shifting interchange between racialized “structures” and corresponsive racial 
“agencies” centers more squarely on the politics of black identity formation.  An 
undertaking of this kind ultimately involves an investigation into the political character 
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and potential of black identity production as the basis for a politics and praxis of social 
action.  Here I draw upon Stuart Hall’s work in recognizing the ways in which processes 
of racial identity formation often involve strategic acts of self-positioning, or what Hall 
has referred to as practices of “subjective self-constitution” (Hall 1996:13).  Such efforts 
are by no means openly contingent but are rather always and already informed and 
constrained by historically prescriptive fields of racialized power as they are lived in the 
material everyday.  Such power-induced subjectivization invokes a Foucauldian derived 
notion of power as a positive, constitutive force in the shaping of individual subjectivity 
and identity (see McNay 1984).  Where Hall’s Gramscian-inflected approach intervenes 
however is in his suggestion that racial identities find articulation precisely between these 
interpellating forces (Althusser 1971) – i.e. subaltern racializations, and individual and 
collective practices of self-making.62  Hall’s privileging of the term identification over 
identity moreover is significant in that it underscores not only processual but also the 
(pro)active capacity of identity construction on the part of individuals and groups.   
 In this respect I would hold that identity, in its capacity as the outward, self-aware 
expression of subjectivity, serves as a processual intermediary though which racialized 
subjects become racially self-identified social actors; an ontological movement akin to 
what Coco Fusco has called identity’s transformation from essence to action (Fusco 
                                                 
62 McNay makes the argument that Foucault’s later writings on “governmentality” and “ethics of 
self” represent a reformulation of his ever-evolving conception of power that allows for a greater 
role of individual social agency in the shaping of subjectivity.  In her reading Foucault’s later 
work accounts more for a dialectical play of domination and resistance in comparison to his 
earlier, more totalizing notion of power as exemplified in the image of the ‘docile body’ – a 
formulation she contends which tends to be over-emphasized in Foucauldian treatments of the 
power/subject dynamic.  Such an appraisal, especially as it relates to Foucault’s writings on 
governmentality, offers more potential convergences between Foucauldian and Gramscian 
positions on questions of resistance/counter-hegemony than many have previously conceived.  
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1992).  Collective forms of racial identity in these ways provide an experiential lens 
through which individuals come to recognize the commonalities of racialized experience 
which in turn can serve as the ground upon which collective modes of politics can be 
waged.  Here the dynamics of identity, as Roger Rouse observes, are “fundamental to the 
cultural politics that link personal experience to collective forms and actions” (Rouse 
1995:351).  I am not suggesting some sort of teleological relationship between identity 
and identity-based action where a unidirectional progression from identity formation to 
identity mobilization necessarily exists.  Rather I speak of both the potential of this 
progression as well as the ways in which racialized subjects can become racially self-
aware actors through their involvement within politicized contexts of racially-centered 
organizing and action.  In both cases “the political,” as it were, operates on two 
processual levels of potentiality: at the level of the negotiated making of subalternly 
positioned racialized identities, and at the level of their social mobilization.  
 Regarding Cuban hip hop it is precisely within this framing of identity politics 
that I seek to understand the ways in which critical situated identities of blackness are 
forged, and how they are mobilized towards liberatory-directed kinds of social practice.  I 
contend that within the evolving space of Cuban hip hop identity operates as a site 
through which transnationally informed notions of “blackness” are engaged and deployed 
in ways directed at contesting racialized expressions of power within an increasingly 
neoliberalized Cuban everyday.  Here a new generation of black and brown skinned 
youth are drawing upon the black-signified expressive frameworks of rap music and hip 
hop “culture” in fashioning new, critically positioned black identities as the basis for 
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advancing race-based social critique and antiracist struggle.  These moves I hold emerge 
largely in strategic response to these young people’s quotidian experiences of racism and 
racial exclusion within Cuba’s new, globally imbricated economies of race and class.   
 At the same time, such processes are again bound by late capitalism’s logics of 
cultural commodification that both conditions the grounds of their emergence as well as 
provide matériel for their production.  While a tourist-driven, consumerized market for 
blackness may be a key component of Cuba’s new racial dynamic, in the same breath 
commodified representations of blackness through a commercialized lens of U.S. hip hop 
provide recourse for the fashioning of alternative black social vistas.  In this sense Cuban 
raperos are complexly implicated simultaneously as consumers, producers, subjects, and 
agents of a globalized ‘post-modern’ economy of blackness.   
 Dynamics of these kinds recall the work of authors like of George Lipsitz (1994), 
Arjun Appadurai (1996) and others who have underscored manner in which global capital 
expansion has enabled the making of intricate new forms of local culture, experience, and 
identity through transnational flows of people, commodities, and information.63  With 
their explicit emphasis on social agency over economic determinacy, such positions have 
been critiqued by some for what is viewed as their tendency toward unproblematic 
celebrations of transnational processes of cultural/identity making without significant 
attention to how power is unequally articulated within these contexts (Rouse 1991, Basch 
et. al 1994, Lemelle and Kelley 1994, Lavie and Swedenburg 1996, Ong 1999).  Such 
positions nonetheless generally recognize a central, seemingly incongruous tendency of 
                                                 
63 Also see Featherstone and Lash (1995) and Hennerz (1996).  
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advanced global capital: a predisposition towards producing differentiated forms of 
domination along social axes such as race, “ethnicity,” and gender which, in turn, provide 
conditions for the emergence of new and/or rearticulated identities and related social 
strategies that often seek to contest the very power-infused circumstances of their 
making.    
 Lisa Lowe and David Lloyd provide an insightful intervention along these lines in 
their suggestion that transnational capital often produces sites of contradiction at the level 
of the local in which ““culture” obtains a “political” force when a cultural formation 
comes into contradiction with economic or political logics that try to refuction it for 
exploitation or domination”  (Lowe and Lloyd 1997:1).  In their understanding 
contemporary social mobilizations such as those predicated on antiracism, feminism, and 
anti-imperialism cannot be subsumed under traditional social paradigms of class struggle, 
but rather “these struggles in themselves occupy significant sites of contradiction that are 
generated precisely by the differentiating process of advancing global capital” (1997:2).  
When considering the sociohistorical particularities of Cuban hip hop Lowe and Lloyd’s 
discussion is productive on a number of fronts.  In recognizing the intrinsic tension 
between globally-inflected modes of differentiated domination and corresponsive forms 
of social agency, contemporary identity-based struggles are seen as emerging largely out 
of contradictions arising from collisions of pre-existing, “modern” constructions of social 
difference – e.g. race, ethnicity, gender, etc. – and varying “post-modern,” commodity-
driven reifications of such differences for market consumption (1997:24).  My suggestion 
here is that Cuban hip hop, as a site of social formation, has arisen within just this kind of 
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historical collision and resulting contradictions between “old” and “new” paradigms of 
race and racialized frames of power.  Rather than operating at some type of meta-
discursive level, these contradictions are negotiated by black and brown-skinned youth in 
the lived everyday as they attempt to critically situate themselves and move amidst a 
constellation of social transformations that define Cuba’s current moment.  The central 
role of “culture” in Lowe and Lloyd’s analysis as an active terrain of the political further 
lends itself to an examination of the ways Cuban raperos utilize realms of culture and 
cultural production in the critical forging and deployment of identities of blackness 
towards socially-directed kinds of intervention.  Culture and identity hence are 
recognized in these contexts as potential sites of both political articulation and action.  
  
Hip Hop Cubano: the narrative   
 
 In my understanding it is clearly no coincidence that the evolution of hip hop as a 
social space over the last decade or so in Cuba has occurred precisely at this current 
moment of rapid social disjuncture and transformation.  Though the early roots of rap 
music and hip hop “culture” in Cuba can be traced back to the mid 1980s, it was not until 
amidst the economic crisis of the Special Period of the early 1990s that hip hop began to 
take shape and an apparent urgency as a self-identified culture movement on the island.  I 
suggest that hip hop Cubano has emerged as an organic sociocultural phenomenon of this 
particular historical juncture – one that operates as both a critical manifestation of, as 
well as a space of social agency within a shifting historical field constituted at the 
conflictive intersection of national and transnational matrices of power.  
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 I begin here by presenting a sketch of the social narrative of hip hop’s emergence 
in Cuba.  I speak of a narrative in the sense that the story of hip hop’s birth on the island 
has become something of urban lore through its telling and retelling by the initiated.  
Given the relative youth of the movement many involved often claim some level of 
involvement as an authentic marker of one’s ‘old school’ status, while others’ own 
personal narratives have become woven – or in the process of being so – into the wider 
narrative as part and parcel of Cuban hip hop’s larger collective story.  The increasing 
growing throngs of foreign journalist, filmmakers,  and academics descending on Havana 
in the last few years to “research” and “document” Cuban hip hop are actively 
reproducing their own rendition of the narrative.  In visiting this narrative I do not wish to 
replicate pre-exiting accounts, but rather to analytically foreground the constitutive role 
that race has and continues to play in hip hop’s ascendance in Cuba – a role which all to 
often is either downplayed or whose complexities have been largely obscured by previous 
treatments.  Such a contextualization is essential in the framing of my own more 
ethnographically focused treatment of contemporary dynamics of the Cuban hip hop 
movement.  I also feel a responsibility to the folks with whom I work to render a reading 
of this history based on my own personal experience and knowledge of the actors and 
stories involved.  In the end hip hop’s narrative in Cuba is exactly that: an interwoven 
collection of personal stories, struggles, relationships, and internal politics upon which a 
sociocultural movement is made.  
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 As the first to publish scholarly on Cuban hip hop,64 musicologists Deborah 
Pacini Pacini Hernández and Reebee Garofalo’s article “Hip Hop in Havana: Rap, Race 
and National Identity in Contemporary Cuba” (2000) makes an important contribution in 
documenting the early history and social contours of hip hop in Cuba within an academic 
frame.  It is unfortunate, however, that in spite of promising claims of the article’s title 
their treatment falls short in grasping the extent and political significance of race and 
racial identity in the making of Cuban hip hop as sociocultural phenomenon.  A particular 
limitation of Pacini Hernández and Garofalo’s examination is that although they situate 
hip hop’s emergence within an analytical frame of globalization, they fail to recognize 
the politically-laden transnational character of black identification and black racial 
identity so critically present among raperos and their followers.   While two more recent 
treatments have been relatively more straightforward in their attempts to address the 
centrality and transnational dimensions of racial politics within Cuban hip hop 
(Fernandes 2003a/b; West-Durán 2004), their emphasis on textual analyses and resultant 
lack of ethnographic depth has at times produced cursory renderings of the social 
complexities and identity politics that shape the movement.65  Here I am not adverse to 
textual analysis per se.  Rather it is when text-based approaches either make claims to 
ethnographic authority and/or lack accuracy when depicting ethnographic subjects or 
social phenomenon that such approaches become problematic.  Whilst my work is in 
                                                 
64 There are numerous articles published on Cuban rap and hip hop in popular, journalistic-based 
media that predate Hernandez and Garofalo’s work.   
65 Given their similar analytical framings and references, I consider two journal articles published 
almost simultaneously by Sujartha Fernandes in 2003 on Cuban hip hop for all intents and 
purposes one treatment.  
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dialogue with the above mentioned authors this is precisely where my intervention is 
critically directed: providing a more ethnographically-grounded analysis of Cuban hip 
hop as a multivalent site of contemporary racial formation.  To do so it is necessary to 
first outline the context of hip hop’s early development in on the island.  
 
 The narrative of hip hop’s birth in Cuba, much like its forebearing U.S. 
counterpart, has become something of urban lore among the initiated – one that many cite 
and claim some level of involvement as an authentic marker of one’s ‘old school’ status 
as raperos – as well as foreign chroniclers.  This narrative usually begins with Alamar, 
the previously mentioned costal municipality just nine miles east of Havana which is 
commonly sited as the “birthplace” of Cuban hip hop.  This sprawling collection of over 
2000 multi-storied cement-block apartment buildings was constructed between the 1970s 
and early 1980s by Cuban workers and prison laborers with the help of Soviet architects.  
Though many buildings were erected by individual microbragadas – volunteer civilian 
work crews organized to build their own housing with state-supplied materials, the 
cubical form and grid-like orientation of Alamar’s semi-urban layout reflects an 
utilitarian Soviet functionalism of their architectural design.  Originally raised to 
accommodate the overflows of young couples from Havana’s over-populated urban 
center as well as an influx of workers from la provincial,66 the municipality is now home 
to an estimated 300,000.  Outside commentators have tended to make claims of a black or 
Afro-Cuban majority in Alamar (Sokol 2000; Pacini Hernández and Garofalo 2000).  My 
                                                 
66 As other regions of the island are commonly referred to by geocentric habaneros.  
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understanding based on conversations with residence and observation is that though black 
and browner-skinned folks are a visual component, the municipality’s working-class 
population is generally more multiracial in character.  
 Leaving aside the question of race for the immediate moment, one key factor in 
Alamar’s significance within Cuban hip hop’s narrative relates to its geographical 
location.  One of the principle routes of rap music’s initial entry into Cuba in the mid 
1980s was via Southern Florida-based radio stations like Miami’s “99 Jams” whose FM 
signal on good days could be picked up on make-shift antennas fashioned out of 
apartment windows or on roof tops in and around Havana.  With its high-rise apartment 
buildings and its northern sea-side location Alamar was positioned ideally for such 
reception.  And it was there – the narrative follows – that a cultural space which would 
eventually be identified as hip hop first began to take root.  Building on this lore, many 
U.S. journalistic accounts of Cuban hip hop tended to liken Alamar, as Cuba’s massive 
“housing project,” to that of the South Bronx’s public housing-laden urban topography 
that first gave rise to rap and hip hop in the 1970s (Sokol 2000; Robinson 2002).  While 
this analogy may carry cultural cachet both in and outside Cuba, it is difficult to pinpoint 
precisely where and when hip hop actually “began” in the Havana area.  In all probability 
there were multiple, intermingling sites of cultural naissance.   
 What is less in contention however is that those who immediately took active 
interest in U.S. rap music via the radio waves, be they in Alamar or Cayo Hueso, were 
overwhelmingly black and brown skinned youth.  Habaneros and others in close 
proximity to the North American mainland have long accessed U.S. radio broadcasts by 
 
 150
informal means, this is not new.  U.S. rock & roll for example had a popular following 
among Cuban youth in the 1970s Cuba.  A Cuban friend of mine in his early 40s from 
Havana told me of his own experience listening to North American top 40 via AM radio 
from as far away as Arkansas.  The consumption of U.S. popular culture has in fact been 
an important, if at times ironic and contradictory, component in the historical shaping of 
popular culture and national imaginary in Cuba67 – a theme underscored by historian 
Louis Pérez who has argued that the ever-present influence of North American culture 
since the 1850s has inextricably tied Cuban notions of national identity and modernity to 
those of the U.S. Pérez 1999).68   Conspicuously absent from Pérez’s treatment however 
is any attention to how race has historically figured within such Cuban/U.S. inter-culture 
dynamics.69   
                                                 
67 In their treatment of Cuban rap Deborah Pacini Hernandez and Reebee Garofalo have argued 
that Cubans under socialism have largely not been “bombarded with images and products 
emanating from multiple metropolitan sources,” were “Cuban youth are able to catch only 
fragmentary, intermittent, and highly decontextualized glimpse of non-Cuban cultural forms such 
as rap” (2000:19).  This understanding seems to run counter to the fact that although politically 
speaking relations between revolutionary Cuba and the United States have been characterized 
primarily by hostility and ideological oppositionality, within realms of popular culture there 
continues to be a strong and present Cuban affinity – whether officially condoned or not – for 
U.S. popular cultural forms such as music, film, and fashion.   
68 As an illustrative case in point one only needs to consider Cuba’s celebrated national sport of 
baseball – or pelota as Cuban’s lovingly refer to it as – whose introduction to the island dates as 
far back as the1860s (Milton 2000).   
69 It is remarkable that beyond a handful of pages pertaining to José Martí and the early 
independence movement, Pérez recent 500 page opus On Becoming Cuban: Identity, Nationality, 
and Culture completely sidesteps the question of race in the making and transnational framing of 
Cuban history and culture vis-à-vis the United States.  Completely absent from his account for 
instance is any discussion of the island’s long standing engagements with jazz, one that stands as 
a poignant example of the ways race has variously framed both the transnational context as well 
as domestic character of Cuban cultural production in the 20th century (Acosta 2003).  Nor is their 
any mention of the historical figure and work of poet Nicolás Guillén let alone his influential 
longstanding relationship with Langston Hughes (see Ellis 1998).  For a collection of essays 
pertaining to a history of black Cuban and African American cultural and intellectual engagement 
see Lisa Brock et al. (1998).  
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 Within the contemporary context of Cuban hip hop there can clearly be no such 
evasion.  The reality that the majority of youth drawn to rap music in Cuba were and 
continue to be black and darker-skinned, urban and less economically-advantaged is not 
coincidental nor is it inconsequential.  As laid out in my opening chapter, the 
participation of racialized subaltern youth in the making of local hip hop followings 
frequently involves strategic mobilizations of racial difference were transnationally 
informed practices of cultural consumption are instrumental.  In many of these contexts 
performative rearticulations of black racial meanings through the racially-coded lens of 
hip hop are often central to such collective endeavors.  Transnational engagements of 
these kinds, if we recall, have been employed by black youth in various Afrodiasporic 
locales in forging new kinds of critical black subjectivities and identity (Wade 1999; 
Anderson 2000; Sansone 2003).  In the case of black and brown Cuban youth in the late 
1980s and early 90s, the active engagement with U.S. rap music by way of radio and 
other resources like records, cassettes and videotapes signified, I maintain, a form of 
racial politic; one that involved significant levels of racial identification and racial self-
meaning making.   
 Ariel Fernández, whose prodigious work over the last handful of years as a 25 
year-old Havana-based journalist, DJ, and hip hop promoter has garnered him something 
of a position as an organic intellectual within the hip hop movement, brings through his 
own “memories” of this period some important insights into the early background of 
rap’s emergence in Cuba.  Mindful of the fact that Ariel’s 25 years put him at a very 
young age in the late 1980s and early 1990s, I am tempted to think of his recollections as 
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something of a personal rendering of the popular narrative of hip hop’s evolution on the 
island rather than necessarily first-hand testimony.  Given the handful of articles he has 
written on Cuban rap in state-run periodicals, there is no doubt that Ariel has substantial 
collective resource to draw upon in his personalized account.70  In a more expansive 
sense, however, Ariel’s story gives multivalent entrée into the sociocultural dynamics, 
tensions, and contradictions present within the larger movement as a whole.  Born, raised, 
and like most young Cubans still living at home with his parents in Havana’s outlying 
barrio of Lauton, Ariel’s transition from adolescence to adulthood – as with most his hip 
hop peers – directly coincided with Cuba’s own transformative shifts from the1980s to 
the 1990s.  Beyond a simple relationship of temporal correspondence, these consequent 
transformations of self and nation find articulation through the space of identity.  Under 
Cuba’s racial classification system Ariel would probably fall phenotypically-speaking 
under the broad category of mestizo with his very light brownish skin and straighter-than-
curly short cropped hair. To my North American-attuned, black-seeking eye his facial 
features nonetheless clearly mark an African descendantness.  Politically speaking 
however Ariel evokes his blackness as the primary source of his identity.  As he explains:  
 
I consider myself black.  Sometimes I am more black.  I don’t know, it’s a concept a 
bit strange.  Everyone on my mother’s side is black. And those on my father’s side are 
white. So my black family came from Africa and my white family came from the 
Canary Islands of Spain. So I think I have both cultures, both races. A mix, no?  But I 
feel more black than white. I think it is something positive.   
 
                                                 
70 Ariel’s article published in the state-run, youth-centered periodical El Caiman Barbudo entitled 
¿Poesía  Urbana? O La Nueva Trova de los Noventa” (2000) touches many of the same historical 
elements he mentioned to me in our discussions.  
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 While such black self-understanding, as his comments seem to suggest, may not 
be without its ambivalences, it is apparent that Ariel’s evolving sense of black identity 
has been significantly shaped and – importantly – found political form through his 
engagement with hip hop.  Similar can be said of the many staunchly black-identified 
raperos I have met who would otherwise be classified as mulato, jabao, trigueño or some 
other gradated vernacularism for non-whiteness in Cuba.  A number of these individuals 
expressed to me that it was precisely through their involvement with the hip hop 
movement that they came to identify themselves as black.  In the case of Ariel, his 
dedication hip hop in fact boarded on the obsessive.  This driving commitment is 
exemplified in his toils as a self-taught journalist to be the first to publish comprehensive 
articles on Cuban hip hop in the state-run media, to his on-going development as a DJ, to 
his now somewhat conflictive position as an institutionally-situated producer of hip hop-
related events.  When we first met in 2000, Ariel was in white-clad marking his year-long 
status as an iyawo, or initiate of santería.  Through our conversations it has always been 
clear that his involvement in the Afro-Cuban identified religion has also been a vital 
component of his everyday life and sense of self.  Rather than competing ontologies of 
blackness,  the racially-marked spaces of santería (“traditional,” nationally-bound) and 
hip hop ((post)modern, transnationally-expansive) have been integral, mutually-
constitutive parts of how Ariel actively defines his blackness.   
 As an important illustration of the seeming organic intersectionality of these two 
routes of black self-making, Ariel has described how through his religious practice he has 
been advised that his camino, or personal path, was to remain in Cuba to work towards 
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advancing hip hop as a constructive force in Cuban society.  Understandings like this 
appear to have emboldened him against the daily frustrations he often seems preoccupied 
with be they personal, political, or resource related (i.e. continual scarcities).  Ariel 
explained that it was also this conviction that precluded the thought of immigrating to the 
U.S., a plan that was all the more tangible after a month-long stay in New York City in 
the fall of 2001 as part of a Cuban delegation of hip hop artists.  During this trip Ariel and 
others spent significant time connecting with elements of New York’s hip hop 
community which among other things included a Bronx visit with the ‘godfather’ of hip 
hop himself Afrika Bambaataa.  As a coveted trophy and documentation of his 
experience Ariel returned with a sizable collection of photographs of him posing with 
various prominent personalities of New York’s hip hop scene.  That Ariel lives and 
breaths hip hop is unquestionable.  It is his devotion as a Cuban hip hop “head” however 
that has and continues to frame his sense of self as well as the race-grounded identity 
politics that guild him.  
 In recalling his memories of hip hop’s Cuban emergence – or possibly more 
accurately his memories of the narrative itself – Ariel told me about the movimiento de 
soul (soul movement) in 1970s and 80s Havana that he suggested just predated rap’s 
appearance.  Among its adherents he recalled the popularity of James Brown – the 
personified cultural icon of that period’s black transnational aesthetic,71 as well as a 
group calling themselves “Los Estevies” who gathered devotedly every weekend to listen 
                                                 
71 See for instance Manthia Diawara's account of how James Brown’s music and imagery inspired 




to the music of Stevie Wonder.  With few LPs floating around Havana and given the 
absence of a state-sanctioned commercial market, the primary source of this music were 
highly coveted audio cassettes of recorded U.S. radio broadcasts.  The same applied for 
the early circulation of U.S. rap and R&B which similarly spread through an informal 
hand-to-hand cassette economy.  Along a similar vein Ariel and others recall glimpses of 
the U.S. television broadcasts of Soul Train which, on rare occasions often associated 
with weather conditions, could be tapped-into using improvised TV antennas.  Regarding 
the circulation and consumption of these black signified images and meanings Ariel 
recounts:  
 
So there were people who had video cassettes. . . these people recorded [the 
program] on these cassettes and would learn how to dance from them. Soul Train you 
know is a dance program. . . So people learned how to dance, and they exchanged 
cassettes.  And also what helped out this movement a lot were athletes who traveled 
[abroad].  Almost all athletes – track and field, volleyball, baseball – are blacks, no? 
They liked this way. They liked the style, the clothing, the large pants, no? They 
would buy nice radios to play in the streets. Boom boxes, these kinds of things. These 
people travel and would buy records, LPs, which folks then copied onto cassettes. 
 
Ariel points out that though informal access and trafficking of U.S. media was popular, it 
was not was not legally sanctioned by the state.  In the case of U.S. radio broadcasts of 
rap and r&b music Ariel recalls:  
 
I don’t know if it happened accidentally or intentionally, but there started to be 
broadcasts of Cuban radio at the same frequency as broadcasts from the United 
States. [he followed in English] I don’t know if it was accidental, you know. But it 
was very funky, because they put a radio station in the same as 99 Jams.  They put a 




 While the Cuban government has a recent history of jamming U.S. radio 
transmissions – the most renowned of which involves the notorious U.S. funded/Cuban 
exile-run Radio Martí out of Miami – the blocking of popular music programming would 
appear to represent a different set of concerns. Here Cuban censorship strategy was less 
about blocking potentially harmful U.S. imperialist-based propaganda then about 
guarding against what was viewed as “culturally” disruptive.  In light of such limitations 
Ariel’s recollection and personal understanding of the moment suggest that young black 
Cubans’ consumption of commercially mediated forms of black popular culture were by 
no means passive.  Rather such engagements were in fact active, intentional and, I would 
hold, involved performative resignifications of black self-representational meanings.  
Ariel’s reference to the ways folks attempted to emulate black styles of dance is 
illustrative of just this kind of dynamic.  Here the transnationally identifiably “black” 
significance of these expressive cultural forms are performatively rearticulated in the 
making of local meaning and ways of being.  Recalling Michael Hanchard’s discussion of 
the black transnational character of Brazil’s Black Soul movement of the 1970s, such 
plays between consuming and re-producing black (self-)meanings have the capacity to 
not only shape collective notions of black identity, but in doing so may also lay the 
groundwork for eventual race-based social mobilizations as well (Hanchard 1994).  
  
La Moña and the early makings of Black Space  
 
 In the case of hip hop the movement from active listening to performative 
remaking developed as interest in rap music spread in the late 1980s and early 90s from 
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the radio waves to the streets.  As increasing numbers of youth, almost exclusively black 
and largely male, began gathering in both private and public settings a cultural space 
began to take shape.  During this period parties referred to as los bonches began springing 
up in private homes, parks, and street corners were young people got together to listen to, 
dance, and otherwise participate in the collective making of la moña – the term coined to 
refer to both U.S. rap and R&B music as well as the black-signified cultural space that 
developed around the music.  Ariel tells for instance of a park in his barrio known as 
Parque Policía after the adjacent police station, where in the late 1980s young moñeros 
would gather on weekends around a make-shift DJ table “on top a piece of wood placed 
over boxes” involving rudimentary amplifiers and speakers to listen and dance to U.S. 
rap, R&B, and funky soul.  At the time of our conversation I told him that his description 
was remarkably reminiscent of the pre-hip hop “street jams” of the mid 1970s which my 
teenage babysitter would drag my brother and me to in our lower-east side neighborhood 
in Manhattan.  Cognizant of Ariel’s astuteness as a student of U.S. hip hop, I wondered if 
his description might at some level be informed by his knowledge of hip hop’s 
originating narrative in the U.S. and, if so, a possible effort to situate himself within its 
now globally-dissimilated historical lineage.   
 Ariel’s personal details notwithstanding, I have heard from others of Parque 
Policía’s famed reputation in the late 1980s and early 1990s for los bonches.  Rather than 
picking up microphones which in all probability was not an option in such resource-
strapped settings, a central component of these early bonches de la calle (of the street) 
was a localized form of breakdancing.  Recollections of this period describe informal 
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competitions know as los rectos de breakdance in which dancers challenged one another 
over audiocassette-derived beats of la moña often accompanied by the now legendary 
rhythmic chants of “la caja, hey, hey, la caja.”  While the principally black crowds in 
attendance may have been mixed-gendered, performatively speaking los rectos were 
largely male-dominated celebrations of music, body, and movement.  Similar gendered 
dynamics would come to define the male performance-centeredness of Cuban rap which 
soon evolved out of these spaces.  Reminiscent of New York’s early male-oriented b-boy 
battles of 1980s, moñeros adoption and recontextualization of breakdancing was no doubt 
informed by early U.S. rap videos that made their way to Havana via visiting family 
members from abroad, traveling Cubans or, by the 1990s the growing presence of tourist-
related foreigners on the island.  Much like their earlier black and Latino peers in New 
York City, these youth were similarly involved in the appropriation and use of public 
space in their making of la moña as a new site of black-signified cultural production.  
And if we are to consider anecdotal accounts of frequent police breakups of los bonches 
such emergent “black” spaces were apparently not well received by the Cuban state 
(Hoch 1999).   
 Attempts at state regulation of public space and the airwaves notwithstanding, it 
would be inaccurate to portray the Cuban state’s position vis-à-vis the evolving black-
identified space of la moña as one of opposition.  State institutions in fact played 
important roles relatively early on in shaping the development of la moña by providing 
access to U.S. popular music through various channels. One early source was state-
produced television programming targeted towards youth which presented both domestic 
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and international popular music.  Ariel recalls for instance hearing and seeing video clips 
of Herbie Hancock’s 1983 hit “Rockit” – whose incorporation of hip hop-inspired 
elements was pivotal in introducing hip hop to the U.S. mainstream – as well as the late-
1980s bubble-gum pop duel of Milli Vanilli on Cuban television.  Such state-sponsored 
presentations of U.S. popular music would appear to run counter Ariel’s account of 
government jamming of U.S. radio broadcasts.  From this vantage point there is no 
definitive way to explain this apparent discrepancy other then to suggest that policies do 
shift and change over time.  There is also an important distinction between uncontrolled 
radio waves out of the U.S. and institutionally produced programming of edited U.S. 
entertainment material.   
 Possibly more significant along these lines was the establishment of state-
sponsored parties and institutionalized spaces in the early 1990s where youth, primarily 
black and darker-skinned, gathered to dance and listen to black-identified U.S. popular 
music.  The premier among these spaces was La Piragua – an open-air performance space 
on the seafront Malecon adjacent the famed Hotel Nacional were weekend la moña 
parties were organized during summers.  Along with other open-air music parties 
centered around various popular music genres, La Piragua was organized by the Unión de 
Jóvenes Comunistas (UJC) (Union of Young Communists) which, as the youth-wing of 
the Cuban Communist Party, is broadly speaking responsible for promoting socialist 
ideals, commitment, and political participation among Cuban youth.  As an alternative to 
these larger state-organized events, smaller more informal bonches would continue to be 
organized in private homes.  While these developments marked the organic growth of a 
 
 160
new cultural movement in the making, they also underscore the beginning of the Cuban 
government’s varying efforts to institutionally frame this emergent, racially implicated 
space of youth activity.72  This play, if you will, between the street and the state would in 
fact remain a central and defining tension – if not battleground – within an evolving hip 
hop movement.   
 As they have been described to me it appears as if a probable rationale behind 
these state-sponsored parties may have been to safely channel young people’s energies 
during the long summer vacation months in ways productive, or at least not disruptive, to 
the social order.  If so such logics would seem to have taken on an immediate urgency 
considering that these spaces were organized at the height of the economic crisis of the 
Special Period in the early 1990s, a time when scarcities of food, electricity, medicine 
and general collapse of any productive semblance of heretofore socialist rewards pushed 
Cuban society and most Cuban’s themselves to desperate ends.   
 I do not wish to suggest a reductive reading of the Cuban state’s intentions during 
this period.  On purely socially responsive grounds it would make sense that the socialist 
state would feel compelled to provide Havana youth leisure outlets during their hot and 
extended break from state-run education system.  Such priorities however could easily be 
in confluence with interests in maintaining effective levels of state governmentality.  One 
only needs to recall the summer huelgas (riots) of 1994 when hundreds of residence of 
Central Havana – large numbers of whom were black and young – took angrily to the 
streets breaking and looting storefront windows containing dollar merchandize only 
                                                 
72 It would be the UJC’s cultural arm, la Asociación Hermanos Siaz that would soon take the lead 
in the Cuban state’s efforts to institutionalize hip hop in Cuba. (See Chapter 6).    
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foreign tourists and a few well-positioned Cubans could afford at the time.  Following a 
year after the legalization of the U.S. dollar, this merchandize represented a first sign of 
dollar-privileged consumer power at a time when the vast majority of Cuban could barely 
secure proper levels of daily nourishment.  Triggered by the armed hijacking of a Havana 
ferry in a successful effort to flee the island, this previously unimaginable expression of 
post-1959 frustration and unrest was a critical link in a chain of events that coalesced in 
that summer’s crisis of los bolseros (rafters).   
 Largely in response to las huelgas and in an effort to immediately alleviate 
mounting social pressures, the Cuban leadership was compelled to allow tens of 
thousands of Cubans to take flight on make-shift rafts towards the U.S. mainland.  For a 
period of roughly a month a carnivalesque environment ensued in the greater Havana 
area as individuals, groups, and families scrambled for materials and resources to 
construct improvised rafts out of inner tubes and scrap wood.73  The 1994 exodus of los 
balseros represented the first time since the Mariel boatlift crisis of 1980 that Cubans 
were temporality granted the liberty to leave the island en masse.  In both episodes black 
and darker-skinned Cubans comprised a sizable percentage of those fleeing. In all the 
early 1990s and 1994 in particular represented critical moment of crisis and reckoning for 
the Cuban state, the Revolution, and Cubans in general.  And it was evident, moreover, 
that the dynamics of race and youth appeared to be significant if not potentially volatile 
                                                 
73 This moment of frenzy is vividly captured in Carles Bosh and Joseph Maria Doménech’s 
Oscar-nominated 2003 documentary “Balseros” produced for Spanish Television Tv-3.  New 
York-based photographer Janis Lewin has also dramatically documented the moment through her  
exhibited collection of photographs of the event.  
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elements of the moment’s social equation – a reality that both the Cuban leadership and 
black youth themselves may have variously just begun to recognize. 
 It was amidst the crisis-level social volatility of 1994 that a soon-to-be DJ 
Adalberto Jiménez acquired a small space in Central Havana dubbed “ell local” where he 
started organizing weekend la moña parties.  This move marked an important new phase 
in the evolution of the Cuban hip hop scene in that it initiated a movement towards a  
more quasi-institutionalized space for hip hop and R&B in Havana. Pacini Hernández 
and Garofalo suggest this development was largely in response to the government’s 
recent opening to U.S. music as well as the growth in size of los bonches which could no 
longer be easily held in private homes or informally organized in public spaces (2000).  
The particular timing of the development, however, is notable.  While DJ Adalberto 
should certainly be credited for his creative initiative as Pacini Hernández and Garofalo 
suggest, he could not have opened the space without the explicit blessing of the Cuban 
state.  As an emergent black cultural space la moña was certainly proliferating as an 
organic social phenomenon at a moment of acute societal crisis.  Hence, there most likely 
was a confluence of interests – individual, collective, and clearly state – which brought el 
local into being.   
 From that moment on through the mid-to-late 1990s similar la moña gatherings 
would find intermittent homes in a number local casas de cultura (neighborhood cultural 
centers) in the central Havana area were DJ Adalberto’s music continued to be a central 
facet.  Though these spaces were initiated by moñeros themselves, they always operated 
with the tacit consent of the Cuba government which at the local level often made these 
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locations available for such use.  Consent of this kind however was apparently not 
without its ambivalences and temperamentality.  Viewed with a level of suspicion as sites 
of foreign cultural influence and anti-social(ist) behavior, local la moña parties where 
often broken up by police according to anecdotal accounts (Olavarria 2002; Sokol 2000).  
Such concerns would be consistent with the discourse of diversionismo ideologico, or 
ideological diversionism, formulated in the early 1970s when debates over the role and 
instrumentality of “culture” in the making of a revolutionary socialist society where first 
articulated.  Cultural forms viewed as embodying capitalist-engendered values of 
competitive individualism were, for instance, deemed antithetical and counterproductive 
to the building of socialist ideas, practices, and collective subjectivity.  These forms took 
on added discord when associated with the penetration of U.S. capitalist culture within 
the otherwise held organic, nationally-bounded Cuban cultural repertoire.  In this way 
such forms were in effect ‘ideologically diversionary’ from both the socialist path as well 
as the historically-given national character of cubanidad.  Within this framed logic, rap 
music was viewed as clearly fitting the bill.  Yet on another critical level, rap music’s 
strong associations with blackness both in the U.S. and increasingly in Cuba might pose 
additional challenges to Cuban ideological orthodoxy particularly as it relates to 
revolutionary discourses of national non-racialism.   
 The establishment of El Local nonetheless marked a new phase in the 
development of la moña as an emergent and growing a black space in Havana.  In 
particular this moment signified a shift in focus from one organized around moñeros to 
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one centered more on raperos; from one characterized by cultural consumption and 
leisure to one of cultural production and politics.  
 While by the late 80s and early 1990s Havana-area black youth had begun taking 
up rapping in informal settings, it was not until 1995 that a more formal convergence of 
Cuban rap began to come into focus.  That year Rodolfo Rensoli, a late twenty-something 
university-educated cultural worker and poet, along with partner Balxesy Rivero founded 
the collective Grupo Uno though with they organized a rap competition in Rensoli’s East 
Havana barrio of Bajia.  It was from this precipitating event that the annual Cuban hip 
hop festival evolved, quickly shifting locations the following year to neighboring Alamar.  
I first met Rensoli and Balxesy in 1999 as they were in the midst of preparing for the 5th 
annual hip hop festival.74  Prior to his involvement in hip hop Rensoli had been active in 
Havana’s preexisting rock scene as a promoter of music-related events – something of a 
rarity for a dark ebony-skinned man in a cultural space traditionally dominated by a much 
lighter/whiter following.  Rensoli explained to me that though he had considered himself 
a rockero at the time, as followers of rock music are known, he was additionally 
influenced by the growing presence of reggae through which he would also come to 
identity himself with Cuba’s “rasta” movement.  There is a significant racial 
juxtaposition between the largely white and definitively black-identified respective 
followings of rock and reggae, Rensoli’s various involvements appear to have been 
motivated above all by an intellectual commitment to advancing avant-gardist forms of 
                                                 
74 Unfortunately, due to funding limitations I had to return to the U.S. a couple weeks prior the 
start of the Festival. I would, however, attend the following four successive festivals between 
2000 and 2003. (See Chapter 5).   
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sociocultural expression through the promotion of músicas alternativas, or alternative 
music-based movements, among Cuban youth.  His participation in the early shaping of 
Cuban hip hop seems to have similarly developed along these lines of commitment. 
 What it was that first drew Rensoli’s attention to the a new rising youth culture in-
the-making was not rap music but breakdancing which, he recounts, had become an 
increasingly visible presence in the streets of his barrio by 1995.  He found his 
intellectual curiosity deepen after attending a local “folkloric” presentation where a 
discussion of the African “roots” of the dance form took place.  Around this time, Rensoli 
recalls, youth began gathering at a local patio to rap, and as he recollects “I remember 
going to a party and there was a [rap] group working on producing music but there was 
no space for them to perform.”  It was at this point that he decided to explore the idea of 
organizing an event to showcase what he apparently recognized as an emergent moment 
of Cuban rap.  Given the lack of resources and no viable alternatives for such other than 
the all-providing socialist state, such an undertaking would necessitate government 
support.  Rensoli realized, Pacini Hernández and Garafalo [have ]suggest[ed], that in 
order to garner state support Grupo Uno would have to present rap in such a way as to 
differentiate it from how rock music had been previously received by the government 
leadership. As they quote Rensoli: 
 
The idea was to avoid the same thing that happened to rock in Cuba.  Rock was 
much misunderstood here, for being a genre that wasn’t considered national – 
another idiocy that was fashionable then, the product of limited vision; that it was 
associated with the so-called diversionismo ideologico (ideological diversionism); 
that it brought with it capitalist influences, deviances of all sorts, physical and 
moral.  And since we suffered that ourselves before, we approached the 
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Asociación Hermanos Sais (sic.) …With this connection it was easier to get the 
project going. (2000:26-7) 
 
 While Rensoli’s comments nicely contextualizes the discourse of diversionismo 
ideologico as it was earlier employed in the context of rock music, I suggest that similar 
concerns in fact would continue to underlie and shape the state’s ongoing dealings with 
Cuban hip hop.  More immediately his remarks references the initiation of Cuban hip 
hop’s evolving, long standing relationship with la Asociación Hermanos Saiz75 which 
took the early lead as the principle site of intuitional contact – and initial state mechanism 
of institutionalization – between the Cuban state and the developing cultural movement.  
In its capacity as the cultural arm of the UJC, la Asociación Hermanos Saiz (AHS) 
operates as something of a union of young artists and musicians charged with promoting 
– and channeling – artistic and cultural production among Cubans under the age of 35.  
Though this institutional association was essential for Group Uno to obtain official 
sanction and access to public space, the festival was organized for the first five years on 
shoestring budget supplied almost exclusively through local municipal sources (Hock 
1999).  During this period the official state position with regard to Cuban rap was one 
more akin to blind neglect than active support.  While raperos continued to struggle for 
official recognition and just access to resources, the Cuban state’s view of the growing 
rap movement generally remained that of an inorganic cultural phenomenon with anti-
social(ist) tendencies – in a sense an ideological diversion that would soon fade by the 
                                                 
75 Named after the late Saiz brothers Luis and Sergio, teenage sympathizers of El movimiento 26 
de julio (the revolutionary guerilla campaign lead by Fidel Castro) who were killed in 1957 by 
police during Batista’s dictatorship.     
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wayside.  The very opposite in fact was be the case. And it was not until 1999 that state’s 
position, if not its implicit strategy, vis-à-vis Cuban hip hop shifted radically.   
 Here I have employed the somewhat awkward expression “anti-social(ist)” to 
characterize hip hop’s initial perception vis-à-vis the Cuban leadership to suggest a play 
of multiply overlapping discourses with which the state has framed the emergent cultural 
phenomenon and its ‘disruptive’ potentialities.  The first being the previously mentioned 
application of the notion of diversionismo ideologico in which rap music’s supposed 
transmission and reproduction of capitalist cultural values is viewed in oppositionally 
juxtaposition to the socialist project.  On another potentially more threatening level, hip 
hop’s overtly “black” racial significance would in fact pose direct challenges to the 
foundational notion of a transculturated, mestizaje-ed Cuban national body upon which a 
post-1959 (as well as pre-) revolutionary socialist Cuba are predicated.  Hence, in this 
way it could additionally be considered ‘anti-socialist.’  At the same time the manner in 
which the racially marked black space of Cuban hip hop has in the past been associated 
with “anti-social” behavior by the Cuban state resonates historically with racialized 
discourses of black social pathology and criminality – propagated at both academic and 
popular levels – discussed in the previous chapter that have long been part and parcel of 
Cuba’s racist belief system.  Though I will return to a more extensive discussion of the 
racially “disruptive” tendencies of Cuban hip hop and the state’s response in the 
following chapter, I felt it necessary to contextualize the Cuban government’s early 
dealings with the movement in this light. 
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 It did appeared, however, that those in the Cuban leadership who initially viewed 
Cuban hip hop with misgivings as an inorganic foreign import could clearly have had 
fodder within this logic.  Given the long absence of technical and financial resources for 
rap music production, up until very recently the vast majority of Cuban rap was 
performed over pre-recorded “background” tapes originating from the U.S. and Europe.  
Anecdotal accounts suggest, moreover, that Cuban MCs early on tended to mimic 
performance styles and dress of African American rap artists often donning the likes of 
hooded jackets, skull caps, big boots, and imitation gold chains (Smith 1998).  Although 
many of the earliest lyrics may have been light on social commentary and political 
“consciousness,” raperos initial appropriations and redeployments of U.S. black male-
centered youth style were by no means devoid of politically imbricated meaning.  Such 
practices I suggest symbolized at least in part opening efforts at black masculine self-
making through the performative, black-signified cultural stylistics of hip hop.   
 Similar to previously black Cuban appropriations of dance styles associated with 
U.S. soul music and breakdancing, Cuban MCs’ early efforts to reproduce hip hop’s 
“black” cultural aesthetics represented attempts at resignifying transnational markers of 
blackness as a means of both invoking one’s own black racial difference, as well as 
(re)constituting that very black self-difference in the first instance.  As I will develop 
further along, I speak here of a (re)constitution of blackness to underscore that such 
identity-based self-making is processual and constantly in a state of re-formation.  For 
many youth involved in hip hop their racialization as black is a everyday lived reality.  
The critical point however is that the dominant prescriptive frames within which such 
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blackness has been historically configured – i.e. as ‘traditional’, autochthonously rooted 
in, and bound by the Cuban nation – began at this moment to be reconfigured and 
reconstituted by these youth though their engagement with the transnationally conveyed, 
black-signified stylistics of hip hop.  Recalling the work of Dick Hebdige, politics of 
style in this way are mobilized not merely as a passive reflection of self, but as an active, 
productive mode of black self-representational practice (Hebdige 1988).  As such these 
practices marked an initiating movement from transnational forms of black identification 
(identifying with) to transnationally informed kinds of black identity based self-making 
(identifying as).  Nowhere has this movement more dramatically pronounced than in 
successive Cuban hip hop festivals.   
 
Performing Blackness and the Cuban Hip Hop Festival  
 
 As an annual marker of hip hop’s development on the island the Cuban hip hop 
festival grew both in size and performative sophistication through 1999.  In spite of the 
dramatic lack of resources the festival expanded during this period from one involving a 
handful of East Havana-based groups to a multi-day event encompassing groups from 
various parts of the island as well as the participation of a collection of foreign MCs 
including, most significantly, a small number of high-profile, New York City-based 
African American artists.  As I came to understand the festival, based on my attendance 
from 2000 to 2003, the event represented not only the collective culmination of a year’s 
artistic development but also an annual inspiration for many raperos to push their music 
 
 170
politically as well as creatively.  Traditionally held in Alamar’s open-air amphitheater 
before some three thousand predominantly black and brown youth, the festival was 
without doubt the largest single stage for Cuban hip hop and one that MCs recognized as 
the best opportunity to showcase their music, themselves, and their message.  This was 
all the more the case given the mentioned absence of production resources as well as any 
semblance of a commercial market for domestic rap through which recorded music could 
be more broadly disseminated.  Hence Cuban rap from its inception was grounded in the 
live performance.   And it was within the annual context of the hip hop festival that such 
performance often found some of its most avant-garde and demonstrative expression.  
 From the festival’s inaugural year in 1995 the social contours that came to largely 
define the Cuban hip hop movement first began coming into focus.  Central among these 
was the beginning of raperos’ lyric text focus on socially-oriented themes and critique 
drawn from their own daily experiences of the island’s shifting, increasingly dollarized 
social landscape.  As played out in the 1995 festival, an early thematic concern along 
these lines was directed towards the then emergent phenomenon of jineteras (female 
dollar-based sex workers).  During the festival significant numbers of songs were 
apparently devoted to critiquing the rise of tourist-driven female prostitution, often 
chastising what was viewed as the excessive materialism of those women involved.   This 
tendency towards a kind of reductive, gendered-focused “blaming the victim” approach 
to the social complexities of Cuba’s dollar-based sex trade was in many ways in line with 
prevailing discourses – both official and popular – regarding female prostitution 
discussed in the previous chapter.  It is not surprising that such patriarchically infused 
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readings would resonance among the festival’s overwhelmingly male concentration of 
performers.  As self-limiting as these critiques were, they nonetheless represented early 
illustrations of the socially directed character and commitments – as masculine in 
orientation as they were – that continued to shape the developmental direction of hip hop 
on the island.  It was not too long, however, before such male-centeredness was 
challenged by emerging female voices in the movement.  
 By the third festival in 1997 there appeared to be a new critical focus evolving 
within a nascent hip hop Cubano in which Havana-based raperos began to more clearly 
define their music and themselves as a cultural “movement” through a further emphasis 
on social themes they recognized as critically affecting their lives.  Such a socially-
engaged focus is illustrated by the now routine use of the term temas sociales (social 
themes) or simply temas (themes) by Cuban MCs in referencing their individual 
compositions rather than the standard Spanish term “canciones” (songs).  Beyond pure 
semantics, this rhetorical practice signifies raperos’ emphasis on the social message or 
mensaje (message) of their work rather than a preoccupation with entertainment per se.  
Although social thematics had already begun to take hold within Cuban rap, the 1997 
festival seemed to mark a significant move towards more overt incorporation of social 
themes particularly as they relate to race and racial identity.   
 Moving beyond the politics of style of the pervious moment, it was through 
lyrical expression that discourses of blackness and racial difference found more explicit 
political (re)articulation.  One incident etched in the collective memory by raperos and 
chroniclers alike involved the pioneering rap trio Primera Base’s 1997 festival 
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performance of Igual Que Tu” (“The Same as You”) in tribute to Malcolm X.76  In 
prefacing the song a member of Primera Base explained before the Alamar crowd 
something to the effect:   
 
This is an homage to Malcolm X, because he is our brother and we relate to black 
people all over the world, even in the United States, and we feel sorry for our black 
brothers in the Unites states who have to live the way they do.  They have it the worst 
of the worst.77 
 
 
Evoking themes of resistance the song drew inspiration from the life story and defiant 
black masculine imagery of Malcolm X.   When it came to the chorus refrain members 
chanted “Igual que tu/igual que tu nigger” (“Equal to you/equal to you nigger”).   
 A collection of North Americans present at the event were openly dismayed by 
the seemingly flippant, decontextualized way in which the term nigger was used to 
reference Malcolm X, leading to a heated debate over the frequent use of the expression 
within U.S. hip hop.  As one of the group’s members Rubén Marín would latter recount 
in a 1998 interview:  
 
Everyone here sort of felt the echo of Malcolm mania after Spike Lee’s movie, so I 
read his autobiography to try to get to the truth of what he was really about. The 
point I am trying to get across in the song is if a great man like Malcolm X is 
considered a nigger, then I want to be a nigger too like him.78 
 
 
                                                 
76 In 1996 Premera Base was the first group to record a commercially produced rap album in 
Cuba. The album was produced through a Panama-based labeled Caribe Productions. Its also 
worth noting that the group’s members are comprised of two black and one white Cuban.   
77 Quoted in Hoch (1999) 
78 Quoted in Verán (1998)   
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While an experiential understanding of the historical violence engendered through the 
term nigger may have been absent, a race-based identification with Malcolm X as a 
transnational figure of black liberation clearly was not.  The MCs’ comments moreover 
further attest to the effectiveness of U.S. media in conveying images and ideas of 
blackness transnationally.  In this case Spike Lee’s 1992 filmic depictions of Malcolm X 
struck a resonant cord among young black Cubans as it similarly did in the context of 
Brazilian hip hop as discussed in Chapter 1.  
 During the 1997 festival another pioneering group Amenaza (Menance) made 
another potentially more overtly political intervention along racial lines with the 
performance of their song “Ochavon Cruzao,” roughly translating as “Mixed-up 
Octoroon.”79  In this tema the groups’ three members of variously mixed-race 
background addressed the lived ambiguities of racial identity in contemporary Cuba in 
ways significantly complicating, if not implicitly contesting, hegemonic discourses of 
mestizaje as a stable, historically harmonious, race-neutral core of the Cuban social body.  





también soy congo,  
también fui esclavo,  




I too am Congo  
I too was a slave  
and so too has my hope suffered for them 
                                                 
79 Cruzao is a Cuban term most often used in religious contexts to refer to the syncretistic fusion 
of African-derived religious forms in the making of everyday kinds of religious practice.  It is 
also worth noting that two of the three original members of Amenaza would eventually travel to 
France and under the tutelage of a French hip hop producer would form the previously mentioned 
“Cuban” commercial rap sensation Orishas in 1999.  I will return to the significance of Orishas in 
Chapter 6.  
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que el racismo no ha acabado,  
soy rumba Yoruba Andavo  
y no acabo hasta ver lo  
mío multiplicado 
no ves soy pinto, ochavon cruzao  
negro como el danzon y el son cubano  
negro como esta mano  
negro como mi hermano  
negro como Mumia,  
y negro como mucho blancos mas quien lo  
diría y no me cuantas  
desafía raza mía  
dijeron negro pero a mi no me contaron  
dijeron blanco pero en esta clan no me 
aceptaron  
dijeron tantas cosas,  
soy el ser que nadie quiso  
lo negro con lo blanco, el grito de un 
mestizo 
because racism has not ended  
I am rumba Yoruba Andavo80 
and I won’t be done until I see what’s  
mine multiplied  
can’t you see I am mixed, mixed octoroon  
black like the Cuban danzon and the son81 
black like this hand 
black like my brother 
black like Mumia  
and black like lots of whites but who could 
tell, so you don’t count me  
my race defies  
they said black but they didn’t count me  
they said white but that clan didn’t accept 
me  
they said so many things,  
I’m the one that no one wanted 




 While this lyric excerpt gives poetic expression to struggles over racial self-
meaning and identity as currently lived by young Cuban’s of ‘mixed race,’  I suggest it 
also represents an early foregrounding of the movement’s quest for a politicized frame of 
black identification that transcends dominant national constructions and its contemporary 
contradictions.  By exposing the dissonance experientially embodied in the celebrated 
national figure of the mestizo, the song’s first-person narrative undermines the central 
foundational symbol of Cuba’s historical claims to a racially transculturated – read 
racially neutral(ized) – nation.  At the same time the song’s mestizo subject position seeks 
to rectify this dissonance by asserting its own historical claims to blackness.  Along 
                                                                                                                                                 
80 Name of a famed Afro-Cuban rumba performance troupe based in Havana.  
81 Two ‘traditional’ popular music forms historically represented as national cultural paradigms of 
a harmonized Cuban racial mixture.  
82 Original Spanish text by Joel “Pando” Heredia as cited, with my own corrections, in Pacini 
Hernández and Garofalo (2000).  Modified English translation my own.  
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‘cultural’ lines such affirmations of black self are articulated through an identification 
with rumba whose own black cultural significance is further secured, both literally and 
discursively, though its association with the Afro-Cuban performance troupe Yoruba 
Andavo.  Potentially more contestive, the black racial recuperation of the danzon and son 
– ‘traditional’ music forms celebrated as national symbols of a harmonized, racially-
transculturated Cuban cultural heritage given their syncretized fusion of African and 
European musical elements (Moore 1997) – makes further claims of black cultural 
legitimacy  
 On a more overtly political level the song’s text invokes the collective social 
memory of Africa (congo) and the racial terror and suffering of slavery – two critical 
components, Paul Gilroy has argued, in the historical shaping of racial consciousness in 
the Black Atlantic world (Gilroy 1993a).  It is the persistence of racism, however, that 
serves as an historical linkage between the past and the present; the everyday lived 
ground upon which such historicized black identification is experientially rooted.  Racism 
here is referenced not so much as an objective truth ‘out there’ but rather a subjectively 
lived reality “that has not ended.”  Within contemporary Cuba, the song text seems to 
imply, regardless of one’s interpolation as mestizo one’s non-white self remains subject 
to – or more accurately a subject of – racializing forms of power.   
 Although such liberatory directed struggles over racial self-meaning are framed 
within the sociohistorical space of the Cuban nation, recourse to blackness are not 
necessary bound by such borders.  The brief though pointed reference to Mumia Abu-
Jamal represents a critical move in this regard.  In breaking from the preceding allusions 
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to nationally defined markers of blackness, Mumia’s invocation presents an alternative, 
outer-national site of black self-identification – one that further transcends the conflicting 
tensions between a racial “ideal” and the racialized social realities of being non-white in 
Cuba’s new economy of the 1990s.  Rather than the historical figure of Malcolm X, 
Mumia’s contemporary black radicalism brings a more immediate political urgency to 
bear on the transnational contours of such black identification.  Calls in English to “free 
Mumia!” have in fact become a frequent refrain among some of the more overtly political 
of Cuban MCs. Tee-shirts framing Mumia’s dreadlocked image are also coveted visible 
marks among many raperos. As I will discuss in greater detail in the following chapter, 
engagements with U.S. black radicalism – both discursive and literal – have in fact been 
critical to the making and mobilization of black identity politics within the Cuban hip hop 
movement.  As Amenaza’s poetic “grito de un mestizo” suggest, however, in spite of 
such black self-affirmations, resolution to the lived social contradictions of being of 
mixed-race in Cuba today remains a lived struggle.  At least so was the case in 1997.  
 As it stands, this present text-heavy focus on song lyrics could conceivably open 
me to critiques that I myself have raised regarding the potential limitations of textual 
approaches to understanding social phenomena.  While this tension may not be 
completely unavoidably, let me respond by foregrounding the ethnographic context of 
performance within which Cuban rap’s lyric-based expression is grounded.  Possibly 
more so then any other contemporary western music genre, rap’s aesthetic form is 
predicated on the centrality of the spoken word, the enunciated text.  Among Cuban MCs 
such textual prioritization is reflected in their common use of the term los textos to refer 
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to their lyric compositions.  Within the live performance-driven setting of Cuban hip hop, 
however, the “black” signifying force of los textos takes on a whole other level active 
social significance.   
 Beyond the initial phase of lyric composition when textual meanings are first 
shaped, it is through Cuban MCs public performance of their textos that such black 
textuality is actively embodied and self-actualized.  It is of course the “rap” through 
which the rapero actively defines him/herself.  Here in a very tangible sense the text 
moves from realms of discourse to those of practice.  While it one thing for a Cuban 
youth of mixed-race to compose a lyric line “[soy] negro como Mumia,” it is a whole 
other undertaking to mount a stage before three thousand of your peers and verbally 
proclaim over a microphone  “¡[soy] negro como Mumia!.”83  Here it is less about 
performing a text than it is about the instrumentality of the text as an active mode of self-
representational practice.  It is within this context of public performance, I suggest then, 
that “black” signifying texts can be mobilized in the strategic self-fashioning of critically 
positioned kinds of black identity and subjectivity.  Similar to the performative use of 
style previously discussed, raperos’ textual invocations of blackness in this manner are 
reconfigured and redeployed in ways in which they take on their own locally generated 
structures of feeling (Williams 1977).  Such imbricated practices of cultural consumption 
and reproduction of blackness, as it were, underlie the strategic creativity of black self-
making on the part of Cuban MCs.  And although these black (self-)reconfigurations may 
                                                 
83 It was bold proclamations of these kinds which helped Amenaza’s “Ochavon Cruzao” win first 
place in the 1995 hip hop festival. The competition component of the festival, however, was soon 
fazed out in succeeding years. 
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be imbued with autochthonous sociocultural – i.e. “Cuban” – significance, they 
nonetheless continue to consciously signify a black transnationality from which they 
arise.   
 My proposition here is significantly counter posed to that of Pacini Hernández 
and Garofalo’s (2000) who have concluded based on their research in the late 1990s that 
Cuban MCs and their followers tend not to foreground their contemporary connections to 
the Afrodiasporic world, and thus display a conspicuous absence of black diasporic forms 
of identification.  In their words: “Thus, even as young Cuban rappers have become more 
conscious of their racial identity in local – Cuban – terms, their perceived relationships to 
people of African descent still seem to be located in the historical past rather than the 
present” (2000: 39).  Their assertion is supported in part by an interview conduced with 
Pablo Herrera, a pioneering Havana-based rap producer and instrumental figure within 
the Cuban hip hop movement, who is quoted as suggesting that contemporary Africa 
holds little attention among raperos as a source of identification and inspiration.  While in 
my own experience this may indeed be the case, there is an important distinction to be 
made between the present-day contexts of Africa and the African diaspora with regard to 
contemporary forms of black transnational identification.  Although I recognize that 
Africa has and continues to serve as source of both contemporary routes (Pierre 2004) as 
well as the historical “roots” (Gilroy 1993a) of Afrodiasporic identification, a critical site 
of transnational black belonging nonetheless remains those active, present-day 
connections forged between African descendant populations within the Black Atlantic 
 
 179
world.  Such a distinction appears to be obscured, if not lost all together, in Pacini 
Hernández and Garofalo’s argument.   
 As I myself have come to know Pablo Herrera there is little ambivalence as to his 
own understanding of the critical importance of black transnational engagement within 
Cuban hip hop – engagements which have significantly shaped his own highly articulated 
sense of black self-identity.  I first met Pablo in the summer of 1999 at the offices of 
Conjunto Folklórico Nacional de Cuba while he was doing translation work for a group 
of North American participants of dance workshop hosted by the institution.84  The class 
had gathered that day for a screening of black Cuban filmmaker Gloria Rolando’s recent 
documentary “Eyes of the Rainbow” celebrating the life of African American political 
exile Assata Shakur who has resided in Cuba since 1986.85  Noting Pablo’s seemingly 
flawless North American accent and familiar affect with the visiting Americans, I simply 
assumed ‘the brother’ was from the States.  It was not until we spoke after the screening 
that I realized that not only was he Cuban but was in fact one of the key contacts 
suggested to me by a mutual acquaintance of ours in New York City.  Our 
communication from that point on has been almost exclusively in English sprinkled with 
U.S. black vernacular, affecting from the start a sense of a black transnational 
                                                 
84 The Conjunto Folklórico Nacional is the national Cuban dance troupe specializing in Afro-
Cuban “folkloric” dance and music founded in 1962 as part of the Revolution’s early efforts to 
institutionalize and codify national culture. Among those participating in the workshop organized 
by Yvonne Daniel, the U.S. academic and author of  Rumba (1995), was Shelia Walker - the then 
director of the University of Texas’ Center for African and African American Studies.  
85 Influenced by the work of friend Aline Helg, Gloria Rolando later produced the film “Raices de 
Mi Corazon” (2001) based on the infamous 1912 massacre of followers of the Partido 
Independiente de Color.  For her part, Assata Shakur, as I will soon return, has been an influential 
figure and inspirational icon of black radicalism with Havana’s hip hop community.    
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camaraderie.  Though such finesse was part and parcel of Pablo’s operative charisma and 
charm, our relationship was significantly more complicated than simply this.  
 I soon learned that Pablo had earned a degree in English and Russian translation 
at the University of Havana, and had later spent a number of months living and working 
in Brooklyn where he was able to hone his African American-inflected vocabulary and 
accent.  Pablo’s linguistic and cultural fluency in “African American-ness” was so attune 
I had heard of his ability to pass in the streets and hotel lobbies of Havana as a yuma 
(Cuban street vernacular for foreigner) – a feat rather remarkable for a dark skinned black 
man in Cuba.  As an illustrative aside, in the 2001 film rendition of Danny Hoch’s “Jails, 
Hospitals & Hip-Hop” Pablo played a naïve, mono-linguistic, camera-totting African 
American tourist in the streets of Havana opposite Danny Hoch who ironically assumes 
the role of local, fast-talking jinetero character.86  Such cultural facility has undoubtedly 
contributed, along with his achievements as Cuba’s pioneering hip hop producer, to 
Pablo’s success over the years in developing a prolific range of North American contacts.  
It was through such contacts he first acquired an assortment of small-scale digital music 
production equipment assembled into an improvised music studio in his small roof-top 
apartment in Havana’s residential barrio of Santo Suarez.  His mother, whose 
accomplishments as a reputable black female architect under the Revolution clearly 
                                                 
86 New York-based, hip hop-identified performance artists and cultural activist Danny Hoch has 
long been an active and influential figure with Havana’s hip hop community.  Building upon a 
strong network of relationships developed since the late 1990s with local MCs and others 
involved in the local scene,  Danny been involved in organizing a number of collaborative 
projects including a tour in 2001that brought nine Havana-based raperos – including Pablo and 
Ariel – to New York City for a month long series of performances and politically-directed 
engagements.   
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infused a level of black pride and grounded respect for socialism, designed his apartment 
which sits atop her home.  Over the years Pablo’s place has become something of an 
institution within Havana’s hip hop community where, working with a handful of the 
most high-profile of Cuban rap groups, he has crafted some of the first locally-produced 
hip hop background beats on the island.  Now in his later 30s, his astute intelligence and 
committed involvement has garnered him the status as one of the most influential figures 
within the movement, a position which – along with a particular set of interpersonal 
dynamics – has contributed to a history of competitive tension between he and the 
younger, highly ambitious Ariel. 
 As Pablo recounts, his involvement in Cuban hip hop first stemmed from his 
thematic incorporation of rap music into his course work during a teaching stint at the 
University of Havana in the mid 1990s.  It was at that point that he first came into contact 
with Amenaza, eventually developing a relationship with its members that lead to a 
managerial role with the group.  Pablo told me that he was concerned early on about what 
he felt was Amenaza’s initial lack of a critical black consciousness.  It was this 
shortcoming he believed contributed to a certain level of disregard among some local 
raperos who viewed the group as politically shallow “pretty boys.”  This despite the fact 
that Amenaza were at the time considered by many to be among the most talented of 
Cuban rap performers.  In his capacity as manager Pablo claims he pushed Pondo, the 
creative head of Amenaza, to deal more explicitly with questions of race and racial 
identity.  This intervention, he contends, contributed to Amenaza’s composition and 
subsequent performance of the above mentioned tema “Ochavon Cruzao” which garnered 
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first place in the now defunct song competition during the 1997 festival.  Regardless of 
possible sources of inspiration, Amenaza’s “Ochavon Cruzao” signed a new level of 
racial self-reflexivity within Cuban hip hop.   
 Although I cannot comment on whether his work with Amenaza may have 
directly informed their referencing of Mumia Abu-Jamal, I do know that Pablo’s own 
exposure to U.S. black radicalism has been a prominent fixture in his life for a number of 
years.  Possibly more than any ‘older school’ member of Havana’s hip hop community, 
Pablo has over the years developed particularly close personal relationships with African 
American political exiles Assata Shakur and Nehanda Abiodun whom have been 
influential figures within the movement.  While Assata has become an inspirational icon 
of black radicalism among many Havana-based raperos stemming in part from her 
internationally celebrated status as a black revolutionary, Nehanda has been more 
personally involved in the growth of Cuban hip hop since receiving political asylum in 
1990.  Now in her early 50s, Nehanda’s mentoring role among many local MCs has 
conferred upon her something of a la madrina, or “godmother” status within the 
movement.  Nehanda’s relationship with Pablo as I have come to know it has similarly 
been an involved and mutually respectful one.  The kinds of relationships that Pablo has 
developed over the years with both Assata and Nehanda has certainly been an influence, 
among others, affecting Pablo’s political development as well as his transnationally 
expansive sense of black self.   
 Regarding Pablo’s relationship with Nehanda, as an expression of their shared, 
transnationally-geared political engagements the two have served together as the Havana-
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based representatives of the African American centered, activist-oriented Malcolm X 
Grassroots Movement’s Black August project (Black August for brevity).87  Using hip 
hop as an organizing medium, the black nationalist leaning Black August has been active 
in supporting the on-going struggles of African American political exiles residing in 
Cuba.  Over the years the organization’s involvements in these directions have spurred an 
active interest in supporting an emergent Cuban hip hop movement.  Though I will 
explore in greater detail the various U.S. black radical/black nationalist influences and 
their resultant expressions within Cuban hip hop in the following chapter, the point I am 
asserting is that like many involved members of Havana’s hip hop community Pablo has 
utilized the transnational frame of hip hop to forge a range of politically engaged 
connections with African Americans as well as mainland Puerto Ricans.  Such 
connections, importantly, prove vital resource in the production of politically-grounded, 
nationally-transcendent kinds of black identity which continue to shape the social 
dynamics that define Cuban hip hop as a space of critical self-making of black 
subjectivity and action.  Here politicized identities of blackness arise in both strategic 
response to Cuba’s new socioeconomic imperatives of race, while serving as the basis for 
race-based social critique and mobilization. In this manner black self-identity making can 
serve as a modality of social praxis.  
 
                                                 
87 Nehanda was actually one of the founding members of the organization.  
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Chapter Five  
 




 In the previous chapter I outlined some of the social contours of hip hop’s 
emergence in Cuba with an emphasis on the instrumental role of transnational black 
identification and identity in the early formation of hip hop cubano as a contemporary 
social phenomenon.  While incorporating some of my own ethnographically informed 
insights and understandings of “the narrative,” my framing was primarily an historical 
one.  At this juncture I now delve into the “ethnographic present” by centering my 
exploration of Cuban hip hop’s on-going development and more squarely upon my field 
experience in Havana between 1999 and 2003.  In this chapter I introduce in greater 
ethnographic detail the immediate context of my field research while presenting some of 
the political negotiations of my own engagements within the Cuban hip hop movement.  
The central concern of this chapter, however, remains the exploration of Cuban hip hop 
as an active site of critical black “self-making.” To this end a key argument I am 
proposing here is that such black self-making occurs at the confluence of two distinct 
currents of nationalist discourse and history; the first drawn from a nationalist tradition of 
U.S. black radicalism, the second rooted in a recuperation of a black radical subject 
within Cuba’s own national narrative.  Through the articulation of the two, I hold, black 
antiracist advocacy is simultaneously advanced through transnational appeals to black 
diasporic histories of struggle as well as assertions of full black citizenship and rights 
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within the nation.  By paying close ethnographic attention to raperos and their work I 
hope to illuminate the complexities of these social dynamics and contours.  
 
 As with all narratives there is a precipitating event or framing that sets everything 
in motion.  My initial introduction to the hip hop scene in Havana came about through a 
colleague of mine Rosanne Adderley, currently an associate professor of history at 
Tulane.  Rosanne and I were among a small group of Afro-descended graduate students 
and junior faculty (herself) who, engaged in critical race scholarship, happen to be doing 
research in Cuba during the summer of 1999.  Though modest in size, this small cadre of 
“black folks doing race stuff” represented something of an historical precedent in Cuba.88  
Never has there been in the past anything approaching a critical mass of young black 
scholars concurrently examining Cuba’s historical problematic of race.  Our presence was 
at least in part a result of Cuba’s recent apertura or opening to foreign researchers that 
has inspired a growing tied of North American academics to the island since the early 
1990s.  At the same time we represented a new generation of critically trained black 
scholars from the U.S. exploring from various vantage points the transnational facets of 
race in the making of the black Atlantic as lived. Given our diasporically attuned 
orientations it is not surprising that we quickly found ourselves converging that summer 
in Santiago de Cuba during an exploratory foray into eastern, more caribeño (read 
“darker”) side of the island.  While I made some preliminary contacts with the small 
rapero community in Santiago during my short visit, I committed myself to concentrating 
                                                 
88 This “cadre” included Jafari Allen and Frank Guridy currently assistant professors of 
anthropology and history respectively at the University of Texas, Austin.  
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my research within Havana’s larger and more developed hip hop community.  Amidst 
Afro-Cuban religious ceremony and salsa  performances during Santiago’s Festival de 
Caribe, and sweltering trips to the Universidad de Oriente and the church of la Virgen de 
la Caridad del Cobre,89 we conversed informally about our current projects which for 
most of us were in their formative stages. 
 It was within setting that Rosanne, aware of my proposed research on Cuban hip 
hop, informed me of a rap group named Obsesión she had seen perform just days before 
back in Havana at the Unión de Escritores y Artistas de Cuba (UNEAC).90  Situated on 
the shady grounds of a once lavish pre-1959 villa and now the site of one of Cuba’s 
preeminent cultural institutions, UNEAC’s patio-bar is renowned for its weekly 
performances of “folkloric” and “traditional” music forms such as rumba and bolero that 
regularly draw a packed audience of rum-drinking, dollar-paying tourists and local 
Cubans.  I recall that it initially struck me that Cuban rap, a heretofore marginal(ized) 
music form on the island, had made inroads into such a culturally prescriptive 
institutional space such as UNEAC.  In mentioning my work to group’s members after 
the performance, Rosanne obtained a contact number which she later passed on to me in 
Santiago.  Once back in Havana I immediately followed up in contacting the group after 
which we agreed to meet one afternoon at my apartment for introductions.  So began my 
relationship with Magia López, Alexei Rodríguez and Roger Martínez whom comprised 
what was at the time the rap trio of Obsesión.  Although Roger – who eventual left the 
                                                 
89 Cuba’s patron saint who is herself the syncretic Catholic half of Ochun, santeria’s orisha of 
love and feminine sensuality.  
90 Union of Cuban Writers and Artists 
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group to immigrate to the U.S. in 2001 – and I were initially close, it was Magia and 
Alexei with whom I developed some of my strongest and most lasting friendships in 
Cuba.91  A married couple whose creativity and tireless commitment over the years has 
helped positioned them among the most successful and respected of artists in the 
movement, Magia and Alexei became two of my first and most trusted entrées into 
Havana’s hip hop community.  In broader sense, moreover, however, they and their 
families proved invaluable windows into the social complicities of contemporary Cuban 




 My initial conversations with Magia and Alexei, then in their late and mid 
twenties respectively, were significant in informing my early thinking about Cuban hip 
hop particularly as its related to questions of race and racial identity.  I recall one of our 
fist exchanges occurring on the roof-top patio of Alexei’s parents’ house in Regla where 
he and Magia primarily reside.92  A fifteen minute ferry ride across Havana’s 
industrialized harbor,93 the municipality of Regla is known for its strong associations 
                                                 
91 Leaving for the U.S. on a fiancé visa, Roger is now living in the Los Angeles area and is 
married to a former UT graduate student whom I had initially introduced him to.  
92 In the past, Alexei and Magia split their time between Regla and Magia’s mother’s apartment in 
Cayo Hueso in central Havana.  These days, however, it is a rare occasion they pass a night 
outside Regla though hardly a day passes when they do not spend some time at Magia’s mother’s 
more centrally located place.   
93 Locally know as la luncha, it was this ferry to Regla that was hijacked in the summer of 1994, 
setting off the crisis of los hulgas discussed in Chapter 4.  In April 2003 Regla’s ferry would 
again be commandeered by an armed group of Cuban’s attempting to flee the island to the U.S.  
The hijackers were eventually apprehended by Cuban commandos after the ferry ran out of fuel. 
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with santería dating back to the late 19th century founding of la Iglesia de Nuestra Señora. 
The church is home to the image of the black Virgin de Regla whom is syncretized with 
Yemayá, the maternal orisha of the sea.  Today Regla is home to a sizeable community 
of babalaos and Iyas de ocha (religious godmothers or madrinas) who live among its 
narrow, sleepy streets.  And revelers continue to pilgrim to la Iglesia de Nuestra Señora 
to pay homage to the alter of the Black Virgin shrouded in Yemayá’s oceanic blues.  
Born and raised in the black working-class family a few blocks from the waterfront 
church, Alexei’s sense of history and black self is deeply a meshed with that of Regla’s.  
Alexei’s self-consciously modern sense of blackness, however, ultimately reaches 
beyond the local. When I posed a question about the seeming ubiquitousness of black 
self-affirmation within Cuban rap lyrics, Alexei responded:  
 
This is a stage of rap. One must first announce “I am black.” And when you 
acknowledge this we can then move forward from there. I think this is valuable, this 
is valuable  today  especially here in Cuba. It seems to me that black people now 
know more about themselves. I think that our work is contributing to establishing 
this. And part of what is necessary here is to know your history in a deep kind of way 
– to know who you are, your roots, and where you come from.  
 
 
 As Alexei’s comments suggest, his conception of black identity is clearly a 
political one.  Rather then passively given, such identity is understood within the Cuban 
context as a conscious  assertion of self – “I am black,” which in turn serves as a the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Shortly following, three of the groups’ members were executed after a brisk tribunal hearing, 
triggered a considerable level of international condemnation from various fronts including some 
long term supporters of the Revolution including Columbia novelists Gabriel García Márquez.  
Incident was the first of a series of hijackings in 2003 – two involving domestic airplanes – that 
signaled a new point of social crisis in Cuba’s ongoing post-1989 struggles.   
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ground upon which to “move forward,” to act.   Alexei was not implying that blackness, 
per se, was some a kind of discursive signifier ‘out there’ which can be willy-nilly chosen 
or rejected at whim. In Alexei’s case, his dark complexion, kinky hair, and strong 
features unmistakably marked him as negro within Cuba’s racialized classification 
system.  The point, however, as I interpreted it was to embrace and celebrate one’s 
blackness in the face of a dominant history that has either imbued blackness with 
negative value or attempted to negate it all together.   
 Magia, a beautiful dark brown-skinned woman with full features, interjected that 
she herself had been resistant to identify as black in spite of the presence of positive black 
affirmations within her family.  She recalled for instance that while a school-age girl in 
her largely black barrio of Cayo Hueso in Central Havana she sought to claim any non-
white marker other than that of black.  Dominant racists dictates taught that blackness 
was not necessarily a desirable attribute to be associated with.  At the same time, the 
ways in which Magia has had to negotiate her blackness are of course particular to the 
gendered specificity of racialized power and history in Cuba.  Such gender-defined 
historical prescriptions that would celebrate la mulata as the Cuban essence of a 
sexualized feminine aesthetic could, for instance, create pressures among darker-skinned 
women to distance themselves from identifying as negra.   
 By 1999, however, things had clearly changed.  As I have come to know Magia, 
her identity and performative self-projection as a black woman has been at the very 
center of her ever-evolving work as a one of Cuba’s pioneering female rap artists.  
Opposed to celebrating la mulata, much of Magia’s work has in fact come to explicitly 
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critique the historically-configured, racialized sexualization of black and brown skinned 
women within Cuban society.  Efforts of this kind represent an assertion of new forms of 
black womanist subjectivity and woman-centered critique within the otherwise male-
dominated space of Cuban hip hop.  Such intervention not only challenge hip hop’s 
masculinist orientation, but provided the basis from which to pose broader critiques of 
racialized patriarchy as they are experienced in the Cuban everyday. 
 During the four years I have known Magia and Alexei their blackness, while ever 
present, has become an increasingly outwardly celebrated facet of their personal and 
public lives as artists.  Here, black-signifying style has been instrumental.  When I first 
met the two, Alexei keep his hair conventionally short cropped, while Magia had her hair 
interwovenly braided with synthetic extensions.  Within a couple years Alexei, like a 
growing number of raperos, began grooming what is now a full head of mid-shoulder 
length dreadlocks.  As previously mentioned, young black men in urban centers such as 
Havana and Santiago de Cuba whom may not necessarily be involved in Cuba’s Rastafari 
movement have in small but increasing numbers embraced dreadlocks as a non-
conformist, Afro-centered marker of their black masculinity.  This practice has most often 
been received in hostile terms within an otherwise socially conservative, racially 
prescriptive Cuba. 94  Despite, or possibly more accurately in opposition to such racially-
                                                 
94 The wearing of dreadlocks in recent years has also been taken up by some young black men 
engaged in informal tourist-based activity including sex work.  As within other Caribbean 
contexts, dreadlocks have become a commodified symbol of an “authentic” black masculinity – 
often associate with a racialized virility – among “thrill seeking” European and North American 
tourists, particularly women. (See again Kamala Kempadoo and Jo Doezema, et al. (1998) and 
Klas de Albuquergue (1998))  Regardless of motivation, young dreadlocked black men have and 
continue to be subjected to racially-inscribed associations with criminality and drug use by Cuban 
police and the broader Cuban public as a whole.   
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coded antagonism, Alexei holds his locks as part and parcel of his identification as a 
black man within a nationally-transcendent community of blackness.  As for Magia, she 
now wears her long, reddish-brown hair naturally combed out into a big ‘fro-like crown, 
or wrapped-up ‘African style’ akin to the new-age, afro-chic Erykah Badu.  In line, 
Magia often adorns herself in West African-inspired gowns when performing in 
celebration of her black womanhood.  Though he has been known to don African prints 
on occasion during performance, Alexei’s thin frame is more often then not draped the 
proverbial raperos attire of over-size baggy pants, footwear from the U.S., and long lose-
fitting tops.  Regardless of outfit, it has long been the case that Magia and Alexei never 
hit the streets of Havana without adorning a set of wooden amulets which rest 
conspicuously atop their chests.  Fashioned by Alexei as symbols of the couple’s 
collective bond, these amulets are carved in the likeness of faces with strong ‘African’-
like features and are spoken of as carrying important protective significance for the two.  
 While such performative expressions of black-signified style and aesthetic may at 
some levels be transnationally informed, both Magia and Alexei understand themselves 
and their blackness as deeply rooted in Cuban history, nation, and revolutionary struggle.  
Such commitments find poetic form in their music.  One of Obsesión’s earliest signature 
temas, “Obsesión Mambí,” is poignantly illustrative of this interarticulation of black self, 
nation, and struggle.  Foregrounded in the group’s initial album – the first rap album 
commercially produced in Cuba,95 “Mambí” is filled with historical references to los 
                                                 
95 The group’s 1998 album “Obsesión” was recorded and released under Cuba’s state-run music 
label Egrem.  The project’s producer, an accomplished young black Cuba jazz pianist by the 
name of Roberto Fonseca, was able to use his professional used clout to access state-run 
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Mambíses; the formally-enslaved, machete-wheedling regiments of black (male) of 
soldiers who fought in Cuba’s late 19th century independence wars under Antonio 
Maceo.96  Rather then simply recounting the history, the song’s first-person narrative 
portrays the group’s members as modern-day mambíses  When asked about the song’s 
thematic significance, Magia put it simply “somos mambíses, luchando lo mismo” (“we 
are mambíses, we are fighting the same [struggle]”).  Below is an except from “Mambí.”  
 
 
[Alexei] Pa´l pueblo aquí estoy yo 
[coro]: Yo estoy aquí diciendo 
Obseción Mambí pinchando 
 
[Alexei]:Que nadie espere ningún tipo´e 
chance 
Si Quintín Banderas nunca dio masaje 
¿Por que yo entonces? 
¡A fajarse! 
Que la manigua está gritando: Yo soy yo 
Y es por mí por quien doblan las campanas,  
no metan forros 
El morro sabe que al combate corro y 
corro junto a los bayameses 
¡Cuba orgullosa de mí! 
No le temo a una muerte gloriosa 
Esténse quietos que insurrecto y prieto es 
un lío ¡Rebambarambara! . . .  
  
 
For the people here I am 
[chorus]:  I am here speaking 
Obsesion Mambí working hard  
  
Nobody should wait for  
chance 
If Quintín Banderas97 never gave up98 
Then why should I? 
Let’s Fight! 
The la manigua99 is screaming: I am me 
And it’s for me for whom the bells toll,  
don’t tell lies100  
The fort knows that in combat I run and run 
with to the bayameses101  
Cuba be proud of me! 
I don’t fear a heroic death 
Stay calm, to a rebel and black is trouble 
¡Rebambarambara!102. . .  
  
                                                                                                                                                 
recording facilities and institutional resources. The album was distributed in limited numbers 
through both official and informal outlets for Cuban peso’s rather than U.S. dollars making more 
readily available to young Cubans island-wide.   
96  The mulato general and key military figure in Cuba’s wars of independence who is celebrated 
today as one of the central figures of Cuban nationalism and, by implication, an heroic symbol of 
a racially transculturated Cuba. (see chapter two)  
97 A celebrated (though at times ambivalently) black general and Mambi leader who served under 
Antonio Maceo.  Upon independence it is reported that he was unable to find employment other 
than work as a janitor.  In 1906 he was assassinated in his sleep by Cuban government troops 
after becoming involved in organizing resistance to the then U.S.-aligned administration of 




 The significance of Alexei’s lyric invocations operates as a number of 
overlapping levels.  In an immediate sense, foregrounding the black racial significance of 
los mambíses underscores the historical centrality of blacks in Cuba’s national liberation 
struggle.  Such efforts signify an historical recuperation of a critical black subject and 
agency within an otherwise racially neutralized national narrative (Helg 1995; Ferre 
1998a).  Much like Maceo, los mambíses are celebrated in official revolutionary 
discourse as liberators of the nation in ways in which their Cubaness supersedes, if not 
ultimately negates, their blackness.  As I will discuss in further detail shortly, the 
historical erasure and subsequent recovery of a critical black subject is a key driving 
thematic within Cuban hip hop.  In the above excerpt, such black recuperations are 
asserted through Obsesión’s poetic self-configurations as contemporary mambíses, thus 
situating themselves and their work within an historical (masculinist) tradition of black 
liberatory struggle.  Rather than autonomously forged, however, such struggle is 
grounded within a Cuban nationalist framework and history.  Here, black liberatory 
action and anti-racism is held as intrinsically part and parcel of the broader historical 
                                                                                                                                                 
98 “Mensaje” literally means massage. Alexei explained within this vernacular context, however, 
that it refers to Banderas’ refusal to bow in the face of danger.  
99 Early Mambi brigade from the region of La Manigua in el oriente, the eastern part of the island.  
100 The line “no metan forros” literally translates as “don’t mess with the cover /or lining” but in 
Cuban vernacular the expression is used to imply “do not tell lies or cheat.” However, in this 
contexts the expression operates as a pun – i.e. “no metáfora” – playing on the previous line’s 
literary reference.  
101 “Bayameses,” literally the people/men of Bayamo, is taken in this context from Cuba’s 
national anthem "Al Combate Corred, Bayameses" which recounts a 1868 battle in which 
nationalist forces were victorious over the Spanish in capturing the town of Bayamo.  Hence, 
Bayamese is synonymous with nationalist liberators. The anthem was officially adopted in 1902 
and retained by the Revolutionary government after 1959. 
102 In Cuban vernacular rebambarambara refers to a tremendous problem/fiasco/mess.  Hence, 
“!Rebambarambara!” might be translated in this context as “Make hell!” 
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context of national liberation and birth.  Los mambíses, as the fighting core of Cuba’s 
national liberation army, fought for the promise of their ‘rightful share’ as full citizens in 
a here-to-come racially egalitarian Cuban republic (Helg 1995).103  Sacrifice in the 
nation’s wars of independence – Cuba’s first “revolution” – consequently warranted the 
nation’s historical indebtedness to black Cubans.  Obsesión’s excavation of such 
historical claims of black citizenship and revolutionary legitimacy in turn provides a 
rhetorical bridge between the revolutionary past and present.   “Yo estoy aquí diciendo… 
pinchando… corro y corro junto a los bayamese... ¡Cuba orgullosa de mí!... insurrecto y 
prieto es un lío ¡Rebambarambara,”104 is all about declaring: ‘I am black and Cuban and 
revolutionary, recognize me, hear me speak, today!’  In doing so similar historical 
assertions of black citizenship and antiracists struggle are once again proclaimed within 
the contemporary context of revolution.  Here, Alexei and Magia’s self-legitimization as 
‘revolutionary’ is directly tied to their strong identification with the Revolution.  As the 
two explained to me that evening in Regla:  
 
[Alexei]: We are rapping from the perspective of a socialist society, from the point of 
view of socialism, and engaging it from a positive position.   
 
[Magia]: Our role [as raperos] within the society is well defined within socialism, 
this is independent of whether we communicate, critique, or denounce certain kinds 
of things in society.  Our position is well defined in this sense.  
 
[Marc]: Do you consider your music somehow connected to the Revolution?  
 
[Alexei]: Yes, we cannot separate one from the other.  I cannot make music by 
putting aside what is significant about the Revolution for me. I can make a song that 
                                                 
103  See Chapter 2.  
104 “I am here speaking… working hard... running with the rebels/liberators… Cuba be proud of 
me!... [to be] a rebel and black is a problem.. make hell!”  
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is critical of something, but never against the Revolution, never against the 
Revolution. Because it is not like this, not for Obsesión.  
 
[Magia]: Since I was little my mother always told me “Gracias por la Revolución” 
(thanks the revolution) for blacks, because black people have had more possibilities 
under the Revolution. I get annoyed however when a black person makes a lot of 
noise in criticizing the Revolution… After the triumph of the Revolution my mother 
told me that even light skinned [black] women couldn’t even get work as servants 
[criadas].  The Revolution allowed blacks study, to work, to be who we are today. 
From here on  its is us who have to work double, triple, whatever [it takes] to arrive 
at who we to become. It depends on us.  
 
 
 In comparison to many of their peers, Magia and Alexei have in fact been 
consistently among some of the most self-identified and vocal supporters of the 
Revolution and, by extension, the Cuban state.  I recall numerous, at times heated 
discussions over the years concerning the current state of Cuban society in which my 
critical readings as an “outsider” where often met with rather fervent defenses of “the 
Revolution.”  Here I refer to the Cuban Revolution in quotations to underscore what I 
have found as the tendency within post-1959 revolutionary nationalist discourse to 
conflate la Revolución, with el estado, and in turn el pueblo.105  Within this framing one 
is all, as all are one.  The most likely intentional effect of this secularized “holy trinity” is 
the restriction of critique.  Within such configurations critique or a perceived challenge to 
one facet (e.g. the state) is deemed a challenge – if not hostile attack – on the other 
mutually constitutive components.  While such a logic may seek to curtail domestic 
dissent, I have found that it can take on a whole other level of defensive significance 
when that critique is leveled from afuera, the ‘outside.’  Such dynamics seemed to have 
                                                 
105 the Revolution, the state, and the nation or people.  
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often informed the tone of some of our more contentious conversations, with Magia 
frequently being the most impassioned in her positions.   
 As Magia’s previous comments suggest and as I have come to know both her and 
Alexei, their orientation towards the Revolution stems in significant part from their 
parents’ own deep-felt convictions vis-à-vis the Revolution.  In recalling conversations I 
have had with Magia’s mother Caridad and Alexei’s father Celso, I was always struck 
with their fervent faith in both the principles and achievements of Cuban socialism.  Yes, 
there may have been errores, mistakes, but the Revolution has worked and is working to 
correct them.  I often found their perspectives and insight a refreshing respite from the 
more conflicted and critical assessments one hears (and lives) daily in Havana.  
Habaneros are ubiquitous with their expressions of displeasure regarding the 
contemporary hardships of Cuban life.  The expression “no es fácil” (“it’s not easy”) per 
illustration has assumed something akin to a national mantra among Cuban’s today.    
 What I came to understand is that Caridad and Celso are among a generation of 
black Cubans who shared a collective memory of what Cuba was for poor black folks 
prior to the Revolution and the hard fought achievements that followed.  Magia’s 
recollection of her mother’s experience is illustrative of the staying power of this social 
narrative for her.  Now in their early thirties, however, Magia and Alexei are 
representative of Havana’s hip hop old-guard.  Given that the majority of today’s Cuban 
MCs are more likely in their late teens and early 20s, their parents would be in turn 
significantly younger than Caridad and Celso who are well into their 50s and early 60s.  
This has certainly been my experience.  This disparity may in part explain the particularly 
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robust Revolutionary identification Magia and Alexei hold in comparison to many of  
their raperos peers who do not have parents who share such a long term perspective on 
the changing circumstances for black Cubans.  As I will develop shortly, revolutionary 
self-identification and discourse is in fact a central and defining component among Cuban 
MCs.  A key distinction lies in the articulation between Revolution with a capital “R” and 
alternative (black) revolutionary conceptions in the making of identity and politics within 
the movement.  Magia and Alexei’s comments underscore Cuban raperos’ general 
tendency towards viewing their work as critically engaged from within rather than 
against the Cuban Revolution and, by explicit extension, the Cuban state.   
 On another level, Magia’s retelling of her mother’s account of black women’s 
difficulty in attaining employment even as domestic workers prior to 1959 underscores 
the gendered contours of race and racism in Cuba which she is herself acutely aware.  
Returning to Obsesión’s tema “Mambí,” Magia gives early expression to her own 
gendered critique of racial patriarchy, a critique which would become increasingly part of 
her identity and personal politics as a performer.  Her opening volley in the song comes 
as follows:  
 
 
[Magia]:  ¿Como e´? Yo soy niche 
Mi intención no es salir como negrita linda 
en los afiches 
Y si me ven así es porque  
sé que todavía hay  
quien quisiera ser mayoral 
Pa’ verme trabajando sin descanso  
en los trapiches 
Eso lo he sufrido, lo he visto. . .  
 
 
What’s that?  I’m black 
My intention is not to be a pretty black girl 
in the posters 
And if they see me this way it’s because  
I know that there are still ones  
who would like to be an overseer 
So they can see me working without rest 
in the trenches 





 Here, Magia opens by invoking her identity as a black woman using the Cuban 
vernacular expression niche for black person.  While historically the term niche carried a 
racially derisive if not overtly racist connotation, more recently the term has worked its 
way into the vernacular of black Cuban youth. In a somewhat similar fashion as African 
American inverted appropriations of the term “nigger” (i.e. nigga), black Cuban youth 
today often utilize niche as a pro-black self-affirmation.  This niche Magia proclaims 
however, is not about to conform to the normative gendered prescriptions that would 
configured her black body as a sexualized object of patriarchal gaze and consumption.  
Her experience of such racialized gendered constructions are once again contextualized 
in the racialized past as Magia invokes the historical memory of enslavement; “I know 
that there are still ones who would like to be an overseer/So they can see me working 
without rest in the trenches.”106  In proclaiming, “I have suffered that, I have seen it,”  
Magia both signifies her lived historical linkages to racial slavery as well as testifies to its 
continued vestiges in her quotidian struggles as a contemporary black woman.  Magia 
declaring once again, “somos Mambíses, luchando lo mismo.”   
  
                                                 
106 It is worth noting that like many raperos neither Magia nor Alexei are formally employed 
outside their work as hip hop performers. When I first meet the couple Alexei was working part-
time in a Havana book binding factory. He soon left this job to devote all his time to his artistry.  
As one of the most successful of Cuban rap groups, Magia and Alexei have been fortunate 
enough over the years to have garnered income, as inconsistent as it might be, though their local 
shows and national tours, , and local sales of their two recorded albums, and most notably their 
three performance-related trips aboard.  Most other raperos, however, have not been nearly as 
successfully in translating their talents into income.  While the majority are formally unemployed, 
like large numbers of young black Cubans many find ways of “getting by” in one form or 
another. In almost all cases these young people live at home with their parents were the basics are 
provided. The challenge of course is to get beyond bare basics.  
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More Black Space  
 
 It was during these first three summer months of 1999 that I first engaged with 
Havana’s hip hop community, making contact with many of the folks who either were or 
became key players in the movement as I came to know it.  In addition to Magia, Alexei 
and later Pablo, Rensoli, and Nehanda Abiodun, I befriended a crew of hip hop affiliated 
folks who resided in the Vedado area of Havana where I had been staying during this 
initial research trip.  The sea-side barrio of El Vedado, with its tree-lined streets and 
numerous, once palatial signal-family houses, was at one time home to some of the most 
wealthy (read “white”) families living in Havana.  Many of these households fled to 
Miami around 1959 in fear the Revolution’s socialist policies that threatened their 
historical privilege.  Today Vedado remains home to some of the more advantaged of 
Havana’s residence, significant numbers of whom are family members of those who 
emigrated during the earlier “white flight” exodus from the island.  In addition to 
racially-skewed dollar remittance patterns that would privilege such lighter skinned 
Cubans, Vedado residents live amongst some of the most coveted real estate in Havana 
which, in today’s dollar-driven tourists economy, translates into marketable capital.  
Unquestionably the barrio with the highest concentration of dollar-generating casa 
particulares (private homes) which rent rooms both legally and illegally to tourists, 
Vedado families disproportionably benefit from this facet of the island’s new economy.  
There are, however, pockets of black and darker-skinned Cubans living in Vedado.  
Many of these families acquired houses and apartments vacated by their previous 
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employers whom members worked for as domestics.  Once occupied by a single family, 
many of these residences now accommodate numerous households within multiply 
partitioned units.107   
 One such pocket centers around the intersection of Tenth and Nineteenth streets – 
locally know as “diez y diecinueve” – where an early twenty-something, dark-skinned, 
now dreadlocked adorned black man by the name of Deno lives with his mother, sisters, 
and extended family.  Deno’s home, which is located in a formally grand two story house 
now in need of serious restorative work, has over the years become a communal center 
for the EPG&B crew (the Executive Plan Ghetto and Barbito).108  Founded in the joining 
of Grandes Ligas, a rap duo out of the same local section of Vedado, Junior Clan, a duo 
from the adjoining barrio of Cerro, and later a spoken-word collection known as Jóvenes 
Rebeldes, EPG&B would come to self-style themselves as one of the more 
“underground” collectives of MCs in the Havana area.109  Increasingly graffiti-adorned 
the patio aside Deno’s house at the corner of diez y diecinueve became something of a 
local institution within Havana’s hip hop community.  There, beginning in 2001, a series 
of street concerts were hosted by EPG&B and their local posse where the collective 
performed along with invited guests, many of whom were among the most established 
                                                 
107 Such post-1959 partitioning of formally occupied residential spaces occurred throughout 
Havana as socioeconomically disadvantaged folks gained access to now vacant housing of the 
formally elite.  Famed for their rumba while often denigrated through their association with poor 
blacks and accompanying racialized discourses of social marginality, central Havana’s 
communally organized, multi-unit solares are products of similar historical conditions.    
108 Barbito is the name of a fellow member of the diez y diecinueve posse who died a couple 
years earlier. Barbito was known for his graffiti work, some of which adorns the mentioned local 
patio.  
109 I will be returning in the following chapter to a discussion of the significance of the term 
“underground” as it is used within the context of the Cuban hip hop.  
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raperos in Havana.  Often taking on the flavor of a festival block party, these informal 
concerts regularly drew hundreds of black youth into the adjacent cobblestone street in an 
otherwise sedate, and predominantly white, Vedado.  In the past such gatherings 
frequently evoked the attention of police who have more than once shut down the event.  
I refer to these concerts as informal to underscore the organic nature in which these 
shows initially came into being through the initiative of the “diez y diecinueve” posse.  
Increasingly, however, through institutions most notability La Asociación Hermanos 
Saiz, the Cuban state lent official support to these events by supplying audio equipment 
and arranging greater tolerance on the part of police.  Such moves, as I will soon discuss 
in further detail, reflected the state’s shift in approach from one of initial distrust, 
including the policing of such “black spaces,” to an active institutionalization.   
 Though members of Grandes Ligas and Junior Clan had close associations in 
1999, EPG&B as a collective had yet to be formally established.110  It was during this 
time, however, that I made early connections with the group’s members and their 
extended Vedado-centered following.  Many of these contacts grew out of my regular 
visits to a small cabaret-style club named La Pampa.  In 1999 La Pampa was the latest 
local incarnation of la moña where Adalberto Jiménez was resident DJ and organizer.111   
Fittingly located in the shadow of Antonio Maceo’s statue at the corner of Parke Maceo 
                                                 
110  By late 2003 EPG&B began to dissipate as performance collective due to a series of 
precipitating events. One of the two members of Grandes Ligas left Cuba for Switzerland on a 
fiancé vista earlier in the year for leaving the remaining member solo.  I have also recently heard 
that this remaining member has had the very unfortunate luck of being arrested on charges of 
marijuana possession – a charge that reportedly brings a minimum of one year in prison 
(regardless of quantity) under Cuba’s harsh drug procession laws. See chapter 3 for references to 
the racialized undercurrents behind Cuba’s recent crackdown on marijuana and drugs.  
111 See Chapter 4.  
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(Maceo Park) and el Malecon, one could on any given Thursday through Saturday night 
find a crowd of black youth extended out into the street in front of the club mingling well 
into the AM.  While many may not have been able to afford the then twenty Cuban peso 
entrance fee (equivalent at the time to one U.S. dollar), others preferred the relatively 
cooler Malecon air outside to the stifling heat within.   
 Many of the young men present donned baggy paints, lose jerseys (including 
NBA and NFL jerseys with numbers), hip hop-associated head gear including U.S. 
baseball caps, and among the privileged few FUBU and Eckô designer jerseys – some of 
the latest in black youth style from the U.S.  Such style-driven markers of a Cuban hip 
hop collectivity were often informed by the dog-eared U.S. rap magazines and 
videocassettes of recent rap videos from BET and MTV that circulate continually among 
these youth.  As discussed in the previous chapter, both the fashion and the 
commercially-mediated images that inspire them frequently found their way to Cuba by 
way of visiting family, friends, and tourists from the U.S.  At a macro level, these 
commodified expressions of U.S. black youth culture were of course tied to Cuba’s 
recent openings to transnational incursions of capital, people, and cultural influences as 
well as a growing culture of consumerism tied to the new dollar economy in a once 
definitely anti-consumerist socialist society.    
 Inside the small, sweltering, barely lit space JD Adelberto – interspersed with 
often distracting, off-beat microphone “shout-outs” – “spun” audiotape cassettes of U.S. 
hip hop and R&B before a moving mass of sweat soaked bodies.  Predating the more 
recent emergence of locally produced Cuban rap, La Pampas’ scene was all about U.S.-
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derived la moña.  To a half-way attuned hip hop follower from the U.S. much of the 
music might have been considered dated at the time given the rather extended lag time it 
took for North American music to make to the island.  Over subsequent years, however, 
this would be less the case as musical sophistication and consumption habits quickly 
evolved, fed in large part by the greater frequency and broader access moñeros had to 
more recent music out of the U.S.  This wider access stemmed principally from the 
increased trafficking of North Americans traveling to the island to variously “engage” 
Havana’s hip hop community, as well as the contributions of a privileged few who have 
been able to accumulate cashes of CD’s through their travels to the U.S.112  Over the last 
couple years the growing availability of computer-based CD “burning” technology has 
greatly facilitated the rapid dissemination of new music within Havana’s tight social 
networks of hip hop followers.  Today folks are just about as informed on the most recent 
“beats” as any hip hop ‘head out of New York City.   
 Recalling those earlier nights at La Pampa, regardless whether a track was a week 
or a year old, a chorus of dancing revelers, hands aloft, could be found singing with the 
lyrics though most themselves could not speak English.  As one of the only state-
sanctioned locales in the Havana area at the time for the hip hop devout,  La Pampa’s 
strictly dance-only format precluded any live performances.  As such local raperos at the 
time had to rely on the varying Friday or Thursday night ‘open mics’ events at Alamar’s 
amphitheater as the only regular performance venue.  Regardless, La Pampa was the first, 
                                                 
112 Including the likes of Pablo, Ariel – who today in his latest incarnation as a DJ has arguably 
the largest CD collection of U.S. hip hop on the island – and a couple of Havana-based rap groups 
including Obsesión who themselves toured the U.S. in 2001 and 2003.  
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though certainly not the last, of hip hop’s emergent “black spaces” I encounted during my 
field research.  This was 1999.  
 
2000 and beyond: Hip hop into the millennium  
 
 I returned to Havana in the summer of 2000 just a week or so prior to the 6th 
annual Cuban hip hop festival which as customary was to be held in August.  The 
common logic behind this scheduling was so the event would be held during the summer 
recess when school-age youth, who comprised a sizable component of the local hip hop 
fan-base, would be free to attend the nightly concerts which often ran late well into the 
night.  Another key factor was that Black August, a New York-based hip hop collective 
that had for a number of years running coordinated the participation of African American 
rap artists in the festival, organized events during the month of August.  Since 1997, the 
collective’s involvement had become an important and influential facet of the festival, 
one not to be compromised if possible.  What this all immediately translated to was that 
the festival took place during the island’s hottest month of the year.  Unlike the previous 
year when I had missed the festival due to funding limitations, at this stage of my 
research I could not afford to miss another year’s event.  As a cumulative annual marker 
of hip hop’s developmental progression as well as an instrumental site of creative 
innovation, the festival was an ideal context within which to launch my next six months 
of field research.  
 Within a day of arriving in Havana, Magia and Alexei brought me to the home of 
a woman they knew who had a room available to rent. The apartment was on ground 
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floor of the building immediately across the street from Magia’s mother’s apartment 
central Havana’s barrio of Cayo Hueso.113  Belkis, a mestizo woman in her mid- 50s with 
abundant energy and wry wit welcomed me into her home – for $12 USD a night.  I 
wound up the first of many foreign lodgers Belkis and her son Antonio, a medical 
student, hosted over the succeeding years as they gradually transformed their three 
bedroom apartment into a proficient dollar-generating casa particular.  Over the course 
of my many extended stays at her place between 1999 and 2002, Belkis and I developed a 
strong and endearing relationship, with her becoming something of a Cuban godmother 
of mine.   
 Our relationship, however, was not at times without its challenges.  Although 
Belkis claimed a non-white identity and cited the blackness of her son’s father as 
testimony of her antiracism, the ways in which she at times uncritically reproduced racist 
discourse, while often infuriating, gave me valuable additional insight into the workings 
of racism in Cuba.  This perspective was even that much more appreciated given the fact 
that but for a few exceptions my entire community of friends and contacts on the island 
were black.  Thus began my time in Cayo Hueso; a congested, densely populated barrio 
known for its sizable working-class black population.  Its dusty, pock-marked streets are 
seemingly filled with the sounds of children playing, the shuffling of dominos, salsa , 
                                                 
113 Although Cayo Hueso literally translates to “Bone Key,” common narrative holds that the 
name stems from a Spanish transliteration of Key West which early residents appropriated for the 
area years ago. Here, Hueso stands in for West, as Key is directly translated to Cayo.  It is ironic, 
however, that the name for the southernmost tip of the U.S. mainland, Key West, is in fact an 
anglicized derivation of the original name Cayo Hueso the Spanish dubbed the island in the 17th 
century.  Legend has it that first European’s to visit the island discovered bones of indigenous 
folks scattered on the beach, hence the bone reference.  
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rumba, religious batá drum rhythms, and of course hip hop.  Cayo Hueso in many ways 
provided the ideal location from which to base my research.  Not only was it a solidly 
black working class community and centrally located, but I was smack in front of 
Magia’s place and a block down the street from La Pampa.  What else could I ask for?   
 Once situated, I immediately headed out to reconnect with folks after a year’s 
absence.  All were caught in preparation for the upcoming festival.  More often than not 
the complaint on the street concerned the disorganization on the part of the festival’s lead 
coordinator, Grupo Uno.  What I came to realize year after year was that this was always 
the case.  There was always tremendous confusion over the details of the event’s 
preparation, necessary resources were never in place and schedules where constantly in 
flux.  While this never seemed to change, one thing that did, however, is that this was the 
last year that that Rensoli and company who comprised Group Uno would coordinate the 
event.  Since 1999, the Cuban state had begun to subtly but increasingly step in as a more 
active participant in the festival’s organization.   This move represented an important 
expression of the state’s previously mentioned shift vis-à-vis Cuban hip hop from one of 
blind neglect to active institutionalization – a shift I will return to in Chapter 6.  For the 
time being, however, Rensoli and company were still the key organizing force behind the 
festival’s four nights of performance and the state-provided resources remained meager.   
 I recall heading out to Alamar’s amphitheater one afternoon the day before the 
opening night for a sound check.  Rensoli was at hand in the control area scrambling 
around pulling together final details.  I had come to Alamar among others things to 
arrange my credential tag that would afford me entrance and, theoretically, back-stage 
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access during the festival.  While waiting for Rensoli I joined in on a cajita lunch that 
was passed around to all working on the prep.  Named after the small brown paper boxes 
stuffed with fried pork, congri (red beans and rice), and raw cabbage which have become 
a Havana street stable, these cajitas represented a  limited gesture of the state’s current 
support of the festival.  While eating my cajita, I listened as the group Reyas de la Calle 
do their sound check for their tema “El mundo va a acabarse” – “The World is Coming to 
an End.”  The song’s background instrumental opened with a sampled riff of a the classic 
1974 hit “La Habana Joven” by the immortal Los Van Van, Cuba’s premier dance band 
since the nineteen seventies.  I later found out that the track was produced by Pablo 
Herrera who often talked about the need to create an “authentic” Cuban sound behind 
Cuban MCs rather than relying on U.S.-produced backgrounds.  In comparison to the 
upbeat Van Van original, however, Reyes de la Calle offered a radically different 
contemporary rendering of a “young Havana.”   
 Filled with liturgical references and images, the song’s lyrics, though playful, 
present a biting critique of everyday racism and social hypocrisy.  Though the Catholic 
Church appears to be a central focus of the lyric barrage, the real target of the song is 
contemporary Cuban society itself.  Here, Reyes de la Calle like many Cuban MCs 
employed metaphor and doble sentido (double meanings) to guise more overt kinds of 
critique.  Their satirically playful performance style further cloaked the acuteness of such 
contestation.  Their narrative employed apocalyptical references to a society riddled with 
racism and duplicity in which blacks are constantly “squeezed,” where a “black God” in 
turn will take retribution against racists leaving black folks secure and liberated.  As it 
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turned out “El mundo va a acabarse” was the opening song during on the festival’s first 
night that evening.   
 I retuned to Alamar later that night with Alexei and Magia who were not 
scheduled to  perform until the third of the festival’s four nights.  Within a couple blocks 
of the amphitheater I could feel the reverberation of hip hop beats echoing down the 
streets, building along with my excitement as we drew closer to the source.  Despite our 
lateness the concert had apparently not gotten underway given that we were greeted by 
the sounds of U.S. rather than Cuban artists.  The organizers where evidently priming the 
gathering crowd with recent tracks by the likes of Common and The Roots, two particular 
favorites of the local audience.114  As we made our way towards the entrance along the 
line of ticket holders, purchased at five Cuban peso a piece (equivalent to about $.25 
USD), we were met by a couple Cuban police who passed us by after eyeballing our 
credential tags.  Once around the bend we were met by a descending sea down to the 
stage below of what was estimated at some three thousand young people milling about in 
energized anticipation of the festival’s first night of music. It was unquestionable that this 
was a predominantly black crowd in attendance.  Much like La Pampa’s patrons but 
thirty times in multitude, many of the young men were dressed in baggy pants and tops, 
baseball caps and skullies (skull caps), athletic team jerseys, while a few flaunted hip hop 
affiliated desire attire like FUBU and Tommy Gear.  Among the young women, spandex 
tights and shorts along with form-fitting tops seemed to be the standard fair.  What was 
notable was how young every one was.  The medium age of those attending could not 
                                                 
114 New York-based Common performed during the previous year’s Festival, while Philadelphia’s  
The Roots would follow in 2003 in a specially organized concert in Havana. 
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have been much more than seventeen.  This was noticeably younger than the La Pampa 
crowd which was more in the range of early twenties reflecting closer to the range of 
most raperos themselves.  The majority of these young people were from Alamar itself.  
The distance and scarcity of reliable night transport from Havana’s city center made it 
difficult for many outside Alamar to make it to the event.  This of course did not stop the 
most faithful who managed by hook or crook to make all the festival’s four nights.  
 Squarely backdropping the stage below hung a gigantic Cuban flag which, as it 
basked and fluttered in the multicolored stage lighting, signified for all “this is Cuba, be 
there no confusion.” Once the music started all attention was directed down to the stage 
as the audience responded with enthusiastic energy to performer’s lyric challenges, at 
times signing in chorus with some of the more popular songs, or engaging in various 
kinds of call-and-response. Including Reyes de la Calle, groups that performed that 
opening night included Raperos Crazy de Alamar (RCA) – a local favorite, Pasión 
Obscura, and the pioneering, diva-esk female trio of Instinto.115  The last performers left 
the stage around 1:30 am as the audience filled out into Alamar’s streets headed home in 
anticipation of the next night’s performance.  For many including ourselves, however, the 
night was not over yet.  The state-run buses and twenty peso máquinas (old, privately-
owned pre-1959 American cars that run prescribed city routes) that had brought us were 
nowhere to be found at that point.  Sweat soaked, dehydrated, hungry, and exhausted we 
dragged ourselves up to the main highway to Havana (a 20 minute walk on a good night) 
                                                 
115 I will return shortly to this all female group.   
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to wait for a passing bus.  We got home to Cayo Hueso at around 4am, all to do it again 
the next night.  
 The following evening seemed immediately to have a different feel than the 
previous night.  Without question one could tangibly sense a higher level of excitement 
and nervous energy among the milling crowd outside.  One critical difference from the 
onset was that in comparison to the previous night’s handful, this evening’s concert had 
brought out scores of blue-clad and capped police who made their presence unmistakably 
felt.  In addition to the significant numbers outside the amphitheater, a stern-faced 
phalanx of police could be seen standing in front and aside of the performance stage.  
What was different or had changed about this night, I asked myself.  One key distinction 
about this particular night’s performance was that along with a list of Cuban groups the 
New York-based rap duo Dead Prez and DJ Tony Touch were scheduled to individually 
perform.  This was Black August’s night at this year’s festival.  On entering the 
amphitheater members of the Black August’s New York contingent handed out flyers in 
Spanish introducing the collective.  The flyer’s front was adorned with the large afro-ed 
images of George Jackson116 and Assata Shakur framed within a big five-point, Cuban 
style star.  Aside lay in block letters “Black August 3rd Annual Benefit Concert 2000, 
Dedicated to Assata Shakur and Vieques, Puerto Rico.”  The eight page handout opened 
                                                 
116 The California prison movement leader who was murdered by San Quentin prison guards 
during an inmate uprising in August of 1971.  The original Black August movement emerged in 
the early 1970s out of the California prison system as a space of political education and 
organizing among black inmates. In remembrance Jackson’s murder and history of black political 
resistant during the month of August dating back to the Nat Turner rebellion, members held 
August as a particularly significant month for political activism and resistance.   
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with the question “¿Por que el agosto negro?” following with a brief history of event 
which began by explaining:  
 
“La tradición del agosto negro fue establecido durante la época de los 70s en el 
sistema penal de california (EEUU) por parte de los hombres y mujeres del 
movimiento de la liberación negra/nueva Africana como una manera de reconocer y 
investigar la  herencia de resistencia en las Américas.”   
 
[“The Tradition of Black August was established during the 70s in the Californian 
penal system by men and women of the Black/New African liberation movement as a 
way to remember and investigate a heritage of resistance in the Americas.”]  
 
 
This opening was followed by a outline of the Collective’s central mission principles that 
include supporting:  
 
 The global development of hip hop culture as a means of facilitating international 
interchange between communities of youth with the intention of promoting greater 
consciousness around social and political issues 
 Collective opposition to the criminalization of youth and youth culture 
 Organizing against the international prison industrial complex and the escalated 
incarceration of political prisoners in the U.S. 
 Fighting the persistence of white-supremacist propaganda and volitions of human 
rights.  
 
This second and final paragraph closed with the statement: “A través de un unión potente 
de al cultura de hip hop y información política, el colectivo del agosto negro promueve 
nuestro propio estética hip hop y lo cual se de énfasis a la autoexpresión sincera, la 
creatividad, y el sentido de responsabilidad por la comunidad.”117  The remaining six 
                                                 
117 “Through a powerful union of hip hop culture and political information, Black August 
promotes our own hip hop aesthetic which emphasizes sincere self-expression, creativity, and the 
sense of responsibility to the community.” 
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pages are filled with song lyrics translated into Spanish of the two scheduled performing 
artists, Dead Prez and Toney Touch.  
 As evident for this excerpted material, Black August organized itself around a 
very particular set of racially-grounded politics.  At center is the collective’s emphasis on 
hip hop as a site of political education and mobilization among African descendent youth 
transnationally.  Such diasporically-framed commitments found further expression the 
following year when Black August coordinated a South African tour of U.S. hip hop 
artists to coincide with U.N.’s 2001 International Conference against Racism in 
Durban.118   The tour opened with a highly publicized concert at the paralleled NGO 
conference site.  Importantly, Black August’s transnationally expansive approach to black 
liberatory-directed struggle and antiracist organizing is significantly informed by the 
collective’s strong black nationalist orientation.  This orientation is at once signified 
though the collective’s above use of the term “nueva Africana” or New African as a 
referent to black populations of African descent.  Such vocabulary is drawn from the 
collective’s associations with post-1960s black nationalist traditions of radical organizing 
in the vein of the Black Liberation Movement (BLM) and the New Afrika People’s 
Organization (NAPO).  Many of these groups’ members have either been imprisoned, 
killed or, as in the case of Nehanda Abiodun, forced into exile.  Along with its root 
organization the Malcolm X Grassroots Movement (MXG) from which it stems, Black 
August’s support of political prisoners and anti-prison work emerges in significant part 
from this affiliation.  Hip hop, in turn, is understood as medium for advancing this 
                                                 
118 Performing artists included Dead Prez, Talib Kweli, and Black Thought of The Roots – all of 
whom either had or would shortly perform in Cuba.  
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tradition of black radical politics and resistance into a new generation and era of black 
political organizing.   
 Predicated on an understanding of both rap and Cuba as vangardist sites of 
resistance, many of these commitments found overlapping expression in Black August’s 
engagements in Cuba between 1998 and 2000.  Here, the collective’s dual focus of 
supporting Cuba’s emergent hip hop movement and the ongoing struggles in Cuba of 
African American political exiles such as Assata Shakur and Nehanda Abiodun was part 
and parcel of the same political project.  The organizer’s co-dedication of the 2000 
concert to Vieques, moreover, not only underscored the collective’s transnationally 
expansive understandings of social justice but recalled black radical movements of earlier 
periods in recognizing the often critical linkages between antiracist and anti-imperialist 
struggle.  In a more immediate sense Vieques’ invocation most certainly also reflected 
the New York membership’s sensitivity to the longstanding history of Puerto Rican 
radicalism and national liberation struggle shared by their [racialized] Nuyorican peers.  
A couple of New York-base Puerto Ricans have in fact been integral members of Black 
August and the collective’s involvements in Cuba.  One of these key individuals was 
Clyde Valentine who was one of the editors of Stress, the now defunct New York-based 
hip hop magazine.   
 For three years running the collective hosted an annual benefit concerts in New 
York City with the dual purpose of raising money to support U.S. political prisoners and 
their families as well as provide financial and material support for Cuba’s resource-
strapped hip hop community.  Along with a host of more progressive and/or politically 
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sympathetic African American and Puerto Rican rap artists, the veteran musician/activist 
Gil Scott-Heron was among the performers topping the bill in 1999.  The collective’s 
previous participation in the Cuban Hip hop festival included performances by Mos Def 
and Talib Kweli of Black Star in 1998.  During the 1999 festival the fusion of music and 
politics, of rap and (black) resistance was in clear evidence when Common, the U.S. 
headliner of the festival, interrupted his performance to read a letter addressed to the 
audience from African American political prisoner Dr. Mutulu Shakur.  The event, which 
created something of a stir among Cuban higher-ups present at the festival, was instigated 
by Nehanda Abiodun who provided Common with the letter and encouraged him to read 
it.119  Under the auspices of Black August Common is rumored to have also met with 
Assata Shukur whose story he later recounted in a track entitled “A Song for Assata” that 
was released on his 2000 album “Like Water for Chocolate.”  
 Upon returning to Havana in 2000 the collective brought in tow from New York 
included the radically-minded Afrocentric duo Dead Prez and Puerto Rican DJ-turned-
music-producer Tony Touch.  At the time it appeared as it must have been these artists’ 
scheduled performances that had contributed to the heightened police presence that 
second night. Dead Prez’s M1 and Stickman were slated to open the night’s performance. 
                                                 
119 As doctor of acupuncture and co-founder and director of the Black Acupuncture Advisory 
Association of North America (BAAANA) and the Harlem Institute of Acupuncture, Mutulu 
Shakur was a founding member of the Republic of New Africa and is currently active in the New 
Afrikan People's Organization of which Nehanda Abiodun is also a member.  Shakur was accused 
by the U.S. law establishment as being a key figure in a black radical cell known as The Family 
which the FBI alleges organized a 1981 Brinks truck robbery in Nyack, New York in which two 
security guards were killed. Nehanda who is alleged to have been involved, is the only remaining 
person of those indicted still at large. One of those indicted Kathy Boudin, a former member of 
the Weather Underground, was released from prison in 2003 after serving a 21 years. Mutulu 
Shakur is still in prison serving 60 year sentence for eight indictments including his reported 
involvement in the 1979 freeing of Assata Shakur (no relation) from prison. 
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In the work-up to the duo’s entrance their support crew projected slides against the back 
wall of the stage where images of Nelson Mandela, shackled black fists, and African 
soldiers flashed adjacent the towering Cuban flag.  When Dead Prez finally made their 
entrance the crowd went wild.  It was quite a remarkable scene to watch M1 and 
Stickman in their dreadlocks, surrounded by stoic cordon of Cuban police, on stage 
rallying close to three thousand black Cuban youth in excited unison signing “I’m a 
African, I’m a African/And I know what is happen’in!/You a African, You a African/Do 
you know what’s happen’in?” from their popular tack “I’m a African.”  And in the event 
that some did not understand the Afrikan nationalist meanings embodied in the lyrics one 
only needed refer to their Spanish translations provided in the previously distributed 
Black August flier.120  I recall in fact being surprised by the large numbers of youth 
apparently familiar with the duo’s more popular tracks.  Here, English proficiency 
evidently was not necessary for cross-cultural intelligibility and communication 
predicated on mutual identifications of blackness.  It is significant to note that when Tony 
Touch performed later that evening he received a much cooler response from the crowd.  
This despite his efforts at addressing the audience in his limited Nuyorican Spanish while 
signifying his boriqua-ness by referring to himself as Toney Toca.  Dead Prez on the 
other hand spoke not a word of Spanish.  They were just plain black – albeit Afrikanized, 
and they turned the house out.   
                                                 
120 I use the term “Afrikan” here similarly as the above mentioned black nationalist-oriented New 
Afrikan People's Organization employs this term to denote a political reclaiming of an African-
based identity by “new world” African descendent populations.   
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 I recall Alexei telling me how impressed he was with Dead Prez’s presence and 
performance.  He commented to the effect “su mensaje fue con mucho fuerza” (“their 
message had a lot of force”).  He did, however, express disapproval of one of their 
performed songs entitled “They Schools” with its blistering denunciation of the U.S. 
school system.  Alexei felt the duo’s anger filled song was over the top. He had particular 
issue with the line “All my high school teachers can suck my dick, telling me white-ass 
lies and bullshit” feeling it was gratuitously disrespectful.  I tried to explain to him that as 
I understood the song it was more a critique of a corrupt, racists education “system” 
rather than a personal attack on individuals; systemic rather than individual.  Alexei had a 
difficult time with this.  In large part it was the level of black anger and societal 
alienation he had difficulty understanding and identifying with.  Such dissonance recalled 
for me a distinction Cuban raperos have made in the past between their music and much 
of U.S. hip hop – the violent degree of racism and social marginalization historically 
inflicted upon African Americans which, in turn, finds expression in much of commercial 
hip hop in the states.  Cuba, in this way, was “different.”  Racism without doubt existed 
regardless of official and popular discourses to the contrary, this was clear.  But its 
history and form of expression was understood as particular to the Cuban experience.   
 A key point however is that language barriers notwithstanding, Dead Prez’s and 
by extension Black August’s racially-grounded radicalism was not lost on deaf ears.  
Though for all intents and purposes Alexei spoke no English, he was able to decipher 
meanings from the English rap lyrics often through the translation help of others.  It was 
the commonalty of blackness (black identity) and racial struggle here that transnationally 
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facilitated a level of racial identification and dialogue.  As one of the key coordinators of 
the festival,  Rensoli had expressed to me his understanding of the event as an 
opportunity for just this kind of black diasporic dialogue between MCs from Cuba and 
the U.S.  In practice, however, there were some real limitations put on the extent to which 
such dialogue could be fully realized.  I recall voicing my frustrations over what I felt 
was the very limited actual contact and interpersonal exchange that occurred between 
Black August’s New York entourage of twenty or so and local raperos.  In the case of 
Dead Prez, the only opportunity most had to engage the duo was a few minutes back 
stage just prior to their performance.121  Handshakes, embraces, and autographs were 
plenty, but not much more.  It seemed for many the priority of the Cuban trip was more to 
connect and engage those key African American political exiles on the island at the 
expense of any set-aside time for structured “intercombio” (exchange) with Havana’s hip 
hop community.   
 The following day after Black August’s performance I attended an afternoon 
meeting of raperos held in a cultural center in Alamar’s as part of the festival’s coloquio 
(colloquium) series.  In a dimly light room with a handful of metal chairs and small desks 
sat just over a dozen or so raperos and a few supporting cast members such as Ariel, a 
local Cuban journalist, and myself.  It basically was a freewheeling discussion revolving 
around issues, concerns, and grievances – both personal and political – affecting the hip 
                                                 
121 The privileged exceptions to this were Pablo and Ariel who were more successfully in 
accessing the artists and other Black August folk given their connectedness.  Pablo in particular, 
with his English fluency and position as a Black August liaison in Havana, spent a significant part 
of his time during the festival working (and just plain hanging out) with artists and their 
entourage.   
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hop community.  One complaint voiced by a few of raperos present was what they felt 
was their lack of access, and by implication Black August’s lack of initiative, to the 
visiting U.S. artists.  They told of how a group of raperos comprised in large part by the 
“diez y diecinueve” crew attempted to visit with the Black August delegation in their 
Vedado hotel and were not even allowed in the hotel lobby.  I had myself spent time with 
Black August and their artists over the last few days and it was indeed apparent that the 
had conformed, intentionally or not, to Cuba’s new apartheid economy that segregated 
local Cubans from dollar-paying foreign tourist and their spaces of privilege.   
 Another issue raised during the coloquio that afternoon concerned the large 
presence and behavior of the police at the festival.  One veteran rapero who is among the 
oldest of the old school and whom I will call Neño was incensed by what he felt was the 
disrespectful treatment he and others received by the police the night before.  He 
recounted how he was harassed and questioned as he tried to move about as an artist 
(though he was not actually performing that night) – behavior which amounted to “!falta 
de respeto en mi propia casa!”122  As he angrily narrated his account he rubbed his finger 
along the inside of his forearm invoking the everyday Cuban gesture for blackness (e.g. 
“its in the blood”) to underscore the racialized significance of his experience.  During the 
discussion that ensued there were complaints that rap performance always seemed to 
draw the attention of the police much more so then say salsa  concerts which they 
claimed are notorious for drunken spats of violence.  An even more telling comparison is 
that of Cuban rock shows whose followers are overwhelmingly “white” in Cuban terms.  
                                                 
122 “Lack of respect in my own house!”  
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Many pointed that that these gatherings of young people with their customary head-
tossing long hair rarely if ever garner the number of police hip hop had to contend with.   
 The difference many claimed was hip hop’s strong association with black youth 
which, in the case of police, tended to translate into association with antisocial behavior 
including violence and marijuana use – again resonation with historical racialized 
associations of blackness with criminality.  In contrast raperos frequently point out 
proudly that rarely if ever do fights break out at hip hop events.  I myself have found this 
to in fact be the case, somewhat surprising for me given past experience at U.S. rap 
concerts where tensions were sometimes so thick you could literally get your head 
knocked by it if you were not careful.  I remember during some of my first ventures into 
Havana’s hip hop spaces the joyful camaraderie and seeming lack of animosity in the air 
between folks.  In the scores and scores of hip hop-related functions I have attended over 
the years I can recall only one incident in which a brief fight broke out between two hip 
hop followers outside La Pampa one late night. I am not claiming Havana’s hip hop 
community is free of internal tensions and interpersonal grievances.  Far from it.  Rather 
the point here is that violence, criminality, and other so-called anti-social(ist) practice are 
far removed from the bulk of hip hop’s following in Havana.  Yet in 2000 the Cuban 
police and by extension the Cuban state appeared to think otherwise, perpetuating the 






 The force of that second night’s concert lay not solely in the performances by the 
North American artists.  In fact the energy set in motion by Dead Prez and company 
continued to build throughout the evening as local Cuban group’s passed the torch.  
Closing out the night’s show was a Cuban duo whose powerful stage presence and lyric 
provocativeness carried the audiences energy and excitement to yet another level.  
Anónimo Consejo’s Yosmel Sarrías and Maigel “Kokino” Entenza hit the stage wearing 
Vietnamese-styled straw hats and black tee-shirts adorned with giant images of Ché 
Guevara’s face in white.123  Though I had been aware of the duo who had the reputation 
as one of the most dynamic and lyrically uncompromising artists in Cuba, I had yet to 
personally meet the two.  After experiencing their performance I knew this had to change.  
Natives of the adjacent, sleepy seaside municipality of Cojimar, Anónimo Consejo were 
among the local favorites of the Alamar crowd, and it showed.  Working the crowd 
through call-and-response, the duo had the riled up audience singing along in unison with 
many of their temas.  Given the overwhelming numbers of youth fluently participating, it 
was apparent that many were well versed with the texts.  One of the songs performed that 
night that seemed to get some of the strongest rise out of the audience was “Las 
Apariencias Engañan” (“Appearances Deceive”).  An excerpt of the tema’s lyrics are as 
follows:  
 
Las Apariencias Engañan 
Anónimo Consejo  
 





Anónimo Consejo Revolution! 
                                                 
123 As I will discuss shortly Yosmel would soon assume the African-signified name Seuko as an 
expression of his on-going political and creative development as a black Cuban artist.  
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¡Yosmel y Kokino Revolución! 
 
No me la aprietes más  
que yo sigo aquí 
No me la aprietes más  
déjame vivir 
Por mí Cuba lo doy todo soy feliz 
Y tú sigues reprendía en mí,  
suéltame a mí 
No te confundas con la  
arena que pisas 
Dos pasos más y se te recuerdas  
que estas en área divisa  
Varadero 
Todo no es como lo pintan  
y yo sigo aquí de frente a los problemas 
Aguantando con mi mano el hierro caliente 
Sin pasarme por la mente coger una balsa 
Y probar suerte en  
otra orilla - a 90 millas 
Todo no es como lo pintan  
y yo sigo aquí 
Cada paso en la calle es una preocupación  
Extranjero en busca de comunicación  
Con la población,  
5 minutos de conversación  
Policía en acción sin explicación 
Andando pa´ la estación  
Trabajes o no trabajes, 
 ellos no pueden creer 
Que estés hablando de cualquier otra cosa  
Que no sea de negocio (de madre socio) 
Coge tu acta de advertencia 
[…] 
Entonces te vas a reprender en mí 
Yosmel and Kokino Revolution! 
 
Don’t squeeze me any more  
that I’m still here 
Don’t squeeze me any more 
Let me live 
For my Cuba I give all, I am happy 
And you continue reprimanding me 
Let me go 
Don’t confuse yourself with the  
sand you step on 
Two more steps and you’ll be reminded 
that you are in a dollar zone  
Varadero [beach]124 
Everything is not how it is painted 
and I am still here confronting problems 
Holding with my hand the hot iron 
Without considering taking a raft 
And trying my luck in  
another shore - 90 miles away 
Everything is not how it is painted 
and I am still here 
Every step in the street is a preoccupation 
Foreigner looking for communication 
With the population, 
5 minutes of conversation 
Police in action without explanation 
Going to the station 
Whether you work or don’t work 
They can’t believe 
That you’re talking of other things 
That isn’t business (damn, brother ) 
Take your ticket of warning 
[…] 
So then you’re going to reprimand me 
                                                                                                                                                 
124 As previously mentioned, the hotel-lined peninsula of Varadero is Cuba’s preeminent beach 
location for tourists which has grown in the last decade into something of a Cuban version of 
Cancun. For years designated as a dollar-only zone of commerce, access to its white powder, 
palm-treed beaches has long been restricted for most working class Cubans.     
125 The libreta is the Cuban food ration card issued to every family by the Cuban government to 
access subsided food stables.  In the past the libreta’s monthly allotments provided families with 
a significant portion of their basis nutritional needs like rice, beans, cooking oil, and meat.  Since 
the economic crisis of the special period, however, the card’s monthly allowances have dwindled 
to practically nothing.   
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Yo que vivo y muero aquí 
Yo que nací con el concepto y el ideal de  
José Martí 
Déjate de abuso 
Coge mi coro cubano que dice 
Yo sigo aquí, jamando el mismo 
cable que tú 
Yo sigo aquí, preparando el mismo vaso de 
agua con azúcar que bebes tú 
Yo sigo aquí, cogiendo el mismo camello 
insoportable que coges tú 
Yo sigo aquí, con el mismo pan de la  
libreta que te comes tú 
Con el apagón que molesta, 
Piénsalo antes de arrestarme 
Justifica tu pregunta  
yo tengo mi respuesta 
 […] 
Entonces yo me pregunto quien es el bueno 
El que coge un viaje y se queda 
O el que ha estado todos estos años 
Dándole el pecho a los problemas 
Entonces porque ¡coño! Te reprendes en mí 
Yo que sigo aquí junto a ti 
Sal de mí no me la aprietes más  
¡déjame vivir! 
Esto no es pa´ que te erices  
Esto no es pa´ que me caces la pelea 
Esto es para que entiendas  
de una vez y por todas 
Que todos los jóvenes no somos basura 
Porque la divisa ha cambiado la forma de 
pensar de mucha gente 
Y mucha de esa gente no somos nosotros 
Los jóvenes cubanos, quienes apoyamos 
la idea de lo que es revolución  
en todos los momentos. 
  
I that live and die here 
I that was born with the concept and the ideal of 
Jose Martí 
Drop this abuse 
Take my Cuban chorus that says 
I am still here, jamming the same  
cable as you 
I am still here, preparing the same glass of water 
with sugar that you drink 
I am still here, taking the same unbearable 
[Cuban] bus that you take 
I am still here, with the same bread from the 
libreta that you eat 125 
With the [electrical] black outs that’s annoying 
Think about it before arresting me  
Justify your questions 
I have my answer 
 […] 
And so I ask myself who is the good guy 
The one who takes a trip and stays 
Or the one who all these years has been 
Giving face to problems  
Then why the fuck do you reprimand me 
I who am still here together with you 
Get rid of me, don’t tighten it more 
Let me live! 
This is not to make your skin crawl 
This is not to make you fight with me  
This is so you can understand 
once and for all 
That not all the young people are garbage 
Because the dollar has changed the way of 
thinking of  many people  
And many of those people aren’t us 
[We] the young Cubans who support 
the idea of what is revolution  
at all moments. 
 
 
 I have provided a this rather extended excerpt because it is so richly illustrative of 
the politically charged nature and highly poetic use of social critique in Cuban hip hop.  
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Thematically speaking, “Las Apariencias Engañan” also expresses in bold, undiluted 
fashion some of the anger and frustration experienced by black youth today, while 
introducing a set of key problematics that have come to define hip hop in Cuba as an 
organic sociocultural phenomenon.  This tema, moreover, poignantly exemplifies 
Anonmio Consejo’s particularly contestive brand of music which has helped position 
them as two of the most respected artists in the movement.  
 Though never mentioned directly, the immediate subject and context of the song’s 
narrative is clear; Cuban police and their harassment of (black) youth within the logic’s 
of Cuba’s new dollar-based economy.  I put “black” here in parenthesis to similarly 
signify that though not directly mentioned, race, in particular racialized profiling by 
police, is implicitly central to the song’s critique.  References to being “squeezed,” 
“reprehended,” and taken in by police for simple acts of talking with foreigners evokes 
the common experience of being racially profiled as jineteros/as whenever black youth 
are seen in the company of yumas.126  The reference to the sands of Varadero as “en área 
divisa” (dollar zone) further contextualizes the social segregation and hypocrisy that 
characterizes Cuba’s new dollarized reality.  Rather than “coger una balsa” and flee the 
island to the U.S. like so many young people have in the past, Anónimo Consejo 
proclaim they remain here to stay and struggle through the hardships of everyday Cuban 
life; the same hardships, they point out, of their fellow compatriots the police.127  While 
                                                 
126 See Chapter 3 for description and accounts of such scenarios.  Yuma once again is a Cuban 
vernacular term for foreigner.  
127 I latter found out that the lyric reference to los balseos carried real personal resonance for the 
two who witnessed many of their friends depart from their sea-side barrio of Cojimar during the 
balsero crisis of 1994.  
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the duo declares “la divisa ha cambiado la forma de pensar de mucha gente,” they affirm 
– and this is important – that they themselves have stood fast in their support and belief in 
“la idea” of revolution “en todos los momentos.”  Here, Anónimo Consejo’s assertion 
“Yo que nací con el concepto y el ideal de José Martí” is ripe with significance.  At one 
level it roots the duo’s black-situated demands for fair and equal treatment by the police 
(and state) as Cubans are squarely within the Cuba’s national historical narrative.  Here, 
assertions of full citizenship, to be black and Cuban, are implicitly embodied within the 
very inception of the nation.  At the same time it is this emphasis on the ideal of Martí’s 
vision of a racially egalitarian Cuba, as well as the idea of revolution that they remain 
committed rather than to – as the song’s title implies – “las apariencias” of such.   
 Interarticulated notions of race and revolution have in fact become a centrally 
defining themes of Cuba’s hip hop movement.  As suggested above, however, such 
framings often predicated on an implicit (or not so implicit) critique of contemporary 
Cuban society and, by extension at times, the Cuban state itself.  Once again the emphasis 
on the nationally imbricated ideals of racial equality and revolutionary struggle; ideals 
which are understood as historically unrealized, if not significantly compromised, within 
the current Cuban moment.  The key tension thus lies between the principled claims of a 
non-racial, revolutionary socialist society and the quotidian lived realities of race and 
racism in Cuba today.  Cuban hip hop emerges precisely from within these historically 
configured contradictions of race, nation, and revolution as they are contemporarily  
manifested, while at the same time engaging those same sets of contradictions from the 
critical vantage point of black-situated critique.  Within this context discourses of 
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revolution take on a decisive racial significance; there is no “revolution” without racial 
equality and justice, the two are joined at the hip (hop) so to speak.   
 Yosmel and Kokino’s signature chant ¡Anónimo Consejo Revolución! which 
open’s “Las Apariencias” is emblematic of their particularly flamboyant use of 
revolutionary discourse and imagery.  This very same expression encircling Ché 
Guvera’s famed star-capped image appears in the form of matching tattoos inscribed on 
the duo’s right shoulders.  This discursive play on revolution has found further expression 
in Anónimo Consejo’s celebrated mantra “Hip Hop Revolution” which has over the years 
taken up a collective resonance among many local raperos.  But again, what specifically 
is meant by these calls to “revolution”?  When asked about this Yosmel and Kokino 
explained to me at the time that their invocations of “revolution” were not necessarily in 
reference to the Cuban Revolution, at least not directly so.  Rather, they directed me to 
the dictionary definition of revolution as a one of radical, progressively-directed social 
change.  This they affirmed was what their music was all about, advocating change.  I 
would hear similar explanations from other raperos I knew when I posed the question 
how and to what extent they saw their work articulating with the Cuban Revolution.  
Such positions mark a subtle distinction from more direct kinds of identification with the 
Cuban Revolution as expressed in the example of Magia and Alexei of Obsesión.  This is 
not to imply that Magia and Alexei do not share this embrace of Cuban hip hop’s 
relationship to broader notions of revolutionary struggle.  However, the emphasis here is 
on the articulation of alternative revolutionary visions, ones that are not necessarily 
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beholden to national proscriptive frames of the Revolution though they clearly remain 
informed by and in critical dialogue with them.   
 Possibly the most productive way to think about how raperos and their followers 
view hip hop’s relationship to overlapping discourses of revolution is through the often 
touted analogy of Cuban hip hop as a “revolution within a revolution.”  The immediate 
implication here is that hip hop is organic to and operates internally within the larger 
context of Cuban revolutionary society.  It is from “inside” rather then “outside” through 
which change is struggled for and effected.  Such a posture is in line with the central and 
repeated refrain among raperos that their work is by no means positioned counter to the 
Revolution.  Claims of this kind obviously carry a certain strategic currency given the 
Cuban state’s long standing intolerance for any public dissention that might upset the 
holy trinity of la Revolución, with el estado, and el pueblo.  On another level, however, 
as I have suggested there is a genuine level of identification among many raperos with 
the ideals and principles of  the Cuban Revolution which they are willing to fight for and 
defend.  These youth in a significant way remain products of Cuba’s revolutionary 
experience, though clearly not uncritically so.  Their demands for a socially and racially 
just Cuba and world stem first and foremost from the principles embodied within the 
promise of Cuban socialism.  Their task, as is often articulated by raperos, is to reveal 
and critique the limitations, contradictions, and at times hypocrisy rooted in the chasm 
between the promise and the realities of today, all towards the ultimate end of 
strengthening Cuban society.   The often expressed sentiment “somos constructivos, no 
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destructivos” speaks directly to this self-positioned role.  As Ariel expressed this 
relationship:  
 
I think that hip hop takes on the necessary critique in our country to educate. I 
always say that the best way to be a revolutionary is to be critical, you understand? 
The best form of art is the one that says what is good, what is bad, what is harmful, 
or what is missing, this is valued, this is critical. You understand? The position most 
revolutionary is to speak the truth. Art has to say what is good and what is bad.  If 
you hide your problems, or if you escape from them nothing will be resolved.[…]  
Rap is a music of resistance. It is fighting for rights that the Revolution notes but that 
society does not deliver 
 
 
 At the same time, however, among Cuban raperos and their followers Cuba is not 
the sole source of revolutionary inspiration.  Over the years, for instance, Yosmel and 
Kokino and others have invoked the lives and struggles in their music of African 
American radicals such Malcolm X, Mumia Abu-Jamal, and Shaka Sankofa (Gary 
Graham) as well as Nelson Mandela.  When asked where their awareness of such U.S. 
black radicalism stems, the two cited Black August’s participation in previous festivals as 
a significant influence.  As I will discuss shortly, Black August was but one route of the 
duo’s transnational engagements with black radical and nationalist traditions.  It is 
important to note, however, that African American struggle has long been a visible 
fixture of Cuba’s internationalist commitments to anti-colonial and anti-imperialist 
resistance dating back to the island’s solidarity with civil rights and black radical 
movements of the 1960’s.  From Fidel Castro’s famed 1960 stay in Harlem’s Hotel 
Theresa and subsequent meeting with Malcolm X, to Cuba’s offerings of asylum to 
political fugitives from Robert Williams and Eldridge Cleaver to Assata Shakur and 
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Nehanda Abiodun, Cubans have a long history of awareness and politically sensitivity to 
antiracists black struggle in the U.S. 128  I recall for instance Rita, an early forty-
something year old Cuban friend of mine, reminiscing about her childhood experience of 
signing for the freeing of Angela Davis from prison.  As she sang the song for me, fist 
raised in the air, she began to cry as the emotionally laden memories of the experience 
returned to her.  This was not for Rita a “black thang” per se – she is in Cuban terms 
white.  Rather it was her heart-felt solidarity with African Americans’ struggle for social 
justice as a Cuban.  As for Anónimo Consejo and many other members of Cuba’s hip 
hop movement, I would suggest that this was certainly the case.  Yet at the same time 
there was critically more at play: a sense of political solidarity predicated first and 
foremost on a transnationally expansive sense of black racial identification.  As I came to 
know Yosmel and Kokino their evolving political sense of themselves and their music, 
was significantly informed by yet another more immediate transnational route of black 
radical inspiration – notably Nehanda Abiodun.  This was especially the case with 
Yosmel who, under Nehanda’s tutelage, eventually took on the African-signified name 
Sekuo as an expression of his continued, ever-evolving efforts at critical black self-
making.  But once again, let me not get ahead of myself.  
  
                                                 
128 Relations between visiting black radicals and the Cuban state did not always result in mutually 
respectful terms. A number of back nationalist such as Robert Williams, Eldridge Cleaver, and 
Kwame Ture (then Stokely Carmichael) left Cuba significantly disillusioned with what they 
viewed as the Cuban state’s and Revolution’s shortcomings regarding its proclaimed antiracist 
commitments.  For further discussion see Carlos Moore (1988) Castro, The Blacks, and Africa, 
Ruth Reitan (1999) The Rise and Decline of an Alliance, and P. E Joseph (2002) “Where 
Blackness is Bright? Cuba, Africa And Black Liberation During the Age of Civil Rights.”  
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2001 – The Meeting  
 
 By the spring of 2001 I began to feel as though I had become something of a 
familiar fixture within Havana’s hip hop community.  Through consistent attendance at 
hip hop related events from concerts, to rehearsals, to meetings, and recording sessions, I 
had by that time established relationships of one kind or another with many of the groups 
and affiliated personnel that comprised Havana’s avant-garde core of the movement.  
Such relationships, however, where not without their complexities and tensions.  One 
immediate challenge involved negotiating many of the interpersonal politics and 
dynamics that drove the inner workings of the movement.  I had hoped to remain “non-
aligned” among the constellations of group and individual affinities, rivalries, and 
antagonisms, and this was naïve. I had unavoidably taken on my own role and set of 
responsibilities within the community.  The critical distinction, however, was that I was 
an outsider.  Not only was I not a rapero, but I was not even Cuban.  Worst yet for some, 
I would learn, I was a Yankee.   
 Whether it was appropriate of me or not I was concerned at the time with what I 
saw as a lack of an articulated, coherent vision among raperos that would help define 
their collective efforts as a “movement.”  I had from the start noted various divisions and 
histories of personal friction that seemed to inhibit more unified kinds of organizing 
within the community.  When they did occur meetings were often occasions when such 
tensions, sometimes in not so subtle ways, arose.  Given this history many avoided these 
kinds of meetings for fear that the same-old, same-old would occur.  I had often 
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expressed my own sentiment to those who were willing to listen that such meetings were 
for this very reason necessary in order to resolve differences and work more cohesively 
towards addressing common concerns effecting all. It was within this context that the 
following scenario took place.  
 Over the past few months I had run into Assata Shakur at a number of hip hop 
related events where we had opportunities to converse, mostly about Cuban hip hop 
itself.  One evening during a conversation I asked if she would be willing to talk with me 
in more detail sometime about her thoughts on hip hop in Cuba and her experience with 
the movement.  She responded by telling me that she would in fact find it a more 
productive experience if she could actually have a dialogue with raperos themselves 
about their work.  I explained to her I thought I could arrange such a meeting and took it 
upon myself.  In addition to facilitating this meeting for Assata I saw this as an 
opportunity to encourage more open and critical dialogue amongst folks, or at least a new 
start at it.  The prospect of the meeting also offered an occasion to explore in a more 
focused way this question of “revolution” in Cuban hip hop and, in particular, its 
relationship to black radical/nationalist struggle and history in the U.S.  Over the next 
week or so I spoke with a number of key players in the community whom were most 
familiar about the potential meeting.  I also enlisted the help and participation of Nehanda 
Abiodun who could provide an additional bridge between Assata and invited raperos. I 
recall there being some signs of resistance from a number of corners, some folks just 
plain weary of another meeting where old personal issues and personalities would clash.  
There were, however, some other concerns to which I myself would soon be party.  By 
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week’s end there appeared to be ample enough interest to pull the meeting together.  For 
a number of those interested the opportunity to have some focused time with Assata 
seemed appealing.  I convinced a writer friend of mine who had a history of collaborative 
projects with the movement to host the meeting at her house.  
 Assembled that evening was something like thirty of Havana’s most active and 
politically engaged MCs, a handful of key hip hop related players – most notably Pablo 
and Ariel – and Assata and Nehanda.  After introductions the meeting fairly quickly took 
on a certain level of tension as some subtle and not so subtle grievances began to be aired 
around challenges facing past and present efforts at cooperative organizing.  Lack of 
resources from performance space and access to audio and recording equipment was 
always a central concern among raperos.  There was a proposition presented to raise 
monies to help a rapero whose home had recently collapsed after a storm, though 
ultimately nothing was follow through upon.  For the most part, however, the issues and 
politics at play at this meeting were clearly more personally oriented.  Less a dialogue 
with Assata and Nehanda, the meeting eventually became more about airing a certain 
amount of dirty laundry.  And I was far from immune. There was a question raised as to 
my own transparency regarding my work in the community.   
 It was at that point that Ariel took the floor and in a very hostile manner raised the 
question as to whether I could in fact be a CIA informant.  I was floored.  Only a few 
nights earlier the two of us had been out drinking and sharing some fairly intimate stories. 
And now here he was in front of some of my most important associates rather hostilely 
attacking me as U.S. intelligence informer.  Again, I was shocked.  He wondered, for 
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instance, how was it that I received funding for my research for such an extended period 
of time? Why was it that I had not reported to el estado (the state), laying out my 
credentials on the table in order to provide them the opportunity to screen me and my 
work for clearance.  Assata responded by stating that it was true one never knows who 
could be an informant, but stated that she personally had full confidence in me.  At the 
time I was not sure if Assata herself might have been somewhat spooked by the 
allegation.  She certainly needed to keep her guard up. 129  In reply, I responded the best I 
could at that moment given how off-balance this all caught me.  It did not help matters 
that the tremendous level of anxiety I was immediately feeling made it that much more 
difficult to express myself clearly in Spanish as I would have hoped.  Eventually the 
meeting moved on but I felt truly devastated and as well as furiously angry at Ariel for 
what I experienced as a malicious personal attack on me.  At first I honestly could not 
understand where it had come from. After the meeting a couple people came up to 
consoled me while many others did not approach me at all.  Was it that Ariel’s words had 
struck a resonant cord? Or was it simply not as significant of an event as I had 
experienced it?   In retrospect I have been told by a couple people present at the meeting 
that the incident was not all that significant or personally in their minds. I my experience, 
however, it was all a deeply challenging episode. 
                                                 
129 By this point security for Assata has become particularly urgent following the $100,000 
bounty then New Jersey Governor Christy Todd Whitman put on Assata’s head in 1998.  The 
bounty was widely advertised on Radio Martí, the U.S.-funded/Cuban exile-run radio 
transmission into Cuba from  Miami. That same year the U.S. House of Representatives had 
passed a resolution demanding the extradition of Assata back to the U.S.  
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 Down on the street after the meeting I immediately approached Ariel, and I was 
livid.  I told him in no short order that he was completely out of place to publicly attack 
me in the manner he did, let alone in a meeting that I myself had organized. If he had had 
issues with me, I asked, why not address them with me personally rather the coming out 
of left field at a meeting?  My issue with him, I continued, was less so the questions he 
raised then the anger and viciousness from which it came, and the context under which it 
occurred. He seemed somewhat unprepared for the level of angry interrogation I was now 
directing towards him.  At the time he offer no apologies and we left it at that.  Ariel 
would, however, apologize to me some weeks later.   While he explained that it is true 
that one never knows for sure who-is-who under these circumstance, he conceded he was 
wrong to have attached me publicly in the way he did.  Ariel also confided later that a 
mutual associate of ours, a Cuban, who was also present at the meeting had expressed 
suspicion about me laying out a similar scenario as Ariel had voiced. Ariel claimed that 
the thought had not occurred to him before the conversation.  Given my past experiences 
with this particular person, and the subtle level of distrust he seemed to have conveyed 
from the beginning, I was not at all surprised. I could in fact have envisioned him saying 
these exact words as Ariel recounted them to me. 
 The whole experience gave me much to think about.  And upon further reflection 
I gained some greater insight into the varying dynamics that contributed to the outcome 
of the event, while walking away from the experience with some important lessons.  I 
recognized that the most immediate variable was Ariel himself.  Prior to the meeting 
Ariel had recently assumed a position with La Asociación Hermanos Siaz (AHS) – long 
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the principle institutional intermediary between the Cuban state and hip hop – as La 
Asociación’s event coordinator and official liaison with the movement. 130  Though 
garnering next to nothing of a peso salary this move catapulted Ariel, already something 
of an organic intellectual and leading figure within the community, into a official state 
capacity.  Importantly, his appointment was a significant development in the state’s 
increased efforts at institutionalizing hip hop as an officially sanctioned, supported, and 
managed space of culture and music making.  Ariel later described his new position as 
representing his move from one of the margins to one more of the center; a move that 
may have been suggestive of a larger process at play with regard to Cuban hip hop as a 
whole.   
 In his new capacity Ariel became something of a the go-to person when one 
needed access to state-owned audio equipment for music related events.  This was the 
case one afternoon at “diez y diecinueve” where EPG&B had organized a street concert 
with invited guests.  Ariel was the man of the hour having coordinated the logistics for 
the event’s audio needs which, in Cuban fashion, arrived a couple hours late.  It was that 
afternoon that I approached Ariel to inform him of the upcoming meeting with Assata.  
He had seemed a little surprised but did not have any particular comment other than that 
he would try to make it.  In my ensuing conversations with him following the meeting 
episode I found out that he was upset by the fact that I, an “outsider” had organized the 
meeting.  Why, he asked, wasn’t he approached by Assata if she was interested in 
                                                 
130 One U.S. journalist who now has a book out on contemporary Cuban music once referred to 
Ariel in this capacity as the Cuban “Minister of Hip Hop” (Robinson 2002).  
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arranging a meeting with raperos. Was it not he that should have been in his official 
position the go-to person?  
 It hence became apparent to me that at least part of what inspired Ariel’s 
assaultive challenge of me that night was that I had in his view undermined his new 
found authority by circumventing his institutional responsibilities.  His whole argument 
questioning why it was that I had not gone though “official” channels, and cleared myself 
with el estado seemed now clearly to have arisen from his new positionality and 
identification with the state and a sense of being personally undermined in this capacity.  
I would not be at all surprised if for instance he had in fact discussed the upcoming 
meeting with AHS members prior to that night.  The truth is I was not interested in 
making this an officially organized event, nor do I think that many of those involved 
would have wanted this either.   
 Regarding Ariel’s new found positionality, in a conversation I had a number of 
months into his new job he acknowledged that his thinking had recently changed with 
regard to his long standing distance from the state and “the Revolution.” He now told me 
he saw things somewhat differently.  When asked if he had a greater level of 
identification with the state due to his new involvements, he responded:  
 
Of course, completely. [What changed?] I don’t know, my thinking is more deep, my 
struggle is more deep, my political understanding is more profound. Before, when I 
started, the only thing important was that rap could be in Cuba, that it could be 
heard in Cuba. Now I’m interested in what role rap can have in the political life of 
the country, no?  In the social life […]  Many people complain about the state but 
there are things that the state does that may harm five or six  people but benefit many. 





 To be fair Ariel’s thinking and positionality was always evolving and often 
characterized by conflicting tensions he seemed to be continually in struggle over.  In 
describing his new found responsibilities working for La Asociación, the seeds of some 
of these conflicts seemed  apparent.  
 
My mission is to be an artist, to be human.  Think for it, work for it [the movement]. 
This is the same mission of the movement itself. I am fighting  to be a messenger 
between the Cuban institutions and the artists.  Understand? I arrived at the Cuban 
institutions— the Minister of Culture, AHS – because raperos wanted that. I am there 
to fight because raperos want concerts, disc, for these kinds of things. [Like a 
bridge?]Yes, like a bridge. I do not desire that people create an identity of me apart 
from the movement, no. I think that people intend for me to have a role within the 
movement. I don’t want people to think that I want to be a “mogul” like Russell 
Simons.  Sincerely, if I am a leader, or the face of the movement about many things, I 
always have to respond to what the movement wants.  
 
 
 Though Ariel above seemed to be suggesting the contrary, his comments 
underscored for me the tensions he was experiencing as a ‘middle man’ between hip hop 
on one hand and the state on the other.  Ariel’s need to repeatedly foreground his 
allegiance to the movement reflected the potentially compromising position he now 
occupied as an “organic” member of the hip hop community.  Most raperos I know 
highly respected Ariel and what he has been able to access for the movement through his 
work with AHS.  In reality though there was little alternative to the state in terms of 
securing necessary resources such as performance venues and equipment.  And if Ariel 
could facilitate such access then it was a productive thing for the movement.   
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 For most, however, this need-based relationship did not translate uncritically so 
into unguarded involvement with the state and its institutions.  Some I knew were in fact 
quite wary of deep personal involvement with AHS or any state institution.  Ariel in turn 
seemed cognizant of how he, as an employee of La Asociación, might himself be 
implicated in such concerns.  One well positioned person within the movement went as 
far as to liken Ariel to “a house negro” at AHS.   The truth I think is that Ariel was 
himself conflicted about his position.  He often complained about the frequent arguments 
he would wage with the institution’s  leadership over the direction of his work and the 
movement itself.131  Ariel would later express some misgivings about continuing his 
direct involvement (i.e. employment) within AHS.  He talked about the desire to break 
from La Asociación and organize his own hip hop-related projects independent of the 
state.  The challenge of course was how to accomplish this and with what resources.  
Though Ariel may have eventually made moves to create some distance between himself 
and La Asociación, he was for the time being caught at the epicenter of the ongoing 
negotiated play between hip hop and the state as both attempted to grapple with Cuba’s 
ever transforming social landscape.  For a highly ambitious individual like Ariel such 
were the stakes.   
 The above provides some contextual background to Ariel’s highly performative 
outing of me that evening. Indeed, as I came to understand the episode it had as much to 
do with his need to perform before his peers as it had to do with putting me in place.  It 
                                                 
131 Truth be told Ariel was always arguing with someone.  It was part and parcel of his personal 
character and everyone knew this about him.  This is not to suggest, however, that his issues with 
AHS may not have been materially substantive.  
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appeared to me that under the circumstances Ariel felt the need to assert his authority in a 
effort to (re)capture a space in which he otherwise felt sidelined.  His recent state-side 
position was new and complicated territory for him particularly as it related to his 
ongoing relationship with folks in the movement.  In this light it is understandable how 
he might use the opportunity to present a strong posture in front his fellow community of 
raperos.  At the same time I along with practically everyone else was aware going into 
the meeting that a real riff was building between Ariel and Pablo who was also present.   
I recall that the duo were in fact barely on speaking terms that night.132  Though among 
two of the most influential, resourceful, not to mention ambitious members of Havana’s 
hip hop community, their relationship has long been a contentious one.  Possible 
personality clashes not withstanding, it was apparent that this tension stemmed in 
significant part from their mutual competitiveness.  I was actually warned before the 
meeting that stuff might fly between the two during the gathering.  Though this did not 
come to pass it is quite possible that part of Ariel’s inspiration to step up in such an 
unquestionably hostile way may have been informed by this competitive tension with 
Pablo.  
 Aside from what may or may not have motivated Ariel that evening, the 
experience forced me to confront some very real on-going challenges and potential 
limitations of my work to date. For one it brought into unavoidably clear relief the 
distance I occupied as an outsider.  Regardless of my invested efforts in building organic 
relationships with folks – at times a challenging undertaking in and of itself, I would of 
                                                 
132 When I last checked the two still have little in any contact between them except when 
overlapping work necessitates it.  
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course always remain a yuma in the eyes of most.  Potentially more politically 
challenging was that regardless of my diasporically shared blackness upon which much 
of my dialogic engagement with folks was significantly hinged, at the end of the day I 
was still a still a privileged Yankee.  Yes, within the streets of Havana my brown body 
was often racialized in similar ways as most other black young men present at that 
meeting.  And yes, these same youth indeed embraced a level of racial affinity and 
identification with African Americans along lines of both culture and politics. All this 
said, my nationally-framed blackness was clearly a significantly privileged one vis-à-vis 
my Cuban peers.  Ariel hit it right on the head when he raised the question as to my 
seemingly uninhibited ability to spend extended periods in Cuba while moving to and fro 
between the island and U.S.  For many of these ambitious young people such privileges 
of travel and mobility are among the most coveted.  Every Cuban MC I know holds as 
one of their greatest hopes the possibility that their music might offer them the 
opportunity to travel abroad.  Such has been the case for a very select few such as 
Obsesión and Anónimo Consejo whose combined travels have recently brought them to 
the U.S., France, and Brazil.  Given the heavy economic and political limitations placed 
on overseas travel for most Cubans, music offers these youth one of their very few 
potential options.  Most likely the only real alternative for most would be the foreign 
fiancée visa hustle as sizable numbers of other young black men and women have opted 
for. 133 Such has in fact been the case for a handful of Havana-based raperos I know.  In 
my case, however, such privileges of transnational mobility are a given as a foreigner.  
                                                 
133 See Chapter 3 for a discussion of this black Cuban strategy of ‘self-exploiting’ blackness.    
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 There were of course additional set of issues at play with my being a Yankee.  
The very real and clearly ongoing historical antagonisms between revolutionary Cuba 
and successive U.S. administrations since the early 1960s unquestionably informed the 
context of my own work in Cuba.  My blackness and expressed political convictions not 
withstanding, as a U.S. researcher I remained potentially implicated in the broader frames 
of U.S. imperialist design in the eyes of some.  It is particularly understandable given the 
acutely aggressive posture the current U.S. administration has taken vis-à-vis the Cuban 
state and, by consequence, the Cuban people in its absurdist ever-escalation of the U.S. 
trade embargo.  Even Alexei, one of my most trusted friends, when asked why he and 
Magia did not come in on my defense during the meeting asked me in turn, “What could 
we have said? That we know you to be a good person?” His point being that nobody 
knows for sure who is who given the current political context. Anybody could be an 
informant. Could I in fact deny this?  
 At the same time something additionally interesting came out of this particular 
line of discussion.  During later conversations I had with Alexei and Ariel individually, 
they both made the point in no light manner that Cuban hip hop could offer those who 
would like to undermine revolutionary Cuba an ideal site of infiltration and provocateur 
work.  Indeed, Nadine Fernández suggests that the Revolutionary leadership has long 
been concerned that the race question in particular could be manipulated by enemies of 
the state who would used the issued as a nationally divisive one (Fernández 2001). 
Raperos in fact were quite aware of the political stakes of their work as a critically-
oriented youth movement vis-à-vis the outside world.  There were for instance well 
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founded concerns about how Cuban hip hop could be exploited by anti-Cuban interests 
overseas particularly those in the U.S.  Cuban MCs had repeatedly had their words and 
lyrics manipulated by U.S. journalist to fit certain dominant readings of Cuban hip hop in 
the U.S. as a new site for counter-Revolutionary dissent on the island.  This dissertation’s 
opening reference of the ways Papa Humbertico’s “denuncia social” was 
decontextualized by the U.S. press and flaunted by Miami Cubans as a an anti-
Revolutionary diatribe is but one example. In my own capacity as an “authoritative” 
academic I myself have been subject to politically motivated misrepresentations by a U.S. 
journalist.  I further recall Alexei and Magia’s experience of being aggressively mobbed 
in a Miami airport upon their arrival by a Cuban American TV news reporter who 
questioned them about whether Cuban rap was a new voice of anti-government protest 
and whether they planed on defecting to the U.S.  Such were some of the broader political 
implications of Cuban hip hop that necessitated a certainly level of vigilance.  Could I in 
all honestly find fault in this even when I myself was not held completely beyond 
suspicion?  In reality this was part of the political context in which I had to negotiate my 
work.  While there obviously was no getting around this, the whole experience forced me 
to reconcile the fact that as an outside researcher I was indeed an “informant” of one kind 




Chapter Six  
 




Sekuo and Recuperative Forgings of Radical Blackness  
 
 Returning to this central question of Cuban hip hop as a site of critical black self-
makings, there were two hip hop-related spaces that emerged between 2001 and 2002 that 
served in differing though complimentary ways as important sources of black 
radicalization for a number of key individuals in the movement.  The spaces in question 
were two informally organized “classes” geared towards redressing, in their respective 
nationalist frameworks, themes of black radical struggle and history.  One individual who 
in many ways most dramatically embodied the confluence of these two spaces of black 
radical (re)articulation was Yosmel of Anónimo Consejo.   His participation in both 
classes was both a critical outgrowth of, as well as a significant contributing factor to his 
on-going political and personal development as a Cuban MC.   
 Sometime in 2000, Nehanda Abiodun began holding occasional gatherings in her 
apartment just outside Havana.  By 2001 when I encountered them, these gatherings had 
become fairly regular weekly events.  These evenings drew a interesting collection of 
young people comprised of local Cubans as well as an assortment of North American 
college-age students who were in Havana on various educational programs.  Though 
these gatherings had an informal and at times somewhat festive atmosphere, the meetings 
were used as a space for serious discussion on issues ranging from the imprisonment of 
African American political activists and patriarchy to interracial dating.  These classes, as 
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Nehanda referred to them, always drew a core group of local raperos.  The space was 
unique in that it provided a forum for cross-cultural dialogue around questions of race, 
gender, and power as they manifest themselves in both Cuba and the U.S. – kinds of 
critical exchange that had yet to occur in any significant way elsewhere within the hip 
hop movement.  Discussions were often highly engaged and at times impassioned as 
varying perspectives were aired and collectively negotiated amongst the group.  The 
impetus and framing of such exchanges were largely informed by Nehanda’s political 
commitments to a nationalist tradition of black radical struggle and organizing.  She 
understood such undertakings, she explained to me, as simply an extension of her 
ongoing work as a black revolutionary.  Just because she was in Cuba, she asserted, this 
did not mean that her active commitments to and engagements in political struggle had 
ceased to be part of her life.  In the several gatherings I attended, Yosmel was 
consistently among one of the more outspoken of participants, Cuban or otherwise.  His 
involvement always struck me as particularly thoughtful and critically self-reflective.  It 
was in these meetings that I first got a sense of what appeared to me as Yosmel’s quest 
for personal growth and critical self-education.  
 An important inspirational influence in this process was Nehanda herself.  She 
had over the years developed close personal relationships with both Yosmel and Kokino 
due in part to the fact that they shared neighboring barrios in the Havana de este (east 
Havana) area.  It is clear that her involvement in their lives as a mentor figure has had a 
significant impact on their thinking, their sense of black selves, and their music. 
Nehanda’s personal history of black radical struggle and nationalist orientation, 
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moreover, was clearly a instrumental facet of this mentoring.   As an expression of both 
the level of personal connection as well as the black nationalist contours of their 
relationship, Nehanda presided over a diasporically-hybrid New Afrikan ceremony in 
which the two raperos were given the African-signified names of Sekuo Mesiah Umoja 
and Adeyeme Umoja for Yosmel and Kokino respectively.  While Kokino would 
ultimately continue to be known primarily by his original name, Sekuo in contrast fully 
embraced his new identity as testament to his new found sense of black Afrikan selfhood.  
As an expression of this commitment, on his shoulder opposite the one affixed with 
Ché’s figure and the slogan “Anónimo Consejo Revolution,” Sekuo soon added a large 
tattooed image of Africa enclosed by the prose  “Mi mente, mi esperitu, mi vida esta 
aqui” (“My mind, my sprit, my life is here”).  Poetically revealing, the juxtaposing 
imagery of these two scenarios was symbolically reflective of the seemingly competing 
nationalist lenses though which Sekuo negotiated his every-evolving understanding of 
himself as a black Cuban man.  These very same nationalist frameworks – one “Cuban,” 
the other predicated on a transnationally diasporicized notion of blackness – in a broader 
sense operate as key self-referential paradigms of black identity making within the larger 
context of Cuba hip hop as a whole.   
 While the above described scenario illustrates one nationalist current of critical 
black self-making within the movement, almost concurrently another pedagogic related 
space opened up directed to the other side of the nationalist shoulder as it were.  In 2002 
Tomás Fernández Robaina, a bibliographic archivist of Afro-Cuban history at Havana’s 
Biblioteca Nacional de José Martí,” initiated an informal weekly class at the Biblioteca 
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Nacional on Afro-Cuban history.  The class, open to all, was held in an open-air corner 
section of the library’s second floor reading room.  On an average day the gathering drew 
roughly a dozen-and-a-half or so participants the vast majority of whom were young, 
almost exclusively black.  In addition to a small handful of U.S. researchers like myself 
who attended some classes, the core constituency was comprised of young academics, 
politically oriented artists, and a few hip hop-affiliated individuals among whom Alexei, 
Ariel, and Sekuo were the most consistent participants.  The fact that a class of this kind 
was being held in a public institution like la Biblioteca Nacional was reflective of a new 
tolerance on the part of the Cuban state to more open public discussions of racial themes.  
Similar kinds of spaces were occurring in places such as UNEAC where well publicized 
and attended academic-focused symposium of race was held that same year.134  
 In curricular terms, the class entitled “El negro en Cuba” was thematically 
organized around Tomás Fernández’s similarly entitled pioneering work El negro en 
Cuba, 1902-1958: Apuntes para la historia de la lucha contra la discriminación racial 
(Fernández Robaina 1990).135  The course focused on the role of black political 
mobilization and antiracist/discriminatory activism during the 20th century prior to the 
1959 triumph of the Cuban Revolution136 and sought to explore the text’s central thesis: 
black Cuban negotiated confrontations with Cuba’s historical problematic of race and 
nation.  Regardless of its varied historical examples, the fundamental struggle, as 
                                                 
134 I will shortly suggest that Cuban hip hop has emerged as an instrumental agent of this recent 
racial apertura, or opening in Cuban society.  
135 “The Black in Cuba: Historical Notes on the Struggle Against Racial Discrimination.”   
136 A time frame which clearly reflected strategic considerations given the sensitivity of Cuban 
scholarship on race post-1959. Sticking with these historical parameters in the class no doubt 
served similar ends.  
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historically framed by Tomás, was one directed at black attainment of full national 
citizenship and rights within a Martí-envisioned non-racial Cuba.  Within Cuban 
historical orthodoxy such foregrounding of autonomous kinds of “black” agency in the 
making of Cuban history and nation clearly represented a revisionist undertaking; one 
geared towards rectifying the historical erasure of the critical black subject from Cuba’s 
past.  In many ways I saw Tomás’ class as serving precisely that role for many of it 
participants; the historical recuperation of the critical black subject from an otherwise 
racially-neutral(ized) national narrative.  I use the term “critical” to underscore black 
Cuban’s as active, critically engaged subjects rather than passive, consumable objects of 
historical processes – e.g. mestizaje – as they have all to often been portrayed within 
prevailing Cuban national discourse as I have previously demonstrated.  Historical 
examples such as Antonio Maceo, el Partito Independiente de Color (PIC), Afro-Cuban 
journalist Gustavo Urrutia, and more recent figures such as Juan René Betancourt and 
their varying efforts at addressing racial exclusion within “the nation” were among those 
interwovenly discussed.  
 As the following anecdote suggests, one dynamic that emerged in class 
discussions that I attended involved some subtle differences in positionality between 
Tomás and some of the young participants in the course.  One afternoon Tomás returned 
to Maceo’s famed quotation “Nunca pedir como negro, solo como cubano” (“Never ask 
as a black, only as a Cuban”) which he often references as suggestive of his 
understanding of black Cuban struggle as historically predicated on national integration 
rather than racial autonomy or separation. After class I was speaking with Sekuo who 
 
 247
expressed to me in no uncertain terms that he did not respect Tomás’ implication in his 
Maceo comment that black Cuban’s were somehow “Cubans” before they were black.  
He asserted defiantly that he was Africano first and foremost before anything else.  In 
another conversation I later had with Alexei he similarly expressed the sentiment that he 
considered himself negro first and then Cuban which, at the time I actually found 
surprising given what I had long understood as his strong identification with the 
nationalist ideals and framework of the Revolution.  In both cases it appeared to me that 
these statements signified the shaping of increasingly black-centered kinds of self-
identity that exceeded nationalist definitions and constraints.   
 At the same time, however, Tomás’ class as suggested was all about the assertive 
recuperation of a critical blackness within the national historical narrative.  Or framed in 
a slightly different way, for many of the young people present it was in effect an assertion 
of “self” as contemporary black subjects of history within a racially sanitized historical 
narrative.  A possible distinction here between the political situatedness of this project 
and that of Tomás’ may stem in part from generational differences of racialized 
experience and positionality.  Now in his 50s, Tomás is among a earlier generation of 
black intellectuals that were trained and socialized during the height of the Revolution.  
As such, Tomás’ identity as a black man and intellectual is deeply implicated in 
complexly lived kinds of ways with the revolutionary project.  As a gay-identified, light 
brown skinned man who would commonly be read as mestizo, however, Tomás has long 
fought for recognition as both black and gay within exclusionary political and intellectual 
circles that might have otherwise denied him both.  Full acceptance and inclusion of his 
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subjective identity within the prevailing revolutionary context would therefore be a 
significant facet of his political project.  Among Sekuo, Alexei and others such 
historically configured, nationally-bounded commitments to nation and national inclusion 
are not necessarily articulated in the same kinds of ways.  In the immediate sense they are 
coming of age in a distinct historical moment were lived experiences of race and 
racialized power are manifested differently; where daily experiences of racism are more 
self-consciously present.  This is to suggest that in today’s Cuba where the national 
contradictions of race are so much more apparent, there is a more urgent need for 
politically-grounded black identities that supersede the limitating discourse of national 
non-racialism.  Yet at the same time, these young people have access to alternative, 
nationally-transcendent routes of black identification and identity that clearly translate for 
them into structured kinds of feeling.  This is particularly the case for those engaged in 
Cuban hip hop.   
 Potential differences notwithstanding, it was apparent that folks participating in 
the class were gaining invaluable access to historical material that they otherwise would 
have little other recourse to.  Again, the key intervention here is the recovery of a critical 
black subject within the national historical narrative; a recovery which in turn roots the 
present-day legitimacy of politically-grounded black identity and claims of citizenship 
squarely within the national frame.  In the case of Sekuo, Tomás’ class clearly proved 
instrumental in his on-going negotiations between national and nationally-transcendent 
assertions of black political autochthony.  As a direct and vivid expression of his 
involvement in the class Sekuo soon produced a new tema for he and Kokino entitled 
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“Afro-Cubano” which quickly became one of Anónimo Consejo’s most celebrated songs.  
Sung over an innovative background track by Pablo Herrera and incorporative of heavy 
Afro-Cuban percussion, Sekuo’s lyrics pays homage to a history of black resistance 
figures centered on a narrativized rendering of the struggle and ensuing massacre of el 
Partito Independiente de Color. Importantly, the song situates the duo as historical 







Pedro Ivonnet, ibaé                                      
Soy Lagardere, ibaé 
Evraristo Estenoz, ibaé  
Gustavo Urrutia ibaé  
Aponte, ibaé 
Antonio Maceo, ibaé 
A nuestro mártires del partido 
independiente de color, ibaé 
Pedro Ivonnet, ibaé, yo con usted  
Por la justa causa moriré 
Amor sin diferencia hace la fe 
Hombre y mujer, guerreros de África,  
otra vez de pie 
Ofi Zumbi, Ganga Zumba 
Adeyeme, Sekuo 
[. . .] 
Rastafari filosofía, resistencia 
Erguidos ante la policia 
Dreadlocks p’arriba 
Orgullo fortaleza nuestra fila 
[. . .] 
Nyabinghi valor 
muerte al opresor,sin excepción de color 
de los falsos profetasse encargará el Señor






Pedro Ivonnet, ibaé  
Soy Lagalbe, ibaé 
Evraristo Estenoz, ibaé  
Gustavo Urrutia ibaé  
Aponte, ibaé 
Antonio Maceo, ibaé 
To our martyrs of the Independent 
Party of Color ibaé 
Pedro Ivonnet, ibaé, I’m with you, 
Will die for a just cause 
Love without difference makes faith 
Man and woman, warriors of Africa 
Again on their feet 
Ofi Zumbi, Ganga Zumba 
Adeyeme, Sekuo  
[. . .] 
Rastafari philosophy, resistance 
Standing [tall] before the police 
Dreadlocks raised up 
Pride fortifies our position   
[. . .] 
Nyabinghi courage  
death to the oppressor, regardless of [skin] color 
God will take care ofthe false prophets 
Babylon burn  
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Nuestra función: educación  
En cada barrio que por revolución 
 
Coro:   
Aheeaho, aheeaho, abre los ojos, raíces 
Afro-Cubano soy yo 
Aheeaho, aheeaho abre la mente, raices 
Afro-Cubano soy yo, soy yo 
[…] 
África, llena de cultura y gente 
Apreciando la raíz potente 
La lucha continua 
Hoy micrófono, cultura 




Our function: education 
In every neighborhood [that is] for revolution 
 
Chorus:   
Ahee aho, aheeaho open your eyes [to your] roots 
Afro-Cuban I am, I am  
Ahee aho, aheeaho open your eyes [to your] roots 
Afro-Cuban  I am, I am 
[…] 
Africa, full of culture and people 
Appreciating the powerful root 
The fight continues  
Today microphone, culture 





 The tema opens with an ritualized evocation of black resistant figures such as 
famed 17th century slave rebellion leader José Antonio Aponte, Antonio Maceo, and 
members of PIC including its leader Pedro Ivonnet – all of whom were focal points in 
Tomás’ class.  Each is followed by refrains of ibaé, a truncation of the Yoruba phrase 
ibaé bayé tonú which is uttered at the initiation of santería ceremonies to invoke the 
participation of ancestral sprits.  A connection to the present, however, is immediately 
made as the duo professes their allegiances with Ivonnet to “die for a just cause.” While 
Ivonnet and his fellow PIC members are invoked in nationalist language as a “our 
martyrs,” in the same breath their history – and by extension those of Sekuo and Kokino 
– is framed within a broader diasporic context of black historical resistance.  Here 
references to Ofi Zumbi and Ganga Zumba, the leaders of Brazil’s famed Quilombo dos 
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Palmares,137 provide linkage to histories of black Atlantic struggle which are nationally 
transcendent of Cuba’s particular historical outlines. And although the ultimate historical 
foundation for these “guerreros de África” is Africa itself, the routes to such black 
Africanness are very much “new world” in their orientation.  The numerous references to 
Rastafari imagery from nyabinghi to Babylon is reflective of the growing influence of the 
Cuban Rastafari movement on Sekuo’s thinking and self-identity at the time.138  While as 
previously mentioned a number of raperos had begun wearing dreadlocks as transnational 
markers of blackness, Sekuo’s growth of locks and attention to a more “ire,” or naturally-
oriented lifestyle was informed more directly by his ideological engagement with 
Rastafari associated beliefs and discourses of resistance.  In his reference to “Standing 
[tall] before the police/Dreadlocks raised up/Pride fortifies our position” Sekuo clearly 
draws upon such black resistive imagery as an inspirational source for his own defensive 
posturing.  Again, the source of such black signified identification and self-imagery is 
diasporic in scope.   
 However, as the song’s title implies and is lyrically reiterated in the chorus,  
however, Anónimo Consejo are ultimately asserting their identity and historical 
groundedness as Afro-Cubanos.  The tema closes with tributes to a number of 
contemporary black figures such as filmmaker Gloria Rolando, preeminent Afro-Cuban 
intellectual Rogelio Martinez Furé, and Tomás Fernández Robaina himself.  In a similar 
                                                 
137 The large 17th century maroon society in the north eastern interior of Brazil which for over a 
century.  
resisted violent attempts to incorporate it within colonial Brazil’s plantation slave system.  
138 For a discussion of Rastafarianism in Cuba see Katrin Hansing (2001) “Rasta, Race and 
Revolution: Transnational Connections in Socialist Cuba.”  
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cadence as the opening each name is followed by refrains of aché, the Yoruba expression 
for the divine power of the orishas used in santería ritual.  In proclaiming “La lucha 
continua/Hoy micrófono, cultura/Anónimo defiende los ancestors,” their position is 
secured within this historical continuum of black Cuban struggle through their work 
promoting education “in every neighborhood [that is] for revolution.”  Here, it is 
significant that the original Spanish text reads in somewhat ambivalent fashion “en cada 
barrio que por revolución.”  This phrasing is a direct play on a popular revolutionary 
slogan “en cada barrio, revolución.” It refers to local revolutionary organs known as los 
Comités de Defensa de la Revolución (CDRs) originally organized as neighborhood-
based vigilance organizations.139  Through such play a subtle distinction is again 
suggested between Anónimo Consejo’s endorsements of revolutionary struggle and those 
of the Revolution.  In assuming their self-styled objective of anónimo consejo 
(anonymous advice), the revolutionary “educación” that the duo claims to promote is 
understood as an implicitly critical one.  While Tomás’ class was an obvious source of 
inspiration for Sekuo’s penning of “Afro-Cubano,” the transnationally expansive notions 
of black resistance that underskirts the song’s self-celebrate narrative no doubt found 
encouragement from other points of engagement.   
 Another influential rap duo whose work in necessitates at least brief mention at 
this juncture is Hermanos de Causa (‘Brothers of Cause’).  Drawn from the adjoining 
barrios of Cojimar and Alamar respectively, the music of Zoandris and Pelón is among 
the most poetically sophisticated and politically uncompromising of any artists on the 
                                                 
139 The slogan was actually appropriated from the lyrics of a popular 1970s song by Grupo de 
Experimentación Sonora de ICAIC entitled “Canción de los CDRs”  
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island.  One of their most celebrated signature temas entitled “Tengo” (“I have”) 
similarly contextualizes contemporary black struggle within an historical frame of Cuban 
national blackness but manages it in a more bitingly satirical manner.  The song is in fact 
a play on the famous poem by the same title by celebrated Afro-Cuban poet Nicolás 
Guillén.140  Originally penned in 1964, Guillén’s Tengo celebrates the recent 
opportunities opened up to blacks as a result of the Cuban Revolution’s early efforts at 
addressing the island’s history of racial inequality.  “Tengo” becomes Guillén’s rhythmic 
refrain in gratitude to all that “I have” now as a black Cuban man, thanks to the 
Revolution.  As the revolutionary appointed national poet, Guillén’s Tengo and its 
exaltive message has assumed popular canonic status in Cuba and is standard reading in 
Cuban secondary schools.  Working self-consciously with these parameters, Hermanos de 
Causa present a critical reversioning of Guillén’s Tengo as a modus of black social 
commentary on questions of rights and citizenship.  
 
Tengo  
Hermanos de Causa 
 
[Zoandris] 
Tengo una bandera, un escudo, un tocororo 
También una palmera, un mapa sin tesoro 
Tengo aspiraciones sin tener lo que hace falta 
Tengo más o menos la medida exacta 
Crónica que compacta 
Polémica que impacta 
Pasan los años y la situación sigue intacta 
El tiempo no perdona 
Pregúntale a La Habana  
Que ahorita está en la lona 






I have a flag, coat of arms, a tocororo 
I also have a palm tree, a map without a treasure 
I have aspirations without having what I need 
I have more or less the true measure 
Scenario that tightens 
Polemics that impact 
Years go by, things still the same 
Time shows no mercy 
Ask Havana 
What right now is on the canvas 
Nobody cares about anything  
                                                 
140 In Cuban historical terms Guillén, with his light skin and wavy hair, was considered mulato.  
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Tengo una raza oscura y discriminada 
Tengo una jornada que me exige y no me  
da nada 
Tengo tantas cosas que no puedo ni tocarlas 
Tengo instalaciones que no puedo ni pisarlas 
Tengo libertad entre un paréntesis de hierro 
Tengo tantos derechos sin provechos que me 
encierro 
Tengo lo que tengo sin tener lo que he tenido 
Tienes que reflexionar y asimilar el contenido 
Tengo una conducta fracturada por la gente 
Tengo de elemento, tengo de conciente 
Tengo el fundamento sin tener antecedentes 
Tengo mi talento y eso es más que suficiente. . . 
  
I have a dark race and discrimination  
I have a job that demands from me and pays me 
nothing  
I have so much that I can’t even touch. 
I have all these places I can’t even enter  
I have freedom inside a parenthesis of steel 
I have so many rights I don’t enjoy that enclose 
me  
I have what I have without having what I’ve had 
You have to think, take in the content 
I have a fractured behavior because of the people 
I have the element, I have the consent  
I have the foundation without having antecedents 
I have my talent, and that’s more than sufficient. .  . 
  
 In the above opening except of “Tengo,” Zoandris begins by signifying his Cuban 
citizenship by referencing the national icons of the flag, coat of arms, and el tocororo, 
Cuba’s national bird.  While he may have a palm tree, however, he has no tropical 
treasure. Indeed, “I have aspirations without having what I need” Zoandris proclaims.  
Thus he introduces the central problematic of the tema; the dissonance, disjuncture, and 
chasms between the promises of full citizenship and rights under non-racial revolutionary 
socialism and the lived frustrations of being young and black in Cuba today.  Similar to 
Anónimo Consejo’s previous allusions to being “squeezed,” Zoandris speaks of the 
current moment in terms of a “scenario that tightens.”  In a tone marked by 
disillusionment he expose the quotidian hardships and contradictions within Cuba’s new 
dollarized economics of apartheid in declaring “I have so much that I can’t touch/I have 
all these places I can’t enter.”  And in one of the tema’s most poignant lines, Zoandris 
follows with an unflinching poeticism “Tengo libertad entre un paréntesis de 
hierro/Tengo tantos derechos sin provechos que me encierro”  (“I have freedom inside a 
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parenthesis of steel/I have so many rights I don’t enjoy that enclose me”).  At the same 
time, however, he appears to call into question Guillén’s own rendering of the past in 
proclaiming “I have what I have without having what I’ve had.”  Here, Zoandris stakes out his 
own position as a rapero in affirming “I have the element/I have the consent/I have the 
foundation without having antecedents/I have my talent, and that’s more than sufficient.”  In 
true rapero form, Zoandris asserts, it is through the performed word that he advances his 
politics.  
 
Black Radical Feminist Arising  
 
 With only a couple of exceptions the illustrations I have provided to this point 
regarding the politics of black identity making and social critique within Cuban hip hop 
have been wholly masculine in character.  The simple logic behind this emphasis as 
earlier discussed is that as discussed earlier hip hop in Cuba, as in most other global sites 
of its production, is primarily a male dominant affair.141  With regard to the immediate 
examples above both the assertive claims to black national legitimacy as well as the 
(re)articulated black subject positions from which they arise are solidly predicated on 
appeals to masculine paradigms of power.  As in the case of Anónimo Consejo, 
contemporary self-assertions of black male resistance are moored to an interarticulated 
continuum of black Cuban and Afrodiasporic histories of struggle defined primarily in 
masculinist terms.  As Hermanos de Causa’s gender-specific name implies, their “cause” 
moves first and foremost from a male-centered subject position.  Such black masculinity 
                                                 
141 See Chapter 1 for a discussion of masculinist tendencies of hip hop’s global dissemination.   
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in the end is ultimately expressed through the ways it is performatively enacted within the 
theatrically-driven space of Cuban hip hop.  Taken in its totality, within Cuban hip hop 
masculinist framing to be black, in effect, is to be male.   
 Increasingly, however, black women have been making their voices heard within 
the movement, often asserting black female-centered critiques of gendered forms of 
power as they intersect with those of race.  Such critiques I suggest emerge from new 
critically positioned kinds of black female subjectivity that find performative articulation 
through Cuban hip hop.  As briefly mentioned previously, the female trio known as 
Instinto was one of the key pioneers of Cuban women’s involvement in hip hop.  Though 
all three of the group’s members have for the last few years been living in Spain, I recall 
their performances as choreographed events that employed a highly theatrical use of 
sexualized female energy on stage.  While wearing form-fitting outfits with significant 
skin exposure, these self-styled divas of Cuban rap often played with sexual provocation 
as a means of launching female-centered critiques of Cuban machismo.  Monica, another 
early pioneering rapera who is no longer actively performing, rapped alongside ‘old 
school’ MC Irak Saenz who is now part of the performance duo Doble Filo.142  Though I 
have meet Monica I unfortunately have never had the opportunity to see her perform.  
But unquestionably the most long term active and constantly engaged of female MCs is 
Magia Lopez of Obsesión.  
 As alluded to earlier, Magia’s subjectivity as a black woman has over the years 
increasing become vocal and politicized component of her music and public persona. 
                                                 
142 In the last couple of years Doble Filo and Obsesión have collaborated on a project dubbed La 
fabric_K which produced an album under the same name in 2003.  
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While it has been Alexei who tended to be the primary scribe of many of the duo’s temas, 
it became clear during the period I have known the two that Magia progressively took a 
more direct role in asserting her own voice within the music.  A central and reoccurring 
concern in much of Magia’s work has been directed towards challenging frames of 
racialized gendered discourses and practices historically ascribed onto the bodies of black 
and brown women.  In self-affirmingly celebration of her unapologetically black female 
subjectivity in assertive, non-sexually provocative terms, Magia directly contests the 
dominant imagery of la mulata as a hyper-sexualized icon of a racially “transculturated” 
Cuban nation.143  One tema that marked Magia’s political and artistic maturation in this 
direction was her solo track entitled “La Llaman Puta” (“They Call her a Whore”) which 
was first performed in 2001.  In this song Magia gives a compassionate account of the 
struggles of young women engage in Cuba’s tourist-driven sex trade.  Though she never 
directly addresses the question of race, it is poetically implied as Magia interweaves her 
narrative with choral chants in Yoruba to Ochún, the feminine orisha most strongly 
associated with female sexuality.  Sung to the polyrhythms of the sacred batá drum used 
in santería rituals to call upon the orishas, the song opens as follows:  
 
                                                 
143 See Chapter 3.   
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La Llaman Puta  
Magia  
 
La llaman puta 
para todos no es mas  
que una mujer suela  
disfrutando el hecho de ser bonita  
!Loca! carne que invita  
que esita provoca  
menudo oficio el que le toca   
esta chica ambulante  
ese look evidente que  
hace proposiciones indecentes   
es un cuerpo de cuerda que se agita 
traduciendo fuego interior que no siente  
dientes se clavan en sus senos,  
llego el momento de gritar y  
ensayar locura  
apura sus caderas porque  
afuera espero otro cliente  
puede ser un borracho, 
puede ser un demente,  
un tipo elegante,  
o un asesino que vino escondido  
en un cuerpo masculino. 
!Cuantas no van por ese camino! Y  
Entonces La llaman puta,  




They call her whore 
for everyone she is no more  
than a solitary  woman  
enjoying the fact of being pretty 
Crazy woman!  Flesh that invites 
that excites that provokes  
petty  is the job that she falls to 
this roving  girl  
that evident “look” that 
makes indecent proposals 
it’s a wind-up body that agitates 
translating inner fire that isn’t felt 
teeth dig into her breasts, 
the moment to scream and rehearse  
madness arrives  
she hurries her hips because 
outside another client waits 
it could be a drunk, 
it could be a lunatic, 
an elegant guy 
or a murderer who has come dressed up 
in a masculine body. 
How many don’t take this road! 
So for that they call her whore 
[. . .] 
 
obligada a hacer lo que no deseas  
le huyes a la idea ,  
pero la miseria tiene la cara fea  
aunque no se crea , y entonces lo que sea 
te arreglas como puedes  
sales sonando los tacones  
revisando mentalmente  
por si hay otras opciones, pero no 
tu cuerpo asume y  
la llaman puta.           
[. . .] 
forced to do what you don’t want to 
you avoid the idea, 
but misery has an ugly face 
even if you don’t believe it, so whatever 
you fix yourself however you can 
you leave clicking your heals, 
mentally revising 
in case there are other options, but there aren’t  
your body assumes (them) and   
they call her whore 
[. . .] 
 
de pronto estas haciendo fila  
arananado algun empleo  
desesperada pero la jugada esta apretada  
vas una y mil veces y nada 
duermes escuchando el sonido de las puertas 
suddenly you’re getting in line 
scratching for some job 
desperate, but things are tight 
you go a million times and nothing 




que te cierran en la cara  
la sociedad tira el anzuelo y tu  
muerdes la carnada. . .   
 
the doors that are shut in your face 
society throws the hook and you 
bite the bait. . .  
  
 
 The level of Magia’s empathy with the narrative’s protagonist and her position is 
poignant.  The bleak scenario she paints of female sex work is very much one of societal 
victimhood in which women are not only “forced to do what you don’t want to,” but are 
shunned for doing so.  With little other options the body is recognized as these women’s 
only exploitable capital.  In Magia’s understanding of the circumstances, “society throws 
the hook and [they] bite the bait.”  Although in my own academically tinted lens Magia’s 
rendering of female sex workers tends to undervaluate questions of social agency, she is 
in many ways singing against more dominant representations of jinerteras as joy seeking 
materialists whose decisions to engage in sex work stem from positions of moral 
compromise.144  Magia alternatively presents an image of these women as social 
casualties of Cuba’s new economy whom have few others means through which to access 
today’s life-essential dollars.  While at one level her repeated, melancholic refrains to 
Ochún are employed narratively to call upon the orisha’s presence and aid in defense of 
these women, Magia’s personal appeal Ochún additionally marks her own subjectivity as 
a black woman.  As I know Magia she herself is not a practitioner of santería, yet she 
chooses to invoke the female orisha in ritualized Yoruba to spiritually, culturally, and 
racially ground her woman-centered narrative.  Magia’s performative identification with 
                                                 
144 See Chapter Three.   
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both these women and Ochún is therefore rooted in this confluence of gendered and racial 
experience that binds them all in struggle.  
 Through Magia’s tenacious work over the years as one for the most active and 
accomplished of MCs regardless of gender, she has garnered considerable respect from 
practically all in the movement.  While she has increasingly asserted in more powerfully 
confident terms her own voice as a woman over the years, as a member of a male-female 
(sic.) duo she nonetheless continues to be strongly identified within the movement with 
her husband Alexei who makes up the other half of Obsesión.  More recently there has 
been a small but growing number of all female groups and female soloists emerging from 
within Cuban hip hop.  Though a small few have tended to reproduce performance styles 
reminiscent of the sexualized “hoochie chochie”-like characteristics ubiquitous in female 
salsa  performances, most have assumed more assertive, less prescriptively gendered 
kinds of postures in their performance.  
 One more recent expression of ascendant female voices whose emergence has 
posed a radical womanist challenge to the male-centric space of Cuban hip hop is Las 
Krudas.  Las Krudas, or “the raw ones,” are an openly lesbian trio of black, afro-centered 
vegetarian feminist who entered Havana’s hip hop scene in 2001.  Prior to their 
involvement in hip hop, the trio of Peluka and the sisters Pasa and Gaunga had long been 
active in street theater and music performance, most notably as members of a colorful 
performance troupe of stilt walkers who performed regularly in the highly touristed area 
of Havana Vieja where the three reside.   Within a couple months after Las Krudas made 




[We are] a female trio of new hip hop, with a new consciousness, a new 
understanding about the role of women within this movement of hip hop. We classify 
our music as “superground”. So I am here with Peluka and Gaunga fighting, writing, 
and working to have our music heard so to help, to open the mentality and the 




 Pasa’s reference to the trio’s music as “superground” is a play on a term 
“underground” commonly used by raperos to draw a distinction between commercially 
compromised “pop” hip hop which dominants the genre in the U.S. and more “authentic,” 
politically-oriented forms that have remained true to hip hop’s organic socially 
committed roots, hence “underground.”  This terminology has in fact been at the center of 
ideological debates within the movement over the current challenges and future 
directions of Cuban hip hop.  The critical resurfacing questions is whether individual 
artists, if not ultimately the movement itself, will “sell out” their social commitments and 
political convictions to the ever-encroaching commercialism swallowing the Cuban 
everyday.  To remain “underground” for many is to signify one’s resistance to such 
commercially co-optive processes which are seen already having corrupted much of hip 
hop in U.S.  Such positions are therefore explicitly grounded in critiques of capitalism.  
Indeed, raperos are themselves very vocally critical of what they see as the “micky 
micky” tendencies in U.S. commercial hip hop, using the vernacular youth reference to 
Mickey Mouse as a metaphor for the social vacuousness of much of U.S. commercial 
culture.   
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 Pasa’s playful allusion to Las Krudas as “superground,” however, is meant to 
underscore the overt political nature of their feminist-directed intervention within the 
male-dominant culture of Cuban hip hop; an intervention aimed at ‘opening up’ the 
movement’s “mentality and the consciousness.”  Commenting further on the group’s 
inspiration, Pasa continues:  
  
This is my race, this is my color, this is my people. And [yet] the movement greatly 
lacks female representation.  The community is made up of both black women and 
black men. We therefore have to represent black women.  So we’re supporting the 
movement, particularly the women because there are different realities. Some[in the 
movement] may think all is the same, no.  There are different realities, different 
truths, different experiences that women have due to their sex, their gender.  
 
 
 While Pasa and her sister Gaunga’s black identification might appear more 
obvious given their dark-complected skin and phonotypical features which 
unquestionably mark them as “negra,” Peluka with her very light brown skin and 
reddish-color hair would by contrast most likely be racialized as jabao or trigeña within 
Cuba’s racial classification system.145  In my eye Peluka’s facial features subtlety suggest 
the possibility of some Asian descent stemming most likely from Cuba’s history of 
Chinese indentured labor whom immigrated to the island in the later half of the 19th 
century.  Significantly however, Peluka – like many lighter-skinned male MCs 
embracements of blackness – largely self-identifies in a political sense as a black woman.
 Referring more directly to Pasa’s concern regarding the lack of black women’s 
                                                 
145 The terms jabao and trigeño/a  are somewhat similar in phenotypic discretion to the 
expressions “red-bone” or “meriny” used historically by Africa Americans in the U.S. South to 
refer to lighter skinned folks with reddish hues.   
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representation within Cuban hip hop, her comments recalls in many ways similar 
critiques leveled by U.S. black feminist of the male-centered leadership and character of 
black liberation movements of the 1960 and 70s.  By foregrounding the particularities of 
black female subjectivity though the differentiated ways in which racial oppression is 
gendered, Pasa like black feminist before her challenges the notion of a unified black 
subject (i.e. masculine) of struggle upon which the male-focused Cuban hip hop 
movement is largely predicated.  In keeping, a central concern that Las Krudas articulate 
though both their music and their personal engagements within Havana’s hip hop 
community is the pervasiveness of machismo within the movement and broader Cuban 
society.  As Pasa again explains:  “I feel that it is an impossibility to talk about racism 
without talking about machismo. [In the past] machismo was a phase of slavery. 
Understand?  It’s also a form of racism. And so our temas talk about these things.”  By 
asserting a black lesbian feminist subjectivity within the movement’s otherwise 
masculinist hetero-normativity, Las Krudas’ intervention resonates in many ways with 
those articulated in the U.S. by the black lesbian feminist Combahee River Collective of 
the 1970s and 80s.  Excepts of the Collectives’s 1986 statement reads:  
 
Our politics evolve from a healthy love for ourselves, our sisters and our community 
which allows us to continue our struggle and work. This focusing upon our own 
oppression is embodied in the concept of identity politics. . . [T]he most profound and 
potentially most radical politics come directly out of our own identity. . .  Although 
we are feminists and Lesbians, we feel solidarity with progressive Black men and do 
not advocate the fractionalization that white women who are separatists demand. . . 
We struggle together with Black men against racism, while we also struggle with 





 The trio’s very choice of name is very much reflective of this kind of feminist-
based assertion through the politics of identity.  On an immediate level as they described 
it, Las Krudas – again a feminine-signified “raw ones” – was chosen to signify the 
group’s adherence to vegetarianism (i.e. raw food) which they understand as an important 
part of their collective alterity as female artists.  At the same time the women refer to the 
unadulterated, female “rawness” they and their lyrics represent; a rawness that refuses to 
conform to patriarchal gendered prescriptions of Cuban women as passive, male-gaze 
oriented objects. Again Pasa:  
 
I think we also call ourselves La Krudas because our image is a bit difficult to qualify 
under established classifications. Within the culture of hip hop it seems that our 
image is very powerful. Because in reality women that I have seen tend to be delicate, 
very refined, passive. Women for men, as usual. Understand? So we are another type 
of thing. We are not nicky, chicky or micky. 
 
 
 Indeed, Las Krudas with their dreadlocks, full-figured bodies, in-your-face 
feminist lyrics, and unorthodox performance style clearly represent radical departures 
from both conventional Cuban images of feminine beauty as well as the standard 
masculinist hip hop fair.  As Peluka recalls, the group’s initial performances were greeted 
by raperos and accompanying audiences with silent, wide open mouths and eyes.  Among 
male MCs I knew there clearly was an initial coolness to the trio when they first hit the 
scene.  When I asked a prominent MC early on what he thought about Las Krudas, I 
recall him commenting to the effect “no tienen ningún tipo de floow,” or “they don’t have 
any type ‘flow’” referencing the all important verbal dexterity or “flow” raperos exhibit 
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in performance.  I found it interesting that rather than referencing the lyric content of 
their music, critical attention was paid in a dismissive manner to Las Krudas “skills” as 
raperas.  There was, however, no getting around the highly provocative, feminist 
orientation of the trio’s music.  One of Las Krudas signature temas, for instance, entitled 
“Tema Dedicación” (“Dedication Song”) reads as something of a black feminist critique 
of gendered oppression as it manifests today in Cuba.  The tema opens as follows:  
 
Tema Dedicación  
Las Krudas  
 
Cantarte, Tema dedicación  
Dedicado a todas las mujeres del mundo  
A todas las mujeres que como nosotras 
estan luchando 
Atodas las guerreras campesinas urbanas 
A todas las hermanas 
Especialmente a las más negras 
Especialmente a las más pobres  
Especialmente a las más gordas 
Soy yo, paz en sí 
Nunca nadie te hablo así 
Nunca aquí 
Me fuí... me fuí... me fuí... 
Chata, me cantas 
Juguemos nuestro papel en nuestro tiempo 
Artificios de risas y postizos son 
Continuación del cuento colonialista 
No te cojas pa´ eso 
Deja esa falsa vista 
Tienes talento y pregunto 
Hasta cuándo seremos esta poca cantidad 
En Tarima? 
Maldita y machista sociedad que contamina
No hay racismo? 
Y, coño, 
Y nosotras qué punto? en el mismo escalón
No hay verdadera revolución sin mujeres 





Sing, Dedication song 
Dedicated to all the women in the world 
To all the women like us, who 
are fighting 
To all the urban peasant guerrilla women 
To all the sisters 
Especially to the most Black 
Especially to the most poor 
Especially to the most fat 
I am, peace itself 
Never anybody talked to you like this 
Never here 
I left… I left… I left  
Small one, sing to me 
Let’s play our role in our time 
Fake laughs and implants are 
a continuation of the colonialist tale 
Don’t buy it 
Move away from that false point of view 
You are talented and I ask 
Until when we will be this little number 
In Tarima? 
Wicked and macho society that corrupts 
Is there no racism? 
And, shit, 
what about us? Still on the same step 
There is no real revolution without women 
It is not laziness 
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Como mujeres imperfectas 
Yo tambien como tú he hecho cosas mezquina
Yo tambien como tú he fregado por dos 
pesos que sonaban en cualquier esquina 
Yo tambien como tu he sido forzada y 
llevada sin mi voluntad a fornicación 
Y aún seguimos siendo objeto de valorización 
que nos queda? 
Prostitución, seducción 
Esto es sólo una costumbre de edad para 
Ayudar a nuestras gente económicamente  
En este mundo tan material 
No somos nalgas y pechos solamente 
Tenemos cerebro, mujer 




Like imperfect women 
I like you have also done nasty things 
I like you have paced the street corners for  
the clinging of two pesos 
Me like you have been forced and 
 taken against my will to fornicate  
And still we are objects of valorization 
What is left for us? 
Prostitution, seduction 
This is only a tradition of our times 
to help our people economically  
In this very material world 
We are not only breasts and ass 
We have brains, woman 
Feel, feel. . . 
 
 
 The song begins with a celebratory homage to a universalist notion of women’s 
struggle within which the trio politically situate themselves.   Promptly, however, a self-
referential identification is claimed particularly with those women black, poor, and yes, 
fat.  Here lies a central critique of the song’s text; the patriarchal objectification and 
disciplinary conditioning – in Foucauldian sense – of (black) Cuban female bodies and 
subjectivity (Foucault 1977).  Referent suggestions to the ways Cuban women conform 
both behaviorally and bodily to the dictates of a hetero-normative male gaze in particular 
recall Judith Butler’s writings on the performative hetero-normativization of female 
subjectivity (Butler 1990, 1993).  The refrain “Fake laughs and implants are a 
continuation of the colonialist tale/Don’t buy it” alludes directly to such disciplinary 
effects on women.  Implying historical linkages between these practices and colonialism, 
moreover, historicizes the duality of female oppression and liberation within broader anti-
colonial/anti-imperialist struggles upon which the Cuban national and Revolutionary 
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narratives are themselves based.  They in turn call for a resistance, a ‘moving away’ from 
such self-objectifying gender/ed conformity.  Within this “wicked and machista society,” 
they rhetorically ask, “is there is no racism?” While the answer is clearly yes, they are 
most concerned with the intersection of racism and sexism – as well as  hetero-
normativity – particular to black women’s experience and subjectivity.  Here, claims of 
“Revolution” are empty without the critical recognition and participation of (black) 
women and their struggles within broader revolutionary struggle.  
 “Tema Dedicación” ultimately centers on the experience of female sex workers as 
an acute manifestation of the racialized sexual objectification of black Cuban women and 
their bodies.  Possibly more directly so then Magia’s “La Llaman Puta,” Las Krudas’ 
level of empathetic identification with these women and their circumstances is grounded 
in their narrative through the first person: “I like you have paced the street corners for the 
clinging of two pesos/I like you have been forced and taken against my will to fornicate.”  
For Las Krudas such are the conditions in which (black) women find themselves today, 
where male-focused female sexuality is once again viewed as a key if not sole source of 
exploitable capital.  “What is left for us?,” they ask, “[t]his is the only tradition of our 
times/To help our people economically in this very material world.”  Moving away from 
such externally-produced, materially-directed interpolations of black women’s bodies, 
black female self-redemption lies in the recognition that “We are not only breast and 
ass,” but in fact, “We have brains.” Rather then be a material object for male-centered 




Black Radical Challenges, La Apertura, and The State 
 
 I have to this point provided illustration of the ways black and brown-skinned 
Cuban youth are negotiating new critically-positioned kinds of black subjectivity and 
identity through the performative space of Cuban hip hop.  The political nature of such 
self-constituting processes, I have argued, lies first and foremost in the highly politicized 
context of their making.  Not only do these negotiations occur at the power-infused 
intersection of racializing forces and efforts at race-based self-making, but importantly 
there are overt, self-consciously political meanings deeply implicated in the ways these 
young people chose to define themselves as black.  At the same time such identities of 
blackness are realized in their most tangible and active of forms through the ways in 
which they are enacted through their performance.  To “be” black in this context is to 
“act” as such not simply in the dramaturgic sense, but rather in the political sense of 
moving or acting consciously from critically positioned kinds of black identity.  For 
raperos/as, the political enactment of black-self is ultimately exercised through lyric 
voicings of race-based social critique.146  Beyond the immediate circumstances of their 
making, however, what kinds of broader impacts might these black political engagements 
be affecting within the larger Cuban social context?  What, moreover, in a more 
comprehensive sense has been the Cuban state’s own response to Cuban hip hop and its 
new identity-based politics of race?    
                                                 
146  I have up to now generally used the male-signified term “rapero” to refer to Cuban MCs in 
reference to the largely masculinist character of this population.  Here, however, I use the term 
“rapero/a” to mark what I have now more distinctly defined as the gendered specificity of male 
and female subjectivity within Cuban hip hop.  
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 In an immediate sense, the ways that raperos/as are actively (re)articulating their 
blackness in and of itself poses challenges to Cuba’s historical configurations of race and 
nation so central to past and present nationalist projects.  Returning to the non-racial 
nationalist foundations of Martí and Maceo as they have been dominantly framed, any 
assertion of black identity with the slightest of political implication have tended to be 
viewed as counter-national in their perceived foregrounding of “race” over “nation” 
(Helg 1995; Ferrer 1998a, 1999; de la Fuente 2001).  Such race-based assertions in turn, 
as discussed on Chapter 2, often carried with them very real political consequences in 
both pre- and post-1959 Cuba.  The state-sponsored massacre of the leadership and 
followers of el Partito Independiente de Color in 1912 is but the most grievous 
illustration of such stakes.  Here, black political demands for full citizenship as Cubans 
predicated on the promise of a racially egalitarian Republic were viewed as tantamount to 
“race warfare,” and were thus met with the full, unbridled violence of the state.  One need 
not look at the direct allusions made by Anónimo Consejo to recognize that today’s 
raperos/as are making similar kinds of claims on the nation.  These young people’s calls 
for full participation as “negros/as” within an increasingly racially and socially stratified 
Cuba are similarly shaped by the ideals – if certainly not the reality – of a racially-just 
Cuban Revolution and nation.  In this sense, as Alejandro de la Fuente has suggested in 
other historical moments, while national discourses of non-racialism may have at some 
levels inhibited black political mobilization they may simultaneously open up strategic 
spaces for advancing claims based on the promise of such principles (de la Fuente 1999).  
Much of de la Fuente’s discussion of this tactical distinction is framed within the context 
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of non-racial forms of political organizing in which black Cubans could implicitly make 
such claims without evoking race directly.  The difference in the case of Cuban hip hop, 
however, is that such demands are explicitly racial, directly exposing the present-day 
contradictions of national non-racialism as they are live.  
 On yet another level, the black identity politics posed by Cuban MCs implicitly 
contest dominant representations of blackness as they have been historically configured 
within the nationalist troupe of “folklore.”  As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the framing 
of Afro-Cuban expressive culture within notions of folklore has tended to fix black 
Cubans within prescriptive, nationally-bound constructions of a racially transculturated 
(i.e. race-neutralized) Cuban national patrimony.  Within these discursive parameters 
blackness, if recognized at all, is viewed as a “traditional” cultural holdover from an 
earlier historical moment, and therefore autochthonously rooted within Cuba’s mestizaje-
ed national past.147   Such logics have the effect of freezing Afro-Cuban cultural 
production within static, politically-neutralizing terms of non-racialism, while at the same 
time ultimately precluding the existence of autonomous expressions of black subjectivity 
outside such restrictive historical parameters.   
 Raperos/as production of self-consciously modern, nationally-expansive 
expressions of black Cuban identity in many ways represent an historical rupture of 
Cuba’s nationalizing meta-narrative of race.  It is important to note that there have long 
been examples of transnational dialogue between black Cubans and other Afrodiasporic 
                                                 
147 Isar Godreau (2002) has argued that blackness in Puerto Rico has undergone a similar 
historical folklorization regarding the ways Puerto Rican blacks are effectively relegated by 




locations though which political affiliations and identifications were forged (Brock et al. 
1998; Childs 2001; Guridy 2003).  Cuban hip hop represents a most recent expression of 
such black transnational engagement; one that both reflects and responds to the specific 
social, cultural, and economic imperatives of this particular historical moment in Cuba.  
While black Cubans and their “culture” are by their very historical condition rooted in 
that of modernity (Palmie 2002; see also Du Bois [1903]; Gilroy 1993a; Hanchard 1999), 
the kinds of black identity and cultural production engendered by Cuban MCs are 
explicitly modern, or more accurately post-modern in their political and cultural 
sensibility. 148  Cuban hip hop’s  assertion of a critical black difference contests in both 
form (identity) and function (lyric-based critique) the utopic, modernist claims of national 
racelessness which would seek to silence and politically neutralize social difference for 
the greater “Cuban” national and Revolutionary good.  In this sense raperos/as identity-
based interventions are very much an assertion of what Cornell West prudently dubbed a 
“new cultural politics of difference” in their deployment of blackness a liberatory-
directed mode of social praxis (West 1990).    
 In seeking to historically ground both identity and racial struggle through the 
recuperation of an autonomous black subject of Cuban history, Cuban MCs moreover 
disrupt de-politicizing narratives that have attempted erase blackness as an historicized 
space of social agency.  At the same time, however, such identity and corresponding 
race-based political articulations are not themselves beholden to nationally circumscribed 
                                                 
148 See additional Chapter One for a discussion of the ways in which the “black” identities, 
subjectivities, and related forms of racial politics fashioned though the global space of hip hop are 




historical frameworks.  They are both spatially and temporally transcendent of such fixed, 
meta-narrativistic historiography.  In these ways Cuban hip hop signifies a boisterous, 
unapologetic post-modern(esk) break from dominant racialized – if not racist – 
configurations of blackness as an ahistorical, politically-neutralized “object” of national 
consumption.  Rather, the racial politics advanced by these youth are directed towards the 
assertion of blackness as paradigm for the making of critically engaged “subjects” (i.e. 
agents) of history.  But again, how are such interventions being received beyond the 
immediate social context of hip hop?  
 It is unquestionable that the politicized character of black identity and race-based 
social critique voiced within Cuban hip hop has been instrumental in pushing critical 
discussions of race into otherwise tightly controlled realms of Cuban public discourse.  
Never has there been in the history of revolutionary Cuba anything akin to an 
autonomous space that has engendered the level of open, racially-positioned critique and 
antiracist advocacy as Cuban hip hop is currently provoking.  Where else in Cuba today 
can one gather publicly before anywhere from one-hundred to three-thousand black folks 
and engaged in relatively opening critique of systematic racial exclusion let along 
racially-directed police harassment?  The widely popular dance music genre of Cuban 
timba of which the majority of performers are black and darker-skin certainly presents an 
alternative contemporary space of black-derived social contestation through popular 
cultural performance (Hernandez-Reguant 2004).  While timba is without question  
an important component of an expanding space of race-based social expression – one 
which is very much in dialogic relationship with Cuban hip hop – it does not articulate 
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the same kinds of overt sets racial politics and critique that hip hop has managed to 
produce.  Cuban hip hop in this capacity is in many ways operating as an vangardist site 
of racial articulation in Cuba today.  It is even reported that Cuban hip hop lyrics are 
being analyzed in college courses at the University of Havana – the bastion of Cuban 
intellectual production – as sources of contemporary social commentary on Cuban 
society.  
 I suggest in fact that the Cuban hip hop movement is emerging as a key player in 
an evolving black public sphere predicated on the assertion of contemporary black 
political difference within a previously configured non-racial Cuban national imaginary.  
I speak here of a black public sphere in the sense that Michael Dawson, building on 
Nancy Fraser, refers to a black “counter public” in the U.S. to delineate its subaltern 
position vis-à-vis the dominant, hegemonically-constituted broader public sphere in the 
U.S. (Dawson 1995).  Dawson distinguishes this alternative black “counter public” from 
that of Habermas’ bourgeois concept of the public sphere as one predicated on formal 
institutional structures (e.g. media, the academy, organizational forms, etc.).  Indeed, in 
the same collection Michael Hanchard suggest in the context of Brazil’s Movimento 
Negro that Afro-Brazilians utilized the space of cultural production in fashioning an 
“alternative” black public sphere were “culture” becomes “an organizing principle 
against racial oppression, and as [a medium] for constructing and enacting Afro-Brazilian 
identities” (Hanchard 1995:186).  In this formulation the interconstitutive relationships 
forged between new, performatively-centered spaces of cultural production (i.e. Afro-
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Brazilian blocos afros) and identity provide frames of social praxis towards advancing 
race-based political claims and social organization.   
 Though its voicings of a new racial politics of Cuban blackness, I maintain that 
Cuban hip hop is operating in a similar fashion in the opening up an alternative public 
space of black political articulation where identity serves as the grounds for maneuver.  
One expression of this new political opening is illustrated in the growing attention that an 
older generation of established black intellectuals have begun to pay Cuban hip hop and 
the challenges it is posing.  In addition to Tomás Fernández Robaina who, coming out of 
his experience with raperos/as in his class “El Negro en Cuba” has engaged in scholarly 
commentary on the black racial politics of Cuban hip hop (Fernández Robaina 2002), 
there are a number of other influential black intellectuals who are increasingly engaging 
with raperos/as and their music.  For her part filmmaker Gloria Rolando has interviewed 
and filmed Anónimo Consejo in relationship to their tema “Afro-Cubano” in 
development of one of her recent documentary projects on the 1912 massacre of  el 
Partido Independiente de Color.149  Two other engaged intellectuals on the periphery of 
Cuban hip hop are Roberto Zurbano, a poet and vice-president of UNEAC’s literary 
section, and Gisela Arandia, a prominent researcher and journalistically-trained scholar 
on contemporary black issues who is also based out of UNEAC.150  The two have for 
                                                 
149 In developing this project Gloria Rolando has been working with Swiss historian Aline Helg 
who’s work “Our Rightful Share” (1995) of the Partido Independiente de Color has recently been 
issued in a Spanish translation addition in Cuba.  
150 Gisela Arandia was the key organizer for the previously mention “Color Cubano” symposium 
held at UNEAC in 2002.    
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example been consistent and often outspoken participants in the preciously mentioned rap 
colloquium held annually during the Cuban hip hop festival.   
 Unlike earlier years when it was not much beyond an informal gathering 
involving a handful of raperos, since 2000 when I first presented the colloquium has 
grown into a multi-day, academically-directed event involving Cubans and foreigners 
focusing on commentary and analysis of Cuban hip hop as a new social phenomenon.  
This shift has largely been a result the increased involvement of state institutions in 
directly supporting and framing hip hop in Cuba.  In this case the hosting institutions 
have been UNEAC and la Museo de la Musica (The Museum of Music) though La 
Asociación Hermanos Saiz has been the primary coordinator of the event a number of 
years running.  These public forums have in fact often produced heated debates around 
issues of race, racism, “blackness,” citizenship, identity, and the role of women as they 
relates to Cuban hip hop.  Its significant to note that with this shift towards more a formal 
academic direction tended to marginalize raperos/as as participants within the 
colloquium.  While they filled the seats of the auditorium listening to others, including 
myself, pontificate about them and their music, they were rarely if ever on the podium 
themselves.  This, however, did not inhibit them from making their voices heard from the 
floor.  Cuban MCs participation in the colloquiums, whether institutionally sanctioned or 
not, contributed a critical component to the tone and scope of the discussions.   
 Ariel for one, who played an active role in organizing a number of colloquiums in 
his official capacity with La Asociación Hermanos Siaz, presented a rather blistering 
critique in 2002 of the racist tendencies exhibited in official tourist-directed print 
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advertising.  Using actual clippings Ariel illustrated both the invisibility of blacks within 
much promotional literature or, when presented, black people were configured in racial 
caricature in was that reprocessed racist, “colonial’ (i.e. “folkloric”) imagery.  During his 
presentation he also offered a handful of Cuban rap lyrics to illustrate the black racial 
character of the movement.  Ariel’s tone was unapologetic and represented something of 
a milestone in that it was the first time in my experience that such an overt proclamation 
of the movement’s black racial orientation was discussed in an open public forum.  It was 
as if Ariel was shattering the official public silence on the question of race vis-à-vis hip 
hop; the taboo subject to which the state itself it is dealings with the movement had yet to 
publicly acknowledge.  In the same breath Ariel firmly challenged any suggestions that 
Cuban MCs and their music were somehow counter-revolutionary in political orientation 
and practice. This contention was meant to address both the assertion black identity as 
well as the race-based social critique articulated by raperos/as.  The first point being that 
one could be both “black” and “revolutionary” – that is the assertion of one’s black 
identity is not in and of itself an anti-revolutionary (i.e. anti-national) act in defiance of 
Cuba’s sacred national racelessness.  At the same time Ariel was also defending the 
position that “constructive” forms of social critique are necessary within revolutionary 
society and processes.  Cuban hip hop, for Ariel, moves from this location.  
 Such discussions produced some interesting exchanges.  At one point a middle-
aged black man from the audience addressed a panel complaining of what he saw as a 
misguided emphasis on the part of raperos/as on racial identity and critiques of racism.  
He suggested that these MCs were merely uncritically reproducing the discourse of U.S. 
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hip hop, and that such concerns were inorganic to Cuba.  His statements did not carry 
much resonance among the present audience, the majority of whom were raperos/as 
themselves, and whom have long defended their “Cubaness” as artists.  Yet on another 
day Seku addressed the colloquium from the floor protesting the fact that young black 
Cuban’s have no sense of a black history of struggle in Cuba.  He complained of how if 
one were to approach black youth in the streets of Havana and ask who were black 
leaders of the past, “who fought for you?”  Many he claimed could not name anyone 
other then possible, in that ambiguous nationalist way, Antonio Maceo.  Astutely, Seku 
followed by suggesting that black youth have to look elsewhere for such “black heroes” 
giving the examples of Malcolm X and Martin Luther King.   
 Again, it is important to note that not only were such politically-charged 
discussions openly taking place in a public forum,151 but the event itself was organized 
and hosted by state institutions.  What I wish to underscore here is that though these new 
critical black openings were largely engendered by the on-going growth and efforts the 
Cuban hip hop movement, the Cuban state itself played a role in a cautious ‘opening up’ 
of public space for just this kind of critical discussion.  And to the extent to which Cuban 
hip hop is contributing to the development of an alternative space of black political 
articulation, it is one which is emerging through the Cuban state’s own negotiations of a 
shifting sociopolitical landscape of which it too is a compelled participant.  
  
                                                 
151 Though granted the packed auditorium probably held no more than two hundred people 
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 Returning to the context of the colloquium, another increasingly active player in 
recent years has been a small group of young black intellectuals many of whom first 
came into contact with raperos/as while attending Tomás’ class in 2002.  This new 
generation of young thinkers and cultural producers have come to share with their 
rapero/a peers a more radical political and racial orientation in comparison to their 
predecessors.  One such individual of this new hip hop-engaged generation of black 
intellectuals is Yesenia Selier Crespo, a thirty-something, social psychology-trained 
researcher at Havana’s Centro Juan Marinello.  Yesenia’s work has centered on the 
problematics of race and racial identity in Cuba with a focus on racial attitudes among 
black, mestizo (mixed-race in Cuban terms), and white Cubans.  Committed to advancing 
antiracist struggle, a key critique in her work relates to what she sees as a lack of an 
historical memory of race on the part of black Cubans and the broader Cuban national 
imaginary as a whole.  She has suggested such silences and gaps are not accidental, but 
rather have been actively and intentional produced through hegemonic national discourse 
(Selier Crespo 2002) – an analysis echoed in this dissertation.  Yesenia has recently 
found fertile creative and intellectual ground for her research in Cuban hip hop and had 
recently taken on the movement’s racial identity politics as central site of investigation.  
Rather than detached researcher, Yesenia’s engagements with Havana’s hip hop 
community has ranged from co-authoring an article with Pablo Herrera on Cuban hip hop 
for the prestigious Casa de Las Americas to performing poetry alongside a collection of 
female MCs during a hip hop show.  Currently, Yesenia is in the New York area on a 
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research grant through which she has continued to write on Cuban hip hop and other 
themes relating to contemporary racial dynamics in Cuba.  
 One additional individual in need of brief mention who is also in a broader scene 
part of this new hip hop-conversant generation of young black intellectuals is artist 
Roberto Diago Durruthy otherwise known as Diago.152   As an exceptionally successful 
young Cuban artists his early thirties, Diago has had dozens of exhibitions of his work 
since the mid-1990s in both Cuba and aboard.  Infused with social critique, much of his 
paintings deal provocatively with contemporary themes of race, racial identity, and 
racism often mixing Afro-Cuban religious symbolism with racially-charged text in a 
stylistic form reminiscent for some of the work of Jean-Michel Basquiat (Mateo 2003).  
My first experience with Diago was in Tomás’ class where he was often a rigorous 
participant in discussions.  Like Yesenia and others, moreover, it was in Tomás’ class 
that Diago first came into dialogue with raperos/as.  Though it never materialized, there 
was brief talk at one point between he, raperos/as and other class participants in 
organizing a collaborative presentation around the course’s racial thematics.  When later 
interviewed by a Cuban journalist concerning the centrality of racial critique in his work 
– which was suggested was exemplary of a new generation of black intellectuals – Diago 
responded by drawing parallels between himself and raperos/as regarding the “carga 
agresiva” (“aggressive change”) that characterizes the kinds of “in your face” challenges 
and black self-assertions present in both spaces of artistic production (Mateo 2003).    
                                                 
152 Diago is the grandson of the pioneering black Cuban artists Roberto Diago (1920-1957) from 
whom he takes his name. The elder Diago also broadly exhibited his work internationally as well 
as domestically.  
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 At the same time Diago has become something of a celebrated son of Cuba’s new 
openness to overtly “black” forms artistic and cultural expression.  The artist for instance 
had a highly coveted solo show at Havana’s new Museo Bellas Artes in 2002.  During the 
exposition a well attended symposium was held on his work and its racial thematics.  A 
collection of high-profile black intellectuals assembled to participate including Rogelio 
Martínez Furé and celebrated Afro-Cuban poet Nancy Morejon.  The symposium was 
officiated by Cuba’s iconoclastic Minister of Culture Abel Prieto whom has emerged 
today as one of the most influential of a new generation of Cuba’s leadership and 
institutionally-groomed intelligentsia.153  Significantly, Prieto has been a long-standing 
advocate for an openness within the Revolution to more plural and anti-dogmatic forms 
of contemporary cultural production in Cuba (Davies 2000).  Within his capacity as 
Minister of Culture Prieto has been an instrumental agent in the shift within the Cuban 
state to more “responsive” approaches to cultural production and industry within an 
increasingly commercialized national landscape.  Though in Havana at the time, I 
unfortunately was not present at the mentioned colloquium organized around Diago’s 
work.  I was, however, informed by a few who did attend that ensuing discussions around 
the heretofore sensitive themes of race and racial expression in art and cultural practice 
were quite involved.  From accounts there were also some engaged exchanges around the 
nature and extent to which the state and its institutions have been receptive, or not, to 
such expression, as well as calls for greater openings for dialogue in the arts and culture 
on questions of race.  
                                                 
153 A published poet himself, Prieto was president of UNEA between 1991 and 1997.  
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 At one level the evolution of the hip hop colloquium and Diago’s exposition are 
in part expressions of the previously mentioned opening or “aperture” taking place place 
in Cuba by the mid-1990s to more critical kinds of public discussions around racial 
themes.  Many commentators in both Cuba and abroad cite the 1986 Third Congress of 
the Communist Party of Cuba as something of a watershed event in this regard 
(Fernández 2001; de la Fuente 2001).154  It was during the Third Congress that the Cuban 
leadership set in motion the national Rectification Campaign aimed at haltering what was 
perceived as Cuba’s diversion from socialism following a series of economic reforms 
initiated in the 1970s and 1980s.  In the Congress’s closing speech Fidel Castro 
acknowledged that racism and racial discrimination had in fact not been eliminated, 
pointing out in particular scarcity of blacks as well as women and youth within the ranks 
of the party’s leadership.  Following, he challenged the political structures, institutions, 
and Cuban society as a whole to address the issue of exclusion; the immediate result of 
which was a two-fold increase of blacks and mulatos in the Party’s Central Committee 
(de la Fuente 2001:313) following a purge of older committee members (Moore 1988; 
Dilla Alfonso 2002).155 
 Castro’s statements signified something of a re-opening of public discussion on 
the topics of race and racism after their long silencing following the 1962 Second 
Declaration of Havana proclaiming racial discrimination eliminated in revolutionary 
                                                 
154 Such was also conferred me in private conversations by Roberto Zurbano and Tomas 
Fernández Robaina.  
155 Carlos Moore, however, asserts that significant numbers of those purged were an older 
generation black committee members, and hence suggest that the move was an effort in part to 
eliminate an older guard of influential black politicos.   
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Cuba.156  As is often the case Castro’s speeches set the official tone on issues upon which 
other government figures, state institutions, the press, and the intellectual community 
itself take its cues in terms of the direction of public discourse on such issues.  The 
Party’s Fifth Congress in 1997 similarly drew attention to the continued absence of 
blacks, women, and youth in the party’s ranks, raising the question once again concerning 
the persistence of racial exclusion (along with gendered and age-based forms) within 
Cuba’s political and social structures (Pérez Sarduy and Stubbs 2000).  Separated by a 
decade, the historical situatedness of these two declarations were distinct in that the 
second was set against the backdrop of Cuba’s recent social transformations following 
the early 1990s crisis of the Special Period.   
 Nadine Fernández has examined what she identifies as an important shift in the 
1990s within Cuba’s popular press and academic circles regarding the terms of public 
debate around the problematics of race (Fernández 2001).  Fernández suggests that the 
earlier part of the 1990s saw cautious moves among some journalist and academics 
towards addressing the persistence of racism Cuba.  The ways in which such discussions 
were framed, she asserts however, kept within official party lines of discourse on the 
topic.  Fernández points out that between 1996 and 1997 an important break occurred in 
which more critical kinds of debate began being aired in a small but significant range of 
popular and academic writing, many of authors of whom were black.  These writings 
                                                 
156 See Chapter 2.  
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tended to moved away from the normalized rhetoric of institutional vs. individual racism 
as well as the notion of racism as a static historical holdover from the past.157   
 In discussing the factors that may have contributed to this new critical impetus 
with within the academic sphere, Fernández suggest that Cuban scholarly engagements 
with North American peers at conferences like the Latin American Studies Association 
(LASA) and, I am sure, the growing numbers of North American researchers in Cuba 
itself encouraged broader, possibly more critical frames of academic analysis with regard 
to race.  She points out, however, that according to at least one account the Cuban state 
gave a group researchers headed to LASA’s 1992 conference a green light to engage in 
open debate on Cuba’s racial dynamics while in the U.S. (Fernández 2001:128).158  
Fernández’s account suggest once again that the Cuban leadership played a role in 
initiating this new 
apertura in the 1990s for more public discussion of the previously taboo subject of race.    
 It is important to recognize that such developments occurred within a broader 
general context of a greater openness on the part of the Cuban state in the 1990s to a 
wider range of social expression (Dilla Alfonso 2002; Hernandez Rodriguez 2003).  The 
Cuban government’s relatively more receptive approach to homosexuality, long viewed 
as socially deviant from the revolutionary national course and broadly repressed as such 
(Arenas 1993; Lumsden 1996), is one particularly poignant example of such recent 
                                                 
157 See discussion in Chapter 2.  
158 The researcher in question who gave this account was Thomas Fernández Robaina.  
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openings (Bejel 2001).159   With regard to the question of race, however, it is 
unquestionable that the surfacing of a new set racial imperatives tied to Cuba’s shifting 
socioeconomic landscape of the 1990s necessitated critical kinds of responses on the part 
of both black Cubans – including, but certainly not limited to academics – and the Cuban 
state itself.   Concerning the revolutionary leadership’s initial broaching of the topic of 
racism in the first years of the Revolution, black intellectuals were key in instigating and 
pushing the terms of public debate (de la Fuente 2001).  Within the current context, I 
suggest that a similar process is taking place in which Cuban hip hop has emerged as an 
important social actor in the (re)opening of critical dialogue on race and blackness.  Here, 
the negotiated play thus occurs between hip hop as an emergent social space of racial 
articulation in both form (racial subjectivity) and function (race-based critique), and the 
Cuban state in its efforts to manage the terms of such articulation amidst the rapidly 
evolving social complexities that define Cuba today.  But what more specifically are the 
contours of such negotiations?  
 Throughout my treatment of Cuban hip hop I have underscored the ongoing role 
the Cuban state has played vis-à-vis hip hop’s emergence and development as a 
sociocultural phenomenon.  From alternately enabling and restricting accesses to U.S. 
popular music to consenting to a limited opening of space and resources during the 
phenomenon’s evolution from la moña to hip hop Cubano, the state’s earlier 
engagements were characterized by one of cautious tolerance.  An important shift 
                                                 
159 Widely screened in Cuba, Tomás Gutiérrez Alea’s critically acclaimed 1994 film Fresa y 
chocolate (Strawberry and Chocolate), with its central portrayal of a homosexual man with strong 




occurred in 1999.  In May of that year Abel Prieto, the previously mentioned Cuban 
Minister of Culture, held a meeting with representatives of both rapero and rockero160 
communities in Havana where he expressed the state’s recognition of rap and rock music 
as legitimate forms of Cuban cultural expression.  In a public ceremony held the 
following June, Prieto declared: “We have to support our Cuban rappers because this is 
the next generation of Cubans and they are saying some powerful things with this art.  I 
am responsible for giving this generation the freedom to claim their power culturally” 
(Hock 1999:194).  Prior to this moment as discussed earlier, the Cuban state officially 
regarded hip hop as an inorganic expression of U.S. capitalist culture with implied 
‘ideologically diversionary’ tendencies.161  From this point on, however, the Cuban state 
took a much more active interest in Cuban hip hop with the Ministry of Culture under the 
direction of Abel Prieto serving as the central coordinator in promoting efforts to 
institutionalize hip hop within the frame of Cuban revolutionary culture.  
 As mentioned, La Asociación Hermanos Siaz (AHS)162 took the early lead as the 
state institution most directly involved in Cuban hip hop.  The increasingly active role 
AHS assumed in successive Cuban hip hop festivals is a poignant illustration of the 
state’s expanding institutional engagement with the movement since 1999.  Though AHS 
was the official institutional home for Grupo Uno, the collective headed by Rodolfo 
Rensoli which  launched the first Cuban hip hop festival 1995 ran the first five years of 
                                                 
160 The self-styled term rockero refers to members of Cuba’s rock movement.  Within the Cuban 
racial paradigm, and in notable contrast to raperos, the majority of rockeros are drawn from the 
ranks of “white” youth.  
161 See Chapter 4.  
162 The cultural arm of the Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas (UJC) (Union of Young Communists) 
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the festival with nominal material support from state institutions including AHS.  While 
the 2000 festival saw a significant ratcheting up of AHS’s direct involvement in the 
festival, but 2001 La Asociación took full control of the festival’s coordination leaving 
Rensoli and others of Grupo Uno completely out of the fold.   
 The new public face of the festival was put on display during a high-profile press 
conference held in a swanky lounge bar atop the Teatro Nacional (National Theater).  On 
the podium along with Pablo and Ariel book-ending the table were a couple of 
institutional figures including AHS’s vice-president Fernando Leon Jacomino.  As La 
Asociación’s key contact with Havana’s hip hop community Jacomino, as he was known 
to all, had established a fairly respectable reputation among raperos/as by this point.  His 
easygoing, good-natured affect certainly facilitated his acceptance among many.  Fairly 
quickly, however, Jacomino disappeared  from the scene as the state’s central 
institutional liaison with Cuban hip hop.  This role was filled by Alpidio Alonso, AHS’s 
new national president who had recently transferred to Havana from Santa Clara to take 
up his appointment.163  The shifting of responsibility from the vice to presidential rank of 
La Asociación’s institutional hierarchy represented a further ratcheting up of the Cuban 
state’s engagement with the movement.  Assuming this role with a direct, fairly 
aggressive hands-on approach, Alpidio was eventually able to establish a range of 
working relationships within Havana’s hip hop community over the following years.  
Most of these relationship, however, were clearly not without their tensions and 
ambivalences.  
                                                 
163 Santa Clara is the regional capital of the island’s central province of Villa Clara.  
 
 287
 When asked about the evolving role of the state vis-à-vis Cuban hip hop, Alpidio 
explained to me that as he understood it the responsibility of AHS was to help 
incorporate raperos and their work within institutional structures as a means of supporting 
and channeling their creative energy more directly within the Revolution.  In outlining 
such, he spoke of raperos as among  “la vaguada” (“the vanguard”) of the Revolution; 
holding that hip hop was in many ways “en frente los instituciones” (“in front of the 
institutions”) in terms of their social vision (and critiques) of what is occurring in Cuba 
today.  As such, he concluded, the institutions – and by extension the state and 
Revolution – then needed to pay attention to what it was raperos and their music were 
saying.  In a similar vein, in response to a Cuban interview’s question in 1994 about 
whether AHS has provided a space for hip hop, Alpedio responded:  
 
Prefiero que esta pregunta se la haga a los mismos raperos. Pero, sí, el rap cubano ha 
encontrado a través de la AHS un espacio para decir, para formar parte de la 
Revolución. Y se difunde un mensaje revolucionario y comprometido porque sus 
textos así lo dicen. 
 
(I would prefer if the question was asked directly to the raperos themselves. But yes, 
Cuban rap has found a space to speak, to form part of the Revolution. And it spreads 




 Despite Alpidio’s expressed concern for not speaking for raperos/as, what became 
apparent with AHS’s increased involvement with Cuban hip hop over the years is that 
that state was clearly working in certain capacities to manage the public face – if not the 
organizational character – of the movement.  The official press conference for the 2002 
                                                 
164 Quoted in Matienzo (2004).  
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hip hop festival is a vivid case in point.  Held in Havana’s International Press Center, a 
small collection of middle aged white men book-ended once again by the younger and 
darker Pablo and Ariel, sat on the stage before a packed audience. At center was Alpidio 
himself directing the conference while Pablo and Ariel sat less so as active participants 
than window-dressing.  For their part, the dozen or so MCs who actually showed up for 
their “own” press conference were lined up along the back wall completely opposite – 
both in location and “hue” – to those on stage listening along rather disinterestedly.  The 
scope of this disconnect was echoed in a remark Pablo later made about how telling it 
was to see this one older bearded white man from the AHS at the table listing the various 
U.S. artists who were planning on participating in the festival and had no idea how to 
pronounce their names.  Pablo’s implication was that this gentleman was clueless about 
hip hop yet he was one of the institutional “authorities” presenting on behalf of the 
movement.  Such was in keeping with the paternalistic tone which presided over much of 
the press conference.  Here, the message conveyed by Alpidio and company was one to 
the effect that these were “our” Cuban youth – as silent/silenced as they were – and that 
they, the state, was here to provide.   Following the press conference another well 
positioned individual within the movement put it this way: “black music, white people, 
the same old story.”   
 In line with such paternalistic framing that would deny autonomous voice and 
subjectivity to Cuban MCs, conspicuously absent from the press conference was any 
mention of race.  Such omissions has in fact become standard practice in practically all 
publicly disseminated discourses on hip hop by the Cuban state and its institutions.  The 
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incorporative discourse of “our youth,” for instance, is often strategically deployed in 
state pronouncements in avoidance of any public acknowledgement, let along discussion 
of the black racial significance of the movement.  In the context of the press conference 
such an omission was all too apparent given the blatant racial divided between the white 
men on stage and the black, mostly male raperos standing removed in the rear.  One 
public space in which critical kinds of discussion has occurred, as mentioned earlier, was 
in the hip hop colloquium.  While this space was cautiously opened up by the state, it was 
raperos/as and others themselves whom exploited the opening in pushing the dialogue 
into new terrain.  And while Ariel has played a key role within the state’s broader 
institutionalizing effort, at the same time it was he who first challenged the official public 
silence on race vis-à-vis hip hop in the 2002 colloquium.  It is further notable that Sekuo, 
after critiquing what was tantamount to the historical erasure of black political figures 
from Cuba’s national narrative during the same colloquium, was seen being pulled aide 
by Alpidio and reprimanded from his failure to appreciate his Cuban heritage. How could 
he, Alpidio protested, forget about Martí and his non-racial legacy.   
 The state’s institutional ante vis-à-vis Cuban hip hop was raised a considerable 
notch with the establishment of La Agencia de Rap (The Rap Agency) under the Ministry 
of Culture in late 2002.   La Agencia took on the responsibility of representing a select 
group of hand-picked rap groups with whom it coordinated performance activities such 
concerts and tours.  It was generally understood that a key criteria used in choosing this 
handful of artists was what was perceived as these group’s commercial viability.  And in 
a couple cases political connectedness seemed to be a contributing factor as well.  
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Appointed to head La Agencia was Susana Garcia, a black women in her late-thirties to 
early-forties who had previously worked in an institutional research capacity on the 
theme of blacks in Cuban literature.  Though it seemed clear to all that her blackness was 
seen by the Ministry of Culture as a political asset, many commented that she had no 
background in music administration let alone a knowledge of hip hop.  In this light she 
was viewed by many as not much more than a funcionaria; an institutional cog or 
functionary operating uncritically within the larger bureaucratic apparatus.  In a 
conversation I had with her in the summer of 2003 she did not present much that would 
have otherwise dispelled this notion.  
 In describing the objective of La Agencia, Susana explained straight forwardly 
that La Agencia was formed with the objective to promote and commercialize hip hop 
talent within its portfolio.  Such intentions were not necessarily received 
unproblematically by within the hip hop community.  Shortly after its formation one 
particularly well positioned individual in the movement expressed concern to me that La 
Agencia signified the state’s move to position itself to siphon off Cuban hip hop the 
international marketplace.  Similar institutional arrangements had already occurred with 
regard to the ever expanding numbers of Cuban musicians traveling aboard in response to 
the boom in international demand for Cuban music since the 1990s.  In some of these 
scenarios Cuban state was able to garner up to 50% of overseas earnings acquired by 
those musicians and groups traveling abroad (Watrous 1997).  Regarding the new 
institutionalized interest in hip hop, the apprehensive individual above likened such 
moves as tantamount to state attempts to “pimp” Cuban hip hop for commercial profit.  
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Its no doubt that those in decision-making positions were made aware of the commercial 
potential of Cuban hip hop given the international success of Orishas, the previously 
mentioned “Cuban” rap group produced out of France whose premier 1999 album “A Lo 
Cubano” surpassed the gold mark in Europe and sold over 50,000 copies in the U.S. 
(Varela 2002).  The impact of Orishas came home when the members, two of whom 
culled from the pioneering Havana rap trio Amenaza, returned to Cuba for a series of 
sold-out concerts in December 2000 and January of 2001.  While most local raperos/as as 
mentioned previously are critical of what they view as Orishas’ overtly commercial 
character, many recognize that the group’s commercial success has opened up certain 
doors for them at home as well as abroad.  The extent and consequences of such 
openness, however, remains to be seen.  
 When asked about what she saw as the social significance of Cuban hip hop, 
Susana made the point repeatedly that hip hop in Cuba was a totally different thing – 
“una otra cosa” – in comparison to hip hop in the U.S.  What specifically was she 
implying by this?  She emphasized that raperos/as had begun developing their own style 
of dress, gesture, and textual thematics that reflect a “Cuban” aesthetic and sensibility.  In 
keeping, she seemed to have adopted much of the official discourse developed around hip 
hop including referring to raperos/as in general, non-racial terms as “los jovenes” (the 
youth) whom were contributing to a deepening of understanding of Cuban society, “pero 
en una forma constructiva” (but in a constructive way) within the revolutionary process.  
When I asked her specifically about the racial significance of the movement, she 
responded: “Here in Cuba you can speak about pigmentation (la pimentación), of 
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coloration (de coloración). But you cannot talk about “the races” (la razas).  Because in 
reality we are all mixed.”  I found this response a bit incongruous, if not ingenious, given 
that her previous institutional focus dealt with the topic of “el negro” in Cuban literature.  
She went on to explain that in terms of skin color, yes, the majority of raperos/as are 
darker-skinned but, she emphasized, there are also those “mas claro” (more lighter 
skinned).  I then prodded her a bit by suggesting that race clearly factored into Cuban hip 
hop well beyond simply questions of skin color, pointing out the centrality of  black 
racial identitdad, identity within the movement.  At that she pretty much let the issue rest 
without further comment.  While its quite possible that Susana may have been cautious 
with me as an “outsider” – again, a Yankee at that, her avoidance and then fairly 
unsophisticated negotiations around the racial question was telling.  Such seemed to lend 
some credence to the idea that she was indeed operating not too removed from the role of 
a functionaria by enabling, in an apparently uncritically-engaged way, institutional(izing) 
policy vis-à-vis Cuban hip hip.  
 One the first projects Susana undertook in her capacity as director of La Agencia 
was to accompany Magia and Alexie of Obsesión, and MC Edgar González of Doble Filo 
during a U.S. tour in 2003.  Though the tour was entirely organized and funded by a 
collaboration of progressive Miami and New York-based art organizations and activist,165 
the Ministry of Culture able to negotiate Susana’s inclusion as something of an official 
                                                 
165 The New York contingent was represented by the International Hip Hop Exchange collective 
comprised of a number of hip hop-activists with strong ties to Black August including Nuyorican 
Marinieves Alba as well as performance artist Danny Hoch.   
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state chaperone for the performers.166  This was a marked development in comparison to 
the first tour of Cuban raperos to the U.S. in 2001 when a group of MCs along with Pablo 
and Ariel spent a month in New York City – unaccompanied by any state functionary – 
performing and otherwise engaging in the city’s local hip hop scene.167  It appeared that 
Susana’s inclusion on the 2003 tour was largely about putting an official face in the tour, 
while establishing a new level of institutional coordination of Cuban hip hop as a whole.  
A joke circulating within the Havana community had it, however, that Susana had in fact 
spent most of her time during the tour shopping.  In keeping, La Agencia was not 
necessarily received with open arms by the majority of raperos.   
 While Obsesión as one of the most accomplished rap groups on the island was 
“represented” by La Agencia, many other highly talented and more overtly critically-
postured groups in Havana were not.  During a rather heated discussion during the 2003 
Cuban hip hop colloquium, Zoandris of Hermanos de Causa took the floor to challenge 
what he saw as La Agencia’s exclusionary character – an accusation which carried with it 
a certain anti-socialist charge.  The critique was leveled at Alpidio who had already been 
defending La Agencia given Susana’s conspicuous absence from the colloquium, the first 
one held during her new tenure as director.  Alpidio responded that it was impossible for 
La Agencia to represent all groups, implying that it was ultimately was a question of 
limited resources.  In actually,  Zoandris’s charge was very much reflective of the broader 
                                                 
166 A highlight of the tour was Obsesión and Edgar’s performance Harlem’s Apollo Theater along 
side The Roots among other high-profile “alternative” U.S. hip hop artists.    
167 See Chapter 4.  During the 2001 tour there was, however, one political causality. On rapero 
member of the delegation refused to return to Cuba with the tour.  He later showed up in Miami 
and was quoted in the El Nuevo Herald, the Spanish edition of the Miami Herald, as saying some  
rather unfaltering things about the Cuban government  (Cancio Isla 2001).   
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disillusionment – if not overt distrust – that many within the movement held for the start-
up La Agencia.  Even Magia and Alexei who were among the celebrated “stars” of La 
Agencia soon became highly critical of the office’s workings as well.   
 The truth once again, however, was that the state had the resources that raperos 
desperately needed.  In 2004 La Agencia collaborated with el Instituto de la Música (The 
Institute of Music) in the coordination of a collaborative national tour of tour involving 
Obsesión and Doblo Filo.  If it were not for state institutions of the such these kinds of 
tours would most probably not be able to occur under the present circumstances if only 
for material and resource reasons. Moreover, over the last few years La Agencia, along 
with AHS and Instituto de la Música, has also been involved in organizing a host of hip 
hop shows in various theaters and other venues throughout Havana.  One particularly 
important setting has been the relatively glitzy Café Cantante beneath the Teatro 
Nacional were weekly hip hop concerts were held fairly consistently between 2002 and 
2003.  There DJ Acho, Ariel’s nome du jour, played host with technical support from 
others including Pablo.  Such events have also included a number of concerts devoted 
specifically to the performance of female MCs.  The first of these were held 2002, the 
largest of which occurred during that year’s hip hop festival.  In doing so the state has 
been instrumental in providing space for the emergence of female voices within the 
movement.  Additionally, in 2002 a fairly regular hip hop peña was held at AHS’s 
Havana field-office known as La Madriguera were Ariel once again held court as DJ 
Asho.  Under the auspices of AHS, once more, the annual Cuban hip hop festival grew 
dramatically between 1999 and 2003 from three nights in Alamar to a non-stop, five-day, 
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multi-sited event held throughout the greater Havana area.  Lastly, after years of 
anticipation, the first issue of “Movimiento” – a magazine devoted to Cuban hip hop – 
was released during the 2003 festival.  While institutional funding from the Ministry of 
Culture was coordinated through La Agencia, the issue was completely produced by hip 
hop-affiliated writers, photographers, and graphic designers whom had fairly open 
editorial control over the magazine’s content. 
  
 As these numerous examples testify, through its various institutions the Cuban 
state has greatly expanded the space within which Cuban hip hop has been able to operate 
since 1999.  Only a few years ago completely invisible, raperos/as are now celebrated in 
state-run television and print media as part of Cuba’s broader revolutionary cultural 
repertoire. Such accommodations, however, did not come about through the benevolence 
of state paternalism as some might wish to hold.  Rather, the individuals who make up the 
Cuban hip hop movement have fought long and hard for the recognition, resources, and 
the space to give critical expression to their music, subjectivity, and political voicings.  
Through such efforts raperos/as are contributing to the emergence of new kinds of race-
based political articulation at the level of public discourse as well as within a brewing 
black public sphere.  The Cuban state, in turn, has had to accommodate hip hop and its 
insurgent racial voicings.  In doing so, however, its has attempted to manage if not 
mitigate the effects of such challenges though efforts to institutionalize hip hop within the 
structural and discursive folds of revolutionary national “culture.”  While such endeavors 
may have had their restrictive affects, is its also evident that the Cuban hip hop 
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movement has been able to exploit such openings in order pose critiques and expose 
contradictions in both discursive and material realms of the Cuban everyday.   
 It is yet to be seen, however, what the ultimate consequences of such increased 
revolutionary “national” incorporation will be on the viability of Cuban hip hop as a site 
of alternative racial articulation and politics.  Robin Moore, for instance, has documented 
the ways in which the nueva trova movement of the 1960s and 70s in Cuba was 
transformed from a youth-derived protest music to a prominent component of 
institutionalized music making (Moore 2001).  Much like raperos/as today, trovadoras 
were early products of the Revolution who embraced many of the ideals of socialism 
while critically questioning the extent to which such ideals were being realized in 
revolutionary society.  Moore points out that the Cuban state was not initially receptive to 
such questionings and respond with a period of political intimidation and repression 
directed at a number of the movement’s lead artists including Pablo Milanés and Silvio 
Rodríguez (Moore 2001: 188).  A shift occurred, however, by the early 1970s with the 
establishment of el Movimiento Nacional de la Trova (MNT) under the Ministry of 
Culture which effective institutionalized the nueva trova movement within the state 
apparatus.  While such moves provided trovadoras much needed access to state-
controlled resources such as performance venues, studio time, and distribution networks, 
Moore notes that the new arrangement affected the movement’s political autonomy of 
voice.  Artists’ work was now under tighter scrutiny, beholden to possibilities of losing 
the state’s favor if they did not tread lightly.  As Moore phrases it:  “Established 
trovadores thus walked an ever more delicate line between fidelity to a government that 
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now supported them and fidelity to themselves and their own points of view” (Moore 
2001:192).  
 The question to which the example of nueva trova begs, therefore, is whether 
Cuban hip hop might be faced with similar challenges.  I recall Magia telling me some 
years ago that some had likened hip hop Cubano to the “La nueva nueva trova” (the new 
nueva trova) – an analogy Ariel also picked up on in one of his articles (Fernández 2000).  
Its most likely that none of us at the time was completely aware of the range of 
implications that such an analogy could possible represent.  At the same time, however, 
what is clearly apparent is that hip hop and the Cuban state are engaged in something of 
an on-going dialectic of mutual negotiation in which each seeks to affect the other while 
both are transformed to some extent thought the process.  Such negotiations take place, 
moreover, within the broader context of a shifting (trans-)national landscape; one which 
shapes both actors as well as the contemporary socioeconomic and political imperatives 








 I have throughout this dissertation employed the term “movement” to describe the 
active and evolving character of hip hop in Cuba.  At one level I use the phrase because 
raperos/as themselves refer to the cultural, social, and political space they have forged 
through their music and labors as un movimiento.  Granted, within Cuban Spanish argot 
the term “movimiento” is often used in a more culturalist sense to describe, for example, 
the previously discussed illustration of el movimiento nueva trova.  Such usage is in large 
part juxtaposed to the ways we in the U.S. tend to speak of social and/or political 
“movements” in more formal political terms.  Even in the case of nueva trova there 
clearly was an organic political component to the music in its inception.  For most Cuban 
raperos/as, however, politics remains much at the center of what it is that delineates the 
orientation and thrust of hip hop as a sociocultural phenomenon in Cuba today.  As social 
actors, Cuban MCs define both themselves and their music through such political 
commitments.  And here again it is identity, in particular critically-positioned identities of 
blackness, which serve as the basis for such political articulations.  By identifying 
themselves as un movimiento raperos/as seek at a discursive level to give cohesion and 
form to these race-based assertions and their contestations.   
 In what ways, then, might the example of Cuban hip hop speak to the broader 
contemporary phenomenon of new social movements, particularly as they have emerged 
within the Latin American context?  Clearly, Cuban hip hop shares with many of these 
recent, subalternly-positioned forms of social mobilization the instrumentality of identity 
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as the ground upon which to make and move a politics towards claiming greater rights 
and resources within otherwise exclusionary national settings (Escobar and Alvarez 
1992).  Similar to the rise of both indigenous and black social movements in Latin 
America, the identities articulated and mobilized by raperos/as are done so through the 
language of difference.  While both indigenous and black-oriented social movements 
have tended to evoke – at times strategically – such difference through discourses of 
“cultural” or “ethnic” differentiation vis-à-vis the mestizo nation (Warren 1998; Wade 
1993, 1997; Archa 1998; Perry 1999; Thorne 2004), within the context of Cuban hip hop, 
difference is asserted in explicitly racial terms.  Overt expressions of racial difference 
which have long been superseded, if not effectively silenced, under both pre and post-
1959 nationalist projects are now finding new politicized voice and form through the 
space of Cuban hip hop.  Here, the politics of identity are at the same time “expressive” 
as they are “instrumental” in the sense that hip hop offers a new organizing frame for the 
social constitution of blackness, while simultaneously serving as medium through which 
such blackness can be collectively set in motion (Foweraker 1995).   
 In apparent contrast to much of the new social movement literature which has 
tended to focus on more formally-organized kinds of social mobilization, the racial 
identity politics engendered and deployed through Cuban hip hop are not necessarily 
exercised in such conventional ways.  Rather, it is through performance-based practices 
of cultural production that the politics of identity are realized and acted upon.  As 
opposed to dismissing these efforts as an example of a politically ineffective 
“culturalists” approach to racial politics (Hanchard 1994), its is necessary to recognize 
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the ways that raperos/as are utilizing realms of expressive culture to affect the political 
terms of debate on race in Cuba in ways that may potentially contribute to greater social 
democratization (Dagnino 1998).  Indeed, value-based distinctions traditionally drawn 
between the cultural/discursive and the material/political may analytically obfuscate more 
than they illuminate (Hale 1997, 2004; Wade 1999).  While it is quite possible that the 
challenges that hip hop presents run the risk of being politically neutralized, or at least 
significantly diffused, through their incorporation within the institutional frameworks of 
revolutionary national culture (i.e. Hanchard 1994), it is also quite possible that 
significant numbers of raperos/as may retain a level of critical distance from which to 
continue to advocate and agitate from positions of relative autonomy.  There have indeed 
been recent efforts within some important sectors of the movement to resist on-going 
processes of state incorporation.  Alternative sites and resources outside institutional 
spheres of control have began to emerge, while a number of established groups including 
some, though certainly not all, within the state-run La Agencia de Rap have begun 
distancing themselves from state-involved projects.   
 The insurgent black identity politics that undergird Cuban hip hop, like many 
identity-based frameworks upon which other new social movements have been grounded, 
have emerged in significant part due to the erosion of the hegemonic salience of the 
national-popular project – predicated on ideological variations of mestizaje – which has 
taken place throughout Latin America (Hale 1997).  In the case of Cuba, revolutionary 
socialism’s positing of a homogenized, non-racial national identity of inclusion has been 
significantly undermined by incursions of global capital and their fragmenting and 
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socially differentiating affects.  The utopic, modernist promise of a unified, racially and 
socially egalitarian nation could no longer be supported under the weight of historical 
contradictions exposed and exacerbated by late capitalist transformations.   
 Such processes call to mind scholarship exploring the linkages between neoliberal 
capital expansion and the rise of identity-based social movements (e.g. Harvey 1998), as 
well those that deal more broadly with the constitution of new kinds of neoliberal subject 
formation (e.g. Comaroff and Comaroff 2001).  Drawing on her work with Chinese 
immigrant female garment workers, Lisa Lowe has suggested that while transnational 
capital is currently engendering differentiated forms of exploitation and oppression along 
lines of race and gender, it is paradoxically enabling the formation of new “political” 
subjects who can and do work towards collective social action (Lowe 1997).  For Lowe 
sites of cultural production serves as spaces through which such political subjectivities 
are actively constituted and, moreover, are done in ways that transcend the limits of the 
nation-state itself.  Similar processes, I have argued, have and continue to operate within 
the sociocultural context of contemporary Cuban hip hop.  
 At the same time Charles Hale has suggested that neoliberal reform in Latin 
America has actively encouraged the adoption of multiculturalism as a new form of state 
governance to replace the previous moment’s hegemonic national paradigm of mestizaje 
(Hale 2002, 2004).  While such “neoliberal multiculturalism” may open up space for new 
kinds of political organizing around subaltern locations of difference, Hale argues that 
these developments may also serve the interests of transnational capital by providing a 
premise of greater political rights while enabling further neoliberal restructuring of the 
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socioeconomic landscape.  In a similar vein, others have likened multiculturalism in the 
North to a reformist strategy of neoliberalism which seeks to exploit discourses of 
difference as means of fetishizing and commodifying otherness (Gilroy 2000; San Juan 
2002).  In doing so, E. San Juan has argued, “others” are ultimately consumed back 
within the fold of politically debilitating national hegemonies which (now) deny the 
existence of structural inequalities under a “refurbished  humanist cosmopolitanism” (San 
Juan 2002:7).  
  In the case of Cuba, however, such framings of neoliberalism and its impacts 
have an important caveat.  Unlike most of the “developing” world, Cuba’s still self-
identified socialist leadership has refused to this point to engage in formal contractual 
relationships with international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) – relationships that 
would dictate the conditions of neoliberal restructuring and policy “reforms” that have 
taken hold of much of the hemisphere.  As such, the kind of politically calculated, or at 
least systemically implemented encouragement of a neoliberal multiculturalism to which 
Hale speaks is not as directly applicable in the case of Cuba.  However, it is 
unquestionable that in a much broader sense “the logics” (i.e. Jameson 1991) of 
neoliberal capital expansion and its socially differentiating effects, as mentioned, are very 
much at play within Cuba today.  My discussion of Cuba’s new racialized economy and 
the emergent race-based social strategies and processes of black self-making which have 
arisen largely in response is very much predicated on this analytical assumption.   
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 The question then becomes whether one should heed critics’ cautions about the 
potential political risks of celebratory renderings of black racial difference as in the case 
of Cuban hip hop, without garnering any significant political gains from such moves.  
Here it is clear that the Cuban state has for various reasons both cautiously expanded the 
space for racial articulation (Chapter 6) as well as exploited a new marketability of Cuban 
blackness (Chapter 3) towards its own strategic ends.  And it has done so, moreover, 
largely in response to new socioeconomic imperatives tied to the growing incursion of 
transnational capital within the Cuban national landscape.  As such, Hale, San Juan and 
others’ collective warnings regarding the politically neutralizing tendencies of neoliberal 
multiculturalism may in fact be actively resonant within contemporary Cuba.  In the case 
of Cuba’s racialized sex trade, the sexualized commodification of black bodies for tourist 
consumption might offer the most dramatic expression of what San Juan refers to as a 
reconstitution of social relations through an economy of difference in which “privatized 
sensibilities and sensoriums become the chief organs of consumerist experience.” (San 
Juan 2002:8).  I have argued, however, that even within the logics of this particular 
“economy of blackness” black and darker-skinned Cubans have found ways to exercise 
strategic forms of social agency.    
 Having said this, a very real and immediate challenge facing Cuban hip hop is the 
extent to which its increased commercialization – fed by the same neoliberal processes – 
might further erode the political-directed character and commitments of raperos/as and 
their music.  In contemplating this question it is worth considering the recent example of 
Cubanitos 20-02.  As one of the first groups to be adopted within La Agencia de Rap’s 
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representational roster, Cubanitos 20-02 has become arguably the biggest commercial 
success of domestically-produced hip hop in Cuba.168  Unlike most groups discussed, 
Cubanitos are unapologetically commercial in performance style and lyrical content.  
Emphasizing dance beats and party themes over politics and social critique, the trio 
formed in 2002 have heavily incorporated stylistic elements of reggaeton – the hip 
hop/reggae hybrid genre out of the Spanish Caribbean which has recently swept Cuba.  
The group’s 2002 album was widely popular among Cuban youth, reaching far beyond 
Cuban hip hop’s traditional loyal following thanks largely to their catchy dance rhythms 
and playful lyrics.  Cubanitos, through the coordination of La Agencia, is reported to 
have conducted an international tour during the summer of 2004.  What is additionally 
noteworthy here is that one of the group’s members, DJ Flipper, was originally part of the 
pioneering hip hop group Primera Base discussed in Chapter 4.  To recall, Primera Base 
was one of the first of Cuban groups to articulate a politicized black racial identity.169  
Could this be the way for more raperos/as in the future?  There have in fact been other 
Havana-based artists who have more recently gone the way of commercial reggaeton, a 
development which has contributed to something of a split within the movement between 
more commercial and more politically-minded, aesthetically pure “underground” hip hop 
artists.  
 Cuban hip hop has, however, emerged and continues to persist as a vital site of 
critical black self-making or, as Joao Costa Vargas has suggested in another context, a 
                                                 
168 Again, a distinction needs to be made between locally-produced hip hop and the previously 
discussed example of Orishas which, though unquestionably the most commercially successful in 
international terms, was produced overseas for an international market.  
169 It may also be worth noting that Flipper is one a very few “white” Cuban MCs.  
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space of “black radical becoming” (Costa Vargas 2004).  Beyond the immediate contexts 
of their making, these new historical actors are actively engaged in affecting the frames 
of both national-dominant as well as racially-alternative public spheres of sociopolitical 
articulation.  In so doing Cuban raperos/as must be seen in historical terms as both 
subjects and social agents within Cuba’s shifting terrain of national racial formation.  I 
speak here again of racial formation in the sense that Michael Omi and Howard Winant 
have used the term to describe competing “racial projects” undertaken by social actors, 
inclusive of the state, in the continual making and remaking of racial meaning and 
corresponding structures and relations of power (Omi and Winant 1986).  It is fairly 
evident in this light that the Cuban hip hop movement and the Cuban state are invested in 
advancing distinct kinds of racial projects.  The two, however, are operating within a 
larger set of national and transnational frameworks of power that additionally affect the 
character and dynamics of these processes.   
 The eventual outcome or at least direction that such positioned plays of power 
will take – as with practically everything in Cuba today – remains to be seen.  However, 
what is currently transpiring with Cuban hip hop underscores the potentially 
transformative effect that transnationally-engaged, race-based social strategies have on 
“modern” national formations where the terrain of blackness itself becomes a site of 
social praxis.  Although Paul Gilroy, for one, has lamented that black cultural practices 
and their liberatory impulses are “being transformed beyond recognition by the uneven 
effects of globalization and planetary commerce in blackness” (Gilroy 2000:13), what he 
and others seem to have forgotten is that these same commercially-mediated modes of 
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black expressive culture often retain a capacity to convey oppositionally-positioned racial 
politics across time and space.  These conduits of black transnationalism can be drawn 
upon and redeployed within new contexts of struggle.  Young raperos/as are 
representative of a new generation of Cubans who will soon inherit a rapidly 
transforming Cuba.  Their transnationally-informed positionalities and on-going abilities 








2003 Cubano Be, Cubano Bop: One Hundred Years of Jazz in Cuba. translated by 
 Daniel S. Whitesell. Washington DC: Smithsonian Books.   
 
Aguilar, Luis E.  
1996  [1993] “Cuba, c. 1860 - c. 1930.” in Cuba: A Short History. Leslie Bethell, ed. 
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 21-56.  
 
Aidi, Hisham  
2001  “B-Boys in ‘Les Banlieuses’: Hip Hop Culture in France.” web-article 
 <www.africana.com> 
 
Allen, Ernest Jr.  
1996 “Making the Strong Survive: The Contours and Contradictions of Message Rap.” 
 in Droppin’ Science: Critical Essays on Rap, Music, and Hip Hop Culture. 
 William Eric Perkins, ed. Philadelphia: Temple University Press,  pp.159-191. 
 
Althusser, Louis  
1971 “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus.” in Lenin and Philosophy, and other 
Essays. New Left Books.  
 
Anderson, Benedict 
1991 Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. 
 New York: Verso. 
 
Appadurai, Arjun  
1996  Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. Minneapolis: 
 University of  Minnesota Press.  
 
 
Archa, Jamie  
1998 “Inclusion of Afro-Colombians: Unreachable Goal?”  Latin America Perspectives 
 25(3):70-89.  
 
Arenas, Reinaldo 
1993 Before Night Falls. New York: Viking.  
 
Arrizón, Alicia 
2002 “Race-ing Performativity through Transculturation, Taste and the Mulata Body.” 





1991  “Is There a ‘Neo-Racism’?” in Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities. 
 Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein,  London: Verso. 
 
Balibar, Etienne and Immanuel Wallerstein  
1991 Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities. London: Verso. 
 
Basch, Linda, Nina Glick Schiller, Cristina Szanton Blanc  
1994 Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and 
 Deterritorialized Nation-States. Langhorne, PA.: Gordon and Breach.  
 
Baraka, Amiri (LeRoi Jones)  
1963  Blues People: Negro Music in White America. New York: William Morrow. 
 
Bejel, Emilio 
2001 Gay Cuban Nation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Bennett, Andy  
1999 “Hip Hop am Main: The Localization of Rap Music and Hip Hop Culture.” 
 Media, Culture & Society 21:77-91. 
 
Brock, Lisa and Digna Castañeda Fuertes (et al.) 
1998   Race and Empire: African Americas and Cubans before the Cuban Revolution.  
 Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
 
Brown, Elaine 
1992    A Taste of Power: A Black Woman's Story. New York: Pantheon Books.  
 
Brundenius, Claes  
2002 “Whither the Cuban Economy After Recovery? The Reform Process, Upgrading 
 Strategies and the Question of Transition.” Journal of Latin American Studies 
 34(2):365-396.  
 
Burdick, John  




1990  Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New York: Routledge.  
1993  Bodies That Matter. New York: Routledge. 
 
Cabeza, Amalia Lucía 
 
 309
1998 “Discourses of Prostitution: The Case of Cuba” in Global Sex Workers: Rights, 
 Resistance, and Redefinition. Kamala Kempadoo and Jo Doezema, eds. New 
 York: Routledge. pp. 79-86. 
 
Cagler, Ayse  
1998  “Popular Culture, Marginality and Institutional Incorporation: German-Turkish 
 Rap and Turkish Pop in Berlin.” Cultural Dynamics 10(3):243-262. 
 
Cancio Isla, Wilfredo  
2001 “Rapero De Cuba Se Queda En EU.”  El Nuevo Herald, November 16, 2001 
 
Carr, Barry 
1998   “Identity, Class, and Nation: Black Immigrant Workers, Cuban Communism, and 
 the Sugar Insurgency, 1925-1934.” Hispanic American Historical Review 
 78(1):83-116.  
 
Casal, Lordes 
1979 “Race Relations in Contemporary Cuba.” in The Position of Blacks in Brazilian 
 and Cuban Society, Minority Rights Group Report, 7, pp. 11–27. 
 
Chatterjee, Partha  
1993  Nations and its Fragments: Colonial and Post-Colonial Histories. Princeton: 
 Princeton University Press. 
 
Childs, Matt David  
2001 The Aponte Rebellion of 1812 and the Transformation of Cuban Society: Race, 
 Slavery, and Freedom in the Atlantic World. dissertation thesis. Department 
 of History, University of Texas, Austin.   
 
Comaroff, Jean and John L. Comaroff 
2001 “Millennial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second Coming,” in Millennial 
 Capitalism and the Culture of Neoliberalism, J. Comaroff and J. L. Comaroff, 
 eds. Durham: Duke University Press, pp. 1- 56.  
 
Combahee River Collective   
1986 The Combahee River Collective Statement: Black Feminist Organizing in the 
 Seventies and Eighties. New York: Kitchen Table Women of Color Press.  
 
Comellas, Miguel  
2004 “1.9 Million Visitors in 2003.” Granma International January 11. 2004. 
 
Costa Vargas, João 




2004 “Black Radical Becoming in The African Diaspora: Imagining Beyond The 
 Master’s Tools And Embracing Liberation.” (forthcoming article) 
 
Dagnino, Evelina  
1998 “Culture, Citizenship, and Democracy: Changing Discourses and Practices of the 
 Latin American Left.”  in Cultures of Politics, Politics of Culture: Re-Visioning 
 Latin American Social Movements. Sonia Alvarez, Evelina Dagnino, and Arturo 
 Escobar, eds. Boulder: Westview Press. pp. 33-63.  
 
Daniel, Yvonne 
1995 Rumba: Dance and Social Change in Contemporary Cuba. Bloomington: Indiana 
 University Press.  
 
Darlington, Shasta  
2000  “Brazilian Rappers Speak to the Poor: Popular Duo Launch Recording Career 
 From Notorious San Paulo Prison” The Globe and Mail (Toronto) September 5, 
 2000 p. A10.  
 
Davies, Catherine  
2000 “Surviving (on) the Sup of Signs: Postmodernism, Politics, and Culture in Cuba.” 
 Latin American Perspectives 113 27(4):103-121. 
 
Dawson, Michael C.  
1995  “A Black Counterpublic? Economic Earthquakes, Racial Aganda(s), and Black 
 Politics.” in The Black Public Sphere: A Public Culture Book. Houston Baker Jr. 
 and Michael C. Dawson, eds. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 199-227. 
 
de Albuquergue, Klas  
1998 “In Search of the Big Bamboo: Among Sex Tourists in the Caribbean.” 
 Transitions 8(1): 48-57.  
 
De Genova, Nick  
1995  “Gangster Rap and Nihilism in Black America: Some Questions of Life and 
 Death.” Social Text. 13(2): 89-133 
 
de la Fuente, Alejandro  
1995  “Race and Inequality in Cuba, 1899–1981.” Journal of Contemporary History, 
 30:131–167. 
1998   “Recreating Racism: Race and Discrimination in Cuba’s Special Period.” Cuba 
 Briefing Paper Series 18. Washington, DC: Georgetown University. 
1999   “Myths of Racial Democracy: Cuba, 1900-1912.” Latin American Research 
 Review. 34(3):39-69. 
2001 A Nation for All: Race, Inequality, and Politics in Twentieth-Century Cuba.  




del Barco, Mandalit 
1996 “Rap’s Latin Sabor.” in Dropping Science: Critical Essays on Rap Music and Hip 
 Hop Culture, William Eric Perkins, ed. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
 pp. 63-84. 
 
Diawara, Manthia 
1998 In Search of Africa. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Dilla Alfonso, Haroldo 
2002  “Cuba: The Changing Scenarios of Governability.” Boundary 2 29(3):55-75.  
 
Dominguez, Jorge  
1992 “Cuba Since 1959” in Cuba: A Short History. Leslie Bethel, ed. Cambridge: 
 Cambridge University Press. pp. 95-148.  
 
Du Bois, W.E.B.  
1989  [1903]  The Souls of Black Folk.  New York: Bantam.  
 
Duharte Jiménez, Rafael 
1993   “The 19th Century Black Fear.” in AfroCuba: An Anthology of Cuban Writing on 
 Race,Politics and Culture. Pedro Perez Sarduy and Jean Stubbs, eds. Melbourne: 
 Ocean Press. 
 
Elfein, Dietmar  
1998  “From Krauts with Attitudes to Turks with Attitudes: Some Aspects of Hip-Hop 
 History in Germany.” Popular Music 17(3): 255-65. 
 
Ellis, Keith 
1998  “Nicolás Guillén and Langston Hughes: Convergences and Divergences.” in 
 Between Race and Empire: African Americas and Cubans before the Cuban 
 Revolution. Lisa Brock and Digna Castañeda Fuertes, eds. Philadelphia: Temple 
 University Press. pp. 129-167.   
 
Escobar, Arturo and Sonia Alvarez  
1992  The Making of Social Movements in Latin America: Identity, Strategy, and 
 Democracy, Arturo Escobar and Sonia Alvarez, eds. Boulder, CO: Westview 
 Press. 
 
Featherstone, Mike and Scott Lash 
1995  “Globalization, Modernity and Spatialization of Social Theory: An Introduction.” 
in Global Modernities. Mike Featherstone et al. eds. London: Sage.  
 
Flores, Juan  
 
 312
1994  “Puerto Rican and Proud, Boyee! Rap Roots and Amnesia.” in Microphone 
 Fiends: Youth Music and Youth Culture. Andrew Ross and Tricia Ross, eds., New 
 York: Routledge, pp. 89-98. 
1996  “Puerto Rocks: New York Ricans Stake Their Claim.” in Dropping Science: 
 Critical Essays on Rap Music and Hip Hop Culture, William Eric Perkins, ed. 
 Philadelphia: Temple University Press, pp. 85-105.  
 
Fernandes, Sujatha  
2003a “Fear of a Black Nation: Local Rappers, Transnational Crossings, and State 
 Power in Contemporary Cuba.”  Anthropological Quarterly, 76 (4): 575-608.  
2003b  “Island Paradise, Revolutionary Utopia or Hustler’s Haven? Consumerism and 
 Socialism in Contemporary Cuban Rap.” Journal of Latin American Cultural 
 Studies 12(3).359-375. 
 
Fernández, Ariel  
2000 “¿Poesía Urbana? o la Nueva Trova de los Noventa.” El Caimán Barbudo 296: 4-
 14. 
 
Fernández, Nadine  
1996 “The Color of Love: Young Interracial Couples in Cuba.” Latin American 
 Perspectives. 23 (1): 99-118. 
2001  “The Changing Discourse on Race in Contemporary Cuba.” Qualitative Studies In 
 Education 14(2):117–132.  
 
Fernández Robaina, Tomás 
1993  “The 20th Century Black Question.” in Afrocuba: An Anthology of Cuban Writing 
 on Race, Politics, and Culture. Pedro Pérez Sarduy, and Jean Stubbs, eds. 
 Melbourne: Ocean Press. pp. 92-105.  
1990 El negro en Cuba, 1902-1958: Apuntes para la historia de la lucha contra la 
 discriminación racial. Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales.  
1998 “Marcus Garvey in Cuba: Urrutia, Cubans, and Black Nationalism.” in Between 
 Race and Empire: African Americas and Cubans before the Cuban Revolution. 
 Lias Brock and Digna Castañeda Fuertes, eds. Philidelphia: Temple University 
 Press., pp. 120-28. 




1998a “The Silencing of Patriots: Race and Nationalism in Marti’s Cuba.” in Jeffrey 
 Grant Belnap and Raul A Fernández, eds. Jose Marti's "Our America": From 
 National to Hemispheric Cultural Studies, pp. 228-249.  
1998b “Rustic Men, Civilized Nation: Race, Culture, and Contention on the Eve of 
 Cuban Independence.” The Hispanic American Historical Review. 78(4):663-668.   
 
 313
1999 Insurgent Cuba: Race, Nation, and Revolution, 1868-1898. Chapel Hill: 
 University of North Carolina Press. 
 
Foucault, Michel  
1977 Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Vintage.   
 
Foweraker, Joe 
1995  Theorizing Social Movements. London: Pluto Press. 
 
Fraginals Manuel 
1978 EL ingenio. Editorial Ciencias Sociales, La Habana, Cuba.  
 
Furé, Rogelio Martinez  
2000  “Homogenizing Monomania and the Plural Heritage.” in Afro-Cuban Voices: On 
 Race and Identity in Contemporary Cuba.  Pedro Perez Sarduy and Jean Stubbs, 
 eds. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, pp. 154-161 
 
Fusco, Coco 
1992 “Pan-American Postnationalism: Another World Order.” in Black Popular 
Culture, Gina Dent, ed. Seattle: Bay Press. pp. 279-283.   
1998 “Hustling for Dollars: Jineterismo in Cuba.” in Global Sex Workers: Rights, 
 Resistance, and Redefinition. Kamala Kempadoo and Jo Doezema, eds. New 
 York: Routledge, pp. 151-166.  
 
Garofalo, Reebee  
1993  “Whose World, What Beat? The Transnational Music Industry, Identity, and 
 Cultural Imperialism.” The World of Music: Journal of the International Institute 
 for Traditional Music 35(2):16-32. 
 
Gilroy, Paul  
1987  There Ain’t No Black in The Union Jack: The Cultural Politics of Race and 
Nation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
1993a  Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness. Cambridge:  Harvard 
University Press. 
1993b  Small Acts: Thoughts on the Politics of Black Cultures. London: Serpent’s Tail.  
2000 Against Race: Imagining Political Culture Beyond the Color Line. Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press.  
 
Godreau, Isar  
2002 “Changing Space, Making Race: Distance, Nostalgia, and the Folklorization of 
 Blackness in Puerto Rico.” Identities 9:281-304. 
 
Gordon, Edmund T. and Mark Anderson  
 
 314
1999  “The African Diaspora: Towards an Ethnography of Diasporic Identification.” 
 Journal of America Folklore 112(445):282-296. 
 
Guridy, Frank 
2003 “From Solidarity to Cross-Fertilization: Afro-Cuban/African American 
 Interaction during the 1930s and 1940s.” Radical History Review 87(1):19-48. 
 
Guevara, Nancy  
1996 “Women Writti’ Rappin’ Breakin’.” in Microphone Fiends: Youth Music and 
 Youth  Culture. Andrew Ross and Tricia Rose, eds. New York: Routledge, pp. 
 49-62. 
 
Hagedorn, Katherine  
2001  Divine Utterances: The Performance of Afro-Cuban Santería. Washington D.C.: 
 Smithsonian Institution Press.  
 
Hale, Charles R. 
1997 “Cultural Politics of Identity in Latin America.” Annual Review of Anthropology 
 26:567-90.  
2002 “Does Multiculturalism Menace? Governance, Cultural Rights and the Politics of 
 Identity in Guatemala.” Journal of Latin American Studies 34:485-524.  
2004 “Rethinking Indigenous Politics in the Ear of the ‘Indio Permitido’.” NACLA 
 Report on the Americas 38(2):16-21. 
 
Hall, Stuart  
1986 “Gramsci’s Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity.” Journal of 
 Communication Inquiry 10(2):5–27. 
1992 “What is this Black in Black Popular Culture?” in Black Popular Culture. Gina 
 Dent, ed. Seattle: Bay Press. pp. 21-33.  
1996 “Who Needs Identity?” in Questions of Cultural Identity. Stuart Hall and Paul Du 
 Gay, eds. London: Sage Publications, pp. 1-17. 
 
Hammond, Jack 
1999  “The High Cost Of Dollars.” NACLA Report on the Americas 32(5):24-5.   
 
Hanchard, Michael 
1994  Orpheus and Power: The Movimento Negro in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, 
 Brazil,  1945-1988. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
1995  “Black Cinderella?: Race and the Public Sphere in Brazil.” in The Black Public 
 Sphere: A Public Culture Book. Houston Baker Jr. and Michael C. Dawson, eds. 
 Chicago: University of Chicago Press,  pp. 165-185.   
1999 “Afro-Modernity: Temporality, Politics, and the African Diaspora.” Public 





1996     Transnational Connections: Culture, People, Places. New York: Routledge.  
 
Hansing, Katrin 
2001 “Rasta, Race and Revolution: Transnational Connections in Socialist Cuba”  
 Journal for Ethnic and Migration Studies 27(4): 32-47.  
 
Harvey, David 
1989   The Condition of Postmodernity: An Inquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change. 
 Cambridge: Blackwell. 
 
Harvey, Neil  
1998  The Chiapas Rebellion and the Struggle for Land and Democracy. Durham: Duke 
 University Press.  
 
Hebdige, Dick 
1988  [1979] Subcultures: The Meaning of Style. New York: Comedia - Routledge.  
1987 Cut ‘n’ Mix: Culture, Identity and Caribbean Music. London: Comedia. 
 
Helg, Aline  
1995 Our Rightful Share: The Afro-Cuban Struggle for Equality, 1886–1912. Chapel 
 Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
 
Hernandez-Reguant, Ariana   
2004 “Blackness with a Cuban Beat.” NACLA Report on the Americas 8(2):31-36. 
 
Hernandez Rodriguez, Rafael 
2003  Looking at Cuba: Essays on Culture and Civil Society. translated by Dick Cluster.  
 Gainesville: University Press of Florida.  
 
Herskovits, Melville J. 
1938  Acculturation: The Study of Culture Contact. New York : J. J. Augustin.  
 
Hidalgo, Vilma and Milagros Martinez 
2000 “Is the U.S. Economic Embargo on Cuba Morally Defensible?” Logos 3(4):100-
 120. 
 
Hoch, Danny  
1999  “La Revolución Embraces Hip-Hop with Fidel’s Blessing.”  Village Voice,  
 October 5, 1999, p. 194.  
 
Hodge, G. Derrick  
2001 "Colonization of the Cuban Body: The Growth of Male Sex Work in Havana," 





2001 “Rapero de Cuba se queda en EU.”  El Nuevo Herald, November 16, 2001, 
 p.18A. 
 
Jamail, Milton  
2000  Full Count: Inside Cuban Baseball. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University 
 Press.  
 
Jameson, Fredric  
1991  “The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism.” in Postmodernism or The Cultural 
 Logic of Late Capitalism. Durham: Duke University Press, pp. 1-54.   
 
Jatar-Hausmann, Ana Julia 
1999 The Cuban Way: Capitalism, Communism, and Confrontation. West Hartford, 
 CT: Kumarian Press.   
 
Joseph, P. E  
2002 “Where Blackness is Bright? Cuba, Africa and Black Liberation During the Age 
 of Civil Rights.”  New Formations. 45: 111-124. 
 
Kelley, Robin  
1996  “Kickin’ Reality, Kickin Ballistics: Gansta Rap and Postindustrial Los Angeles” 
 in Droppin’ Science: Critical Essays on Rap, Music, and Hip Hop Culture. 
 William Eric Perkins, ed. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, pp. 117-158.  
1997  Yo’ Mama’s Disfunktional!: Fighting the Culture Wars in Urban America. 
 Boston: Beacon Press. 
 
Kamala Kempadoo, ed 
1999 Sun, Sex, and Gold: Tourism and Sex Work in the Caribbean. Lanham, MD: 
 Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.  
 
Krims, Adam  
2000  Rap Music and The Poetics of Identity. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Kritzman Lawrence  
2000  “Identity Crisis: France, Culture, and the Idea of the Nation” in French Cultural 
 Studies: Criticism at the Crossroads. Marie-Pierre Le Hir and Dana Strand, eds. 
 State University of New York Press. pp. 11 -27. 
 
Kutzinski, Vera 
1993  Sugar's Secrets: Race and the Erotics of Cuban Nationalism. Charlottesville: 




Lavie, Smadar and Ted Swedenburg, eds.  
1996 Displacement, Diaspora, and Geographies of Identity. Durham: Duke University 
 Press.  
 
Leeds, Jeff  
2000  “Speaking in Tongues: Rap Music in Korea and Polish? As the Hip-Hop Culture 
 Explodes Worldwide Record Label Def Jam is Leading the Race to Capitalized on 
 the Phenomenon.” Los Angeles Times December 17, 2000, p. C-1.     
 
Lemelle, Sydney J. and Robin Kelley  
1994 “Imagining Home: Pan-Africanism Revisited” in Imaging Home: Class, Culture 
and Nationalsim in the African Diaspora.  Sydney J. Lemelle and Robin Kelley, 
eds. New York: Verso. pp. 1-16.  
 
Leogrande, William and Julie Tomas  
2002 “Cuba’s Quest for Economic Independence.” Journal of Latin American Studies 
 34(2):325-363.  
 
Lowe, Lisa 
1997 “Work, Immigration, Gender: New Subjects of Cultural Politics.” in The Politics 
 of Culture in the Shadow of Capital. Lisa Lowe and David Lloyd, eds. Durham, 
 NC: Duke University Press. pp. 354-374.  
 
Lowe, Lisa and David Lloyd.  
1997 The Politics of Culture in the Shadow of Capital. Lisa Lowe and David Lloyd, 
 eds. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.  
 
Lipsitz, George  
1994 Dangerous Crossroads: Popular Music, Postmodernism, and the Politics of 
 Place. New York: Verso Press. 
 
Lorde, Audrey 
1984  Sister Outsider: Essay and Speeches. Freedom, CA: The Crossing Press.  
 
Lumsden, Ian 
1996 Machos, Maricones, and Gays: Cuba and Homosexuality. Philadelphia: Temple 
 University Press. 
 
Magaldi, Cristina  
1999  “Adopting Imports: New Images and Alliances in Brazilian Popular Music of 





1989  [1974] Marriage, Class and Colour in Nineteenth-Century Cuba. A study of 
 Racial Attitudes and Sexual Values in a Slave Society. Ann Arbor: University of 
 Michigan Press.  
 
Martínez-Echazábal, Lourde 
1998  “Mestizaje and the Discourse of National/Cultural Identity in Latin America, 
 1845-1959.” Latin American Perspectives, issue 100, 25(3):22-42.  
 
Masferrer, M. and C. Mesa Lago 
1974 “The Gradual Integration of the Black in Cuba Under the Colony, the Republic, 
 and the Revolution.” in Slavery and Race Relations in Latin America. R. Toplin, 
 ed. Westport: Greenwood Press. pp. 348-84. 
 
Mateo, David  
2003 “No Todos Los Negros Tomandos Café.” La Gaceta de Cuba (mayo-junio): La 
 Habana: Ediciones Unión. pp. 22-26.  
 
McDaniles, Andrea  
1999  “Striking Cord With Youths, Brazil Rappers Nudge Reform” The Christian 
 Science Monitor January 11, 1999, p. 7. 
 
McGarrity, Gayle and Osvaldo Cárdenas  
1995 “Cuba.” in No Longer Invisible: Afro-Latin Americans Today. London: The 
 Miniority Rights Group. pp. 77-107.  
 
McLaren, Peter  
1995  “Gangsta Pedagogy and Ghettoethnicity: The Hip Hop Nation as a Counterpublic 
 Sphere.” Socialist Review 25(2):9-57.  
 
McNay, Lois 
1994 Foucault: A Critical Introduction. Cambridge, U.K. Polity Press.  
 
Mintz, Sidney  
1985 Sweetness And Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History. New York: 
 Viking.  
 
Mitchell, Tony  
1996  Popular Music and Local Identity: Rock, Pop, and Rap in Europe and Oceania. 
 London: Leicester University Press. 
 
Mitchell, Tony et al. 
2001  Global Noise: Rap and Hip Hop Outside the USA. Tony Mitchell, ed. 





1993  “Race and Nation.” in Afrocuba: An Anthology of Cuban Writing on Race, 
 Politics, and Culture. Pedro Pérez Sarduy, and Jean Stubbs, eds. Melbourne: 
 Ocean Press, pp. 227- 237. 
 
Moore, Carlos  
1988  Castro, the Blacks, and Africa. Los Angeles: Center for Afro-American Studies, 
Center for Afro-American Studies, UCLA.  
 
Moore, Robin 
1994  “Representations of Afro-Cuban Expressive Culture in the Writings of Fernando 
Ortiz.” Latin American Music Review 15(2):32-54.  
1997  Nationalizing Blackness: Afro-Cubanismo and Artistic Revolution in Havana, 
 1920-1940. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
2001 “From the Canción de Protesta to the Nueva Trova, 1965-85.” International 
Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education 14(2):177-200.  
 
Nassy Brown, Jacqueline  
1998  “Black Liverpool, Black America, and the Gendering of Diasporic Space.” 
 Cultural Anthropology 13(3):291-325. 
 
O’Connell Davidson, Julia  
1996 “Sex Tourism in Cuba.” Race and Class  38(1):39-48. 
 
Omi, Michael and Howard Winant 
1986 Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960’s to the 1980’s. New York: 
 Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
 
Olavarria Margot  
2002  “Rap and Revolution: Hop Hop Comes to Cuba.” NACLA Report on the Americas 
 35(6):28-30.  
 
Ong, Aihwa 
1999 Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality. Durham: Duke 
 University Press. 
 
Ortiz, Fernando 
1973  [1906]  Los negros brujos. Reprint of second edition. Miami: Ediciones 
 Universal. 
1963 [1940] Contrapunteo cubano del tabaco y el azúcar. La Habana: Direccion de 
 publicaciones Universidad Central de las villas. 
 
Palmie, Stephan  
 
 320
2002 Wizards and Scientists: Explorations in Afro-Cuban Modernity and Tradition. 
 Durham, NC: Duke University Press.  
 
Paquette, Robert L.  
1988  Sugar is Made with Blood: The Conspiracy of La Escalera and the Conflict 
 Between Empires Over Slavery in Cuba. Middletown: Wesleyan University  
 Press.  
 
Parker, Dick 
1999  “The Cuban Revolution: Resilience and Uncertainty.” NACLA Report on the 
 Americas  32(5):17-20.  
 
Pérez, Louis  
1988   Cuba Between Reform and Revolution. New York: Oxford University Press.  
1999 On Becoming Cuban: Identity, Nationality, and Culture. Chapel Hill: University 
 of North Carolina Press. 
 
Pérez Sarduy, Pedro and Jean Stubbs, eds. 
2000 Afro-Cuban Voices: On Race and Identity in Contemporary Cuba. Gainesville: 
 University Press of Florida.  
 
Perry, Marc D.  
1999 Garifuna Youth in New York City: Race, Ethnicity, and the Performance of 
 Diasporic Identities. MA Thesis, Department of Anthropology, University of 
 Texas, Austin.  
 
Pacini Hernández, Deborah and Reeebee Garofalo  
2000  “Hip Hop in Havana: Rap. Race, and National Identity in Contemporary Cuba.” 
 Journal of Popular Music Studies 11/12:18-47. 
 
Phillips, Joan 
1998 “Tourism-Oriented Prostitution in Barbados: The Case of the Beach Boy and the 
 White Female Tourist.” in  Sun, Sex, and Gold: Tourism and Sex Work in the 
 Caribbean. Kamala Kempadoo ed., Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 
 Publishers. pp.183-200.  
 
Potter, Russell  
1995  Spectacular Vernaculars: Hip Hop and the Politics of Postmodernism. Albany: 
 State University of New York Press. 
 
Pough, Gwendolyn D 
2004 Check It While I Wreck It: Black Womanhood, Hip Hop Culture, and the Public 




Prévos, André  
1996  “The Evolution of French Rap Music and Hip Hop Culture in the 1980s and 
 1990s.” The French Review 69(5):713-725.  
1998 “Hip-Hop, Rap, and Repression in France and the United States.” Popular Music 
 and Society 22(2):67-84. 
 
Reitan, Ruth  
1999  The Rise and Decline of an Alliance: Cuban and African American Leaders in the 
 1960s.  East Lansing: Michigan State University Press.  
 
Ring, Harry 
1961 How Cuba Uprooted Race Discrimination. New York: Pioneer Publishers. 
 
Rivera, Raquel  
2003  New York Ricans From the Hip Hop Zone. New York: Palgrave. 
 
Rosaldo, Renato 
1989  “Imperialist Nostalgia.” Representations 26:107-122.  
 
Robinson, Eugene 
2002 “The Rap Revolución.” Washington Post, Sunday, April 14, 2002, G01 
 
Rose, Mike 
2001 Edmonton Sun, Wednesday, June 28, 2001  
 
Rose, Tricia  
1994 Black Noise. Hanover: Wesleyan University Press. 
 
Rosello, Mireille  
2000  “Rap Music and French Cultural Studies.” in French Cultural Studies: Criticism 
 at the Crossroads. Marie-Pierre Le Hir and Dana Strand, eds. State University of 
 New York Press. pp. 81-102. 
 
Ross, Andrew  
1994  “Introduction.” in Microphone Fiends: Youth Music and Youth Culture. Andrew 
 Ross and Tricia Rose, eds. New York: Routledge, pp1-16.  
 
Rouse, Roger  
1991  “Mexican Migration and the Social Space of Postmodernism.” Diaspora (1):8-
 23.  
 
Safa, Helen 
1998 “Introduction.” in Race and National Identity in the Americas, Latin American 




San Juan, E.  
2002 Racism and Cultural Studies: Critiques of Multiculturalist Ideology and The 
 Politics of Difference. Durham, NC : Duke University Press. 
 
Sansone, Livio  
1997 “New Blacks from Bahia: Local and Global Afro-Bahia.” Identities 3(4):457-494. 




1997 Pleasure Island: Tourism and Temptation in Cuba. Lincoln: University of 
 Nebraska Press.  
 
Segal, Ronald 
1995 The Black Diaspora. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
 
Selier Crespo, Yesenia 
2002  “Identidad Racial de Gente Sin Historia.” Caminos 24/25. Centro de Memoria 
 Martin  Lurther King. Habana.   
 
Serviat, Pedro 
1986 El problema negro en Cuba y su solución definitiva. Havana: Editora Política.   
 
Shnookal, Debora and Mirtha Muñez. eds.  
1999  José Martí Reader: Writings on the Americas. New  York: Ocean Press.  
 
Smith, Anthony 
1991 National Identities. Reno, Nevada: University of Nevada Press. 
 
Smith, Shawnee 
1998 “Words & Deeds: Cuban Hip-Hop Starts To Come Into Its Own.” Billboard 
 September 19, 1998. 
 
Sokol, Brett  
2000 “Rap Takes Root Where Free Expression is Risky” New York Times, September 
 3, 2000.  
 
Stutzman, Ronald 
1981  “El Mestizaje: An All-Inclusive Ideology of Exclusion.” in Cultural 
 Transformations and Ethnicity in Modern Ecuador. Norman Whitten and Arlene 





Swedenburg, Ted  
2001  “Islamic Hip-Hop vs. Islamaphobia: Aki Nawaz, Natacha Atlas, Akhenaton.” in 
 Global Noise: Rap and Hip-hop Outside the USA, Tony Mitchell, ed. 
 Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press. pp. 57-84. 
 
Thomas, Hugh 
1996  [1993] “Cuba, c. 1750 - c. 1860.”  in Cuba: A Short History. Leslie Bethell, ed. 
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Thorne, Eva  
2004  “Land Rights and Garifuna Identity.” NACLA Report on the Americas 38(2):21-
 25  
 
Ullestad, Neal  
1999  “American Indian Rap and Reggae: Dancing to the Beat of a Different 
 Drummer.” Popular Music and Society 23(2):62-91.  
 
Varela, Jesse   
2002 “Orishas Emigrante – Reseña.” Latin Beat Magazine September 2002. 
 
Vasconcelos, José  
1979 [1925]  The Cosmic Race/La raza cósmica. Didien T. Jaén, ed. Los Angeles: 
 Pace.  
 
Verán, Cristina 
1998 “¡Viva la rap revolución!”  The Source (January 1989). pp. 132-140.  
 
Wade, Peter 
1993 Blackness and Race Mixture: The Dynamics of Racial Identity in Columbia. 
 Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
1997 Race and Ethnicity in Latin America. Chicago: Pluto Press. 
1999 “Working Culture: Making Cultural Identities in Cali, Columbia.” Current 
 Anthropology 40(4):449-471.  
 
Warren, Kay   
1998 Indigenous Movements and their Critics: Pan-Maya Activism in Guatemala. 
 Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
 
Williams, Claudette  
2000 Charcoal & Cinnamon: The Politics of Color in Spanish Caribbean Literature. 
 Gainesville: University Press of Florida. 
 
Williams, Raymond.  




Winant, Howard  
1994 Racial Conditions. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Windance Twine, Frances 
1998  Racism in a Racial Democracy: the Maintenance of White Supremacy in Brazil. 
 New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. 
 
West-Durán  
2004  “Rap’s Diasporic Dialogues: Cuba’s Redefinition of Blackness.” Journal of 
 Popular Music Studies 16(1)1: 4-38. 
 
West, Cornell 
1990  “The New Cultural Politics of Difference.” in Out There: Marginalization and 




Other sources:  
 
Behar, Ruth   
1999 Panel Presentation as participant in  “Complex Relations: Contemporary Art in 
 Cuba.” Austin Museum of Art, Austin, Texas. September 25, 1999.   
 
Associated Press, July 4 2001 
 




Web sources:  
 
Faber, Jörg 
 “Cape Town's Hip Hop Scene.” Ntama - Journal of African Music and Popular 
 Culture, Mainz University. <http://ntama.uni-mainz.de/hiphop/faber/>  
 
Matienzo, María  
2004 “Así lo dicen sus textos” La Jiribilla. <http://www.lajiribilla.cu/2004/ 
 n170_08/170_23.html> 
 
Watrous, Peter  
1997 “Eye of the Storm: The Artist and Cuba's Music Industry.” Descarga Newsletter, 

















 Marc David Perry was born in New York City on February 6,1967 to Morton 
Orville Perry and Margie Francis Ribner Perry.  After graduating from New Lincoln high 
school in Manhattan, he attended Vassar College in Poughkeepsie, New York where he 
graduated in 1989 with a B.A. in Africana Studies. Upon graduation he worked for a year 
as a New York City Urban Fellow with the New York City Department of Juvenile 
Justice. After completion he traveled to East Africa and spent a year-and-a half working 
in Kenya and South Africa. Upon returning to the U.S. he worked for five years in 
documentary film and educational television production.  In 1996 he entered graduate 
studies in the African Diaspora Program in the Department of Anthropology at the 
University of Texas at Austin.  
 
 
Permanent Address: 160 W. 97 Street, apt # 7L, New York, NY 10025 
 
This dissertation was typed by the author  
 
 
